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IL SICILIAN JOURNAL
DI
LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK
(1812-1814)

TESI DI DOTTORATO

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Introduzione

Il presente lavoro mira a far luce su un personaggio complesso e abbastanza discusso, il ministro plenipotenziario inglese Lord William Bentinck, attraverso l'analisi delle pagine del suo Sicilian Journal, il diario ancora inedito che scrisse negli anni di permanenza in Sicilia (1812-1814), attualmente conservato, insieme ad altri numerosissimi documenti dello stesso, relativi non solo a quegli anni (7000 circa) ma a tutta la sua carriera diplomatica e militare, presso l'archivio della Nottingham University Library (UK), quale lascito dei duchi di Portland, eredi di Bentinck. Si prenderanno in considerazione anche alcune lettere rinvenute durante la ricerca, anche queste inedite, rivolte a Bentinck, scritte dall'abate Paolo Balsamo, personaggio di spicco della intelligentsia siciliana di quegli anni.

Lord Bentinck, comandante delle forze inglesi nel Mediterraneo prima (e delle forze congiunte anglo-siciliane, in seguito) nonché ministro plenipotenziario alla corte siciliana, fu inviato in Sicilia dalla corona britannica nell'ultima fase -la più critica- del cosiddetto decennio inglese (1806-1815), allorquando la Gran Bretagna decise di intervenire a difesa dei Borbone costretti a lasciare Napoli ai francesi e trovare rifugio nell'isola tricuspidale, sotto la protezione (militare oltre che economica) dell'esercito inglese nel Mediterraneo. Poco da aggiungere sulle motivazioni che spinsero l'Inghilterra ad intervenire in Sicilia: alla base, questo è chiaro, motivi di carattere economico, strategico e culturale.

Ha inizio così il "virtual protectorate" conosciuto come decennio inglese (1806-1815), «periodo in cui le vicende dell'Inghilterra e della Sicilia sono state più strettamente congiunte che in ogni altra epoca della loro storia [...]».

Si trattò, ovviamente di relazioni che ebbero un peso ben diverso nel destino dei due paesi: ch  se per la Sicilia l'occupazione inglese   legata a momenti fondamentali della sua storia sociale e politica, di decisiva importanza anche per le successive vicende risorgimentali, assai minor peso potevano avere quegli episodi per l'Inghilterra, impegnata nella gigantesca lotta contro il sistema napoleonico»¹. Frutto legislativo di quegli anni fu la costituzione del 1812.

Numerosi e divergenti sono i contributi di molteplici studiosi contemporanei circa la presenza della Gran Bretagna nella Sicilia dei primissimi anni dell'Ottocento e la successiva redazione della Costituzione siciliana del 1812.

¹ R. ROMEO, Recensione al testo di J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck and the British occupation of Sicily*, in «The Journal of Modern History», vol. 30, n. 2, 1958, pp. 145-147.

L'opera che si «conferma uno dei grandi libri che la storiografia italiana ha prodotto nel secolo né solo per il vigore della scrittura, la vastità della ricerca, l'importanza dei risultati, ma soprattutto per la genialità dell'interpretazione»² è *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia* di Rosario Romeo, definita da Giuseppe Giarrizzo «opera fondativa di un indirizzo»³. Fosse solo per l'aver riconosciuto nella Sicilia dell'epoca una sorta di giacobinismo isolano che la liberasse dalla consueta erronea formula della “Sicilia lieta di non aver conosciuto la Rivoluzione francese” le cui idee, invece, penetrarono laddove «andava

² G. GIARRIZZO, *1812: Sicilia inglese?*, in A. ROMANO (a cura di), *Il modello costituzionale inglese e la sua recezione nell'area mediterranea tra la fine del 700 e la prima metà dell'800. Atti del seminario internazionale di studi in onore di Francisco Tomas Y Valiente* (Messina, 14-16 novembre 1996), Milano 1988.

³ G. GIARRIZZO *Rosario Romeo e «Il Risorgimento in Sicilia»* in S. BOTTARI (a cura di), *Rosario Romeo e «Il Risorgimento in Sicilia»: bilancio storiografico e prospettive di ricerca*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 2002.

formandosi una nuova classe media di proprietari terrieri: era perlopiù da questa classe che provenivano i pochi giacobini degli anni 1790 e i leaders del futuro movimento democratico del 1813»⁴. E non solo: «avanza con la borghesia delle professioni un ceto dirigente (avvocati, notai, medici) che già controlla il potere locale e opera per differenziare socialmente il ceto rurale, mentre ne politicizza i gruppi interessati alla questione demaniale»⁵. Lo stesso Giarrizzo, a tal proposito, ci dà conferma che “l’iniziativa politica tra il 1812 e il 1813 è dei democratici e non già del partito inglese che pur dispone di adesioni borghesi”⁶.

⁴ R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, Laterza, Roma Bari 1950.

⁵ G. GIARRIZZO, *1812: Sicilia inglese?*, cit.

⁶ Ivi, p. 64.

Romeo, dunque, funge da spartiacque nell'ambito della storiografia del risorgimento isolano e proprio dagli anni '50 si fa luce in modo differente. Fino a quel momento, per oltre un secolo, sebbene «esisteva già una robusta impostazione storiografica, che Romeo poteva riprendere»⁷ - ci si riferisce, per dirla con sue parole, sia a «lavori dei contemporanei, (...) taluni scritti di uomini più avanzati del movimento costituzionale» quali Balsamo⁸, Palmeri⁹, Aceto¹⁰ e Paternò Castello¹¹, sia a studi condotti da contemporanei¹² -, la

⁷ M D'ANGELO, *Romeo e la Sicilia inglese*, in S. BOTTARI, *Rosario Romeo e il Risorgimento...*, cit., p 144.

⁸ P. BALSAMO, *Sulla Istoria moderna del Regno di Sicilia. Memorie segrete (1816)*, Palermo 1848.

⁹ N. PALMERI, *Saggio storico e politico sulla costituzione del Regno di Sicilia infino al 1816*, Lausanne 1848.

¹⁰G. ACETO, *Della Sicilia e dei suoi rapporti con l'Inghilterra nell'epoca della Costituzione del 1812*, Palermo 1848.

presenza inglese in Sicilia necessitava ancora di «una prospettiva innovativa, rettificando antichi stereotipi e allargando il campo anche alle ricerche degli studiosi inglesi»¹³. Nel riconsiderare dunque i rapporti tra Sicilia e Gran Bretagna negli anni che precedettero la Costituzione siciliana del '12, che

¹¹ F. PATERNO' CASTELLO, *Saggio storico politico sulla Sicilia dal cominciamento del secolo XIX sino al 1830*, Catania 1848.

¹² Per gli studi sulla Sicilia inglese prima del 1950 si vedano le ricerche condotte da G. BIANCO, *La Sicilia durante l'occupazione inglese (1806-1815)*, Reber, Palermo 1902; F. GUARDIONE, *Il Risorgimento italiano: la Costituzione del 1812 in Sicilia* in «Rivista d'Italia», Roma 1912; N. NICEFORO, E. DEL CERTO, *La Sicilia e la Costituzione del 1812* in «Archivio Storico Siciliano», Palermo 1913, 1914, 1915, 1917, 1922, 1924, 1925; H. M. LACKLAND, *The failure of the Constitutional Experiment in Sicily 1813-14*, in «The English Historical Review», Oxford 1926; V. TITONE, *La costituzione del 1812 e l'occupazione inglese della Sicilia*, Cappelli, Bologna 1936; E. PONTIERI, *Il tramonto del baronaggio siciliano*, Sansoni, Firenze 1943, L. TOMEUCCI, *Il tramonto della nazione siciliana. La Sicilia e i Borboni (1806-1816)*, Ferrara, Messina 1949.

¹³ M. D'ANGELO, *Romeo e la Sicilia inglese*, in S. BOTTARI, cit., p.144.

considerava «il momento originario, sul piano politico del Risorgimento isolano»¹⁴ «Romeo sgombrava il campo da quelli stereotipi politici, culturali e storiografici che in quasi un secolo e mezzo si erano cristallizzati sui due termini di occupazione inglese e tradimento»¹⁵ da parte del governo inglese nei confronti delle speranze dei siciliani, una volta esauritasi la fase costituzionale.

In seguito a Romeo, un nuovo filone di ricerche si è aperto, analizzando la relazione economica tra Sicilia e Gran Bretagna. La presenza inglese sull'isola e i suoi riflessi sull'economia siciliana sono state, infatti, oggetto di studio a partire dagli anni '70, quando il ritrovamento della corrispondenza commerciale della ditta Ingham e di altri inglesi in Sicilia, mossi dalla ricerca

¹⁴ R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento...*, cit., pp 120-121.

¹⁵ M. D'ANGELO, *Romeo e la Sicilia inglese* in S. BOTTARI, cit., p.145.

e dagli studi storiografici precedenti, hanno avuto un impulso decisivo, testimoniando come la Sicilia stesse assumendo sempre più il ruolo di potenziale risorsa commerciale e militare nei rapporti con la Gran Bretagna imponendosi, in quella congiuntura, come primaria e, in fondo, obbligata alternativa, riproponendo il problema della stessa regolamentazione dei rapporti tra i due regni¹⁶. In particolare «il decennio 1806-1815 rappresentò una svolta significativa collegando Sicilia e Gran Bretagna in un tessuto di rapporti non solo politici ma, anche economici, sociali e culturali perduranti

¹⁶ Cfr. M. D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia (1806-1815)*, Giuffrè, Milano 1988. Inoltre cfr. R. BATTAGLIA, *Considerazioni conclusive sugli Inglesi e la Sicilia negli esiti dei seminari su Ingham e i Whitaker*, in R. LENTINI e P. SILVESTRI (a cura di) «Atti del seminario di studio: I Whitaker di villa amalfitano », pubblicato dalla fondazione Giuseppe Whitaker con il patrocinio dell'Assessorato dei beni culturali, ambientali e della pubblica istruzione della Regione Sicilia, dicembre 1995.

molto dopo l'Unità»¹⁷. «E' a partire dal 1806, con l'arrivo degli inglesi, che il commercio registra un'improvvisa accelerazione che ne muta dimensioni e caratteristiche. Gli inglesi, infatti, si rivolsero sempre più al mercato siciliano per il rifornimento delle truppe e della flotta dislocata nel Mediterraneo»¹⁸ oltre che, più avanti, «come tappa di carico prima di intraprendere la rotta atlantica che li porterà in Sud America»¹⁹ Così «la Sicilia borbonica, al pari di Malta, divenne per gli Inglesi non solo base militare di importanza strategica nel Mediterraneo -soprattutto dopo l'introduzione del "Blocco Continentale" imposto da Napoleone per limitare e penalizzare le attività mercantili della

¹⁷ R. BATTAGLIA, *Considerazioni conclusive sugli Inglesi e la Sicilia negli esiti dei seminari su Ingham e i Whitaker*, op. cit., articolo on-line.

¹⁸ E: IACHELLO, *Il vino e il mare. Trafficanti siciliani tra '700 e '800 nella contea di Mascali*, Maimone, Catania 1991, p. 121.

¹⁹ Ivi, p. 122.

Gran Bretagna- ma anche emporio di materie prime e di prodotti agricoli (zolfo, ceneri di soda, vino, sommacco, frutta secca, ecc.)»²⁰. Questi, dunque i cosiddetti anni della “euforia inglese” e della conseguente “rivoluzione commerciale”²¹, in cui «si attua la svolta più consistente»²². Saranno allora studi condotti da O. Cancila, R. Trevelyan, F. Brancato, R. Battaglia, R. Lentini e M. D’Angelo ad analizzare l’aspetto socio-economico della presenza inglese in Sicilia e a questi si rimanda per maggiori informazioni sull’argomento.

²⁰ Cfr R. LENTINI, *Dal commercio alla finanza: i negozianti-banchieri inglesi nella Sicilia occidentale tra XVIII e XIX secolo* in «Mediterranea», 2004, pp.105-122.

²¹ F. SIRUGO, *La “rivoluzione commerciale”. Per una ricerca su Inghilterra e mercato europeo nell’età del Risorgimento italiano*, in «Studi storici» 1961, pp 267-297.

²² E. IACHELLO, *Il vino e il mare ...*, cit., p 107.

A seguito della crescita economica degli anni della Sicilia inglese, lo stesso territorio siciliano venne modificandosi tramite migliorie: ne è un esempio lo “stradone” che congiungeva Giarre con Riposto descritto dall’ingegnere catanese nel 1807 come fino a quel momento «lasciato in quella forma nuda che la natura glielo offerse»²³, venne deciso proprio in quell’anno di riattarlo «dotandolo di manto stradale. Significativamente ciò avvenne negli anni della presenza inglese nell’isola che, con il conseguente incremento dei traffici, rende necessario (e possibile, per gli aumentati introiti) sistemare il fondo stradale»²⁴. Per quanto riguarda le trasformazioni del territorio si rimanda agli studi di E. Iachello e P. Militello.

²³ Archivio Storico di Catania, *Fondo Intendenza Borbonica*, b.1517, *Relazione dell’ingegnere Antonio Battaglio*, Riposto 25 Gennaio 1807.

²⁴ E. IACHELLO, *Il vino e il mare ...*, cit., p. 82.

Relativamente alla figura e al ruolo di Lord William Bentinck, ministro plenipotenziario inglese inviato dalla Corona nell'isola, nel 1951 Walter Maturi in una sua recensione sul lavoro di Romeo si lamentava del fatto che mancasse una “soda monografia particolare fondata sugli archivi-base della famiglia Bentinck e del Foreign Office”²⁵. Si dovranno attendere gli studi monografici condotti dallo studioso italo-inglese John Rosselli²⁶ che

²⁵ Cfr. la recensione al testo di R. Romeo di W. MATURI in «Rivista Storica Italiana», Napoli 1951, p.590 e seguenti.

²⁶ John Rosselli (1927-2001) è stato un eminente studioso italo-britannico di storia, storia economica e di musica. Nato a Firenze l'8 giugno 1927, figlio di Carlo, fondatore di “Giustizia e Libertà”, fu bambino a Parigi dove il padre era esule antifascista e, dopo il suo assassinio nel 1937, visse tra l'Inghilterra e gli USA. Si laureò allo Swarthmore College (Pennsylvania) conseguendo poi il dottorato presso la Peterhouse di Cambridge. Insegnò Storia alla University of Sussex.

costituiscono l'unico porto saldo per la conoscenza di tale personaggio²⁷.
Questi, proprio come si auspicava Maturi, prese le mosse dai carteggi e dal diario di Bentinck, scritti durante gli anni di servizio e conservati per la maggiore presso la University Library di Nottingham. Lo storico cominciò a occuparsi di Bentinck sin dagli anni universitari quando, studente a Cambridge, svolse la tesi di dottorato sotto la guida del prof. Herbert Butterfield che lo spingeva a farsi le ossa occupandosi di avvenimenti di storia

²⁷ Per lo studio monografico di Bentinck si veda: J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck and the British Occupation of Sicily, 1811-1814*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1956; J. ROSSELLI, *Il progetto italiano di Lord Willam Bentinck, 1811-1815*, in «Rivista Storica Italiana», Napoli 1967; J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making of a liberal imperialist, 1774-1939*, Sussex University Press, London 1974.

diplomatica. La tesi che ne venne fuori vinse il premio Thirlwall e fu meritevole poi di pubblicazione dalla Cambridge University Press²⁸.

In seguito Rosselli tornerà sull'argomento Bentinck con una monografia, a sua detta, parecchio più accurata ma pressoché assente dalle biblioteche italiane, *Lord William Bentinck, the making of a liberal imperialist*²⁹, che vede la figura di Bentinck con maggiore respiro dal momento che prendeva in considerazione diverse esperienze del personaggio in questione, maturate nell'arco di tutta la sua vita.

Bisogna aggiungere che nella prefazione all'edizione italiana di un suo testo del 1956 riproposto nel 2002, Rosselli, pur ritenendo ancora valide le sue tesi

²⁸ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck and the British occupation of Sicily*, cit.

²⁹ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making of a liberal imperialist, 1774-1939*, cit.

sul personaggio anche a distanza di mezzo secolo, ammette di aver peccato nei suoi testi della giusta conoscenza storica della Sicilia, non avendo potuto avvalersi degli studi recenti, in particolare quelli condotti dalla scuola storica locale a partire dagli anni Cinquanta, che hanno dimostrato quanto l'isola fosse presente nel dibattito europeo verso la modernizzazione piuttosto che la sonnacchiosa Sicilia, dove l'eco della rivoluzione francese non era mai arrivato.

Da allora nessun ulteriore passo per la ricostruzione del “decennio inglese” e soprattutto della figura di Lord Bentinck . Lo stesso Rosselli, nel 2000, annunciando la ristampa del suo testo del '56, si diceva pronto, o quasi, a pubblicare il diario di Bentinck, manoscritto tuttora inedito giacché Rosselli morì poco dopo, lasciando incompiuto il progetto della pubblicazione del Sicilian Journal di Bentinck .

Il presente lavoro di ricerca prende spunto proprio da tali studi e intende, tramite un'attenta lettura del diario di Bentinck, portare un contributo alla storia del personaggio in Sicilia, liberandolo dall'aurea di uomo "ardente di carattere, autoritario e violento" che "per i mezzi di cui disponeva e per la piena libertà d'azione accordatagli dal proprio governo, divenne il vero dittatore della Sicilia"³⁰, così come veniva dipinto dagli storici del periodo immediatamente successivo al decennio inglese e restituendo alla storia l'immagine di un uomo ben lontano da tali tratti³¹.

³⁰ E. PONTIERI, *Il tramonto del baronaggio...*, cit., p. 358.

³¹ L'erudito barone von Helfert, in una monografia del 1878 su Maria Carolina d'Austria, parlava di un turbolento Bentinck, «von Natur heftig und hochfahrend». Cfr J.A von HELFERT, *Königin Karolina Von Neapel und Sizilien im Kampfe gegen die französische Weltherrschaft 1770-1814*, Braumüller, Wien 1878., p. 434. Il testo è reperibile on-line.

Sulla base, dunque, di queste premesse metodologiche si basa il presente lavoro articolato in due capitoli. Nel primo capitolo si prenderà in esame il contesto storico e culturale del Mediterraneo, con particolare riferimento alla presenza inglese e l'interesse della corona britannica verso la Sicilia tra '700 e '800. In questo clima emerge la figura di Lord Bentinck, capo militare e ministro plenipotenziario alla corte siciliana, inviato nell'isola nell'ultima fase del cosiddetto decennio inglese (1806-1815), di cui si tratterà un quadro biografico con veloci pennellate, tenendo conto della sua provenienza aristocratica, della sua formazione e delle sue esperienze precedenti l'arrivo in Sicilia.

Nel secondo capitolo verrà analizzato il diario, ancora inedito, che Lord Bentinck scrisse durante gli anni di permanenza in Sicilia e di cui si è presa visione presso gli archivi della Nottingham University Library. Sulla base di

un'analisi meramente quantitativa, verranno delineati i rapporti che Bentinck intesse con le élites siciliane di cui si troverà riscontro nel diario. Particolare attenzione sarà data al rapporto con gli uomini del partito inglese, in particolare Paolo Balsamo, voce fondamentale dell'Ottocento siciliano. Verranno, a tal fine, analizzate anche le lettere, anch'esse inedite, che questi scrisse a Lord Bentinck.

Infine verrà delineato, nella parte ultima del lavoro, il bilancio conclusivo dell'esperienza siciliana di Lord Bentinck e l'immagine che ne viene fuori sia di Bentinck che della Sicilia di primo Ottocento.

Seguono in appendice le trascrizioni dell'inedito manoscritto, il Sicilian Journal di Lord Bentinck e delle epistole dell'abate Paolo Balsamo, inviate al ministro inglese.

CAP. I: Bentinck e la Sicilia del “decennio inglese”, (1806-1815)

1.1 Gli Inglesi nel Mediterraneo

Nel 1799 e nei primissimi anni dell'Ottocento, a seguito della rapida ascesa napoleonica e all'arrivo dell'esercito francese a Napoli, nuovi interessi politici ed economici si rivolgono verso la Sicilia quale luogo strategico nel Mediterraneo³². Da un canto, infatti l'isola rappresentava un ottimo avamposto militare per controllare e controbattere la dilagante presenza francese nella parte meridionale della penisola italiana. Dall'altro canto, se già dal XVIII

³² Per una ricostruzione complessiva del Mediterraneo in quegli anni cfr. G. GIARRIZZO, *La Sicilia da Cinquecento all'Unità d'Italia*, in V. D'ALESSANDRO, G. GIARRIZZO, *La Sicilia dal Vespro all'Unità d'Italia*, Storia d'Italia diretta da G. GALASSO, Torino 1989, pp. 611 ss.

secolo, numerosi mercanti inglesi avevano raggiunto la Sicilia e impiantato attività commerciali legate perlopiù al vino, allo zolfo e all'industria tessile³³, ancor più all' inizio del XIX secolo, la Sicilia rappresentava per gli inglesi una base commerciale essenziale, sia per l'approvvigionamento delle merci che per lo smercio delle proprie nel Mediterraneo, in particolare, dopo che Napoleone con il "blocco continentale" aveva precluso ogni rapporto commerciale tra Inghilterra e Stati d'Europa³⁴. Si infittivano, così, le già

³³ Cfr. le ricerche condotte da R. Trevelyan, F. Brancato, R. Battaglia, R. Lentini, M. D'angelo ed E. Iachello.

³⁴ A tal proposito, si legge in una lettera proveniente dalla Sicilia inviata al Foreign Office datata 26/02/1808 (Foreign Office 70/34, Public Record Office, London) dei prodotti siciliani di notevole interesse per gli inglesi, prodotti nell'isola in abbondanza ed esportati: il grano ("la Sicilia è sempre stata il granaio del Mediterraneo"), l'olio per le manifatture, la barilla, manifatture di saponi e di vetri, il sommacco per le pelli (addirittura considerato il migliore d'Europa), la seta, il sale (prodotto in quantità inesauribile). E inoltre: mandorle,

avviate relazioni commerciali tra le due isole -Sicilia e Gran Bretagna-, delle quali usufruiva anche Malta, da qualche tempo possedimento inglese³⁵.

In realtà, l'interesse d'oltre Manica nei confronti della Sicilia va inserito all'interno di quella "*insular strategy*" che aveva visto, già a partire dagli

manna, liquirizia, fichi, uva e uva passa di Lipari, vino, brandy, arance, limoni, pietra pomice, cotone, canape e tartaro. Ma soprattutto, l'inesauribile quantità di zolfo e nitrato di potassio. "L'isola, perciò, sembra essere di per sé capace di rifornirci per le nostre manifatture di quelle materie prime che i nostri nemici stanno cercando di toglierci, e se la loro produzione fosse sufficientemente incoraggiata, potrebbe essere adeguata alle nostre richieste". Inoltre, "essendo il Levante e l'Italia chiusi, l'isola è una grande risorsa". Cfr. M. D'ANGELO, *Mercanti inglesi in Sicilia*, cit., p.39.

³⁵ Cfr. D. D'ANDREA, "*If Sicily should become a British island*". *Sicilia e Gran Bretagna in età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica*, ed. Labate, Messina 2007, pp. 43-44. Ivi si legge che la Sicilia rappresentava "il granaio" di Malta e riferendosi a un viaggiatore di fine settecento, Richard Colt Hoare, questi descrive nel suo diario la funzione di "nutrice" dell'isola: «Malta wants the principal necessity of life. Sicily is the nurse which feeds it; and supplies corn, oil and wines». E ancora, l'inglese T. Walsh scriveva nel suo Journal: «Malta draws most of her supplies from Sicily».

ultimi anni del 1700, l'attenzione britannica rivolgersi nell'area mediterranea via via verso la Corsica (1794-1796), l'isola d'Elba (1796), Malta (a partire dal 1800), la Sicilia (1806-1815, il cosiddetto *decennio inglese*) e le Isole Ionie (1809)³⁶, quali basi dalle quali partire per opporsi politicamente e militarmente, ma anche *culturalmente*, alla Francia napoleonica³⁷. Infatti, oltre

³⁶ Sulla politica insulare inglese nel Mediterraneo si veda D. D'ANDREA, *G. F. Leckie and the "insular strategy" of Great Britain in the Mediterranean, 1800-1815*, in «Journal of Mediterranean Studies», vol. 16, Malta 2006.

³⁷ Crf C.R. RICOTTI, *Il costituzionalismo britannico nel Mediterraneo fra rivoluzione e restaurazione. Dal "modello corso" (1794) al "modello ionio" (1818)* in A. ROMANO (a cura di) *Il modello costituzionale inglese e la sua ricezione nell'area del Mediterraneo fra la fine del '700 e la prima metà dell'800. Atti del seminario internazionale di studi in memoria di Francisco Tomas y Valiente*, Milano 1988. L'autore dedica una serie di saggi alle esperienze costituzionali ispirate dal modello britannico nell'area mediterranea sotto l'influenza inglese tra il 1794 e il 1818 (Corsica, Malta, Isole Ionie e Sicilia). Vd. anche

alla questione meramente politica ed economica, sebbene con un peso differente, la Sicilia assolveva un ulteriore compito legato a fattori ideologici.

Il dilagare delle idee rivoluzionarie in tutta Europa, la popolarità (o impopolarità) della cultura francese che, sottomettendo i principi di libertà e uguaglianza da cui aveva preso le mosse, si era tradotta in termini di un governo militare³⁸, spostavano la partita su un terreno di gioco *anche* ideologico. Gould Francis Leckie³⁹, un pubblicista inglese che visse in Sicilia per anni conducendo una tenuta modello nel siracusano, sosteneva che fosse

C.R. RICOTTI, *Il costituzionalismo britannico nel Mediterraneo 1794-1818*, Giuffrè, Milano Roma 2005.

³⁸ Cfr E. SCIACCA, *Riflessi del costituzionalismo europeo in Sicilia (1812-1815)*, Bonanno ed., Catania 1966, p 37.

³⁹ Sul pensiero di G.F. Leckie si veda G.F. LECKIE, *Historical Survey of the Foreign affairs of Great Britain*, London 1808 e le edizioni successive; inoltre, su G.F. Leckie si vedano i recenti studi condotti da D. D'ANDREA.

necessario combattere una “*war of opinion*” antinapoleonica e, partendo dalla discrasia tra principi rivoluzionari ed esiti pratici, affermava che se l’intervento britannico avesse debellato gli strascichi del feudalesimo presenti in Sicilia, l’isola si sarebbe trasformata in un laboratorio politico esemplare⁴⁰. Non solo: avrebbe indotto gli italiani tutti ad «insorgere ed unirsi contro i francesi [...] e al contempo dimostrato al mondo che *while France conquers to*

⁴⁰ Cfr M. D’ANGELO, *Tra Sicilia e Gran Bretagna* in J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l’occupazione britannica in Sicilia. 1811-1814*, Sellerio, Palermo 2002 (ristampa), p.20. Ivi si legge: «In quella *guerra di principi*, la Gran Bretagna doveva proporre il suo *sistema* politico, in contrapposizione al *codice militare e rivoluzionario* imposto dai francesi, e diffondere *le idee di libertà e giustizia* per favorire riforme istituzionali e sollecitare l’estensione del modello costituzionale inglese in questa isola retta da un governo *ottuso e tirannico*».

devastate, Britain conquers to do good»⁴¹. In altre parole, per contrapporsi al “*military and revolutionary code*” dei francesi, bisognava «propagare “*the principles of freedom and justice*” su cui si basavano le istituzioni inglesi»⁴².

Condizione essenziale: «*Sicily must be regenerated under British tutelage*»⁴³.

Tali motivazioni, dunque, stavano alla base dell’ingerenza britannica negli affari siciliani. Ai succitati motivi di carattere economico, militare e ideologico, una costante paura, più volte dimostratasi reale, spingeva gli

⁴¹ *Correspondence between G.F. Leckie and Lord Bentinck* , 19 March 1812 (Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, Bentinck Papers (BP), PwJd 3076), citato in J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck and the British occupation...*, cit., p. 67 e in J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making of ...*, cit., p. 117.

⁴² G.F. LECKIE, *An Historical survey of the foreign affairs of Great Britain for the years 1808, 1809 and 1810, with a view to explain the causes of the disasters of the late and present wars*, London 1810. Citato in D. D’ANDREA, “*If Sicily should ...*”, cit., p. 91.

⁴³ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making ...*, cit., p. 117.

inglesi a intervenire in Sicilia: si temeva, infatti, che anche l'isola potesse rivolgere alla Francia le richieste d'aiuto per risolvere le proprie questioni. Questo avrebbe causato la perdita totale del controllo del Mediterraneo, con conseguenze nefaste anche per il nuovo possedimento, Malta⁴⁴.

Il pretesto era stato offerto dal soccorso prestato ai reali Borbone quando, alla fine del 1805, abbandonavano nuovamente (era già avvenuto nel 1799) i possedimenti continentali ai francesi, rifugiandosi in Sicilia. Da allora in poi, fino all'ottobre 1815, per dieci anni di *virtual protectorate over the island*, «i

⁴⁴ Nel 1803, da Malta, il Civil Commissioner, sir A.J. Ball faceva presente, in una lettera indirizzata a Hugh Elliot, rappresentante diplomatico inglese a Napoli, che «the Sicilians are expecting us anxiously and if we do not go there soon, they are so disgusted with their government that they will allow the French to assist in making them an independent republic». British Library, Add Ms 37268, ff.49-50. Cfr D. D'ANDREA, «*If Sicily should become ...*, cit., p. 52.

governi britannici prestarono denaro, truppe e navi per mantenere l'isola in mani amiche»⁴⁵ impedendo alla rivale Francia di «esercitare un reale controllo nel Mediterraneo»⁴⁶. «Il punto debole dell'esiliata monarchia è il bisogno di denaro. Gli inglesi versano un sussidio (alla corte, si intende) e non pagano tasse per i loro traffici»⁴⁷, intensificando così il formarsi di nuove fortune economiche dal momento che nei porti siciliani, come detto prima, convergono le navi inglesi cariche di prodotti in cerca di sbocco e con forte necessità di rifornimenti non solo per la madrepatria ma anche per le colonie della corona. Si apre così il *decennio inglese* (1806-1815).

⁴⁵ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione...*, cit., p 37.

⁴⁶ D. D'ANDREA, *"If Sicily should become..."*, p.67.

⁴⁷ A. CRISANTINO, *Breve storia della Sicilia. Le radici antiche ai problemi di oggi*, Di Girolamo ed., Trapani 2012, p. 181.

1.2 La Sicilia nei primi anni dell'Ottocento

La situazione in Sicilia era tutt'altro che semplice: una monarchia che per anni aveva governato a distanza diventava adesso ingombrante, perlopiù avendo portato con sé tutta una serie di ministri napoletani che poco posto davano, e intendevano dare, ai politici siciliani e poco tenevano conto delle esigenze e delle aspirazioni del paese, oltre al fatto che «la corte parve considerare la Sicilia solo come una sorgente d'imposte, i cui proventi erano dedicati in gran parte alla riconquista del napoletano»⁴⁸; l'isola era «an extraordinary museum of late medieval institutions»⁴⁹ dove i baroni, ancora in possesso dei privilegi

⁴⁸ R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento ...*, cit., p. 133.

⁴⁹ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making ...*, cit., p. 117.

feudali, vivevano un periodo di crisi economica⁵⁰; quei pochi siciliani, perlopiù nobili, ecclesiastici e avvocati – *the Island Intelligentsia*, per usare un'espressione di Rosselli- che avevano avuto l'opportunità di leggere e viaggiare, già dalla fine del secolo precedente, maturavano sempre più un senso di appartenenza alla cultura e alla *nazione* siciliana e, prendendo atto dei problemi economici del proprio paese, confrontandosi con l'Inghilterra (con la quale, peraltro, nella ricerca di identità, condividevano la conquista normanna)

⁵⁰ Il reddito della terra era in calo: poiché si erano man mano allontanati dalle terre, incaricando gli intermediari delle loro funzioni di feudatari, i nobili avevano cominciato a perdere i benefici che tali funzioni un tempo avevano loro portato. Le restrizioni che la legge feudale ancora collocava sulla cessione delle terre cominciava ad apparire pesante e il sistema, nel suo complesso, antiquato. L'aristocrazia, quindi, se da un canto difendeva i suoi privilegi dal centralismo monarchico, dall'altro era spinta a mettere in discussione alcuni dei principi che aveva cominciato a difendere. Cfr J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck , the making ...*, cit., p. 117 e J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p.41.

«fecero risalire il benessere inglese alla costituzione politica, e ravvidero in quella costituzione una possibile panacea ai mali siciliani»⁵¹. Agli occhi di quanti «desideravano correggere piuttosto che cancellare le antiche istituzioni»⁵², la costituzione inglese appariva come un modello da imitare. Veniva così delineandosi *il partito inglese*⁵³, che «incarnava privilegi di classe

⁵¹ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p.42. Ivi si legge di un nobile siciliano che riferì al viaggiatore inglese Brydone nel 1770 di «desiderare ardentemente la benedizione della costituzione inglese».

⁵² Cfr G. GIARRIZZO, *Storia della Sicilia dal Cinquecento all'Unità d'Italia*, in V. D'ALESSANDRO e G. GIARRIZZO, *La Sicilia dal Vespro all'Unità ...*, cit., per un maggiore approfondimento relativo al partito inglese.

⁵³ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p.43. In realtà questo movimento non aveva un nome ben preciso. All'epoca definito "patriottico", poi liberale, costituzionalista, partito filo-inglese, era composto da nobili e loro seguaci, perlopiù avvocati e membri del clero, tutta aristocrazia cui la proprietà terriera aveva conferito e conferiva prestigio. Questa aristocrazia si trovava di fronte a due pericoli, uno esterno

e tradizione isolana»⁵⁴ allo stesso tempo. Tra i maggiori esponenti, i principi di

Belmonte⁵⁵ e Castelnuovo⁵⁶ e il loro ideologo, l'abate Paolo Balsamo.

In quegli anni, dunque, la Sicilia è piena di entusiasmo culturale e filosofico,

frutto del precedente accostamento alla cultura europea e a nuove correnti di

pensiero quali, in particolare, l'empirismo adottato da intellettuali come lo

storico Rosario Gregorio prima e più avanti il suo discepolo, il fisico

Domenico Scinà, per il quale «l'esigenza della concretezza, [...] lo portava a

legato all'ingerenza di una monarchia incline all'accentramento e alle riforme autoritarie,

l'altro interno: il progressivo deterioramento della posizione economica propria dei baroni.

Cfr J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p.38-39.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵⁵ Vd. G. GIARRIZZO, *Giuseppe Ventimiglia e Cottone, principe di Belmonte* in AA.VV., *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 8, Treccani, 1966.

⁵⁶ Vd. F. BRANCATO, *Gaetano Cottone, principe di Castelnuovo*, in AA. VV., *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 21, Treccani, 1978.

vedere il peggior avversario di ogni seria e fruttuosa ricerca scientifica nel formalismo degli scolastici»⁵⁷. E ancora, Giovanni Agostino De Cosmi che aveva usato il metodo empiristico in campo pedagogico e l'abate termitano Paolo Balsamo, esperto di cose agrarie, economista, storico e politico. Questi, in particolare, «nutrito di cultura britannica, [...] portò sempre nelle sue indagini uno spiccato amore per i fatti particolari e concreti, e l'abitudine all'osservazione paziente e metodica»⁵⁸. Tra le pagine delle sue *Memorie* si legge che «i fatti sono la base ed il sostegno delle scienze naturali, e l'analisi

⁵⁷ R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento ...*, cit., p. 81.

⁵⁸ Ivi, p. 83.

l'unico mezzo per promuoverle. L'istesso forse con maggiore ragione affermar si deve della politica economica»⁵⁹.

L'accostamento di tali studiosi verso l'empirismo è stato di fondamentale importanza per la Sicilia e la sua cultura: «per la prima volta, una moderna corrente di pensiero europeo riusciva a penetrare nell'isola non come astratta dottrina filosofica ma come insieme di principi informativi di una nuova mentalità e di una nuova cultura»⁶⁰. E' un chiaro segnale, questo, di una terra

⁵⁹ P. BALSAMO, *Memorie economiche e agrarie riguardanti il Regno di Sicilia*, Palermo 1802, pp. 60-61, citato in R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento ...*, cit., p. 83.

⁶⁰ R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento ...*, cit., p. 83.

che mostra fortemente di voler partecipare al dibattito culturale europeo, animato da ideologie ora inglesi, ora francesi⁶¹, aperto già da qualche tempo.

E non solo: dal punto di vista politico, per usare un'espressione già nota, la Sicilia è un vero e proprio "laboratorio". In contrasto con l'immagine di una Sicilia sonnacchiosa e che non ha conosciuto gli echi della Rivoluzione Francese, si osserva che «la vita sociale e politica assume [...] un più energico andamento, che permetterà da una parte una più efficace opera degli elementi progressisti in appoggio alle riforme, e dall'altra una reazione

⁶¹ Cfr R. Romeo (1950) e G. Giarrizzo (1968, 1989, 1998,) parlano di un modello liberal-costituzionale (di chiara ispirazione inglese) e di una corrente di indirizzo democratico-egalitario di ascendenza francese e giacobina, modelli europei, entrambi, con contaminazioni mediterranee.

insospettabilmente vigorosa da parte delle forze conservatrici»⁶². In altre parole, si diede «alla vita pratica un più ricco contenuto, che stimola e attrae ingegni e interessi [...] sebbene la vecchia mentalità era ancora radicata nella maggioranza dei siciliani»⁶³.

I semi erano stati piantati nel secolo precedente. «Nel movimento culturale siciliano della seconda metà del '700 aveva esercitato una considerevole influenza l'empirismo inglese, meglio rispondente, rispetto al razionalismo francese, pure penetrato nell'isola, al carattere concreto e positivo degli studi maggiormente coltivati in Sicilia. Aveva inoltre notevolmente contribuito ad accrescere la simpatia per l'Inghilterra, specie negli ambienti più illuminati dell'aristocrazia, l'affinità riscontrata tra le antiche istituzioni locali e il sistema

⁶² R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento ...*, cit., p. 84.

⁶³ *Ibidem*.

costituzionale inglese, per cui “l'anglomania” aveva acquistato poco alla volta una particolare tendenza non solo culturale, ma anche politica, manifestatasi, specie dopo le tentate riforme del viceré Caracciolo, in un maggiore attaccamento alle tradizionali prerogative isolate e, nel campo economico, in una più decisa avversione al regime vincolistico imposto dall'assolutismo borbonico. Balsamo, in particolare, che si era formato in tale clima, trovò pertanto in Inghilterra l'ambiente più consono al suo spirito»⁶⁴. «Anglofilia e anglomania significano essenzialmente ammirazione per la libertà e la costituzione britannica, e aspirazione, se non decisa volontà, a trasferirle in Sicilia per rafforzare i minacciati diritti della nazione»⁶⁵.

⁶⁴ F. BRANCATO, *Paolo Balsamo* in AA.VV., *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, volume V, Treccani, 1963.

⁶⁵ R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento ...*, cit., p. 110.

Tutti presenti, dunque, gli elementi che avrebbero dato le mosse al cambiamento. In questo clima di fervore, le scienze economiche ruotavano attorno alle teorie liberiste dell'abate termitano Paolo Balsamo⁶⁶. Discepolo di Young, dunque, «aveva appreso dal maestro un metodo di ricerca che si legava direttamente all'osservazione dei fatti e della loro dinamica economica»⁶⁷ e, rientrato in Sicilia, continuò la sua professione di professore

⁶⁶ Giovane di vivo intelletto, Balsamo, indirizzato inizialmente verso gli studi ecclesiastici, si era accostato poi agli studi economici proprio negli anni del riformismo illuminato del marchese Caracciolo e del principe di Caramanico. Eletto nel 1786 *cattedratico* di agricoltura presso l'Accademia palermitana, fu inviato, con il chiaro scopo di apprendere i più progrediti mezzi agrari, in Toscana, Francia, in Inghilterra dove soggiornò per ben diciotto mesi presso la scuola di Arthur Young e infine, di ritorno verso la Sicilia, visitò i Paesi Bassi. Tra tutte, fu soprattutto l'esperienza inglese che segnò profondamente il pensiero di Balsamo

⁶⁷ C. LAUDANI, *Appello dei Siciliani alla nazione inglese. Costituzione e costituzionalismo in Sicilia*, Bonanno 2011, p. 91.

universitario «insegnando all'inglese, ma operando alla siciliana»⁶⁸, vale a dire «avvalendosi di moduli mentali che erano senza dubbio più avanzati di quelli offerti dalla cultura media locale»⁶⁹, sforzandosi di continuo di adattarli per «interpretare e modificare la realtà dell'Isola»⁷⁰, guardando alla Sicilia con gli occhi di chi aveva visto realtà differenti.

«Gli anni 1810-13 sono per il Balsamo anni di appassionato impegno politico a fianco di Belmonte e Castelnuovo, dei *baroni costituzionali* dei quali egli

⁶⁸ D. SCINA', *Prospetto di storia letteraria di Sicilia nel secolo decimottavo*, Palermo 1824/27, p. 420 citato in F. RENDA, *Introduzione* in P. BALSAMO, *Memorie segrete sulla storia moderna del Regno di Sicilia*, Ed. Regione Sicilia, Palermo 1969, pag 20.

⁶⁹ F. RENDA, *Introduzione* in P. BALSAMO, *Memorie segrete...*, cit., p 20.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*.

non si limita a sostenere la lotta⁷¹, ma ne è ispiratore e portavoce insieme. Suo è il progetto di costituzione, nelle due redazioni successive- la siciliana e la *inglese*-; suoi gli studi sull'organizzazione delle magistrature e sull'amministrazione locale, che stanno alla base della lotta dei *castelnovisti*; suo lo sforzo (documentato dalla corrispondenza) di sconfiggere, con l'appoggio di Bentinck, il partito francese, che mira ad una *riforma* della costituzione, peraltro ancora incompleta, ad alta corte di giustizia con intenzioni che fanno evocare a Balsamo gli spettri dei Levellers e dei giacobini»⁷².

⁷¹ Si veda la lettera all'editore del *Weekly Political and Literary Review* (Palermo, 1° febbraio. 1812 in Archivio Storico Palermo).

⁷² G, GIARRIZZO, *Paolo Balsamo economista*, cit., p. 96.

La presenza degli inglesi in Sicilia fu dunque il catalizzatore per tutti i problemi fin qui esposti, aggravati dall'atmosfera di reciproca sfiducia⁷³: gradualmente *the Great Power* e *the Small Power* (l'espressione è di Rosselli) arrivarono ad una crisi nel 1810 quando, ad un tentativo di invasione da parte di Murat, la corte sembrò indifferente (forse anche speranzosa di un suo successo). Contemporaneamente, il gruppo riformista dei baroni aveva raggiunto uno stallo nei negoziati con la corte. Era arrivato il momento di intervenire *de*

⁷³ I rapporti tra inglesi e reali (Ferdinando IV di Borbone e la moglie Maria Carolina) furono sempre tormentati da reciproci sospetti e sfiducia: gli intrighi della sovrana, il suo continuo pensiero alla riconquista di Napoli, la sua disposizione a venire a patti con tutti (Russia, Austria e persino Francia) per raggiungere il suo scopo, la mancanza di collaborazione da parte dei reali, la paura di questi che l'Inghilterra fosse interessata alla Sicilia, la necessità di denaro dei reali e di contro il ricatto economico e della tutela militare, il timore che, finita la propria guerra, la Gran Bretagna si sarebbe rifiutata di proteggere i Borbone e che fosse di continuo pronta a barattare la Sicilia.

facto proponendo come rimedio per *the salvation of the Kingdom* un'amministrazione siciliana e un Parlamento modellato su quello inglese, quello che desideravano i baroni ⁷⁴.

Fu proprio in questo clima che venne inviato Lord William Bentinck in Sicilia.

1.3 Lord Bentinck in Sicilia

Chi era Lord William Bentinck⁷⁵? Egli «non fu solo un uomo a cui capitò di impelagarsi in una missione diplomatica o governativa, (...) egli era un

⁷⁴ Cfr J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck , the making ...*, cit., p. 119.

⁷⁵.Lord William Henry Cavendish Bentinck (Bulstrode, Buckinghamshire 14 Settembre 1774 - Parigi 17 Giugno 1839), governatore di Madras (1803-1806), della Sicilia(1812-

1814), del Bengala (1828-1833) e delle Indie (1833-1835). Aristocratico terriero, secondogenito del 3° duca di Portland, simpatizzava con molte delle idee liberali del suo tempo. Durante la sua carriera diplomatica, politica e militare, fece importanti riforme amministrative in particolare nella società indiana dove ha riformato le finanze, ha aperto i messaggi giudiziari agli indiani, e soppresso tali pratiche quali la pira funeraria delle vedove (sati) e l'omicidio rituale (thug). Le innovazioni effettuate nei suoi anni di ufficio sono state pietre miliari nella creazione di uno stile molto più interventista del governo rispetto a quelli precedenti, uno stile che ha coinvolto in particolare l'occidentalizzazione della società e della cultura indiana. Bentinck non era un pensatore originale; suoi maestri filosofici erano gli utilitaristi Jeremy Bentham e James Mill; il suo istruttore pratico, soprattutto nel campo dell'istruzione, è stato lo storico Thomas Babington Macaulay, tra gli altri. Ha preso in prestito elementi utili dalla religione dei suoi antenati whig liberali e da Bentham, combinando il tutto in politiche che erano ragionevoli, pratiche e umanitarie. Si era unito in matrimonio nel 1803 con Lady Mary Acheson, figlia del primo duca di Gosford, dalla cui unione non nacquero figli. AA.VV., *Britannica* (on line) alla voce Bentinck. Cfr. *Dictionary of national biography*, edited by Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee. London, Smith, Elder, & Co., 1885-1901; e le due monografie curate da J. ROSSELLI.

membro, relativamente poco privilegiato, dell' aristocrazia terriera britannica»⁷⁶. Era un giovane ufficiale, quando venne in Sicilia, di appena 36 anni, con la sola esperienza coloniale maturata a Madras come governatore nel periodo 1803-1807⁷⁷.

⁷⁶ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making of a liberal imperialist ...*, cit., p 11.

⁷⁷ Bentinck a 17 anni ricevette una commissione nel corpo navale delle Coldstream Guards e, dal 1794, divenne tenente colonnello. Nato da famiglia ricca e di rango, era un promettente, se non eccezionale, giovane ufficiale che meritò, all'età di 29 anni, la nomina a governatore di Madras (ora Chennai). Sebbene abbia svolto le proprie funzioni in modo abbastanza soddisfacente, la sua amministrazione a Madras venne offuscata da disaccordi con il suo consiglio e bruscamente interrotta dopo l'ammutinamento di Vellore. Un ordine imprudente da parte del comandante in capo dell'esercito di Madras che aveva proibito alle truppe indigene di indossare le loro barbe e turbanti tradizionali e la mancata revoca di Bentinck, ebbe come conseguenza un grave ammutinamento nel luglio 1806, accompagnato da attacchi contro ufficiali e truppe britanniche. Il focolaio venne soppresso con pesanti perdite di vite umane, e l'ordine sconsigliato fu finalmente ritirato. Bentinck fu ritenuto responsabile e pertanto richiamato dal suo incarico in madrepatria nel 1807. Mal

sopportando tale rientro e credendo di esser stato trattato ingiustamente, premette il governo inglese negli anni successivi per la possibilità di rivendicare il suo nome. Le occasioni non tardarono a venire: con le guerre napoleoniche in corso, fu assegnato alla Spagna, dove ebbe a comando una brigata a La Coruña, dopo di che fu nominato comandante delle truppe britanniche in Sicilia. L'Italia era allora nelle mani di Napoleone, ma in Sicilia i monarchi borbonici di Napoli regnava ancora sotto la protezione della flotta inglese. Ordini di Bentinck erano di sollevare un esercito siciliano di 10.000 uomini per integrare i suoi 5.000 soldati britannici e, con le due forze combinate, contribuire alla campagna contro Napoleone. Inoltre sembrava progettasse la deposizione del re Borbone a favore dell'erede, come pure l'adozione di una costituzione liberale siciliana con un corpo legislativo sul modello del Parlamento britannico. Inoltre, progettava di invadere l'Italia e radunare la gente non solo per espellere Napoleone, ma per istituire una monarchia costituzionale. Il governo britannico non avrebbe mai sostenuto un tale piano: infatti, intendeva eventualmente a ripristinare il dominio austriaco in Italia. Lo sbarco italiano non ebbe luogo in quel momento e Bentinck, ritardò il suo sbarco in Spagna oltre la data stabilita. Quando finalmente arrivò a Genova nel 1814, i suoi proclami liberali ancora una volta imbarazzarono il suo governo, e pertanto fu richiamato in Inghilterra nel 1815. Al suo ritorno fu eletto alla Camera dei Comuni. Cfr. AA.VV., *Britannica*, cit., ad vocem.

Cresciuto tra l'ideologia di Burke (che aveva impiantato in Bentinck il concetto di nazionalità⁷⁸) e l'oratoria di Fox, egli era figlio cadetto del terzo duca di Portland, capo dell'ala whig e due volte primo ministro negli anni 1783-1807, che entrò successivamente a far parte del governo Pitt, «più accanito degli stessi *Pittisti* nel dare la caccia ai fautori di rivoluzione e nel voler proseguire la guerra ideologica contro la Francia»⁷⁹. L'ideologo irlandese Burke rimase, per tutta la sua vita, un ispiratore sebbene avesse atteggiamenti contraddittori, ora sostenendo le indipendenze dei popoli, ora la pace e l'ordine europeo. Dopo alcune brevi esperienze presso gli eserciti alleati in Italia settentrionale e in Spagna, fu incaricato come governatore di

⁷⁸ Cfr. J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making of a liberal imperialist...*, cit., p.31.

⁷⁹ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p. 30.

Madras dal 1803 al 1807, dal cui incarico fu destituito per via dell'ammutinamento delle truppe indigene. Durante questa esperienza fu molto influenzato dal suo superiore, Lord Wellesley, governatore del Bengala, «imperialista *ante litteram*, il quale, grazie alla distanza dalla madrepatria, riuscì a portare a termine una serie di guerre e di espansioni territoriali. Fu proprio Wellesley, nel 1811, divenuto ministro degli esteri a Londra, che gli offrì la missione in Sicilia.«I due ex-governatori videro esplicitamente il problema dei rapporti con l'isola in una luce indiana» tanto che Bentinck, prima di partire, scriverà a Wellesley di andare ad applicare in Sicilia «quella politica generosa e illuminata che ha già salvato un altro impero»⁸⁰.

⁸⁰ Ivi, pp. 29-32.

La missione siciliana gli venne affidata, a partire dal luglio 1811, proprio nel momento di maggior tensione politica tra la monarchia borbonica e l'opposizione baronale che era insorta contro i decreti del febbraio dello stesso anno che imponevano una tassa, giudicata dagli stessi *incostituzionale*, dell'1% su tutti i pagamenti in denaro effettuati in Sicilia, e di fatto danneggiavano, anche se indirettamente, gli interessi commerciali inglesi. Dopo una breve assenza di qualche mese durante la quale si recherà in Inghilterra per ottenere più ampi poteri, Bentinck rientrerà in Sicilia, dove la situazione era alquanto «complicata e refrattaria»⁸¹ e «la presenza inglese costituiva il detonatore di problemi interni irrisolti e faceva maturare l'antico e

⁸¹ J. ROSSELLI, *Il progetto italiano ...*, cit., p. 371.

latente contrasto tra monarchia e baronaggio»⁸². E, in questo contrasto, gli inglesi, «trovandosi a scegliere fra una monarchia poco amata e i baroni che proclamano di agire per la libertà della patria, scelgono i baroni che si atteggiavano a ribelli contro un governo assoluto»⁸³.

L'idea di Bentinck, d'altronde, si riallacciava fortemente alle idee espresse in diverse occasioni dai suoi conterranei - Leckie *in primis*, ma anche uomini come i poeti Wordsworth, Coleridge e Shelley⁸⁴ - che si inserivano nel dibattito politico sostenendo la necessità di un intervento a favore della libertà delle

⁸² M. D'ANGELO, *Tra Sicilia e Gran Bretagna*, in J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p. 16.

⁸³ A. CRISANTINO, *Breve storia della Sicilia ...*, cit., p. 181.

⁸⁴ Cfr. R. J. WHITE (a cura di), *Political tracts of Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley*, Cambridge 1953.

nazioni, la cui indipendenza era «indispensable to the highest form of individual and social life»⁸⁵ .

Perlopiù Bentinck, «caldo seguace del partito Whig, si era formato in un ambiente nel quale si era diffusa la convinzione che le istituzioni liberali britanniche rappresentassero la miglior forma di reggimento politico per ogni paese: e questa convinzione lo guidò nella sua quadriennale lotta in Sicilia [...]. Il Bentinck vide nella lotta in difesa della costituzione siciliana assai più che un semplice espediente politico»⁸⁶.

⁸⁵ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making ...*, cit., p. 116.

⁸⁶ R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento...*, cit., p. 137. Nell'articolo di H.M. LACKLAND, *Lord William Bentinck in Sicily 1811-1812*, in «The English Historical Review», Oxford 1927, p. 372 si legge: «Bentinck thought that in the British constitution lay the salvation of the world. There is probably much truth in the assertion, though Bentinck was hardly unique in holding that creed. Nearly all Whigs of the early and most liberals of the late nineteenth

In realtà, la sua idea di liberare la Sicilia faceva parte di un progetto ben più largo: intervenire con una riforma degli abusi nell'isola per poi rivolgersi all'unificazione dell'Italia (sempre in funzione antinapoleonica), causa alla quale Bentinck sembrava molto interessato: «*the creation of one Italy is, and will always remain, the true great idea*»⁸⁷. Pensava inizialmente che l'impresa fosse semplice, ma non si rivelò tale.

century [...] have been firmly convinced that the principles of the great and glorious British constitution should be adopted all the world over as a kind of test of national sobriety». Lo stesso si legge in A. CAPOGRASSI, *Gl'inglesi in Italia durante le campagne napoleoniche. Lord William Bentinck*, La Terza, Bari 1949.

⁸⁷ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making ...*, cit., p. 121. Rosselli cita le parole di Bentinck.

Giunto in Sicilia, dunque, sposò la causa del partito costituzionalista siciliano di cui lui avrebbe assunto il ruolo di guida « into path of law »⁸⁸. Nel suo diario, nel gennaio del '12 annotava il suo *programma* per la Sicilia: Parlamento, Costituzione e un esercito nazionale per difenderla. Dal canto suo, il partito costituzionale si mise subito al lavoro per redigere una costituzione: Bentinck aveva chiesto a Belmonte⁸⁹ e Castelnuovo di prepararla, loro avevano incaricato l'abate Balsamo esortandolo - racconta lo stesso Balsamo - a lavorare sul modello della costituzione d'Inghilterra e «praticare le minori possibili innovazioni nell'attuale forma di governo». Il 20

⁸⁸ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, Bentinck Papers (BP), PwJd 414, 13 giugno 1813.

⁸⁹ Vd. G. GIARRIZZO, *Giuseppe Ventimiglia e Cottone, principe di Belmonte* in AA.VV., *Dizionario...*, cit.

giugno venivano approvati i 15 articoli della nuova costituzione⁹⁰. Il progetto veniva sottoposto a Bentinck che scrivendo in patria diceva: «Devo confessare che all'inizio ero decisamente contrario all'adozione della costituzione inglese. Dubitavo che la gente avesse fermezza, saggezza o virtù sufficienti ad attuarla. Tuttavia [...] lessi lo schema di una costituzione modellata su quella inglese, ma con grande moderazione e saggezza modificata e adattata allo

⁹⁰ Lo storico Rosario Romeo ha un duplice giudizio della costituzione «Nel quadro della storia europea e italiana la costituzione del '12 rappresenta dunque un momento nettamente arretrato, riconfermando che, mentre l'Europa veniva rinnovata dalle armate rivoluzionarie, le forze dominanti in Sicilia erano ancora legate ad un'economia e a un mondo etico sostanzialmente feudale. Ma, rispetto alla vecchia Sicilia del baronaggio, le istanze poste dalla costituzione del '12 hanno, ripetiamo, un carattere certamente progressivo: il quale però, nel concreto svolgimento della lotta politica, rimase a uno stato potenziale per il deciso prevalere dell'impostazione conservatrice della maggioranza baronale su quella dei progressisti, e la correlativa impossibilità, per la democrazia borghese, di far valere positivamente le sue esigenze[...]». R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento ...*, cit., p. 153-154.

stato di una società degradata [...]»⁹¹. La Costituzione «sembrava esser destinata a fondare per sempre la libertà e la gloria della Sicilia moderna», scriveva Giovanni Aceto. Fino a novembre '12 continuarono i lavori con la preparazione e l'approvazione del testo ma, alla chiusura del Parlamento e con l'attuazione della riforma amministrativa⁹², finito l'entusiasmo e subentrati gli interessi e le passioni, cominciarono i dissidi politici. I baroni avevano rinunciato sì ai propri secolari interessi ma, come sostiene lo storico Pontieri,

⁹¹ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p. 116. Cfr. il *Sicilian Journal* di Bentinck (Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, Bentinck Papers (BP), PwJd 6254-6264) nelle date 29 e 31 maggio, 1, 3, 8, 10, 16, 18 e 22 giugno; *letter* from Bentinck to Castlereagh, 30 giugno 1812, Foreign Office (London) 70/51.

⁹² Per un maggiore approfondimento si veda E. IACHELLO, *La riforma dei poteri locali nel primo Ottocento*, in F. BENIGNO- G. GIARRIZZO (a cura di), *Storia della Sicilia*, Laterza, Roma Bari 2003.

«non senza disinteresse»⁹³: la spaccatura tra i due leader del movimento costituzionale, Belmonte e Castelnuovo, ne è chiara dimostrazione⁹⁴. Il malcontento era generale: il popolo insorgeva per la crisi alimentare. La peste di Malta (la paura che potesse dilagare in Sicilia tramite l'andirivieni delle navi inglesi) costituiva una crescente minaccia, gli inglesi diventavano sempre più impopolari, la monarchia che poco collaborava con gli inglesi, i democratici (partito di opposizione ai costituzionalisti) cominciavano ad avere

⁹³ E. PONTIERI, *Ai margini della costituzione siciliana del 1812*, Roma 1933, p.131.

⁹⁴ Belmonte, di idee aristocratiche, voleva che tutte le magistrature superiori fossero concentrate nella capitale, Castelnuovo, invece, di principi democratici, sosteneva il decentramento oltre che lo smantellamento dell'edificio feudale. Il suo avvicinamento all'ala moderata dei democratici era poco accettato dai suoi stessi amici e avversato dai belmontisti. Le due ideologie stridevano: le idee democratiche volgono verso un allargamento dell'assetto politico verso un coinvolgimento popolare, a differenza delle idee aristocratiche che avevano una visione elitaria del controllo della nazione.

la meglio, mentre i sostenitori della costituzione erano in netta minoranza: insomma, sin da principio, quell'anno fu costellato da un continuo crescendo di disordini che culminarono nella crisi politica dell'estate del 1813, proprio quando Bentinck era in Spagna al comando di una spedizione anglo-siciliana. Ha inizio qui, secondo l'abate Balsamo, «l'epoca del cominciamento dei disordini e delle sciagure del regno», definita dallo stesso «the fatal epoch»⁹⁵.

Bentinck che, di ritorno dalla Spagna «nel mettere piede a terra si accorse che i mali dai quali era travagliata la Sicilia, erano più gravi che non aveva da lontano immaginato. Vide *con dolore* che il nome degli inglesi era assai decaduto da quel rispetto ed attaccamento, nel quale l'aveva lasciato; che gli

⁹⁵ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, Bentinck Papers (BP), PwJd 418.

amici suoi e compagni nella rivoluzione erano calunniati e perseguitati; che il ministero era occupato da persone infide o sospette alla buona causa; e che il regno tutto era in agitazione e scompiglio, e bersagliato da tali scissure ed inimicizie, che non si potevano facilmente sedare e comporre. [...] Protestò che *avrebbe fatta man bassa* contro tutti coloro che fossero osati attentare in qualunque modo alla sicurezza ed alla tranquillità di Sicilia⁹⁶». E così fece. Applicando la legge marziale, il suo iniziale ruolo di consigliere, divenuto poi governatore di fatto della Sicilia, sconfinò, in ultimo, in quello di dittatore. Ad una figura diventata via via sempre più impopolare si aggiungeva il fatto che in madrepatria il ministro Castlereagh mutava la sua politica in previsione della restaurazione, «vedeva nel regime costituzionale dell'isola un focolare

⁹⁶ P. BALSAMO; *Memorie segrete* ..., cit., p.170.

pericoloso per quell'ordine conservatore [...] ch'egli meditava di attuare sul continente. Di lì a poco (Bentinck) veniva richiamato»⁹⁷ in patria. Salpava sulla nave nel luglio nel 1814 «tra le detestazioni dei nemici suoi e le mormorazioni de' suoi anche più cari amici, colui che per due anni aveva tenuto in mani il destino di Sicilia, lord William Bentinck, amareggiato per lo stato in cui lasciava il regno e scandalizzato per l'insensatezza e l'ingratitudine di molti siciliani»⁹⁸.

⁹⁷ R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento...*, cit., p 151. Ivi si legge «L'abbandono della Sicilia s'inquadrava pienamente nel nuovo indirizzo della politica inglese, mirante adesso a perpetuare l'isolamento francese e a rinserrare la politica mondiale della Russia in un sistema d'equilibrio europeo».

⁹⁸ P. BALSAMO; *Memorie segrete ...*, cit., p.209-210. Dopo l'esperienza siciliana, rientrato in patria, aveva rifiutato la riconferma per il governatorato di Madras nel 1819, in attesa di raggiungere la sua vera ambizione, la nomina a governatore generale del Bengala, che avvenne nel 1827. Istruzioni immediate di Bentinck erano salvare l'India dalle sue

difficoltà finanziarie giacché, in quel momento, il governo in India aveva un deficit cospicuo di circa £ 1,5 milioni. Bentinck presto riuscì a trasformare il disavanzo in un avanzo della stessa quantità circa. Il risultato dei suoi sforzi fu il rinnovo del governo della Compagnia delle Indie Orientali con il Charter Act del 1833, per cui Bentinck divenne il primo governatore generale delle Indie. Si interessò poi di riforme del personale, rendendo più fruibili posizioni amministrative e giudiziarie agli indiani e migliorando stipendi e status dei giudici indiani. Bentinck fece anche della lingua inglese, anziché il persiano, la lingua dei tribunali superiori e di istruzione superiore e organizzò aiuti finanziari ai collegi, che dovevano essere adattati ai modelli occidentali. Bentinck mostrò grande coraggio e umanità nella sua decisione di abolire il suttee (sati), l'usanza indù di ardere le vedove vive con i cadaveri dei loro mariti. Fu anche responsabile delle misure adottate per sopprimere l'assassinio di bambini indesiderati, sacrifici umani, e le thags-bande di ladri, legati insieme da giuramenti e rituali, che uccidevano viaggiatori ignari, in nome della dea Kali. Anche la fustigazione nell'esercito indiano fu abolita. Bentinck lasciò le Indie nel marzo 1835, tornò in Inghilterra, dove rifiutò il titolo nobiliare e fu di nuovo eletto alla Camera dei Comuni. Morì a Parigi nel 1839 dove ebbe meriti per le riforme da lui avviate e quelle che seguirono, accelerando l'occidentalizzazione delle Indie. AA.VV., *Britannica*, cit., ad vocem.

CAP. II: IL SICILIAN JOURNAL DI LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK

2.1 Un uomo, il suo diario

Durante il suo soggiorno in Sicilia, Lord William Bentinck annotava, con cadenza quasi quotidiana, gran parte della sua esperienza in un diario (definito dallo stesso *Sicilian Journal*) che, se di per sé sembrerebbe non aggiungerebbe nulla di nuovo alle notizie storiche già note relative alla Sicilia di primo Ottocento e in particolare al protettorato inglese in Sicilia, anzi ne è conferma, esso costituisce una testimonianza preziosa sia per ricostruire la figura di un personaggio “non contraddittorio quanto contorto”, (per dirla con Rosselli), che a scandagliare i rapporti che ebbe in quegli anni con le élites siciliane,

oltre a restituire la visione di un'isola attiva, definita *laboratorio costituzionale*, il cui frutto fu la Costituzione del '12.

Il diario, conservato in ottimo stato nella sezione *Manuscripts and Special Collections* presso l'archivio della Nottingham University Library⁹⁹, si trova all'interno di una vastissima collezione riguardante Lord Bentinck, donata dal 7° Duca di Portland, suo erede, tra il 1949 e il 1968. Il corpus è distinto in sette gruppi relativi a tutta la carriera politico-militare di Lord Bentinck, dalle prime esperienze come giovane ufficiale alle più celebri quali Madras, Sicilia e Bengala¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁹ Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, Bentinck Papers (BP), PwJd 6240-6250.

¹⁰⁰ I sette gruppi in cui è diviso il corpus relativo a Lord William Bentinck sono: PwJa, Early military career to 1803; PwJb, Governor of Madras, 1803-1807; PwJc, Military

Nella sezione ai segni PwJd, denominata “Envoy to the Court of Sicily, 1811-1814”, a sua volta divisa in tre sottogruppi data la sua vastità¹⁰¹, si trova tutta

Service during the Peninsular War, 1807-1811; PwJd, Envoy to the Court of Sicily, 1811-1814; PwJe, King's Lynn and political career, 1814-1827; PwJf, Governor-General of Bombay and India, 1827-1835; PwJg, Political Career after India, 1835-1839. La collezione copre dettagliatamente la carriera di Lord Bentinck: i documenti antecedenti l'anno 1803 si riferiscono all'attività come giovane ufficiale dell'esercito inglese nelle Fiandre e in Italia durante le guerre rivoluzionarie e in Spagna, durante battaglia che si concluse con la ritirata inglese verso La Coruña, nell'esercito del comandante John Moore. Notevoli sono anche i documenti successivi al suo rientro dall'India e dall'attività diplomatica, quando si interessò, in qualità di proprietario terriero, di migliorie agricole e di bonifica delle zone paludose e, come membro del parlamento di Glasgow, di ampliamento dei trasporti verso l'India attraverso mezzi a vapore.

¹⁰¹ Quasi 7000 documenti sono relativi agli anni 1811-1814, periodo in cui Lord Bentinck venne inviato presso la corte siciliana. Per ovvie ragioni, essi sono suddivisi in tre sottogruppi con la seguente collocazione: Pw Jd 1-2944 Papers of Lord William H. Cavendish Bentinck (1774-1839), soldier, politician and statesman: Envoy to the Court of Sicily. Correspondence A-H; Pw Jd 2945-5553 Papers of Lord William H. Cavendish Bentinck (1774-1839), soldier, politician and statesman: Envoy to the Court of Sicily.

l'esperienza siciliana. Questa sezione contiene migliaia di documenti tra cui resoconti, registri, mappe, diari di viaggio e soprattutto una vastissima corrispondenza con i politici, filosofi ed economisti dell'epoca. Di questi, in particolare del *Sicilian Journal* e di parte della corrispondenza, si è presa visione per la redazione della presente ricerca¹⁰² intesa a portare alla luce il diario a tutt'oggi inedito.

Il diario, dunque, consta di sette volumi autografi (in verità, uno dei sette è stato scritto dal segretario di Lord Bentinck, Mr Joseph Smith, durante un periodo di assenza dal 27 maggio 1813 al 20 luglio dello stesso anno),

Correspondents J-Z; Pw Jd 5554-6454 Papers of Lord William H. Cavendish Bentinck (1774-1839), soldier, politician and statesman: Envoy to the Court of Sicily. Miscellaneous.

¹⁰² A tal proposito, preziosa si è rivelata la guida del professor David Laven, docente associato di Storia Italiana presso il Dipartimento di Storia dell' Università di Nottingham. A questi va un sentito ringraziamento.

composti di grossi quaderni di manifattura inglese¹⁰³ con copertina rigida e dorso arcuato, taluni rilegati in pelle, altri in velluto marrone, di circa 175 fogli ciascuno. Ogni foglio, utilizzato in modo recto verso, è riempito per $\frac{3}{4}$, lasciando quindi una colonna esterna per eventuali annotazioni successive, con inchiostro ferrogallico di color seppia. Le pagine, di grana piuttosto spessa, color avorio, misurano circa 18x22 cm.

Sebbene Bentinck trascorse qualche periodo nell'isola già alla fine del 1811 (considerato periodo di acclimatemento alla situazione isolana, frutto del quale è un interessante memorandum sull'isola), il diario viene compilato dal 1 gennaio 1812 e termina il 15 luglio 1814. Nelle pagine del diario, non

¹⁰³ John Williams, book manufacturer & stationer, London. Il marchio della manifattura è posto generalmente sul lato interno della copertina rigida. Solo in alcuni volumi è presente filigrana circolare arrecante i dati del fabbricante.

numerate; viene sempre precisata dallo scrivente, sul margine esterno, la data e il luogo.

Il *Sicilian Journal* è redatto in modo frettoloso e disordinato, alle volte poco leggibile, con numerosissimi commenti postumi, cancellature, conteggi sul margine, etc. La punteggiatura, spesso inesistente, rende ancora più difficoltosa la lettura. I nomi sono spesso storpiati e talvolta addirittura omessi.

Le annotazioni presenti nel diario “sono generalmente fedeli resoconti delle azioni di Bentinck, delle sue conversazioni con i protagonisti della vita politica siciliana”¹⁰⁴, di cui annota ogni dettaglio¹⁰⁵. Da questo si evince la

¹⁰⁴ L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck e il suo Sicilian. Journal (1812-1814)*, in «Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale», LXXI, Catania 1975, p. 359.

natura del documento: si tratta di un brogliaccio, uno strumento personale compilato come promemoria per poi redigere documenti ufficiali di rilievo. Conosciamo, d'altronde, un ministro ben più ordinato e scrupoloso nella compilazione di atti formali.

A testimonianza della natura di promemoria del diario, di certo base per i dispacci diplomatici e per le sue lettere ufficiali e private, la quasi inesistente “presenza di commenti personali, di impressioni, deduzioni o interpretazioni”¹⁰⁶, quanto piuttosto l’annotazione occasionale di “curiosità e descrizioni della vita siciliana che, nell’insieme, danno l’impressione di aver

¹⁰⁵ “Degli incontri, per esempio, sono ricordate l’ora d’inizio, le persone presenti e la durata. Delle conversazioni sono riportate frequentemente le parole esatte, tra virgolette, la maniera di esprimersi dell’interlocutore, le frasi in italiano o in francese” in L.GIARDINA, *Lord Bentink...*, cit., p. 360.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibidem.*

interessato il compilatore solo come elementi per una migliore conoscenza dell'isola"¹⁰⁷.

“In sostanza, una documentazione di fatti, scritta di regola alla fine di una giornata lunga e laboriosa”¹⁰⁸, per dirla con lo stesso Bentinck.

John Rosselli, lo storico italo-inglese di cui si è accennato, scomparso nel 2001, nello studio del personaggio condotto a più riprese nell'arco di cinquant'anni, ha basato le sue ricerche sui documenti originali di Bentinck

¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*. A tal proposito nel diario si leggono annotazioni quali: registrazioni di variazioni metereologiche (“... great snow, such severe weather unknown in Sicily for 50 years” oppure “scirocco, mild wind”), incredulità dinanzi ad un aneddoto raccontatogli riguardo a piccoli tonni che hanno attaccato uno squalo dentro al quale sono stati trovati resti umani (“excellent sport” quello dei siciliani nella caccia agli squali), descrizione dei costumi in maschera di un ballo in occasione del compleanno della regina, etc.

¹⁰⁸ La frase, probabilmente di Bentinck, si trova nel testo di L. GIARDINA, è tra caporali ma non ne specifica l'origine.

contenuti nella suddetta sezione dell'archivio inglese; Di alcune missive e del diario, il *Sicilian Journal*, lo studioso, insieme alla dott.ssa Luisa Giardina, negli anni '70, ha effettuato una bozza di trascrizione, in parte a noi pervenuta, che ha agevolato il presente lavoro. La pubblicazione del *Sicilian Journal* era dunque nelle intenzioni di Rosselli, ma il progetto rimase incompiuto. Da tali intenzioni ha preso spunto il presente lavoro di ricerca che vede, in appendice, una trascrizione integrale del diario finora inedito.

E' doveroso aprire qui una parentesi, a difesa della Sicilia-laboratorio, che chiarisca la natura della Costituzione del '12 -siciliana o inglese-, giacché questo dato emerge esplicitamente dal diario. Essa, infatti, non è il mero risultato della presenza anglosassone nell'isola: la Sicilia di quegli anni, tutt'altro che sonnacchiosa, pullulava di personaggi appartenenti all'élite culturale, economica e politica che facevano avanti proposte di rinnovamento.

In questo processo di modernizzazione, Bentinck si atteggiava sì a garante della costituzione, ma non ne impone alcun modello e, ancor più, è ben distante dall'imporre il modello britannico, che anzi ritiene essere poco adatto alla Sicilia. Sono i baroni, piuttosto, che forse ammaliati dall'anglofilia che imperversava nell'isola in quegli anni, avendo avuto l'opportunità di viaggiare e apprezzare i benefici di tale modello, volevano accostarsi al modello inglese pur mantenendo le specificità della costituzione siciliana. E allora si fa avanti il concetto, già espresso, di riprendere la costituzione siciliana e darle un vestito inglese, "praticando le minori possibili innovazioni nell'attuale forma di governo". Lo stesso Balsamo era convinto di una natura autoctona di tale movimento.

Lo stesso termine costituzione inglese pare fosse un'interpretazione di Belmonte e Bentinck continuava a riferirsi ad essa chiamandola "la Costituzione di Belmonte"¹⁰⁹.

Dal diario e dalle lettere emerge questo dato con estrema chiarezza :“Non ci sono dubbi nel diario sulla estraneità di Bentinck tanto nella compilazione della Costituzione quanto nella scelta del tipo di Costituzione”¹¹⁰. Pare che egli, pur ritenendo indispensabile una Costituzione, volesse rimanere lontano sia alla scelta dell'apparato che alla sua stesura. Nel diario si legge che Belmonte gli avesse proposto un incontro settimanale insieme allo stesso Belmonte, Villermosa, Cassaro e Balsamo, per rileggerne i piano. Ma Bentinck rispose che avrebbe “preferito restarne fuori, che era un'interferenza

¹⁰⁹ L GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck ...*, p 372, l'espressione è spesso riscontrabile nel diario.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

che poteva non piacere al mio governo, e che mi avrebbe fatto più piacere non esserne implicato. Lui disse che non sarei apparso. Si trattava di agire più privatamente che pubblicamente, e il consenso di Cassaro non poteva essere ottenuto altrimenti. Ero indispensabile per questo. Dissi che a ciò mi sarei prestato”¹¹¹ E ancora, relativamente alla questione di prendere a modello la costituzione inglese per redigerne una nuova, sempre nel diario, sebbene Bentinck pensasse, vista la sua formazione politica, alla costituzione come panacea di tutti i mali, si mostrò poco favorevole a che i siciliani adottassero

¹¹¹ Nel *Sicilian Journal*, BP PwJd 6240-6250, in data 26 maggio 1812: «Belmonte then proposed that he, Villa Hermosa, Cassaro, Balsamo and myself should meet once a week to read over the plans. I said I would rather be left out, that it was an interference which my government might not like, and that it would please me better not to be concerned in it. He said I should not appear. I was acting rather privately than publicly, and Cassaro’s consent could not otherwise be obtained. It was indispensable for this. I said I would lend myself to it».

un modello lontano dalle loro tradizioni e nel diario annotava di non ritenerla
“ adatta a loro”¹¹² Balsamo, nella prolissa lettera del 4 ottobre del ‘13 ricorda
alcune parole del Bentinck che ritenevano pericolosa la scelta: “*Sicily in now
for knowledge and morals what was England two centuries back. Too much
liberty is for the sicilian what be a pistol or a stiletto in the hands of a boy or
a madman*”¹¹³.

¹¹² *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 19 June 1812.

¹¹³ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 418, 4
October 1813.

2.2 Le élites nel Journal

Dal diario è facile ricostruire tutti i rapporti che Bentinck intesse con l'ambiente siciliano durante l'esperienza in Sicilia di cui sono traccia sia le annotazioni nel diario che i carteggi conservati.

Nel fervore culturale degli anni in questione, frutto dell'accostamento all'empirismo del secolo XVIII e che diede vita alla Sicilia-laboratorio del primo Ottocento – *the Island Intelligentsia*, per usare un'espressione di Rosselli, fatta perlopiù di nobili, ecclesiastici e avvocati che avevano avuto l'opportunità di leggere e viaggiare, già dalla fine del secolo precedente, maturava sempre più un senso di appartenenza alla cultura e alla *nazione* siciliana e, prendendo atto dei problemi economici del proprio paese, confrontandosi con l'Inghilterra (con la quale, peraltro, nella ricerca di identità, condividevano la conquista

normanna) «fecero risalire il benessere inglese alla costituzione politica, e ravvidero in quella costituzione una possibile panacea ai mali siciliani»¹¹⁴. Agli occhi di quanti «desideravano correggere piuttosto che cancellare le antiche istituzioni»¹¹⁵, la Costituzione inglese appariva come un modello da imitare. Veniva così delineandosi *il partito inglese*¹¹⁶, che «incarnava privilegi di classe e tradizione isolana»¹¹⁷ allo stesso tempo.

¹¹⁴ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p.42. Si legge di un nobile siciliano che ha detto al viaggiatore inglese Brydone nel 1770 di «desiderare ardentemente la benedizione della costituzione inglese».

¹¹⁵ Cfr G. GIARRIZZO, *Storia della Sicilia dal Cinquecento all'Unità d'Italia*, in V. D'ALESSANDRO e G. GIARRIZZO, *La Sicilia dal Vespro all'Unità d'Italia*, vol. XVI, Utet, Torino 1989 per un maggiore approfondimento relativo al partito inglese.

¹¹⁶ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p.43. In realtà questo movimento non aveva un nome ben preciso. All'epoca definito "patriottico", poi liberale, costituzionalista, partito filo-inglese, era composto da nobili e loro seguaci, perlopiù avvocati e membri del clero, tutta aristocrazia cui la proprietà terriera aveva conferito e

E che tipo di legame univa Bentinck e il partito inglese? Si trattava per certo di un rapporto biunivoco: laddove Bentinck contava su di loro per portare avanti il suo progetto, anche i siciliani contavano su Bentinck per attuare quella politica di riforme a loro cara. Non appena si rompe questo rapporto biunivoco per via della spaccatura in seno al partito inglese, il progetto si sbriciola davanti agli occhi dello stesso Bentinck il cui ruolo, designato dai siciliani, era, o meglio sarebbe dovuto essere, quello di guida “into the path of law”¹¹⁸.

conferiva prestigio. Questa aristocrazia si trovava di fronte a due pericoli, uno esterno legato all’ingerenza di una monarchia incline all’accentramento e alle riforme autoritarie, l’altro interno: il progressivo deterioramento della posizione economica propria dei baroni. Cfr J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l’occupazione ...*, cit., p.38-39.

¹¹⁷ Ivi, p.38.

¹¹⁸ L’espressione è ricorrente nelle lettere dell’abate Balsamo.

Ma il problema che presto si fece evidente stava nel fatto che il partito inglese «non era un blocco compatto»¹¹⁹ e nel diario Bentinck lo definisce «disunito e disarticolato»¹²⁰ tanto che spesso l'opera dell'inglese «consistette in un incessante lavoro di convincimento, di persuasione e moderazione e molto spesso di spinta anche là dove il buon senso avrebbe suggerito da solo la strada da seguire»¹²¹. Tale azione di guida (almeno inizialmente) si «esercitò più con un'opera di convincimento che con ordini e ingiunzioni»¹²².

Tra i maggiori esponenti del partito inglese, i principi di Belmonte e Castelnuovo e il loro ideologo, l'abate Paolo Balsamo. Ci limiteremo, in

¹¹⁹ L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck ...*, cit., p. 368.

¹²⁰ *Ibidem.*

¹²¹ *Ibidem.*

¹²² *Ibidem.*

quest'occasione a prendere in esame i maggiori protagonisti del partito inglese, presenti, con cadenza quasi quotidiana, nelle annotazioni del diario¹²³

Bentinck trovò dunque nei baroni ribelli gli uomini che cercava. Le sue preferenze caddero inizialmente su Giuseppe Ventimiglia, principe di Belmonte, il personaggio maggiormente presente nella prima fase del diario. Definito da Bentinck «the ablest leader»¹²⁴ del movimento, nel febbraio '12 scrisse di lui «era la persona più éclairé che avessi visto: credo che il suo obiettivo fosse il benessere del suo paese»¹²⁵. «Belmonte aveva un ruolo di guida tra i siciliani nel piano politico dell'inglese. (...) sembra che, in genere,

¹²³ A tal proposito è stata fatta un'analisi quantitativa dei nomi maggiormente ricorrenti nel diario, presentata nella seconda sezione dell'appendice del presente lavoro di ricerca.

¹²⁴ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck and the making...*, cit., p. 156.

¹²⁵ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 20 February 1812, riportato in L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck ...*, cit., p. 366.

Bentinck abbia riconosciuto la capacità di leadership che Belmonte esercitava con la sua complessa figura»¹²⁶ che nel diario viene a delinearsi tra pregi e difetti: «l'eloquente politico», «l'audace ministro»¹²⁷ ,“l'uomo di virtù” (il giusto, di cui ammirava la droiture del suo animo)¹²⁸ e, di contro, anche “uomo di grande immaginazione” e con una notevole «dose di vanità»¹²⁹ che «immaginava di poter guidare, senza vedere la necessità di avere intorno a sé un forte partito»¹³⁰. La relazione tra i due, fatta nella prima parte del diario di consigli reciproci, divenne problematica quando, dopo la crisi dell'estate del '13, al ritorno di Bentinck dalla Spagna, il ministro inglese pone l'accento

¹²⁶ L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck ...*, cit., p. 369.

¹²⁷ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 27 June 1812.

¹²⁸ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 27 July 1812.

¹²⁹ Cfr L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck...*, cit., p. 370.

¹³⁰ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 13 September 1812

sulla vanità di Belmonte che adesso diventa un problema per le sorti del suo stesso partito¹³¹ che di lì a poco si ruppe irreparabilmente. Eppure Belmonte era stato il primo a parlare di costituzione da adottare, proponendo «la vecchia Costituzione Siciliana rinnovata, ben lavata e pulita e messa in un vestito inglese, *habillé à l'Anglaise*»¹³² per la cui compilazione avevano incaricato l'abate Balsamo, ideologo del gruppo.

Lo stesso D'Acì, uno degli uomini che Bentinck aveva voluto al governo quale ministro della guerra e che aveva fortemente voluto l'adozione della

¹³¹ «Non ho mai visto Belmonte più vanesio, lo è sempre quando sta bene di salute e di animo» (*Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 20 November 1813); «Nessuno era più audace quando in prosperità e ben incoraggiato, ma non poteva combattere contro le difficoltà» (*Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 21 November 1813).

¹³² *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 6 June 1812.

Costituzione inglese¹³³ (il termine pare che sia suo), si rivelò agli occhi di Bentinck esempio «più (di) vanità che (di) patriottismo»¹³⁴. E più avanti, nell'anno seguente scriveva nel suo diario in riferimento a D'Acì come «un miserabile, sporco individuo»¹³⁵.

Così, generalizzando, riconosceva nella vanità il grande difetto del paese, di quelli che ormai definiva “compatrioti” che avevano risposto sì «all'appello di Bentinck ma, col passare del tempo, manifestavano una incapacità di perseguire prammaticamente i fini prescelti»¹³⁶ ascrivendo al loro carattere «la

¹³³ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 5 June 1812.

¹³⁴ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 26 may 1812. Ivi si legge: «Vuole il merito di creare un nuovo sistema e non può sopportare l'idea di qualsiasi partecipazione».

¹³⁵ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 9 February 1813.

¹³⁶ L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck...*, cit., p. 375. Nel diario si legge: «cominciavo a conoscere i miei compatrioti, i siciliani, la vanità era il più grande difetto del paese. Non

vera causa del loro insuccesso»¹³⁷. E via via, sempre più si rafforzava il giudizio negativo sui siciliani e nel diario annotava «non sapevano guardare avanti in questo paese. Consideravano solo il pericolo presente»¹³⁸. E ancora «facevano un gran chiasso, abbaiano molto forte, ma non avevano denti, non osavano mordere»¹³⁹, Infine, nelle ultime battute del diario, il giudizio è sprezzante: «una caratteristica generale era che essi non ragionavano mai su quello che vedevano, ma su ciò che supponevano. Erano guidati dalla loro

avevo visto nulla di simile in nessuna parte del mondo». *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 17 April 1812.

¹³⁷ L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck...*, cit., p. 374.

¹³⁸ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, March 1813.

¹³⁹ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 24 May 1813.

immaginazione e non dalla loro ragione. Nessuno calcolava che 2 e 2 fanno 4.

Faceva 5 o 6, 2 o 3. Erano poeti!»¹⁴⁰

Le impressioni di Bentinck trovano eco nelle lettere di Balsamo al ministro in cui, nell'estate del '13, denunciando la crisi in atto, invocava l'immediato intervento dell'inglese volto «a gridare, dopo averlo riorganizzato, il partito inglese»¹⁴¹. In fondo Balsamo aveva visto con anticipo quello che si sarebbe avverato più avanti e le paure, che denunciava di volta in volta nelle lettere, non erano poi del tutto infondate né tantomeno eccessive. E la sua amarezza è tanta dinanzi al «crollo di una prospettiva storica di una classe, quella dei

¹⁴⁰ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 25 February 1814.

¹⁴¹ G. GIARRIZZO, *Paolo Balsamo economista*, cit., p. 97.

baroni siciliani, alle cui fortune aveva legato tutta la sua esistenza»¹⁴² egli stesso.

I siciliani, dal canto loro, ascrivevano agli inglesi l'incapacità di imporre la propria volontà e utilizzare la forza laddove le circostanze lo richiedevano. La leggenda dell'inflessibile inglese (spesso descritto come *questa dura bestia, un uomo tanto duro, un violento da chiudere in manicomio*¹⁴³) si sfata alla lettura del diario dinanzi ai rimproveri dello stesso Belmonte o del Duca d'Orleans il cui «grande scopo era di persuadermi a misure più energiche»¹⁴⁴.

Lo stesso si riscontra nelle lettere scrittegli dall'abate Balsamo, il quale lo

¹⁴² F. RENDA, *Introduzione ...*, cit., p. 33.

¹⁴³ L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck...*, cit., p. 380.

¹⁴⁴ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 28 January 1813. Si vedano inoltre a tal proposito, le pagine del 29 maggio 1812, 16 dicembre 1812.

esorta a far uso di bastone (*the stick*) e carota. E ancora, «il diario è testimonia di uno sforzo colossale di andare avanti *by fair means*»¹⁴⁵, come se, almeno all'inizio della sua missione, «Bentinck si vide più come il portatore di un messaggio che l'esecutore di esso. Convinto assertore del principio che *le istituzioni fanno l'uomo buono o cattivo*, egli era venuto a dirigere verso la giusta soluzione e sembra mirare più ad influenzare che a comandare»¹⁴⁶.

Il fatto che Bentinck, fino al momento della crisi del '13 parlasse ripetutamente nel diario di "mezzo termine" (definizione ripetuta numerose volte e volutamente in italiano) sottolinea come fino ad allora l'inglese

¹⁴⁵ L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck...*, cit., p. 381.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibidem*. Le parole in corsivo sono di Bentinck riportate nel testo. E nel suo diario annotava il 27 dicembre 1812: «sebbene Belmonte si lamentava della lentezza e della mancanza di energia degli inglesi, i Ministri dovevano essere i capi e il ministro inglese poteva essere solo ausiliare».

cercasse ogni espediente per trovare un punto di accordo con la corte soprattutto e i siciliani in genere, limitandosi a consigli ed evitando qualsiasi forma di imposizione.

I costituzionalisti siciliani non erano una mera creazione del ministro britannico, rappresentavano genuine forze politiche: i baroni, ovvero l’embrionale classe media –composta perlopiù di giuristi, rappresentanti del clero e latifondisti – rappresentavano un’emergente classe . (...) il loro fallimento esprimeva il fallimento di tutta una classe sociale.¹⁴⁷

Più vicino, almeno politicamente, a Bentinck fu “l’inflessibile”¹⁴⁸ principe di Castelnuovo (nel diario chiamato Villahermosa), uomo imbibito degli ideali della repubblica romana che, non condividendo le scelte di Belmonte, peraltro

¹⁴⁷ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making ...*, cit., p.156.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

suo nipote, si era schierato con l'ala moderata dei democratici nel «tentativo di allargare le basi sociali e politiche del regime costituzionale»¹⁴⁹. Egli dovette realizzare che la difesa dei baroni in parlamento coinvolgeva interessi più grandi di quelli della loro classe. Essi «dovevano adesso fare alcuni significativi sacrifici dei loro interessi e prerogative per il bene generale della nazione»¹⁵⁰. Sebbene temesse la democrazia, il desiderio di Castelnuovo di moderati cambiamenti sociali lo portò ad incoraggiare una potenziale alleanza con i democratici, alcuni dei quali avevano speso anni in esilio nella Francia rivoluzionaria. Qualche anno più tardi, ricordando la svolta democratica del Castelnuovo, Balsamo, suo “excellent friend” sostenne che si trattava di un

¹⁴⁹ F. RENDA, *Introduzione...*, cit., p. 42.

¹⁵⁰ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making ...*, cit., p. 156, riporta una frase di Bentinck.

“capitale sbaglio”, «sorgente di mille disordini»¹⁵¹, che si concluderanno con la definitiva crisi politica del movimento costituzionalista.

Quasi inesistente nel diario il dialogo con i reali, «anche se un segno di collaborazione sembrò nascere all’inizio di quel gennaio, ma fu subito travolto dalla condotta di Maria Carolina»¹⁵² e dalla assenza dalla scena politica del sovrano, Ferdinando di Borbone, dedito più alla caccia che non al governo del paese. Numerosi gli episodi riferiti nel diario circa la condotta dei due regnanti. Bentinck puntò, piuttosto, sul vicario del re, il figlio Francesco. Il ministro «tentò subito di suscitare un interesse in Francesco e perseguì immediatamente il tentativo di esercitare un certo ascendente su di lui, forse

¹⁵¹ F. RENDA, *Introduzione...*, cit., p. 42. Si riferisce al testo delle *Memorie segrete* di Paolo Balsamo.

¹⁵² L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck...*, cit., p. 363.

per arrivare a un beneplacito monarchico ai suoi piani»¹⁵³. La loro relazione, facilmente tracciabile nel diario, vede Bentinck definirlo inizialmente «uomo perfettamente imparziale, dei più onesti e candidi, di opinioni ragionevoli (...)»¹⁵⁴ ma «la collaborazione e la sottomissione del principe, le sue buone intenzioni (“che possono anche essere paura o insincerità”, annotava Bentinck), le attenzioni dell’inglese verso di lui, quel senso di cooperazione caratteristico delle conversazioni iniziali, durarono poco e ripresero solo alla fine del soggiorno di Bentinck»¹⁵⁵ Francesco era soggetto ai genitori, si definiva *fils respectueux*¹⁵⁶ e il padre, il re, era infastidito del ruolo di

¹⁵³ Ivi, p. 364.

¹⁵⁴ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, January 1812.

¹⁵⁵ L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck...*, cit., p 364.

¹⁵⁶ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 25 February 1813.

“schoolmaster”¹⁵⁷ che Bentinck, a suo avviso, voleva rappresentare per il figlio vicario. Bentinck, dinanzi alla sua condotta remissiva e di uno che «temeva di essere dannato nell’altro mondo se disubbidiva ai genitori»¹⁵⁸, giudicò «straordinario che un tale stupido potesse dissimulare così bene»¹⁵⁹.

Anche il rapporto con il Duca d’Orleans meriterebbe un’analisi accurata giacché, seppur membro della famiglia reale-era il genero del re- il loro rapporto fu «tra i pochi che rimasero inalterati nel corso del soggiorno di Bentinck»¹⁶⁰.

¹⁵⁷ Espressione riportata nel *Sicilian Journal* da Bentinck.

¹⁵⁸ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 30 June 1812.

¹⁵⁹ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6240-6250, 22 July 1812.

¹⁶⁰ L. GIARDINA, *Lord Bentinck...*, cit., p. 369.

2.3 Dal diario alle epistole: Balsamo e la corrispondenza a Bentinck

Un paragrafo a sé merita il rapporto tra Lord Bentinck e l'abate termitano Paolo Balsamo¹⁶¹ del quale si è accennato via via lungo la ricerca, quale voce poderosa della Sicilia di primo Ottocento, protagonista del dibattito economico, politico e culturale degli anni in cui Bentinck svolse la sua

¹⁶¹ Relativamente a Paolo Balsamo si vedano: F. BRANCATO, *Paolo Balsamo* in "Dizionario biografico degli italiani", vol. V, Istituto dell' Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani, Roma 1963; G. GIARRIZZO, *Paolo Balsamo economista*, in "Rivista Storica Italiana", LXXVII, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 1966, pp. 5-60; F. RENDA, *Introduzione* in P. BALSAMO, *Memorie segrete sulla istoria moderna del Regno di Sicilia*. (ristampa), Edizione della Regione Siciliana, Palermo 1969.

missione in Sicilia, nonché «in larga parte l'ispiratore e l'artefice»¹⁶² della stesura della Costituzione del 1812.

All'interno del corpus relativo a Bentinck sono state rinvenute, tra i numerosissimi mittenti, otto lettere¹⁶³ scritte tra il 1812 e il 1813 da Balsamo, di cui si riporta trascrizione in appendice. Inoltre, sotto la stessa collocazione, alcune riflessioni circa la costituzione stessa e una nota autografa sul commercio dei grani, rispettivamente catalogate dal ricevente Bentinck come «Balsamo on the Sicilian Constitution» e «Remedy for the present scarcity»,

¹⁶² F. RENDA *Introduzione* in P. BALSAMO, *Memorie segrete sulla istoria moderna del Regno di Sicilia* (ristampa), Edizioni Regione Sicilia, Palermo 1969, p. 11.

¹⁶³ Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, Bentinck Papers (già riportate con la sigla BP), Pw Jd 412-421, *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*. Nel dettaglio, lettere scritte in data 5 luglio 1812, s.d. luglio 1812, 13 giugno 1813, 14 luglio 1813, 25 luglio 1813, 18 agosto 1813, 4 ottobre 1813, s.d. 1813.

entrambe datate 1813. Queste, seppur trascritte e meritevoli di ulteriore approfondimento, non fanno parte della presente analisi che prende in esame le sole lettere.

Il corpus comprende otto lettere scritte tra il 1812 e il 1813¹⁶⁴. di lunghezza differente. Quasi tutte sono espressamente indirizzate a Bentinck, ad eccezione della lettera scritta nel luglio 1812 indirizzata al segretario di questi, Frederick Lamb¹⁶⁵. Le lettere, tutte autografe, presentano una calligrafia

¹⁶⁴ Si fa presente che, salvo diversa indicazione, tutte le citazioni riportate d'ora innanzi nel testo, sia in inglese che in traduzione italiana, sono riscontrabili nelle lettere di Balsamo a Bentinck (Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, Bentinck Papers -BP-, PwJd 412-421).

¹⁶⁵ Si noti che Bentinck era solito catalogare la corrispondenza in arrivo sull'esterno della lettera medesima che conservava, privandosi invece dell'incartamento ove essa era contenuta nel momento della spedizione. Sulla parte posteriore della piegatura della lettera

chiarissima e facilmente leggibile. Conservate in ottimo stato presso l'archivio della Nottingham University Library, con segnalazione PwJd 412-421, sono scritte in fogli di diverse dimensione, consistenza e colore: foglio azzurrato con filigrana centrale, 20,5 x 29,5 cm, le lettere del 1812 e foglio avorio, particolarmente sottile, 18,5x23 cm circa, quelle del 1813. A queste ultime fa eccezione la nota di Balsamo sulla Costituzione, scritta su fogli avorio dalle dimensioni 20,5 x 30 circa, peraltro l'unica non autografa. Mostrano tutte un'ottima padronanza della lingua inglese (Balsamo, d'altronde, aveva vissuto alcuni anni della sua vita in Gran Bretagna) e l'uso

egli annotava l'anno, il mittente, data e luogo di partenza (departed), data e luogo di ricezione (received), e talvolta, ma non sempre, l'argomento.

di un registro piuttosto formale¹⁶⁶, uno stile sempre molto ossequioso ed elegante, sintomo non solo dei tempi e della posizione di entrambi, ma anche della grossa stima che l'abate termitano serbasse per Bentinck.

Fatta eccezione per due lettere del 1812¹⁶⁷, (l'una in cui Balsamo fornisce alcune informazioni di carattere meramente agrario¹⁶⁸ e l'altra in cui, su richiesta, riferisce il discorso del re riportato dall'arcivescovo all'interno del

¹⁶⁶ Le lettere cominciano tutte con "My Lord" e si chiudono con la formula di congedo "I have the honour to be your most devoted humble servant" seguite dalla firma di Balsamo.

¹⁶⁷ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 412 (5 luglio 1812) e BP PwJd 413 (luglio 1812, indirizzata a Frederick Lamb, suo segretario).

¹⁶⁸ Si tratta dell'unica lettera del gruppo dove Balsamo fornisce a Bentinck «the best information in my power» relative alla materia agraria: la coltivazione del grano in Sicilia, l'uso delle macine, la mollificazione del grano prima di essere seminato, la differenza tra i mulini siciliani e quelli inglesi (gli uni attivati dall'acqua, gli altri dal vento), etc. Dalla tenuta del principe di Belmonte, Balsamo avrebbe procurato a Bentinck «a very excellent species of sicilian wheat: majoca bianca».

braccio ecclesiastico), e di una con data non precisa del '13 di sfogo personale¹⁶⁹ la maggior parte delle lettere scritte dall'abate sono relative allo «*state of affairs*»¹⁷⁰ della Sicilia durante il periodo di assenza di Bentinck nell'estate del 1813¹⁷¹: si tratta di resoconti intenti a informare il ministro inglese della situazione politica grave e pericolosa nella quale versava l'isola, le cui sorti dipendevano fortemente dalla «*enforcing authority*»¹⁷² della Gran

¹⁶⁹ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 420 (s.d. 1813).

¹⁷⁰ L'espressione si riferisce alla catalogazione per argomento *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 420 (s.d. 1813).

¹⁷⁰ L'espressione si riferisce alla fatta da Bentinck sull'esterno delle lettere.

¹⁷¹ Dal 27 maggio 1813 Lord Bentinck si spostò in Spagna al comando di una spedizione anglo-siciliana dalla quale fu di ritorno solo il 4 ottobre dello stesso anno. Balsamo fa risalire al momento dell'allontanamento del ministro inglese dall'isola «l'epoca del cominciamento dei disordini e delle sciagure del regno».

¹⁷² *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 414.

Bretagna che l'avrebbe *diretta e guidata* -e questo Balsamo lo sapeva bene¹⁷³-
«*into the path of law*¹⁷⁴». Questa funzione di guida era oltremodo necessaria, a
suo dire, in una nazione che, degradata per troppo tempo dal despotismo, la
cui etica era stata fino a quel momento trascurata, non sarebbe stata pronta a
sopportare un simile cambiamento, «*from a slavish to free form of
government*¹⁷⁵».

¹⁷³ Bisogna considerare che sebbene Balsamo fosse convinto della natura autoctona del movimento costituzionale, poiché ben consapevole dell'incapacità dei baroni di sacrificare i propri interessi per quelli del paese, egli riconosceva nella guida dell'Inghilterra un fattore determinante. Cfr. F. RENDA, *Introduzione ...*, cit., p. 35 e G. GIARRIZZO, *Paolo Balsamo economista*, cit., p. 97.

¹⁷⁴ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 414.

¹⁷⁵ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 414.

Nelle lettere si scorge frequentemente un appello di aiuto «appassionato e drammatico»¹⁷⁶ che talvolta risulta persino ridondante. La paura che la situazione possa sfuggire di mano ai «*good sicilians*¹⁷⁷», l'angoscia che il partito filo-francese, travestito di patriottismo e filantropia, guadagnasse sempre più proseliti, la necessità di misure immediate e restrittive («*steady and vigorous measures*» sulle quali entrambi si trovano in accordo¹⁷⁸), sono elementi costantemente presenti nelle lettere dell'estate della crisi politica del 1813, implorando un tempestivo rientro di Bentinck dalla Spagna allo scopo di

¹⁷⁶ Cfr. G. GIARRIZZO, *Paolo Balsamo economista*, cit.

¹⁷⁷ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 417-418.

¹⁷⁸ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6257, 28 January 1813. *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 418.

mettere fine a questa triste «*combination of things*¹⁷⁹» che deteriora giorno dopo giorno. Il paese è nel caos, ci sono «*all the seeds and appearance of some thing like the French revolution and destruction*»¹⁸⁰ Solo il ritorno immediato di Bentinck nell'isola, «*the only man who may estinguish the torch of discord*¹⁸¹», può ristabilire ordine e tranquillità in un paese dove persino i membri del parlamento mostrano «inclinazione per idee strampalate e schemi fantasiosi». Balsamo non risparmia l'uso di toni coloriti nel descrivere la

¹⁷⁹ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 418.

¹⁸⁰ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 417.

Anche nelle pagine delle *Memorie segrete*, compilate poco prima della sua morte, nel 1816, si rilegge dell'atmosfera di "dissenso e torbolenze" che mano a mano comunicava nelle lettere a Bentinck.

¹⁸¹ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 418.

situazione dello «*sfortunato regno*¹⁸²», e ritiene che il solo «*mix good manners to some fear*¹⁸³» (per Bentinck «*bonbons in one hand and il bastone -the stick-in the other*»¹⁸⁴), possano guarirlo. E, con quest'espressione, sembra anticipare quello che avverrà al rientro di Bentinck dalla Spagna: il ministro adotterà il rimedio della dittatura personale¹⁸⁵.

Di particolare interesse è la lettera del 04 ottobre 1813 scritta all'indomani del rientro di Bentinck in Sicilia dalla campagna in Spagna. In essa Balsamo, più che nelle lettere precedenti, riassume dettagliatamente il degradare della situazione politica e soprattutto del rapido disgregarsi del partito inglese a

¹⁸² *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 417.

¹⁸³ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 416.

¹⁸⁴ *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 26 gennaio 1814. Cfr J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck , the making ...*, cit., p. 151.

¹⁸⁵ Cfr J. ROSSELLI; *Il progetto italiano ...*, cit., p. 391 e relative note.

vantaggio della opposizione filo-francese in seno al parlamento. Secondo Balsamo «*the fatal epoch in which broke out all the animosities, and hostilities against the administration , the English, and whatever had been done to benefit this kingdom*¹⁸⁶» coincide proprio con l'apertura dei lavori del nuovo parlamento, immediatamente dopo la partenza del ministro inglese per la Spagna. Il partito inglese, che inizialmente aveva la maggioranza in parlamento, oltre che le poltrone dei due presidenti delle camere con Airoidi e Villafranca, assistette ad un rapido mutare degli eventi. Forti dell'assenza di Bentinck, i membri della fazione democratica cominciarono a portare avanti una campagna volta a screditare gli inglesi e la costituzione stessa con argomentazioni futili quali la peste di Malta, le diversità religiose e le gelosie

¹⁸⁶ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 418.

commerciali. Accusarono l'amministrazione di Castelnuovo di non controllare la spesa pubblica, di dar luogo a sprechi e di oberare la nazione con «*ruinous and insupportable taxes*¹⁸⁷». La situazione di instabilità politica, la debolezza del principe ereditario e la riforma dell'amministrazione ancora incompleta, non andavano a vantaggio del partito inglese, ma anzi portarono pian piano molti parlamentari a sposare la causa del partito filo-francese. In poco tempo i costituzionalisti persero entrambi i presidenti delle camere, trovandosi ben presto in minoranza. Questo portò ad una situazione di completo caos amministrativo, giacché la prerogativa del parlamento, secondo il modello inglese, era quella di approvare il bilancio dello stato, nonché ogni nuova tassa. Castelnuovo , ministro delle finanze, si trovò con le mani legate: il

¹⁸⁷ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 418.

governo aveva urgente bisogno di denaro per poter pagare le truppe e risanare altri settori dell'amministrazione, per cui era necessario che il parlamento approvasse il bilancio. Il partito anticostituzionalista adottò la strategia dell'ostruzionismo parlamentare posponendo, con «*frivolous pretexts*¹⁸⁸», l'approvazione del bilancio. Nel tentativo di risanare questa situazione di stallo intervenne anche il principe ereditario dando un ultimatum alle camere perché concedesse al governo Castelfnuovo i mezzi necessari per l'amministrazione dello stato, ma essi ignorarono anche l'intervento del principe vicario. L'epilogo naturale fu la dimissione dei ministri del governo Castelfnuovo. Oltre a ciò si instaurò un'atmosfera a metà tra regime del terrore francese e *long parliament* cromwelliano. Il partito anticostituzionalista infatti

¹⁸⁸ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 418.

condusse un'aspra campagna diffamatoria nei confronti degli inglesi e della costituzione, minacciava e diffamava quanti non aderivano al loro partito.

Così Balsamo scriveva a Bentinck: «they seem to have chosen for a model, or guide of their proceedings the long parliament of England; but happily for us they had not a Cromwell [...]»¹⁸⁹».

Nelle lettere, in particolare nella lettera di ottobre 1813, si avverte un velato criticismo da parte del Balsamo nei confronti dei membri del suo stesso partito filo-inglese, responsabili, secondo l'abate, di non aver dato molto peso alla possibilità che l'opposizione avesse potuto guadagnare terreno in assenza della protezione inglese e di non aver fatto abbastanza per impedire che ciò accadesse.

¹⁸⁹ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 418.

Emerge, inoltre, la sua visione, oligarchica forse, della gestione amministrativa. Secondo Balsamo il popolo (*il volgo*) è “insano e volubile”. Esso deve essere tenuto a bada e «il potere pubblico deve essere sottratto con ogni mezzo alla loro influenza. [...] Solo una élite di uomini onesti, capaci e soprattutto provvisti di consistenti patrimoni è in grado di assicurare la buona amministrazione della cosa pubblica»¹⁹⁰. E nella *Memoria sulla costituzione*, tra le carte inviate a Bentinck, così scriveva: «All abstract maxims concerning liberty, equality and the like should be expunged from the constitution. The mass of people is ignorant and always perverts them; and in France the rights of man did more harm, than any thing else»¹⁹¹. E mantenne, forse

¹⁹⁰ F. RENDA, *Introduzione...*, cit., p. 40.

¹⁹¹ *Balsamo on Sicilian Constitution in Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 419.

rafforzandola, questa posizione anche dopo che il suo “excellent friend” Castelnuovo, si era schierato con l’ala moderata dei democratici nel «tentativo di allargare le basi sociali e politiche del regime costituzionale»¹⁹² sebbene, in una lettera a Bentinck, questi scriveva: «la moltitudine [...] non è fatta per imbarazzarsi in nulla nelle politiche rivoluzioni; perciocché è un torrente, che, rotte le dighe, non si sa qual direzione piglierà. Se v’è da temere dei movimenti di qualunque popolo, v’è da tremare di quelli di quelli del popolo siciliano, che non è affatto preparato per un governo popolare liberale, e non è ancora emerso da quella profonda servitù nella quale è stato tenuto per più secoli. La massima parte degli uomini di una società, e particolarmente di una poco colta, o civilizzata qual è la Sicilia, sono nati per ubbidire, e lungi dal

¹⁹² F. RENDA, *Introduzione...*, cit., p. 42.

doversi mischiare, non devono quasi sapere i saggi ed utili regolamenti che si fanno per lo miglioramento del loro stato»¹⁹³. In realtà tale affermazione di Castelnuovo, rispecchia più la visione del popolo di Balsamo, che non il nuovo orientamento democratico intrapreso dal principe. Balsamo nelle lettere ne giustifica le difficoltà legate alla gestione del ministero (Castelnuovo, lo ricordiamo era ministro delle finanze) e, pur non condividendone le scelte politiche, rimarrà suo amico. Qualche anno più tardi, ricordando la svolta democratica di Castelnuovo, sostenne che si trattava di un “capitale sbaglio”,

¹⁹³ *Correspondence between the Prince of Castelnuovo (Prince of Villermosa) and Lord Bentinck (1813)*, BP, PwJd 1189-1191. Cfr R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento ...*, cit., p. 150, a sua volta citato in G. BIANCO, *La Sicilia durante l'occupazione inglese 1806-1815*, Palermo 1902, p. 362. Cfr G. GIARRIZZO, *Paolo Balsamo economista*, cit., p. 97.

“sorgente di mille disordini”¹⁹⁴, che si concluderanno con la definitiva crisi politica del movimento costituzionalista. A questi Balsamo poco prima di morire, consegnerà il testo delle Memorie segrete sulla storia moderna del Regno di Sicilia, prezioso contributo alla ricostruzione di quegli anni, che vedrà la luce solo dopo il '48¹⁹⁵.

La scarsa fiducia nel popolo e nelle sue manifestazioni aggravava, agli occhi di Balsamo, il divario tra la Sicilia e la Gran Bretagna che, se prima si limitava alla sola sfera economico-sociale, adesso, con la lucidità datagli

¹⁹⁴ F. RENDA, *Introduzione...*, cit., p. 42, in riferimento al testo delle *Memorie* di Paolo Balsamo.

¹⁹⁵ Tenute segrete per anni, il testo delle *Memorie Segrete* fu stampato nel 1848 a cura di Gregorio Ugdulena, esponente della corrente autonomistica siciliana, quale documento di attualità e interesse ai fini della causa siciliana. Cfr F. RENDA *Introduzione...*, cit., p. 8 e p.29.

dall'evoluzione degli eventi, si estendeva anche sul piano politico. Così scriveva a Bentinck nella lettera del 4 ottobre 1813: «*Sicily is now for knowledge and morals what was England two centuries back. Too much liberty is for the Sicilian, what would be a pistol, or a stiletto in the hands of a boy, or a madman*»¹⁹⁶.

Dalla crisi del '13 fu tutto un precipitare degli eventi. La conclusione dell'esperienza costituzionale è ben nota, un po' meno l'amarezza e la delusione di quanti, coinvolti in prima persona, ci credettero a fondo. Basta leggere le *Memorie segrete* di Balsamo per trovare tra pagine di meri racconti cronachistici, compilate con toni pacati e stile piatto, testimonianza di una fede che si era spenta, un Balsamo deluso e disincantato ben diverso dal

¹⁹⁶ *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck*, BP, PwJd 418.

Balsamo fervido e passionale delle lettere dell'estate del 1813 quando invocava l'immediato intervento di Bentinck volto non tanto «a sconfiggere il partito francese, quanto a gridare, dopo averlo riorganizzato, il partito inglese»¹⁹⁷. In fondo Balsamo aveva visto con anticipo quello che si sarebbe avverato più avanti e le paure, che denunciava di volta in volta nelle lettere, non erano poi del tutto infondate né tantomeno eccessive. E la sua amarezza è tanta dinanzi al «crollo di una prospettiva storica di una classe, quella dei baroni siciliani, alle cui fortune aveva legato tutta la sua esistenza»¹⁹⁸.

Anche Castelnuovo, insieme a Balsamo, ne uscì deluso dall'esperienza costituzionale. «Cercò ancora per qualche tempo di salvare qualcosa del “sistema” collaborando con il Re, ma dopo il maggio 1815 si ritirò a vita

¹⁹⁷ G. GIARRIZZO, *Paolo Balsamo economista*, cit., p. 97.

¹⁹⁸ F. RENDA, *Introduzione ...*, cit., p. 33.

privata, rifiutandosi costantemente di pagare le tasse ad un governo anticostituzionale, salvo quando ne fu costretto, e lasciando alla sua morte, avvenuta nel 1822, la somma di 25.000 sterline a chiunque fosse in grado di convincere il Re a ripristinare la Costituzione»¹⁹⁹.

Poco più avanti, nell'anno della morte di Balsamo (1816), all'indomani del decreto regio che vedeva Ferdinando riprendere pieni poteri tra il plauso della folla, «i costituzionali erano come banditi dalla vita pubblica e sottoposti alla più attenta vigilanza poliziesca, ma si avvertiva dappertutto l'aria della disfatta, l'incertezza e la sfiducia nel domani, divenuti fenomeni del giorno»²⁰⁰

La rivoluzione del 1820 altro non fece che peggiorare la situazione, dal momento che, ancora una volta, «i costituzionalisti si dimostrarono incapaci di

¹⁹⁹ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck e l'occupazione ...*, cit., p 256.

²⁰⁰ F. RENDA, *Introduzione ...*, cit., p. 11.

dominare gli eventi, e la reazione borbonica si scatenò con brutale violenza. In conseguenza, l'opposizione siciliana dovette riparare fra le discrete difese della clandestinità, preparandosi ad una lunga catarsi politica ed ideologica, che si sarebbe conclusa nel '48 ed in modo particolare nel '60»²⁰¹.

²⁰¹ *Ibidem.*

CONCLUSIONI

Di Bentinck si è tanto discusso, la storiografia lo ha ritratto da prospettive diverse, restituendoci delle immagini tra esse contraddittorie, ed evidenziando aspetti differenti²⁰²: un liberale prima, poi governatore *de facto* della Sicilia e, «dopo il fallimento della Costituzione nel 1813, un dittatore che aveva imposto la legge marziale. Due mesi dopo egli trasse la logica conclusione, e in una lettera al principe ereditario, espresse il suo ‘philosophic dream’ che la Sicilia dovesse divenire ‘the queen of our colonies’. Sebbene nulla di ciò si concretizzò, l’avventura siciliana di Bentinck fu comunque un’espressione

²⁰² Ritorna qui il concetto espresso da Paolo Macry riguardo alla differenza tra storia e interpretazione storiografica. Cfr. P. MACRY, *La società contemporanea. Una introduzione storica*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1995.

della storia dell'espansione coloniale britannica così come della sua politica internazionale»²⁰³ tanto quanto il disegno di un uomo «sostanzialmente legato all'ideale di assicurare la felicità dell'isola spingendola sulla via della libertà e del progresso civile, che a un certo momento gli parve raggiungibile solo con l'inserimento nel sistema britannico»²⁰⁴ quando nel famoso sogno filosofico del '13 giunse a proporre l'annessione dell'isola all'Inghilterra.

“Caldo seguace del partito whig” proveniva da un ambiente “nel quale era diffusa la convinzione che le istituzioni liberali britanniche rappresentassero la forma migliore di reggimento politico per ogni paese; e questa convinzione lo

²⁰³ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck and the making...*, cit., p 147.

²⁰⁴ Tratto dalla recensione di R. ROMEO al testo di J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck and the British Occupation...*, cit., in «The Journal of Modern History», vol. 30, no. 2, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1958, pp. 145-147.

guidò nella sua quadriennale lotta in Sicilia”. Per la sua formazione politica e per i suoi ideali Bentinck poteva essere considerato come «uno dei primi esponenti di quella corrente liberale a carattere europeo, composta d’inglesi e non inglesi, che nella prima metà del secolo XIX guardò all’Inghilterra costituzionale come a un modello, e riuscì a diffonderne le istituzioni in tutta l’Europa occidentale»²⁰⁵. E questo scagionerebbe Bentinck, come suggerisce anche Romeo, da quella figura di dittatore della Sicilia²⁰⁶ che più volte è stata declamata sia dai suoi contemporanei che dalla recente storiografia.

Ma allo stesso tempo ci troviamo d’accordo con l’idea che Bentinck sia figlio del suo tempo, della sua nazione, del partito whig e della sua classe sociale. Sì,

²⁰⁵ M. D’ANGELO, *Romeo e la Sicilia inglese*, cit., p. 153. Le parole riportate tra virgolette sono di R. ROMEO, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, cit., p.137.

²⁰⁶ M. D’ANGELO, *Romeo e la Sicilia inglese*, cit., p. 153.

è un liberale cresciuto in seno al partito guidato da Fox, nutrito dell'ideologia di Burke, ma c'è da dire che Bentinck viveva nel periodo di fortissima espansione coloniale della Gran Bretagna, momento in cui era necessario non solo tenere sotto controllo i territori conquistati ma anche contenere l'espansione (politica e culturale) francese in Europa così come nelle colonie. E anche il Mediterraneo fa parte di tale progetto coloniale²⁰⁷. Lo storico Croce conclude questa duale immagine di Bentinck affermando che è chiaro il persistente disegno britannico relativo all'isola²⁰⁸.

Pulito il campo da ipotesi meramente filantropiche che ne giustificano l'operato in virtù di una esclusiva visione di un uomo nel tentativo di risollevarle le sorti di una nazione in nome dell'ideale liberale, la definizione di

²⁰⁷ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making...*, cit., p.147.

²⁰⁸ Ivi, p. 23.

Rosselli, che peraltro dà il titolo alla sua monografia, chiarisce del tutto ogni dubbio: *a liberal imperialist*, coniugando insieme due attributi che presi a sé portano delle connotazioni differenti, talvolta opposte, ma nel caso di Bentinck sembrano poter coesistere. Rosselli non cade nella tentazione di innamorarsi del suo personaggio ma, mantenendo un distacco prospettico, riesce a vedere lati anche contraddittori dello stesso definendolo «a controversial figure in his lifetime»²⁰⁹, rendendoci così un quadro completo che più volte la storiografia passata e recente non è riuscita a vedere, parteggiando per l'una o per l'altra ipotesi.

L'immagine della Sicilia che viene fuori dal diario e dalla corrispondenza esaminata è un'immagine sicuramente contraddittoria, in parte distorta da

²⁰⁹ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making...*, cit., p.20.

Bentinck in particolare quando, avendo sentore dell'imminente fallimento della sua missione nell'isola, parla dei siciliani capaci più di rumoreggiare che di agire (*this was noise rather than action*²¹⁰). Prima ancora di divenire dittatore dell'isola in occasione di un tour nella parte orientale, nelle terre intorno al vulcano, rimane impressionato del cattivo stato (*the bad way*) -si tenga presente la sua educazione classica- e rientra a Palermo ancor più convinto di dover adottare "bullying" (la prepotenza), giacché:

Sicily, in the hands of Great Britain, would become in a very few years a source of wealth and strength ... the capacity of the country exceeds all belief (...) it is only necessary to see it fully to believe all the accounts transmitted by history of its former greatness. But I affix more importance to the character

²¹⁰ J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making...*, cit., p 162, cita Lord Bentinck.

that Great Britain will acquire by the successful establishment of Sicilian liberty than to the value of Sicily as a British possession. I wish Sicily to exist as a perpetual example of the blessing of our friendship, in comparison to that of France; and I would have Sicily become not only the model, but the instrument of Italian independence.²¹¹

La Sicilia ai suoi occhi, nel momento in cui diventa dittatore dell'isola, è un “focolaio di tutto ciò che è male” (*hotbed of all that is bad*), una “cambusa marcita” alla quale è legato (*rotten galley*)²¹². Più avanti, nel momento in cui lascia definitivamente l'isola, si definisce «*disgustato* da un paese che ha

²¹¹ J. ROSSELLI; *Lord William Bentinck, the making...*, cit., p. 164. Nel *Sicilian Journal*, Lord Bentinck fa spesso riferimento alle sue intenzioni di supportare “happiness, greatness and independence of Sicily”. Cfr. *Sicilian Journal*, BP, PwJd 6258, 5 ottobre 1813.

²¹² Tutte queste espressioni si trovano in J ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making...*, cit., p. 166. L'autore non ne specifica l'esatta provenienza.

perso opportunità auree per *mancaza di coraggio, virtù e patriottismo*»²¹³.

Parla come un uomo deluso (ricorrenti espressioni sia nella corrispondenza che nel diario testimoniano la rabbia momentanea) sebbene più avanti, sul finire della sua vita, in alcune lettere , saranno riscontrabili espressioni di rispetto per alcuni “real good Siculi”²¹⁴ che aveva conosciuto durante l’esperienza siciliana. Parole diverse, rispetto a quando, dando chiarimento del sogno filosofico, spiegava la desiderata annessione dell’isola all’Inghilterra per renderla, «dopo l’Irlanda, il gioiello più luminoso della corona

²¹³ J. ROSSELLI; *Lord William Bentinck, the making...*, cit., p.167, riportando parole di Lord Bentinck.

²¹⁴ *Correspondence from P.M. Benza to Lord Bentinck*, BP, PwJg 32, Madras, 14 September 1835, citato in J. ROSSELLI, *Lord William Bentinck, the making...*, cit., p 167.

britannica»²¹⁵. Esse però sono allo stesso tempo testimonianza di un'isola in movimento: era fallito sì il suo tentativo di “nation-building”²¹⁶ ma il movimento (il partito) nel quale aveva creduto non si era esaurito del tutto e ne sono evidenza gli episodi del 1820 e del 1848.

²¹⁵ J. ROSSELLI; *Lord William Bentinck, the making...*, cit., p164.

²¹⁶ Ivi, p. 167.

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APPENDICE I

Qui di seguito verrà riportata la fedele e integrale trascrizione dell'inedito diario manoscritto, l'autografo *Sicilian Journal* (ai segni PwJd 6240-6250). Tutti i documenti riportati sono conservati presso la Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, nella sezione Bentinck Papers (abbreviata BP).

Nella trascrizione si è badato a rispettare anche la punteggiatura e gli accenti. Le note dell'autore, poste numerate ai margini delle carte, sono state riportate in coda alla pagina di riferimento.

Volendo mantenere il carattere originario dei documenti, non privi di imperfezioni (quali nomi di persone e località), volutamente mantenute nella trascrizione sia del diario che delle lettere, si è fatto uso dei seguenti segni diacritici:

[word]:	parola aggiunta, integrazione
[]:	parola illegibile
> word <:	parola interpretata
L[?iverpool]:	sola iniziale nel testo
. . . :	parola mancante nel testo
- :	trattino nel testo
<that>:	espunzione
<i>mademoiselle</i> :	parole marcate nel testo, spesso in lingua francese e italiana

[Palermo], Wednesday, January 1, 1812. Saw last night the Duke of Orleans. He told me the King meant decidedly to abdicate; that the Queen had asked him the form. The Duke answered he did not know; that he knew of three instances: Philip V, Victor Amédée, and Charles V. We agreed that it would be an advantage if the King did abdicate; that the Hereditary Prince could begin afresh and make himself popular at once by granting those things wanted by the nation.

We agreed that the Hereditary Prince could not go on without managing his Parliament. He said that Belmonte could alone do this and that no Ministry would be good for anything without him. We agreed upon the necessity of destroying the Queen's influence. I mentioned that I should propose that Cassaro should be sent to me to arrange the new Government. *We* should have the same objects in view, but at present I was treating with a man, Circello, who had quite different views and wishes.

He told me he heard the King wanted 200,000 ounces to be guaranteed by us. I told him the Hereditary Prince and Parliament could alone do this. He told me his dowry had never been paid; that he understood it was to be 2,000 oz. per month.

He said when the Queen asked him what we wanted, whether to take the island, he said not, that the nation did not wish it. He said he had seen my first instructions from me and that I was not desired even to ask for the command; that he had told her that we should compel the Court to our measures. She said to him: "Do you believe I ever made a treaty with the Emperor of France?" "No, certainly," he said, "what is more, I believe the Emperor would not make one with you". He said she had told him her determination was to leave the palace and to live in the town, and to see only those whom *le cru chef* (I) would permit her.

He told me the Hereditary Prince was delighted with the thought of succeeding; that he was an honest man, but thickheaded and not easy, he thought, to be led out of the circle of his ideas. I told the Duke that I had sent for a regiment from Malta and had ordered transports to Milazzo and Trapani. He said the Queen had observed that the not sending troops to Messina was awkward, but, she said, they would not have them. "Pardon me," answered the Duke, "they would not have me, but too happy to have had your troops".

Thursday, January 2, [1812]. At nine in the morning Butera came to me and brought a letter from the Queen to say she would see me at half past 11. He told me that Countess Zecchi and St Clair had both given the Queen the best. He said he had once thought the former intriguing, but was now convinced of his mistake.

I went to the Queen at half past 11. Found her all smiling and *couleur de rose*. She began by saying: "Let us leave aside all political discourse and have one of friendship". She said she had always been English, *par sentiment*. That *île et presque île* as was Sicily, it was her interest also to attach themselves to a powerful maritime nation that could defend them. She added: "and now I must be *par nécessité - vous voyez comme je vous parle franchement*". Said she would no longer correspond at all with Naples if we chose it, or without showing us her letters and having our passports; that she had desired no more letters to be sent to her, for fear the bearers should be hung either by the French or English. She had employed the King's confessor to speak to the King and induce him to give up that *sottise* of the

abdication. He had returned, having made some impression upon the King. If things would be settled, she said, her intention was to go down to Ficuzza and endeavour to persuade the King to come to his birthday, the 12th, to receive the *baciamano*, give honours and crosses and *toutes ces bêtises - là*". She knew the *injures* and reproaches she would have to suffer from the King. She did not mind it, it was for the best.

She said in the beginning that she was determined not to oppose. Her resolution was taken; it might turn out ill, but she had decided for the best. She hoped she would inspire me with confidence; believed I was an honest man; invited me to come to her at all hours, without notice, and to speak to her without restraint. She said confidence could not be commanded, it must grow with time. She hoped to convince me of her good intentions. After repeating "*Mon cher, accommodons cela, s'il est possible*", said Ascoli was to go to Malta, Medici to England, to explain.

She said she always had called Belmonte *le saute marquis*. (1) She said it would be amusing to see how Cassaro and he would quarrel, *tirer les cheveux*.

She declared she had never written to the Emperor, or her granddaughter or to Murat; that she had lost Naples; that she had done everything to annoy the enemy, and still she was suspected. She had corresponded with Naples. After 40 years she must have connexions. She took out two bundles of papers. She read many letters from different persons giving intelligence. One mentioned the Murat's son, whom she called *ce coquin d'Achille*. She begged that I would not think this production of papers as premeditated and arranged for the purpose. It was entirely accidental.

In the whole of this conversation I took care to say nothing to irritate her, and it passed off without a tear. She evidently wanted to put me in a favourable disposition to receive the plan of a new administration which I was to see at Circello's.

From the Queen I went to Circello's office. He showed me a Note to me in which was: 1st, the determination of the King to give me the command of the army; and 2ndly, the names proposed for the new Council, (2) and of the Ministers. (3) I said the first was satisfactory, but with respect to the new Council, that in my opinion the list would not be agreeable to the nation. He asked my objections, which I refused to express. After much conversation I proposed that Prince Cassaro, who had the confidence of the King, the country, and myself, should be directed to speak with me, and that we should together suggest such names as might be satisfactory. Circello said this would look like an individual dictating a Ministry to the King. But, he said, "Cannot you speak to him privately?" I said I was in no habits of intimacy or intercourse with Cassaro; that I had only met him once, and that I did not know whether without permission he would like to talk to me. I then suggested that he should see him and that the Queen and Hereditary Prince should consult him. He said he would consider it. At dinner he told me that the Queen was to send for Cassaro in the evening.

Mr Obins had a violent fall with the grey horse. He ran away with him, and leaping at the [], his heels flew up and Obins' head came with great violence to the ground. Brought to the house senseless. Came to himself afterwards, but spoke incoherently. Public interest about him very marked. Mme Verrac sent her surgeon. Mme Montjoye came.

Dined here Marquis and Marquise Circello, Duke and Duchess Sangro, Trabia's brother, Mme de St Clair, Rosenheim.

The Queen said to the officers of the Guards upon their giving the *baciamano* on the 1st that she hoped they would show their loyalty and courage in opposing the enemies of their country, and those who now oppress the King; and turning to a colonel of Militia she said: "I hope you will do the same".

(1) Jumping marquess.

(2) Circello, Butera, Cassaro, Cutò, Pantelleria, Cattolica, Partanna.

(3) Circello, Foreign Affairs; Parisi, Grace and Justice; Tomasi, Finances; not named, War.

Friday, January 3, 1812.(1) I went to Cassaro's at nine in the morning. Present Marquis di Spaccaforno. He told me that the Queen had sent for him and had asked his opinion about different people; did not ask who he thought should compose the Council; gave his opinion upon all asked. The Queen told him that it was not intended to change Ministers. Cassaro observed: "This was the most necessary".

I urged [him] to become a Minister and to take the War and Marine departments. He said he did not like to become a Minister at all, that he was old and wished for quiet. I told him this was an important moment for the country, when every man must do his duty. I had done mine. He must do his. Upon urging my proposition he said he did not understand the business of those two departments. I then asked him to take that of Justice. He said he had been Minister before and would take it now. He said that becoming a Minister, from the Council, was descending.

It was agreed that he should say to the Queen, as our visit could not be secret, that I had called to ask if anything was settled and to express my anxiety for an accommodation. He seemed clearly to think that to put any of the barons in, was impossible; and by an extract of a letter (2) from Villa Hermosa, this was his opinion also.

At 2 I went to Circello. He showed me a long list of names that Cassaro had mentioned, as those most fit for the Council, and said: "You see that those I showed you yesterday are taken from them". I told him that I had seen Cassaro and that his story was very different. The Queen merely asked his opinion of different people and that he had given his opinion. I asked if he had anything to propose and observed upon the difficulty of forming a Council. I was well aware, but the difficulty arose from their having sent away the men most capable. He begged me not to mention them; that they must be considered as dead, and that we could only take the next best. Those, I remarked, who had created the embarrassment must take the Court out of it as well as they could; that there were several parties: the King, the nation, the English; and that to the feelings of the King, the interests of the nation were not to be sacrificed. I then proposed that I should see Cassaro and that we should consult together and propose such names as we thought most satisfactory.(3) I went from thence to Cassaro and we agreed upon the following names.(4) In consequence of a letter from Villa Hermosa proposing that Cassaro should be Prime [Minister] with secretaries under him, I sent for the Marquis of Spaccaforno and proposed this as better than the first plan.

(1) Obins no fever. Still speaking incoherently and complaining of great tightness of the head.

Dined here: Mr and Mrs Van Kempen, Lieut. Blaquiere of Hortensia, Duke of Angiò's brother. The Duke of Orleans wrote to know how Obins was.

(2) Lamb received it from Airoidi whom he pressed to become a Minister. He objected, saying *che non aveva forza* to fight with the Queen.

(3) I desired him to say to the Queen that I would do so.

(4) Council: Circello, Cassaro, Butera, Fitalia, Airoidi, Settimo. Ministers: Circello, Foreign; Cassaro, Grace and Justice; Airoidi, Finance; Settimo, War.

Saturday, January 4, [1812].(1) I saw Spaccaforo in the morning. He said that his father had objected in the evening, but in the morning had consented to take the 3 secretaryships. He also told me that Cassaro the night before had been with the Queen and at the palace had seen the different Consuls or heads of tradesmen, who met there to be harangued by the Queen for the purpose of opposing the English. Cassaro told her this was not right.

Lamb told me that Nunziantè had come from the Ficuzza (where he had seen Ascoli), who had told [him] that Ascoli had told him that if I went, the King would be glad to see me; that it was usual when the King was there for any time for the Minister to pay him a visit. Lamb could not discover the view with which this communication was made. Fagan brought a message from the Queen to deny that the Consuls had come by her knowledge and desire.

I myself saw Nunziantè in the evening, but could not extract from him the object of his message.

(1) Obins: good night, quite in his senses. Surgeon said he was 50% better. The Queen sent her own Groom of the Chambers to me to know how he was.

Sunday, January 5, 1812. Left Palermo at half past 7 with Mr Lamb. Arrived at the Ficuzza at half past 12. King out shooting; came home at half past 3. Came into our room while we were sleeping; received us most graciously. Ascoli came in afterwards; said the King would be glad to see me. He first vindicated himself against the charge made against him. He did this with great warmth. He appealed to his conduct at Naples. Who had saved the King in the Roman States? The Duke of Ascoli. Who had made head against Suchet with 1,500 men? The Duke of Ascoli, etc... He said he had followed the King from pure attachment; that he had abandoned his wife and 7 children and an estate of 8,000 ducats per annum for the sake of the King. He said he should go to Malta. He had given up all his situations. He would no longer wear the uniform of the King if he could not do it with honour. He desired I would inform [him] what I had to say against him. He hoped it could all be settled. He was a man of honour and what the Duke of Ascoli said might be believed. All should be settled. The Army I should command. He himself had written to the Queen to advise it. The barons should be brought back, not on the 12th because the King did not

himself choose it. He said it was like giving pardon to delinquents. The Ministers should be Sicilian. He begged me not to speak to the King about affairs, that it put him into a tremor and gave him a purging. I promised not.

I went to the King. He gave me an account of his accident. He said it was one of the happiest days of his life; that the day before he had been 7 hours partridge shooting; that he was in perfect health and was relating to the Queen the good days that he had had. He was called downstairs when his foot slipped, and his knee came to his mouth and his heel to his back. He contrived to get downstairs, but could not move. Some tendon above the knee had broken. He said in the midst of his health and happiness "*Dieu l'avait châtié*". He asked after Obins. Spoke upon indifferent subjects, and I retired.(1)

We dined at eight o' clock. After dinner Ascoli came into our rooms, and we resumed the conversation. We referred to the Ministry. I proposed Fitalia as a Counsellor. He said it mattered not who was in Council. He never had read the consultations. He was for the present Ministers. He said Circello was an old servant of the King, but was always on the *qui vive* about the importance of his own office. He said the King, not the Queen, objected to Cassaro, who had opposed him in Council. I said it was the Queen's influence that had done the harm. He admitted it. She was always intriguing; he had shown her letters which he had intercepted, of which she was ashamed and could say nothing. The King was a weak man and we could observe by his manner of talking the influence she had over him. He was an old man. How could his habits be got over? We must endeavour to get on step by step; but it being said, how was the evil to be removed? he said "*la morte* alone could do it". The Queen was very unwell after dinner, in a state of insensibility. He said he should go on Tuesday to Palermo, when he should see the Queen and Circello, and hoped all should be settled. I asked in the conversation, whether it would not be better had the King abdicated. He said he had strongly dissuaded him from it. He said the King would have appointed the Queen, with the Hereditary Prince, Regents. That the latter was quite willing to accept the charge.

(1) Present: King, Duke of Ascoli, M. Jannucci, myself, Fred Lamb.

The King talking of the late Lord Bristol, that he wanted to make a marriage between him and Lady North. They were both mad.

Ficuzza, Monday, January 6, 1812. Breakfasted with the King at 9 o'clock.(1) The King after breakfast went shooting and we saw again the Duke of Ascoli. I began by telling him that our object was to put the country into a state of complete military defence, and to have such an administration as would remedy the evils complained of etc. The first was nearly settled; to the second, an evil had brought the King and his family to the brink of a precipice; that evil must be removed, that it might not plunge him entirely into it; that evil was the Queen's influence in the Council. There were only 3 ways of removing it: by removing - impossible; to bring in the Barons - impossible; or to bring in Cassaro who was a firm man and could contend with the Queen. Ascoli said the King would not permit a stranger (2) to dictate his Ministry to him. To give the army to the Commander-in-Chief of

the army of his faithful ally, was reasonable and consistent with his dignity. Upon his being pressed he said: "But what can I do, who am a poor exile? I stand between the hammer and the anvil". I then mentioned that I did not ask this of him and it was agreed that this must be left to be negotiated between me and Circello. We could only endeavour to settle about the Army and the barons. I thanked him for his candour and confidence which should not be abused and told him I should be happy to be of any service to him. Of the two, I told him I would rather have a good Ministry than the command of the Army. With the former the latter might be placed in a good state; and I observed, when they gave me the real power in the command why give me a Ministry with which I could not agree? To make a Ministry such as was proposed was only laying the seeds for future discussion and creating the necessity of doing the whole thing over again in a very short time.

We left the Ficuzza at 11; arrived at 3. We changed horses 4 times. Came with the King's horses, 10 miles an hour. 6 horses.

On my return I met the Duke of Orleans on the road. He said the Queen asked him who had advised me to that *bêtise*. He took the remark to himself and said nothing. He said that she supposed my going was an intrigue of the *grand faiseur* Ascoli. Saw Spaccaforno, said Cassaro proposed the Duke of Ferla for his deputy of Grace and Justice.

(1) The King, when he does not hunt [or] shoot, takes only a cup of coffee in the morning and dines at 12 and eats nothing more. When he shoots, he breakfasts or rather dines upon meat and wine and water at nine and eight in the evening.

The King asked much after Obins.

(2) meaning me.

Abate Morso said that the Queen promised Mr Drummond to make him a canonico. Mr D. went; and the Queen, to punish the Abate for his attachment to the English and to keep her word, gave it to another exactly of the same name.

Dined here Mr Smith.

Palermo, Tuesday, January 7, 1812. Lamb told me that Nunziante had been with him to implore from Ascoli that an arrangement might be concluded; that the Army was settled; that the barons would be released and with respect to the Ministry that we might try it. Lamb answered that I was determined upon having Cassaro as Prime Minister. Nunziante said the King would not give it and Lamb then told him that I was decided to put my instructions into execution, and that I should go away on the 13th. Nunziante came back again and said that he believed no objection would be made [to] Cassaro. We then thought all would be granted. This was before dinner.

At 10 at night Nunziante came again and said: "I think it fair to tell you that all is again changed and that the King is determined to make an administration without consulting Lord Bentinck". Lamb then said, from himself, that he was glad it was so, for nothing showed so strongly the effect of the Queen's influence or the entire uncertainty of her mind.

I saw Circello at 9 in the evening, and after a great deal of conversation I told him of my determination to go on the 13th, if Cassaro had not the 3 departments with under-secretaries.

He argued much for Tomasi and Parisi. I said that they might have merit and I believed the first had, but still the public opinion was very unfavourable to them. He said it was very hard upon the King. He urged me to try the experiment of going on with the present people and observed again that the Council was composed of the list given by Cassaro. I repeated to him his mistake regarding this. He said he should write that night to the King.

Wednesday, January 8, 1812. I called upon the Duke of Orleans at 12, by appointment, and remained there till half past 2. I went to see all the papers that had passed about Spain. He said he came from England to Malta solely on account of his brother's health. He had no other view whatever. Malta did not agree with him and he was advised to bring him to Aetna. His brother died.(1)

He came to Messina. Sir J. Stuart asked him to come ashore and live with him. He refused. He said he thought it better for the Duke of Orleans not to land. He therefore slept on board the King's ship, and dined every day with Sir John. He received from Lord Amherst a letter conveying to him a copy of the King's leave to visit Palermo. The original had gone to Malta. He went to Palermo. While he was there one day at the Colli the King proposed to him the marriage with his daughter. He then declined it.(2) He said he had other things in his head.

In the month of July 1808 he went with Leopold to Gibraltar. He said he was principally induced to go by his advice. His family was the next in succession and in the absence of Ferdinand VII, he thought it would be of advantage that Leopold should be the head and Regent. Leopold went without invitation. He mentioned a *sottise*, as he thought it, that the King of Sicily wanted to be the Regent and had directed Count Priolo, the Minister at Cadiz, when supporting the interests of the family of Naples, to ask it. This was evidently an error and an absurdity.

I asked him if a story told me by the Queen was true, that the invitation from Saavedra for the Hereditary Prince (I believe) if not to the King, had been sent to Lord Collingwood, and by him kept for months in his pocket. He said yes; he showed me a copy of the original letter, written to Lord Collingwood to send a ship to Sicily, procured by him at Cadiz, dated 7th June and signed Saavedra. I said that without knowing the answer one cannot judge of the fact.

He went with Leopold, accompanied by Cassaro and Ascoli, to Gibraltar. Sir H. Dalrymple would only allow them to land upon condition of not interfering with the affairs of Spain till answers from Wellesley could be obtained. Sir Hew advised the Duke of Orleans to go to London, which he did. He there found the whole measure at an end. My father was Minister. He asked a ship to return to Spain to bring away his mother and sister. It was granted upon condition that he would not touch at Gibraltar; that he would not see Leopold, if he did; and that he would not interfere in the affairs of Spain. He resented this latter condition very much. He showed me two excellent letters from my father and an intermediate one from him upon this subject. It was arranged that as long as he was in our frigate and living under our protection, he must abstain; but after they landed at Malta or Sicily, he chose then to abandon our protection. He was master of his own actions.

He went back. In the meantime his mother and sister had come away. The latter had followed him to England. The former was at Mahon. He came back to Sicily and married in the month of November. He was afterwards, upon the formation of the Regency of which Castaños was a member, invited by them to go to Spain and offered the command in Catalonia. He went to Tarragona. He was told there was no command for him. He went to Cadiz. It was explained to him that an arrangement was making with Romana and he was asked: "Did he object to serving under Romana?" He said no. The thing was done, and he was then offered the command in Galicia, which he accepted. Still he was put off; and he ascertained that the British Government were against his being employed.

During this delay, Sir R. Keats, just arrived from England, went and offered him a passage to England, *à propos* of nothing. He thanked Sir Robert. Said he had no intention of going to England. But when he had, he would avail himself of his offer. Sir Robert pressed him and said Lord Liverpool had told him that he was expected. The Duke desired Sir Robert to put this in writing.(3) The Duke then went on to Mr Wellesley, who said he had no instructions. The Duke soon after heard that Mr Wellesley had written an official Note saying that the employment of the Duke would not be agreeable to the British Government. He asked Mr Wellesley if it was so, and Mr Wellesley sent him a copy of so much of his Note.(4)

The Duke then asked: "What is the cause of this prejudice? Am I to be ever debarred from serving my country, from having a career? My ambition is to be a soldier". He coupled all this transaction with that of Ischia. I told him I knew nothing whatever of these transactions, or I should not have said that I did not believe the British Government had interfered in regard to his command in Spain. I should not have told him that, with regard to this army, I did not believe the British Government cared who commanded it, if it was efficient. He then said: "What should you do if I asked you?" "Probably I should give you the same answer as Lord Amherst, that I had no instructions". But in order to obviate that difficulty, I proposed to him, if things were settled here, to write me a letter asking me to serve under my command, and that I would send it to England.

He said this with reference to Italy. He said the Queen's last letters from Vienna had mentioned the views of the Archduke Francis. She was quite alive about them. She saw in him a rival to Leopold, for whom she wanted a settlement, a kingdom.(5) The Archduke had set to sleep her former feelings upon this subject. The Duke of Orleans represented to the Queen that the Archduke was the fittest person for a leader from his connections with Austria and Italy itself. That one of two things would happen: either an union of the whole of Italy in one confederacy, when Naples would return to the family; or a division of Italy into North and South, when the same end would be gained. He told me he had said this, when I observed to him that when things were settled in Sicily I hoped to employ our force in Italy and make of it a second Spain. Until that, the great difficulty would be in persuading the family to allow their troops to be employed except in the direct conquest of Naples; and I was sure the Neapolitans would never allow the return of the Queen. He said in continuation of the preceding conversation, that it might be difficult to persuade the Queen, but not the King or the Hereditary Prince.

Cassaro came to me and told me that the Hereditary Prince had sent for him and was angry with my nomination of him for Minister, and had said that his reputation with the Court and the public would be ruined; that it would appear like a cabal between him and me to gratify his ambition; that he should endeavour to dissuade me from insisting upon the choice and would make him responsible for the effects. He asked if he was to say this to me from the Prince. Cassaro said he had no desire to be Minister. The Prince went and asked the Queen and came back and said: "No, say it from yourself". The answer returned was that I was glad he had mentioned it, as I could explain there was no intrigue whatever; that he knew I had no friendship with him and that I had merely proposed him because he had the public opinion; that I had also mentioned others (6) and I sent a message to say I should be glad to see the Hereditary Prince myself. Cassaro told me that the reserve had been out the night before and recommended my finding out the reason.(7)

(1) He wished to see Palermo on his return and asked the King's leave, to which he did not receive an answer.

(2) He rather put it off. He wanted to bring away his mother and sister from Spain.

(3) I saw the letter and answer.

(4) I saw the originals.

(5) with her exaggerated notions of omnipotence (the expression used).

(6) meaning the barons, but not to be by him mentioned by name.

(7) The Duke told me that the Queen heard of my going to the Ficuzza from Castrone through one our servants; that she received at dinner with the Duke of Orleans a letter from the King in which he mentioned the intelligence he had received of my being on the way and added: "*Questo mi mancava, è per me il colpo di grazia*". The Duke read it.

Count La Tour arrived.

Thursday, January 9, 1812. Butera (1) called upon me and asked why things were not settled. He said he had not seen the Queen since he had been with me. He said he should go there. He went and returned. He defended rather the composition of the Ministry. I told him in a decided manner that things should be now arranged for the good of the country and I would bring the British Army here. He was frightened and defended himself, against whom I had made no complaint.

New Counsellors appointed and Gargallo Minister of War. I determined to bring the Army here and dispatched brig of war for the Milazzo garrison.

While at Paterno's a gentleman came from the Hereditary Prince to say he wished to see me at 11 next day.

(1) Butera told me that the reason of the garrison being called out was that somebody had told the King's confessor that there was to have been a revolution at Christmas and that it would take place now. He said he knew it to be so. Butera said he should go to Bagaria.

Friday, January 10, 1812. I went to see the Hereditary Prince at 11, and stayed with him till past 1. He told me that he had received the King's permission to see me and having done so he wished to talk the whole subject over with frankness and truth; that I should find him *un fils respectueux*, a man of his word; that he was placed in a delicate situation; that many things which a cadet could say and do, he as heir to the Crown could not; that he lived a retired life, and had no friends in order to avoid the *tracasseries de famille* and of the Court; that he gave no opinion but when asked, and obeyed the orders given him. He saw many things he disapproved but his duty imposed silence upon him.

I then explained to him the views of the British [Government]; the cause of our present embarrassments, which I considered to be distrust, and the strange notion that we wanted to take the country for ourselves. I told him of the discontent of the people, which he did not believe, and seemed surprised at my observing that I thought the barons more attached to the Government than the people. He seemed surprised when I declared to him that the British Government had nothing in view but the honour of the King and family and the prosperity of the country. He could not reconcile our actions to it. I defended our mistrust by reminding him of the time of invasion when not a man was sent to the point threatened. Also that the persons at Messina now discovered were long known to be traitors. Thus the principal, Filippi, was also known to be in continuous intercourse with the Queen. The same at Palermo with Castrone, who was notoriously a rogue and in correspondence with the enemy. I asked him how could suspicions not be entertained. I told him that the general opinion in the island and with the English was that an understanding existed between the French and the Government. He asked, could I believe it? I then told him the preceding remarks. He asked me the remedy; I told him to take the men most esteemed for a new Ministry. Those were the exiled barons. If the King had a repugnance to them, then the next, who was Cassaro. I would then consult their opinion as to the proper measures to be taken. I dwelt much upon the effect of the banishment without trial of the barons and of the principle by which the tax of 1% was raised. He defended this upon the *capitoli*. I told him that I had read all the papers and was convinced of its injustice.

He seemed to have a doubt as to the barons and others not having a design to subvert the monarchy and asked, if such attempt was made, whether I would oppose it with the British Army. Of course, every attempt of that kind I would resist most certainly. I referred him to what I had said before to Circello, that if he could show me that the barons had been guilty of treason, I should be the first to wish to see them hanged.

I also told him I knew the barons' privileges were as burdensome as many of the rights of the Crown; which seemed to please him.

I assured him about his family. If I was compelled to use force, and should be obliged to meet his troops with himself at the head and should beat them, and become master, still I should keep the King on the throne. If the King should decline, then himself; and if he declined, his son. He seemed struck with this, and made me repeat it.

He evidently had very erroneous ideas of our intentions. I observed it; asked how it could be so. He said the same things, represented day after day, made impressions which time and better acquaintance with me no doubt would do away. I asked: might not the same be the case with the barons? Had they not been misrepresented to him?

Talking of the Army, he asked why British troops were to be brought here. I said that they were most to be depended upon; that it was better to mix them.⁽¹⁾ We talked of the article of a Sicilian force. I said this was the first country that had not a national force. It was absurd. He agreed. He agreed also in letting go the Neapolitans who desired it.

I never was more satisfied with any man. Perfectly dispassionate, most honest and candid, and giving sensible opinions and appearing to weigh well what was said.

I mentioned the abdication and said I was glad when I heard of it. There was a difficulty for the King to retreat. Many things necessary to be done would be considered as mean from the King, which from the Prince would be looked on as marks of favour.

Upon my return I found with Lady William the Duke of Orleans. He said he had seen the Queen for three hours the day before. He said he was sure the Queen would not resist; that she had said as much; that he had recalled to her recollection former discussions of defending Palermo against the French fleet and of the impossibility of feeding it if blockaded by sea, which she admitted. She asked him what he advised. He said, to appoint a Regency, as in Portugal. "But", she said, "the Prince of Portugal has the Brazils". "It would be the same for your Majesty, because you neither could nor would stay there". She said I disapproved of the King's abdication, in which, the Duke told her, she was mistaken; that I might not have advised it, but that I was for it. The Duke advised her to throw herself into my hands. "Then", she said, "you would not have me say no to anything". "*Précisément*," he answered. She said she was sure the English would not so dishonour themselves as to use force. She then asked if the English would give her a ship to take her away. She said she would retire into some convent until the time of her departure arrived. The Duke said she wanted him to be the bearer of a message about the ship, but he did not appear to understand. She then said she would write to me.

The Duke said the King had sent back the names of the Counsellors and Ministers, saying that he would neither approve nor disapprove; that he would not cover his front with dishonour.

(1) In order to calm the Prince's suspicions about us, I begged to consult the Duke of Orleans, who was better acquainted with our sentiments. He said he had not much intercourse with the Duke, but that his sister was a very sensible woman.

Saturday, January 11, 1812. In the morning I saw Circello about the difficulty made by Sicilian officers of admitting any evidence wherein the name of Their Majesties was introduced. Circello made no difficulty about it and said he would speak to the Queen. I told him the troops were ordered to come in consequence of his having done the reverse of what I required. He begged me to put an end to the alarm that existed among the merchants. I answered: how could I prevent it when they all knew the violent discourse held by the Queen? He said it was mere words. But I answered: "by the fear people entertained of her".⁽¹⁾

He came to me again at 9 p.m. and told me that the Queen was to go to the Ficuzza on the 13th or 14th, to persuade the King to transfer everything to the Hereditary Prince, and that all

would be settled. In this confidence he begged I would countermand the troops, to which I consented.

(1) I received a letter from the Hereditary Prince begging me not to go away.

Sunday, January 12.(1) Went to the Court in the evening. Received well by the Queen. Kept all waiting for 2 hours.

(1) Letters sent by Allen to Girgenti, Lord Wellesley, General Calvert, Mr Hamilton, Col. Bunbury, Duke of Portland, Lord Gosford, Mr Plummer, Rundell and Bridge (Heaton), John Heaton Esq., Allen's character, Collyers not to pay Mrs Allen beyond 1st April. Mr H. Wellesley, Lt-Genl Campbell.

Monday, January 13, [1812]. Called upon the Duke of Orleans at a quarter past 8. He told me that he had seen the Queen twice since he saw me last. She told him that I had spoken disrespectfully of her and had said that I would drive her family away. He said: "I can answer for its not being so", and proposed to come to me and ask my denial in writing. She said no: that was not necessary. He said the question now was between an abdication and the *alto Rego* > *alter ego* <, or delegation of full powers by the King. He suspected she was for the latter, in order to keep up an influence. She had asked him what my opinion would be; whether I would guarantee the settlements to them. St Clair had come to ask the same thing and supposed three cases. One, of Sicily being the only possession; 2.^o, of conquering Naples, when the allowance was to be increased; 3.^o, of losing Sicily, whether England would grant a maintenance for the royal family.(1) He said he could give no opinion. St Clair asked this supposing the abdication and also the delegation of powers. I said that in the latter case, the King reigning, the thing was an absurdity. What had England to do with this, indeed in either case, but in the last, particularly? She wanted 40,000 oz. for Leopold; and the same for the Duke of Orleans as he now had.

The Duke said that the Hereditary Prince was perfectly well disposed, much pleased with me, and very anxious to know how I liked him. He said he was well disposed to Belmonte.(1) The Duke had told his opinion freely to the Hereditary Prince. The Hereditary Prince had asked: "Did you say all this to the Queen and was she not convinced?" The Duke said he had. The Duchess also added he had. The Hereditary Princess also observed that many things were put upon the Hereditary Prince that he did not deserve.

At 10 Fagan came with a letter from the Queen begging to see me at 11. He said he had advised her, through two people in the habits of going to both, to give up all to me, to put herself into my hands.

I went to the palace at a quarter past 11. I saw the Hereditary Prince (2) and Princess and five children.(3) He was particularly kind and strong in his expression of requiring the British protection for himself, for his [wife] and their children. He seemed impressed with alarm. He was not well; shook me by the hand twice or thrice. He begged I would come to

him when I pleased. (4) I went from him to the Queen with whom I remained for two hours and a half. She said that the King was coming tomorrow to town to see her and prevent her in her state of health from taking such a journey. She showed me his letter beginning *Carissima moglie*, and saying that he should come to see her and would shut his door to everyone else. She showed me another letter written on his birthday, beginning as the other, "on the first day of my sixty-first year, *Iddio sa se lo finirò e come lo finirò*". She said: "You see the respect and affection existing between us. I attend at his supper and at his prayers. All his children love him".(5) She said of herself: "I pray God for mercy, *miséricorde pour moi comme femme et pécheresse; mais comme reine je ne demande que sa justice infinie*". She said the King had always had other women and therefore his regard for her was only esteem. She asked, as he was coming, what I advised her to say to him. [I told her that] my object was to conclude this business with the dignity and honour of the King and family. I said that, in my opinion, his first intention of abdicating was the best; by which all could be done without discredit to the King and with advantage to the Prince and his family. She said she never could do that. He might repent it. Others had. She said there were three ways proposed: abdication, delegation of full powers to the Hereditary Prince, and association (meaning Regency, I supposed). She talked much of abdication and was against it. For herself in any case she would have nothing to do more with the government. (6) The time would come when justice would be done her. She would give me a sealed paper to be opened 6 months after the abdication. She said of the Duke of Orleans: "*Je le connais au fond*. I cried for days about the match but the King would have it. But I must not appear to think so of him". She said that the Hereditary Prince knew him.

She called Belmonte the *prince lion, le saute marquis*; "*il avait de l'esprit*", he talked well. She wanted the King to make him a Minister. But he objected *par principe d'honneur*, because Belmonte had conducted himself ill when having charge of the roads. She had told the King: "In six months he will make himself so odious to the people that you can at once and easily get rid of him". Very violent against Princess Paterno, a woman of infamous character, to whom she had been too kind: "*C'est une catin*, who should have been shut up in a *maison de pénitence*. *Cette polissonne qui seule fréquente votre maison*. She it is whom you call the nation. I will call a Parliament then, which Cassaro, Butera and others have deprecated. But it shall be done in order to know the sentiment of the nation, which you cannot know". She said: "Then you want to have Cassaro with *ces polissons* of under-secretaries". She said Cassaro had no opinion of Airoidi, and she showed me in the Prince's handwriting the opinion of Cassaro about Airoidi, "*uomo di talento ma di dubbi principi*". You want "*détroniser le Roi et famille*". To my denial She said: "What is it you want? You required the command, and you are Captain-General. You wanted Sicilian Ministers and you have them". I said I wanted an administration having the confidence of the country. "And when you have got it?" she said ironically, and "Do you want nothing else?" She said: "You require Belmonte and Villa Hermosa". I said "No, I advised the Prince, when he asked me what was best, to take them, as having most the good opinion of the country". She said Villa Hermosa was a man of character and talent, but was a Frenchman.

When I first came in I told the Queen that the Hereditary Prince had spoken of her in the most kind and affectionate manner, that from the whole of his conversation he appeared to

me a most honest man, full of respect for his parents and for his King. I could conceive nothing more delicate than the whole of this conduct. I was sure he would do honour to his parents and to his country. She said he had excellent principles.(7) She said of Leopold that he was 22 and that he was more attached to the Duke of Orleans, because he was kind to him, but that Leopold had principles that never would be hurt by him.

She showed me a great packet of her letters found in Rossarol's possession and sent by Danero. She said, in reference to the difficulty made by the Sicilian officers as to introducing her name, she was desirous that her name and conduct might be turned and returned, and that the whole story might be examined to the very dregs.(Lie?) She never had any correspondence with France since she left Naples. Before she left it, Buonaparte had written her the most impertinent letter, which gave her a convulsion; and she showed how she treated it, rubbing it between her hands. She adverted to its having been said that she would sell Sicily, and it was true. She should say it, although the Hereditary Prince did not wish it. She had desired Castalcicala to offer Sicily to England, provided we would give her indemnity in Italy, not specifying Naples only.

She said all her Ministers had offered their resignation to her. Where was she to go to? She could not go away now. It was too cold. "In my state of health, if I go aboard a ship, *je crève*. I will go to Catania, but then it will be said I am there to invite the French. Do you want to drive me and the King away, or me only, or all our family?". I said I had no instructions of the kind. I merely wanted what I had already told her.(8) She was very violent and wild at the end of the conversation, and I said to her that it appeared to me that the conversation led to no good purpose. She said: "You wanted to send back all the Neapolitans". I told her she must know that not to be fact, if what I had written had been truly translated.(9) She said there was only one way to save their honour, that was [for the King] to put himself at the head of his Neapolitans and return to Naples. The King might perish, but he would die like Tippoo Saib upon the breach. She said there were not 5,000 men there. She asked me if I had any objections. I told her I thought she could not be serious. She said she was and repeated the same question. I said I did not think she could really mean to sacrifice her army and her partisans.(10) I added that the King was master of his own troops; that I could not object to his disposal of his troops in what manner [he chose]. To my observing again that she could not be in earnest, she lifted up her hand to heaven and said: "*je le jure*".

She then got up and said: "Come to the table, take a pen and write that you have no objections". I begged to be excused. She then wrote herself in French, that "Lord Benting declares he has no objection to the King undertaking an expedition to Naples; that with respect to ships for the protection of the fleet, it depends upon the Admiral". I had said that I had nothing to do with the fleet, in answer to her saying that she wanted ships, that she did not want our troops; that they should be left in full possession of Sicily, which she supposed we would not object to.

She said in the course of the conversation that she had long ago wanted to sell Sicily to England, but that General Acton would not do it. She said it was an unhappy day for her that had introduced her to public affairs. It was his doing, who was now suffering for it. He

died in time; she often said she wished, she hoped she might die. The state in which she was in at present was *l'enfer même*. (10)

I called afterwards upon the Duke of Orleans to say I had had an unsatisfactory conversation with the Queen, and that I was afraid she had made some impression upon the Hereditary Prince. He said that the Hereditary Prince was very much affected with his mother's situation, of whom he was fond. He said he had forgot to mention to me in the morning, that after my conversation with the Hereditary Prince the latter had gone immediately to the Queen and, falling down upon his knees, he took courage to say to her that for the sake of the King, himself and her family it was indispensable that she should retire from public affairs.

(1) He said the Hereditary Prince was not ill disposed to Belmonte and Villa Hermosa, not to Princess Paterno. He felt the necessity of conciliating those who could lead the Parliament. He said a king should have no parties.

(2) The Hereditary Prince said that he had not sent our conversation to the King. He thought it better to read it to him.

(3) 1 girl by first wife; 2 girls; 1 boy Ferdinand, very fine child with large eyes; 1 small one.

(4) The last words he said were: "You are going to my mother, *la plus tendre, la meilleure des mères*. When going away the Hereditary Prince said: "You must execute your orders. But in the execution you have every *complaisance*". He repeated this acknowledgement.

(5) "with whom I have had 17 children".

(6) At the last she said "it must be understood that the King is not *fou*. He is very far from that".

(7) such an *héritier* of 34 years was not to be found.

(8) The Queen adverted to the infamous things I had said of her to the Hereditary Prince.

(9) She said she was writing an account of past transactions at Naples, and noting all the dates, of the first league with the French and of its rupture by desire of Elliot. She said we acted very *malhonnêtement* by the French upon that occasion.

(10) In my conversation with the Hereditary Prince, his opinion was exactly what mine was: that to go to Naples without the possibility of keeping it, was only sacrificing his own adherents.

(11) She said: "Don't think you have marked upon the Hereditary Prince, and that he is such a hermit as not to understand his situation. He cried all day yesterday. Looking at his children he shed tears, to think of their future condition. It has made him ill. It has given him a *diarrhée*".

Tuesday, January 14, 1812.(1) I called upon Prince Partanna. He told me that he had heard that he had been misrepresented to me. I told him that it was not so. He said he was attached to us, that our protection was necessary for them. He said he approved of all I had done hitherto; that it was necessary to treat them as children, to frighten them. He was for monarchy and he did not like to see the King's dignity humiliated. He was anxious for an

accommodation. I said it was necessary to set the Queen's influence aside. He admitted she was *folle* and had done a great deal of harm, and that all was sacrificed for Naples. With one foot in the boat in coming from Naples, the first thought was how to reconquer it. He said he understood I had demanded the abdication. I denied it. I told him I had been misrepresented also about the Neapolitans whom it had been said that I wished to send home. He begged me to put it down in writing, which I did upon the spot in the words used in the margin.(2)

I told him exactly what I had demanded. I explained to him our views. He said: "I understand you want to reform the Parliament". Of it he remarked that it was very imperfect, that the Braccio Ecclesiastico was badly filled and that the Demaniale did not represent the people. He said it was absurd for the King to have so many votes in it. He defended himself for having not protested with the other barons. He thought the Court were wrong, but the Parliament also in not giving the money upon condition that nothing else should be raised. He said Parliament had once the legislative power. He said he had proposed that the Prince should be *associé* with the King. He thought this would answer all purposes; that other things might be done at leisure, and to save appearance the present arrange[ment] might stand for two or three months. I told him "how could I be certain that the Queen's influence would be set aside?" He said it would, but not how. He said the Queen was surrounded by the greatest *coquins* in the world. He said she had sent a law man to him the night before with the most extravagant propositions.

Madame de Montjoye told Lady William that the Duke of Orleans had met St Clair as he (the Duke) was coming from the Hereditary Prince, and he said to him (as he must be known) how much the Hereditary Prince was *accablé* with the scene the Queen had made to me. St Clair said: "*Cette femme veut se perdre*", and he said afterwards that the Queen's object was to discover how far my instructions went to demand the abdication. King sent for, in order to intimidate the Hereditary Prince, with whom the Queen was very well pleased.

Fagan came and told me that he had been told it was intended to assassinate me. He advised me to put myself upon my guard. He told me that the Queen had said that I was a *révolutionnaire* and had been for that reason sent out of England. Many English had told her so.(3)

The King arrived at 2 p.m.

(1) Called upon Prince Hesse Philippstadt; Prince Cuté; the Archbishop; Duke of Leinster; Lord Montgomerie.

(2) "*Je n'ai jamais demandé ni directement ni indirectement l'abdication du Roi. Je n'y ai jamais même pensé. Je n'ai jamais demandé le renvoi des Napolitains. Au contraire, je serais fâché de les perdre. Ce que j'ai proposé, était que tout Napolitain, officier et soldat, qui le voulait, soit permis de rentrer chez lui; que tout Napolitain qui voulût rester soit gardé et traité en frère*". Signed: W.C.B.

(3) The Duke told the Hereditary Prince he hoped he would be firm. He said he was. The Queen had sent for the King's confessor in order to be ready for him. Mme de Montjoye

said that Leopold had been with the Duke and had talked nothing, just of his own interests in the scuffle.

Wednesday, January 15, 1812. The Duke and Duchess of Orleans. The Duke told me that the King had arrived in the middle of their dinner. It created great confusion. The Hereditary Prince wanted to go to his room to put some powder in his hair. The Queen said it did not signify- He answered: "*C'est très important*" and went.

The King would not dine. He said: "*je vais me recommander à Dieu*". The Queen was with him for four hours. In the evening they went to church. The Duke heard the King crying during the service. Afterwards he was gay as if nothing had happened. Was very good-humoured to everybody. The Hereditary Prince was very anxious to know and asked the Duke of Orleans if anything had been said. He answered nothing. The Queen told the Duke the King was quite indifferent as to the result, he should be satisfied if he was left like a monk in Sicily. The Duke said that he had advised the Hereditary Prince to do nothing, to keep in his room, and not attend Councils. The Hereditary Prince said it was difficult to do so. The Duke said he had done [so] in not having attended a Council with the new Ministers. He had however only evaded it, by putting it off to the next week. The Duke had told him that Ferdinand VII had made himself so popular by having shown that he had nothing to do with the misgovernment of Charles IV. The Duke said, on the other hand, the Queen had told him if the King abdicated like Charles IV, he, the Hereditary Prince, would succeed like Ferdinand, with a halter about his neck to be held by the English instead of the French. He was confounded by all these different accounts. He was, however, steady. He said that the Hereditary Prince had great mistrust in his character. The Queen had infused it into him to keep people at a distance. He also was very much attached to his parents. The Duke said that the Duchess had also come forward to give the Hereditary Prince courage. When coming into the room she gave him a sign, holding herself up. The Duke said that the Queen was very angry with Ascoli, as was also the Hereditary Prince, who called him the Prince of Peace.

The King had talked about his money arrangements, as Leopold told the Duke. This proposed arrangement was not satisfactory either to the Queen or to Leopold, who were to be maintained by him. "So", said Leopold, "if I want a coat I must ask leave, or [if I] wear one too much [I] shall be scolded." The Duke confirmed, as having heard from the Hereditary Prince as well as St Clair, that the Queen's object was, in our last conversation, to ascertain the extent of my powers about abdication. The Duke said that he had, by accident, said that I must represent home my conversation with the Queen. She took alarm and said: "Will all I have said be also communicated?". The Duke said he supposed so: it was my duty.

Prince Partanna called upon me and said he had a proposition to make which he thought would be satisfactory to me and advantageous to the country, namely that I should be in the Council. I told him it was impossible. He asked what I required. I told him that I had already said I required nothing but a new Ministry, which they had made impossible by the appointment of a different one. He asked my advice. I said I advised the King's abdicating;

if that cannot be done, I told him I should be satisfied with full powers being given to the Hereditary Prince; that I could rely on his word, and also that the British troops should be brought here not to *envahir la famille royale*, but to defend Palermo against the French troops. These things granted, the other things might lay over for a time, upon the Prince's giving me his word that they should be executed.

He told me an arrangement nearly upon the plan of my wishes had been settled last night at midnight, and that not the Queen, but the King's confessor had upset it. He said, with great appearances of sanctity, he was a great *cabaliste*. I told him plainly that I wanted to get rid of the Queen's influence. He perfectly understood it. He said she was "*folle, ambitieuse jusqu'aux sourcils*": would sleep with a man but would allow him no part in public business. She had great talents, was very generous, forgiving and a warm-hearted friend. He said Cassaro was an ambitious, ignorant man. I told him I should finish the business quickly, that I could not allow it to hang over any longer.

Between 3 and 4 I waited upon the Hereditary Prince to express my apprehensions that some difficulty might have arisen. He said no, the King and the Queen were all desirous to have the thing settled. He should have told me if it had been otherwise, but he really did believe now that it would be arranged. He said that it was most desirable that the whole arrangement should be made so that there should be no diminution of friendship and affection in the family. Two or three days, he hoped, would produce a conclusion to this affair.(1)

(1) The Hereditary Prince said to the Duke of Orleans upon our second visit: "I hope Lord William does not think me wavering".

Thursday, January 16, 1812.(1) I called upon Circello. He hoped the arrangement would be concluded immediately. He pressed me for money, that it would be wanted on the first of February. I told him I was not disposed to give any before all was settled; that at the same time I was disposed to place all reliance in the Prince's word and his assurance that certain things would be done would be satisfactory to me. He said any delay in the repayments of the subsidy would be very inconvenient. I told him that it was their fault, not mine; a month ago this arrangement might have been made.

Circello wrote me in the evening that the act *ut alter ego* was signed.

(1) Packet arrived from England. Four days from Girgenti. Courier near drowned in a *fiumara*. Left England on the 12th of December.

Madame Verrac, Madame de Montjoye dined here.

Friday, January 17, 1812. The Duke of Orleans called upon me at 6 p.m. He talked to me of the act of the King transferring the government to the Hereditary Prince. He said that the Queen made a great effort through the confessor to prevent it, but in vain. Her advice and plan was that the King should send for me and say: "I am ready to grant everything you

wish". So doing she would have maintained her influence. The King would not do it. He said it was more consonant with his dignity to make a different arrangement. The Duke of Ascoli had written a paper, but he did not know his plan. He said that the Hereditary Prince was very hostile to Ascoli; Ascoli had given the step of major to all the captains of the Guards, contrary to the Hereditary Prince's opinion and wishes, he (the Hereditary Prince) being Commander-in-Chief. The Hereditary Prince would not speak to him until the Queen compelled him to do so. It was the Hereditary Prince who called him the Prince of Peace.

I asked how the Hereditary Prince liked St Clair. Not much, he said; in his command he had been obliged to trouble the Prince.(1) He said the Hereditary Prince gave him credit of having done him no harm in his mother's opinion. He said the Duke of Ascoli and Fardella were not well together.

I told the Duke I was to see the Hereditary Prince tomorrow and that I wished to consult him upon the plan I proposed to follow, that I looked upon him as the friend of the Royal Family, of Sicily and of England. He shook me by the hand. I intended to propose to the Prince that he should immediately recall the barons and revoke the edict of the tax of 1%; that I should go to Messina and arrange the march of the detachment; that I should be out of the way and should appear as little as possible in these transactions; that no change of men or measures should take place for the present. In the meantime the barons would come back. Perhaps the Hereditary Prince might take them in, or if the Hereditary Prince continued hostile, they could best advise what [was] to be done. He approved very much of this proposition. He wished a King's ship to be sent for the barons. I said the Court might perhaps object. I would mention it if I could. He said the Hereditary Prince might gain Belmonte if he would say something civil to him. The Duke said that there had been a great scene at the palace the day before when the Queen before all the family made use of very strong language to the Hereditary Prince, calling this an infamous transaction. She had since taken a different tone and was all kindness. He feared this the most. He said the Hereditary Princess would be a great ally. The Duke told me that the Hereditary Prince had said, not with the view of being repeated, that he believed I was a most honourable man. The Duke told me that the cause of the yielding was my having said to Prince Partanna that I would only treat with the Hereditary Prince; and a report being received at the same time from Danero of the regiments that had marched from Messina to Milazzo.(2)

(1) General Bourcard gave a better reason. That with his influence with the Queen, St Clair had had an almost independent command. General Bourcard also said that Fardella and St Clair did not agree. St Clair had made a total change in the staff.

(2) In this conversation I rectified a mistake in my having denied having said to the Queen that I was against the abdication.

Saturday, January 18, 1812. (1) The Marquis de St Clair came by appointment. I told him I had sent for him to assure him that I did not partake in the prejudice entertained against him by some persons; that I respected and esteemed him, and for the future during my command I hope he would be satisfied that such were my sentiments. I also begged him to

contradict the reports among the Neapolitans that I meant to send them all home. He said they were undeceived and few would go. He said there was a good spirit in the Guards. Of some of the grenadier officers he had to complain not of their way of thinking, but of their zeal.

Fardella came and said the Prince had a fever and could not see me that morning. Proposed British troops to be quartered at Termini, Solanto, Carini. I objected: they must be nearer the town. Told me of Cattolica's appointment. I said that I regretted it infinitely; [it] should have been given to a Neapolitan.

Prince Partanna called upon me. He said that it was the Prince's intention to offer me a seat in Council. We talked of the barons. He said they should present a request. Also, as to the repeal of the 1% tax, he proposed as a reason to be published an opinion I had given, that all fear of invasion was for the present over. I recommended in neither case to give any reason. Nobody would be deceived. Abolish the edicts without saying anything else. He defended the constitutional part of the question of the 1% tax, but condemned the policy of it.

Madame de Montjoye came from the Duke of Orleans to say that he had seen the Hereditary Prince and that he had advised him to bring back the barons and abolish the edicts at once. Told me in great confidence that the Queen reserved for herself the Foreign Department. The Duke had advised the Prince to see me today. He said that the putting me off was a scheme of the Queen's.

Poli came from the Prince who desired to see me at 4. I went to the Hereditary Prince at 4. Received me very graciously. Said he was going to make his *confession de foi*. He said he proposed to bring back the barons immediately. He should have liked better that they had made a request. I agreed in the same opinion, but I observed that it was impossible to expect it. He said he should not require it. He also said that the edicts should be also immediately abolished. He began by saying that we should establish certain bases. *Primo*: Was the treaty in force? I had said so to Circello, he said. I answered: "Certainly". *Secondo*: "You have also said to Circello that you would undertake the guarantee of Sicily till you heard from your Government." I said: "Yes". *Third*: "With respect to the Army, you are to be Captain-General under the orders of the King". I understood this perfectly. I took occasion to state the objections to Cattolica's appointment to the Guards. He said: "You want the Duke of Sangro". To be sincere, I acknowledged I did, but that I thought it should be given to a Neapolitan of rank, at this time particularly when it was reported that I was against the Neapolitans. He said Sangro was a good man; he liked the wife better; that now it was necessary everything should be Sicilian. There were other things to be given to Neapolitans, and he would take care of them. He said that his object was to conciliate and unite all parties. With this view, his object was to add others to the present Ministers; and he referred me to Cassaro for his plan. He said he was anxious to do everything that should be satisfactory to his mother and parents. He said of Belmonte and Villa Hermosa, that when he knew then better he probably should like them and be glad to have them for Ministers.

He talked of Moliterno and asked me if I thought he could be of use. He said he had given in his dismissal. He had a party. I said I believed he had done a great deal of harm in

inflaming the Queen's passion about Naples and in prompting her to useless expeditions. I said I believed he was an adventurer. I did not believe he had a party. I was to see him the next morning. He wished to have my opinion.

He said he proposed to offer me a seat in the Council. I objected. I told him I thought it would not look well and that I am sure it would not be pleasing to my Government. Our principle had always been not to interfere in the internal concerns of our neighbours. We had only done so now because we were compelled. He said then that I should always be informed of any affairs of importance.(2)

"*Parlez-moi franchement*" was his continual expression. I spoke to him of Castrone and told him I believed he was in correspondence with the enemy. Did I believe, he said, that the Queen knew of it? I could not say; I believed no, but under her sanction, I was quite certain a treasonable correspondence was kept up.

(1) Queen's Birthday. Many came in the evening to pay their respects. House lighted up.

(2) I asked for MacFarlane as *sous-chef*. The Prince said he would make enquiry. He did not seem disposed to the appointment.

Sunday, January 19, 1812. Prince Cassaro and Marquis Spaccaforno came by appointment at 11 o'clock. He told me that he must begin by a conversation he had had with the Queen. She accused him of having intrigued with the Hereditary Prince and with me to obtain the abdication of the King. Cassaro denied it and begged the Hereditary Prince might be called in. He came and said boldly that three times the King had offered him his abdication and that he had refused it. The Queen said only once (referring I suppose to the time of his coming from Naples).(1) The Hereditary Prince repeated three times, and added that he now considered it necessary for the safety of the Crown and the royal family that she should retire from business.

Cassaro said that the Hereditary Prince proposed to add Fitalia and Carini to the Council. With the exception of Cassaro and Circello, who are to attend all Councils, the others were to be appropriated to the different departments and to attend those Councils only, except the General Council of all, to assemble once a week to consider the reforms and the general interests of the country. He thought this a good arrangement. To change the present would be only to displease great families.

I agreed in all this; but we both agreed that there should be a change of Ministers; and it was proposed that Villa Hermosa and Di Aci should be Ministers of Finance and War, that Belmonte should be excluded. He thought Parliament need not be assembled before August. I told him he could not go on for want of money; the Parliament must assemble in the course of two or three months; that then would be the difficulty and the Parliament could not be forced, it must be led. Who could lead it? Cassaro said that he knew the Hereditary Prince would agree to any change I proposed. He knew that he must.

Prince Moliterno came afterwards by appointment. He said he had given in his dismissal; that he belonged to a party in Italy of which for the South he was the general officer; that Italy was all ready for revolution. They wanted only a constitution and the guarantee of

England. A small force as a match to mine was alone wanted. He asked if he could be useful. He said that the agents of the party in England had desired him to address himself to me. He said he knew there was an English agent for Italian affairs at Malta and that great sums had been sent into Italy.

I told him I knew of no agent at Malta and did not believe that any money had been sent to Italy. I begged he would write down such information as he possessed with plans etc. I told him without documents etc. I could not possibly feel myself authorised to act upon his verbal assurances. He said he could not give names. I told him when affairs were arranged here, I should be glad to embrace any plan, by whomever proposed, of annoying Buonaparte. Italy a second Spain.

He said we had "*Buonapartiens dans tous les masques*" in Council, Ministry, Army, etc. If his advice had been followed I never should have gone away. He referred to a very recent conversation of his with the King upon his last coming to town. He was intimate with the King's confessor. He said the King had agreed (2) to see me and settle everything when all was again upset. He had always told the Queen that one constitution for the whole of Italy was his view.

Caltanissetta came about business of justice. He took occasion to observe that with respect to affairs and disputes of family, he would sign a blank paper and let me fill it up as I pleased.

Poli said that I need not be afraid of the influence of the Queen, that the Hereditary Prince was fully aware of all the mischief done by her. He would not say this but to me. He was firm and had an excellent heart. Leopold had talents but ill brought up; was a good mathematician.

Called upon the Duke of Orleans in the evening. He said the Hereditary Prince had been shy towards him; attributed it to the Queen's influence; pressed for Belmonte to be in the Ministry, said he had seen the paper by which the King reserved to himself to see the correspondence with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that no treaty or accommodation should be made without his knowledge and consent, and a continuation of the present allowances to the royal family. He had seen Moliterno, and explained the Queen's satisfaction with Moliterno's constitution for Italy, he having proposed that she should be at the head of it.(3)

(1) Only conjecture.

(2) The Queen's plan. He offered to show me his correspondence with the Queen.

(3) Di Aci anchored in the roads at night.

Monday, January 20, 1812. Went to the Hereditary Prince by appointment at 11. He asked me if Bourcard would not answer as well as MacFarlane. I said that Bourcard was a very honest man, but old and inactive, that I thought him very fit for his present situation of commandant. He said that MacFarlane should be appointed.

He talked of the subsidy. I proposed that some British officers should be appointed to superintend the application of it to the proper purposes. I said that the payment was to be

made by the Commissary-General; that I was certainly desired to take care of its appropriation and under a continuance of the former system I should have required such an arrangement, but with the entire confidence I felt in him, I should ask no check.

Talked of the Administration; he mentioned Carini and Fitalia as added to the Council, and names that would be agreeable to me. I believed them to be honest men. I thought the Council would do. The Ministry I confessed I still objected to. I mentioned all their names as persons not having the confidence of the country. He said his intention was to take the others if, after talking with them, he approved them. I said if I was to give my advice I would let things remain as they were for the present, even if such was his decided intention. I thought it better to defer it for the sake of appearances. I said that Lord Amherst had always told me that Belmonte's opinion was that the barons should relinquish their privileges.

I asked if it was his intention to raise Sicilian corps. He said yes. We agreed upon the difficulty and the care necessary to be observed in doing it. I asked also about the return of the Neapolitans: I mentioned my idea that it would be better not to propose it till we had satisfied the Army by clothing, etc.

Tuesday, January 21, 1812. Went with Lady William and the Admiral to leave our names with the Queen. She desired we should be admitted. She looked ill and angry. She said little and seemed very much affected.

Mademoiselle d'Orléans told Lady William that the Queen's first idea was that I came as Captain-General to insult her. But the Duke and Duchess of Orleans, who were present, assuring her to the contrary, she was satisfied. She said that the visit had affected her and that she took a dose of Hoffman immediately after our departure.

Wednesday, January 22, 1812. Called upon Prince and Princess Di Aci. All the officers of the garrison presented to me.

The Duke of Sangro told me his case and asked my advice whether he should stay or return to Naples. I advised his explaining his circumstances to the Hereditary Prince.

The Marquis of Sambuca's son, Marquis of Campo Reale, stated his claim to the rank of brigadier in the volunteers. He had served formerly in Spain.

I told Princess Paterné of Caltanissetta's offer. She came to me today to represent her case, which she did with great eloquence. She told me that she wished that Caltanissetta would allow the marriage and as a proof would write the letter of which she gave me a copy, asking the Archbishop's leave, and that all other disputes might be left to be decided by law.

Thursday, January 23, 1812 (1) Prince Cattolica came by appointment and brought a map showing the divisions of the Volunteer districts.

Called upon the Duke and Duchess of Orleans. Explained why her request to have Lt Oates stationed in the gunboats at Palermo could not be granted.

The Duke of Orleans came in the evening, not pleased with the addition of Fitalia and Carini in the Council. Thought it better no change should have taken place till the arrival of Belmonte etc. Said he had never seen Villa Hermosa in his life. His sister told Lady William that the cause of his bad spirits, which we had observed, was that he saw all prospect of employment closing to him. We fancied that MacFarlane's appointment had caused this. She said he was subject to low spirits about himself.

She told me of herself, that when she left France she went into a convent in Switzerland for two years, where she suffered very much from bad food, lodgings etc. She was driven from thence into Bavière. She passed seven years in the North of Spain, then followed her brother to England in the Fortune >State's< ship.

(1) The second packet's letters arrived from Messina. James Grant at Messina, could not land at Girgenti.

Dined here: Mademoiselle d'Orléans, Madame de Verrac, Madame de Montjoye, Prince and Princess di Aci.

Orlando sailed at night with letters to Sir E. Pellew.

Friday, January 24, 1812. Great numbers of people went to meet the returning barons, who did not arrive.

Saturday, January 25, [1812]. Saw Tomasi and proposed he should give us a list of the arrears due to the whole army. Agreed with me on the impossibility of keeping up the present military establishment.

Madame Montjoye told Lady William that the Queen expressed a great wish to see Belmonte on his return.(1)

(1) Major A'Court told Lady William that Lieutenant-Colonel Ainslie required of his wife before his death, that she would dress his corpse out in regimentals, should put a ring on his finger and cut off her hair and show it upon his body; which she did.

Sunday, January 26, 1812.(1) Prince Belmonte, Duke d'Angio and Prince Villa Hermosa arrived here on the Mole. Blew a terrible storm from the east. Two transports (only ships besides men-of-war) were driven ashore. Markland, Milford, Minorca, Mitford, Espoir lowered top masts. Epervier cut away all her masts. The gale moderated after sunset.

The Admiral said that no 74 was *ever* known to have been lost at anchor.

(1) Major Thackeray told us that near Sligo a young gentleman, Mr Arlow Gibbs, travelled with him for two days to show him the country. He came to a country house and said "I

wish you had seen this place before the woods were cut". Major Thackeray asked why his father had cut it. He answered: "He drank it. By Jasus", he continued, "he has drunk three woods and, dead, a branch would stick in this throat".

Monday, January 27, [1812] Called upon the Hereditary Prince. Talked of the movement of the troops and thanked me for my consideration in proposing that the King should be written to, to know what battalion he would prefer at Corleone. He also expressed his approbation of my general order. I told him that he might be assured of my correctness, and that like a good servant I should endeavour to give the master I served all possible credit in the eyes of his army and subjects.

He noticed the reports in circulation of guillotines ordered by the Queen etc. I told him I did not believe them, but he could not expect the mistrust to cease immediately. I said it was reported she saw exactly the same bad subjects as before. He said that could not cease immediately. There was nothing in it and, if there was, he would be the first to communicate it to me. He wished to show every respect to his mother, but he did not mean that this should interfere with his duty. Why could they not leave the Queen quiet in her retirement? He begged me to put an end to such reports. I would do all I could but it was not in my power.

He spoke about the British troops and reverted to my former proposal that they should be out of the town. He mentioned again Termini. I said it was too far off, I wished to have them more under my own eyes. He mentioned some part of the dislocation of the troops as objectionable. I said yes, one barrack is too near the Queen. He stopped me and hoped I did not think he had any objection of that sort. I thought I saw something like distrust in this conversation. The Duke of Orleans has always said that the Queen has, during his whole life, endeavoured to impress him with distrust of all mankind.(1)

(1) Strange reports current in the town of the intention of the Queen to confine me and Lady William, Lord and Lady Montgomerie and General MacFarlane.

Tuesday, January 28, 1812. Called upon the Duke of Orleans about his letter soliciting to be employed in Italy. I asked in what way he would wish it. He said it was indifferent to him, whether with rank in the British Army, or with a legion of his own, or with rank in the Sicilian Army. He said the Hereditary Prince, he believed, distrusted him and had appointed MacFarlane to prevent me from asking for him.

I asked him if the prejudice in England had begun before Leopold's expedition. He believed not. On the contrary, he had imagined himself more agreeable to the British Government than any of the French princes. When he came first to the Mediterranean, he believed the Government intended to employ him. This was in Mr Pitt's time. They gave him an unlimited credit, of which he only took £ 14 or 1600. He said the Prince Regent had always been very kind to him and assured him of his protection. He said he could play no political part. There was no theatre of it. The activity of a military life was his ambition. He said he

never pressed himself upon the Hereditary Prince upon politics. He went to him every day. Shook each other by the hand. Assured him of his readiness to obey his commands, to which the Prince's answer was: "*Je compte sue vous*".

Belmonte was announced. He had just come from the Hereditary Prince with whom he had been for an hour and a half. He stated all the truths he had said to him. "When you were Hereditary Prince, the nation hoped; now they expected". What he said might not be pleasing to a prince educated in arbitrary principles. The Hereditary Prince intimated his wish to employ him. Belmonte declined upon the score of his health.

After this, the Duke, Belmonte and I discussed what was right to be done. I had before urged the necessity of everybody instead of hanging back, doing all they could. Why was I alone to act? What would be the consequence if I left things as they were? Belmonte then proposed modes of doing it such as stopping the subsidy etc., the convocation of a Parliament and other Ministers being the objects which I allowed. I told him I had a plan adapted to all the difficulties, both English and Sicilian. It was that they should take power. The Hereditary Prince had shown the best dispositions. It might be fear and insincerity, but he ought to have credit for them. "Take office and see if your advice will be followed; if not, go out and then I shall have ground to go on. *Belles paroles* will not do. We must take things as we find them and act accordingly". Belmonte agreed and said he would be guarantee for the others and that I might answer to the Prince that they would take office. "Let us go on gently".

Wednesday, January 29, 1812. Fardella talked of the foolish reports about the town which Major-General MacFarlane and I ridiculed.

Prince Di Aci came and brought a long letter to Lord Amherst, which I did not approve and he did not send. Particularly the part where he said he would not take office.

Lamb had been with Tomasi about the finances. Tomasi sounded Lamb upon the meeting of Parliament. Lamb avoided it by saying: "At any rate you must reduce your finances". Proposed several reforms. To give 15,000 ounces a month to the Marine. Asked that the Admiral (Fremantle) should settle what portion to be kept.

Lamb had also seen Cassaro, who had spoken to the Hereditary Prince about the suspected persons who visited the Queen and the consequent alarm. Cattolica had done the same. Cassaro had objected to the Esteri and had proposed to the Hereditary Prince to send them away. He had answered it was the best regiment they had.

Lamb proposed to the Admiral to meet Admiral La Tour, but he was very much displeased and irritable about it. He disapproved of our flotilla, transports etc.(1)

(1) Mr Douglas sailed in the Herald, Capt. Jackson, for England at 11 p.m., with dispatches to Lord Wellesley from N^o --- to - ; separate and secret, Duke of Orleans; 20, Lord Liverpool 3 - to - . Private: Duke of Portland, Lord Amherst (enclosure from Di Aci). John Heaton Esq.: order to send from Madeira six pipes, and to pay Smeyd's bills for 10 hogsheds of claret at 6, 9 and 12 months. Collyers, with letter to Dobrée for: 120 dozen

claret; 48 port; 24 champagne, 1/2 dry 1/2 sweet; 24 Graves; 6 Hermitage burgundy; to draw upon Collyers - General Calvert.

Lord Liverpool and Lord Wellesley about packet touching at Trapani.

Secret and confidential to Lord Liverpool, future operations.

The most beautiful and strongly marked rainbow I ever saw, from one side of the bay to the other.

Went to the masked ball at the theatre. Supped with Caltanissetta in his box.

Thursday, January 30, 1812. Called upon Prince Villa Hermosa. He had visited the Hereditary Prince with Belmonte, who had spoken to the Hereditary Prince in the noblest manner, with all the respect due to the Prince and with what was due to their own honour. Villa Hermosa said that it was necessary for him to say very little. He had only observed that the satisfaction of their own honour was necessary; that to retrieve the public affairs, it was necessary to call together a Parliament, the members of which were denominated the *Regi consiglieri*. Villa Hermosa said it was the only time when the Prince's conversation was not entirely kind and amiable. He said with some warmth that he should call a Parliament when he should think fit. I asked Villa Hermosa about the Parliament. Could they control it? He said not if the elections were influenced by the Court. He thought the best way would be for the three branches to meet together. He could answer for the barons. I went from him to Belmonte. Belmonte said that the Prince had said to him, in answer to the impossibility of his taking office until his honour was cleared, that his taking him near his person would be ample mark to the public of his innocence. Belmonte answered: "Pardon, Monseigneur, these are no longer times when kings and princes can govern the public opinion. Now the public opinion must direct the conduct of princes".

He said that about 18 months ago the Queen had wanted him to go as Minister to England. She was angry with Castelcicala. She paid him many compliments. He said that he could not do any good because the alliance was one of appearance and not of reality. She said "You have not confidence in me". He answered, "No" and gave his reasons at length. She said: "*Vous prouvez tout ce que vous voulez*". The day after he had seen the Queen, he received an order from Circello (1) to go to his office at once by order of the King. He went there and gave him the same reasons.

The Queen wanted him to go as Minister to Spain, which he refused. The Queen consulted him about Leopold's expedition and showed him Mr Drummond's private note. Belmonte said to her that it was private; where was the public dispatch upon which alone it would be safe to act? Belmonte told her what would be the consequences of that expedition.

The Duke of Orleans told me in the evening (2) that the Queen had proposed that the King should write an apology to the barons acknowledging that he had been deceived.

Nunziante told Lamb that the Duke of Ascoli wanted a passage to Malta, and that the King would receive the barons well if they went to see him.

(1) Mr Drummond said of this *Ministre des affaires étrangères* "*que personne n'était plus étranger aux affaires que lui*".

(2) A ball in the evening, Duke and Duchess of Orleans, Mademoiselle d'Orléans. Prince Leopold went away [at] 3 p.m.

Friday, January 31, 1812. I talked to Fardella about the pay of the troops and the English ration. He said they must have something. I said I thought England had no right to make them any allowance. If the troops wanted an increase, it should be considered and given by the Prince. Fardella pressed the necessity and I desired him to give an opinion upon the amount to be added and a calculation of it.

Belmonte came by appointment to me at 5. I told him my plan for Sicily: Parliament, constitution and national force to protect it. The finances would produce the first. The great object was to remove the distrust. "I wish to go on gently and to accomplish by degrees and by fair means rather than by force". [I said] that I proposed to say nothing to the Prince before I went to Messina. Belmonte hoped, before I went, I would press the Prince to make no changes in my absence; that upon my return I should ask for the change of Ministers, if none should have taken place in the meantime. I told him my intentions with regard to the Army, which he approved. I asked him if the Parliament met, if it could be managed. He said yes; all his friends had dissuaded him before from the attempt, but that it had succeeded.

He then talked of himself; that he had courage; that when he died he hoped to have *les larmes de la reconnaissance*; while he lived, the appearance of goodwill on the countenances of those he met. He was no Buonaparte. He had no ambition to rule. He talked of the privileges of the barons. He was willing to give them all up, but not for the King; for his country only. He wished all to be amenable to one law, all to pay equally. He wished the nobles to give up their privileges and the Church equally.

He said Brissac, when the Parliament was sitting, had received a note from the Queen, which he showed afterwards to Belmonte: "I understand that Belmonte and all his party are pounded in a mortar". Brissac answered "*C'est Belmonte qui pile dans un mortier la cour et tout son parti*".

He said the Queen had once charged him to make the Hereditary Prince acquainted with the constitution and legal history of his country. It took him 4 sittings of 2 hours each to do that. He had found him very *dur* of comprehension. He had no confidence in him. He was sure he would be under the indirect influence of the Queen.

Saturday, February 1, 1812.(1) Lamb had had a long explanation with the Admiral. He found him very dissatisfied. He said that he should go away; he would not go to Messina. Said that I might have got the command of the Marine for him, but had not.

Lamb had seen Tomasi who had told him that Admiral La Tour was also dissatisfied with the reduction to be made in the Marine,(2) and had said that anybody else might undertake, but that he would not.

Cattolica came and paid me a long visit. Told me he had had Ascoli told by some of his friends that he should go away. The Prince did not like him. That on his (Cattolica's)

coming to the command of the Guards, he had found both officers and soldiers holding very improper language about the Hereditary Prince. He had always combated the Queen's passion for Naples. He said that in the North of Italy only Naples was to be conquered. Said for the good of his country he was ready to make advances. He could not say more. Taking it in the sense *de faire des avances*, I answered I conceived he meant to the opposite party. He could not say more.

I said there were bad people about the Queen; I mentioned Castrone. He admitted [it]. We agreed that the position of the Prince was one of delicacy to his parents. He said I ought to urge him. He recommended me to speak to Cassaro and to get him to speak firmly to the Hereditary Prince. He spoke highly of Cassaro.

I went to Circello, to speak about the Bishop of Oppido who was in confinement and had refused to give evidence. It appears that the Pope alone could order him. The Hereditary Prince had spoken to the Archbishop and there did not appear to be any remedy. With respect to the two priests, it was necessary, before the condemnation could take place, that as soon as they were pronounced guilty, that the Archbishop or ... should dismiss them from the Church, and then, becoming deprived of their privileges, condemnation could be passed upon them.

He talked of the Queen and said he went there but never talked of business. She never spoke to him nor he to her; and if she did he should not answer her, as the King had appointed the Hereditary Prince Vicar-General. He never spoke or wrote to the King. He could not, of course, to the Queen.

I talked of the reports and I said that all was owing to distrust. How could it be otherwise? Castrone etc. were every day with the Queen.

Castrone had been succeeded by Pasqualini, an equal rogue. He said there was nobody for the moment to put in. I said that correspondence should be put an end to, and all the officers commanding in the Iles Stromboli etc. changed. The public were as much against Castrone as Ascoli. I had not pressed his removal only from delicacy. And I was sorry to find he had been dismissed with his appointments. He said he could not starve. I asked him if with all the royal favour he had enjoyed, he could possibly not have made a large sum of money. He said there were certainly many and monstrous abuses, but that they could only be put an end to by time. That the Prince and the Council would occupy themselves with this.

(1) Troops from Milazzo arrived.

(2) Proposed to limit the Marine to 12,000 oz. per month.

Prince Belmonte, Prince and Princess Villa Hermosa, Madame de Verrac, Mme de Montjoye, Airoldi, dined here. Madame de Verrac mentioned a curious anecdote, that the commanding officer consulted Belmonte on what he should do if any of the English ships should arrive to bring the barons away.

Sunday, February 2, 1812. (1) Count La Tour told me that he had frequently spoken with the Archduke Charles of Bonaparte, as a man who had hurt his reputation. The Archduke

affected not to mind it. He said: "*C'est tout simple*, we were quite alone". The Archduke did not attribute the result to himself. Count La Tour told me that the Archduke had always wanted a fortress to be built near Vienna and that the loss of the capital should not be that of the monarchy. La Tour said that the hopes of getting Passau and the poverty of the Government prevented the undertaking. It was mentioned that the Archduke Rainer was appointed to some charge in the interior. La Tour said he was not a military man but said to have a good head. Archdukes Ferdinand and Maximilian friends of Francis.

(1) General Campbell arrived in Achille with Colonel Smith.

10, 21, 81 and German light infantry landed, formed on Marina.

Queen in carriage seen out for the first time.

Great numbers of people on Marina.

Capt. Holles said of the wife of ... who was come with him as passenger, that she said everything she thought and thought of nothing she said.

Monday, February 3, 1812. Fardella came and said that the Prince had shown to Tomasi the proposed increased pay of the troops, and had said that the wine could be dispensed with.(1)

I went to the Prince by appointment at 11. I talked to him of the soldiers' pay. He proposed to leave out the wine. He said their soldiers never drank wine. I told him their state of starvation, that I thought the amount recommended by Fardella indispensable. He objected and said the finances would [not] allow it. I then said that the only true principle for an effective army was to pay it well; that a large, dissatisfied army was weakness and not strength. He could not deny this. I told him that the Neapolitans would go if they were not satisfied, and besides that, as their troops would now see the good state of ours, they would be more discontented. I told him the miserable state of the officers: it was worse than the men. He acknowledged the subalterns were wretched, but not the superior officers. I proposed to have a meeting of officers at my house to consider of the least addition that would make the Army comfortable. He consented to this. He wished to see what reduction could be made of other expenses so that the diminution of the Army might be the last.

I asked him if he found wise what I had recommended about Naples. He said yes, but, he observed upon what I had said of a constitution, it could not be done all at once; it must be done gradually. I said, certainly; and told him it must be agreed that this was a despotism where the will of one man could send anyone away without trial. He said that from conscience he should wish that the law should regulate the conduct of men and not his own individual will. I said this was most just.

Villa Hermosa called and presented a paper representing the necessity of an early meeting of the Parliament.

Belmonte (2) was riding with the Admiral and told him that a Regency with the Hereditary Prince's son on the throne was the best way of settling affairs. The Admiral observed upon the impossibility of this.

Medici called in the evening to say he was going in a Sicilian vessel to Messina. He told me that each deserter from Spain taken into the Sicilian service had cost 100 piastres each. He spoke more favourably of Villa Hermosa than of any of the others. He said he was a sensible man. I talked to him of the difficulties of my situation between the mutual jealousies of the barons, the wishes of the country and the prejudices against these. That I was determined to go straight forward and to consider nothing but the good of the country. Upon my return from the Hereditary Prince, I called upon Partanna. Out. Saw the Princess who said that Obins, besides his amiable qualities, had great talents.(3) The Prince came soon after. We talked of the state of affairs. He said the barons had shown indelicacy in the way of their return. He said as yet that there had been no Councils. He repeated his having, after his first conversation with me, gone directly to the Queen and told her *que c'était d'elle qu'on ne voulait pas*; that she was angry but went to the King. I praised his firmness. Among other things, he mentioned the foolish reports in circulation. I said I had heard them but it was a proof of the want of confidence. I said that the Hereditary Prince had desired me to put an end to them. He said I could; that I had more authority than the Hereditary Prince himself and could give the direction I pleased to the public opinion. I told him I knew I had great authority but not just as much as he said.

He said he and Medici had strongly urged that the barons should be recalled and the 1% tax abolished before my return, but they could not prevail with the Queen, who was *folle*. He said she had lost two kingdoms very nearly, Naples and Sicily. He agreed that the difficulties were now beginning. He said it had been arranged with the King that he should settle everything with me and should offer me a seat in Council. It was undone and he was *au désespoir* (?)

Talked of Italy; had not known of my Note. I told him there was no plan in force. He talked of Ruffo's letters to the Queen mentioning it. Proposals, I said, might have been made to our agents at Vienna, but unknown to me. I expressed my readiness to aid any revolt in Italy, but the principle of our Government was not to excite one.(4)

(1) Old pay: 10 bajocchi; 1 polizia; 9 food and ration; 24 oz. bread. Proposed addition: 7 bajocchi; to be deducted and in lieu to receive

(2) Belmonte told Lady William that he would never marry. That the Duke of Sussex in a letter had called his attention to Lady H. Windsor and that Gibbs had come and said that the family would not object on the score of religion. Belmonte considered this more or less as an indication of the wishes of the family, but his vanity must have led him into the mistake.

(3) He had praised her beauty a night or two before.

(4) Dined with us Lt-Col. MacKenzie.

Tuesday, February 4, 1812. Called upon the Hereditary Prince at half past 10 to present MacFarlane. Very kind and gracious.

Called with him upon Pantelleria (not in) and Cattolica, whom we found. He talked of the officers of the Army. [Said] that one officer married the daughter of another, that their son was put in to the Army; and thus it became like dogs, a separate race. Gentlemen did not

like to enter. He said that the Duke of Ascoli had put into the Guards as privates fifty sons of Sicilian gentlemen upon the mere expectation (as he said) of becoming officers, which could not be obtained. He disapproved much of thus disappointing them. He talked of a plan of general education which he intended to propose to the Hereditary Prince. He had 100 plans.

Met (1) to consider the increase of pay that should be given to the officers and men of the Army.(2) Fardella said the officers were very discontented because of the order proposed to be given out, allowing them to return, and the general contempt and hatred of the public against them. I observed that this was natural and increased the necessity of contenting them. Fardella was rather against increase. He evidently seemed to wish to keep the numbers. I charged him with it. With respect to the Neapolitans returning, it was a condition under which I had taken the command, and I gave him my word of honour it should be done. I said that Col. MacKenzie, 81st, had told me that at Toulon the Neapolitan men had behaved very well, but that the officers had all run away and yet, he said, then the officers were well paid.

Saw Lt-Col. Poli at 4. I talked of the preceding conversation and told him that I thought the wish to have numbers instead of a smaller number of effective force could not but proceed from something like distrust. I thought I saw something of the kind in the Prince, because when a truth so evident was not readily acted upon, there must be some secret cause which got the better. He said I might be assured there was no such thing. The Hereditary Prince wished to have an army as well for the safety of his Government from without as from within. He told me that the Queen never talked to him of business. He told me that he had the Hereditary Prince's orders to say to Belmonte and the other princes that he should be glad to see them whenever they went to call upon him. He wanted, if possible, to unite all parties. He said this in answer to my question, how he had liked the barons. He said the Hereditary Prince was very much content with them.

Belmonte came at 8 p.m. and stayed till 10.30 p.m. He told me that the Duke of Orleans had wished him to be Minister of War, when he was to have been Commander-in-Chief; that the Queen (uncertain whether upon that occasion) had asked him three times to be Minister of War, and that he had answered: "I accept no place till I know what your system of government is to be". He told me that Medici had written a memorial which the Queen had given to Madame Circello to copy, and that he, Belmonte, had seen it.(3) He said he had relations with all the officers and knew what was going on. He expressed his confidence that the Queen was engaged in a correspondence with the enemy. Danero obtained her correspondence with Rossarol while Generals Campbell and Donkin were making an examination of the handwriting of Rossarol. The Queen [sic] was overjoyed at this circumstance and sent them to the Queen.(4)

He said he had been very intimate with Moore. I told him the particulars of my original appointment. I showed him my Note in answer to Circello's question about Naples. It was agreed that in my absence things had better remain as they were, but if any offer of places to the barons were made, it should be accepted.

(1) General Bourcard, Fardella, MacFarlane, Campbell, myself.

(2) We agreed that the soldier should be stopped 7 bajocchi or grana, and secure a ration of meat and vegetables equal to 9; and 2 bajocchi in lieu of wine. Decision about officers put off till information could be had of Neapolitan pay.

(3) (Secret).

(4) She showed me an amazing heap of letters.

Wednesday, February 5, 1812. The Duke of Orleans called upon me. He said the Hereditary Prince never spoke to him about business. He feared the Queen was again intriguing to procure the return of the King, that she had sent down the confessor to him, that the King was in bad spirits. The Duchess of Orleans had received a letter from him written in a melancholy state, and observing that he was suffering for his sins. The Duke said he was giving himself up to his devotions.

The Duke said that Circello was often with the Queen and that when there, he (the Duke) saw the Queen take Circello very often apart. He said this upon my remarking to him that Circello had said that he never talked of business with the Queen. He said that the Queen had asked him what she had best do. He answered "*le moins possible, rien*". She said that if there should be any quarrels about a girl or anything else between the English and the people, it would be attributed to her, and the consequences might be fatal. The Duke took the opportunity of saying to her that it would be better if she went to a greater distance. She said: "I can't go across the sea now". "No," the Duke answered, "I mean from Palermo". She said: "I will not go to the Ficuzza". He said any other place could be found more agreeable to her.

I asked how her spirits were. He said it was difficult to say, sometimes very low, sometimes quite the reverse; that her health was bad; that every evening she was in a state of insensibility for two or three hours. Once she told him when in this state: "*Vous me trouvez dans les bêtémens >l'hèbètement<*". She said also that in a few months she hoped *la haine publique s'adoucirait contre elle*. He said at Santa Croce (the Queen's present residence) the tone was to abuse the Hereditary Prince.

He talked of Italy and of Orbetello as a good port but as having malaria. I told him that not a single proposal from Italy had been made to me or General Maitland and therefore I concluded that things were not as ripe as supposed generally, and by the British Government.

Thursday, February 6, 1812. Called at 10 upon the Hereditary Prince. Showed him states recommending increase of pay to the men and officers. I urged it strongly. He said he would do what he could and hoped the reductions in the Marine Department would enable the increase to the Army.

I spoke of the police at Messina and begged no appointment might take place till my return. He begged to except Col. Carboni (l) as he was a Calabrese and therefore revengeful. I said that I had not then any person to recommend.

M.lle d'Orléans.

Belmonte called upon me and told me of a report that the Cassetis were strangled. I said it was impossible. He added something to the corn subscription paper.(2)

I called upon Caltanissetta and Butera. Saw the Princess. Embarked on board the Milford at 5 and sailed at half past 6.

Lady William, Admiral Fremantle, Lord Fred, Capt. Markland, Mr Obins. Passengers: Major Thackeray, Capt. D'Aguilar, Capt. Belt.

(1) The very person recommended by Donkin.

(2) I subscribed for British Government ounces 20,000; myself, 1,000; Belmonte 1,000. Contract made for 20,000 muskets.

Milford, Friday, February 7, 1812. Anchored at Milazzo at 1 p.m. sailed in the Admiral's barge to the Faro. Arrived at 5. Found carriages. Arrived a little after 6. Dined with General Maitland; Genl Danero and Brigadier La Scaletta came after dinner.(1)

(1) Present: Hon. Capt. Litton, De Courcy, Capt. Joynton.

Messina, Saturday, February 8, 1812. Was introduced to all the officers at the Governor's, General Danero (aged 91).(1)

(1) Dined with Genl Maitland.

Messina, Sunday, February 9, 1812. Rode with Genl Maitland to the Carcarazzi heights and from thence down to the Faro lake. Took us the whole day. Inspected the 75th at Carcarazzi. Lectured the officers.(1)

(1) Dined with Genl Donkin. Present: Princess Leonforte, Mrs Campbell.

Messina, Monday, February 10, 1812. Inspected the 2nd 27th. Commanded [by] Major Reeves. Small men. Battalion in good order. Saw next the light infantry commanded by Lt-Col. Robertson.(1) Battalion in high order. Next saw the 58th. Commanded by Lt-Col. An excellent regiment. Then the 62nd commanded by Lt-Col. Gauntlett. Regiment in very high order, stationed at the Faro. Saw a plan for a fortress at the Faro marked on the ground by Major Thackeray. Too extensive.(2)

(1) The battalion dissolved. Lt-Col. Robertson appointed to the command of Lissa.

(2) Dined with Genl Maitland.

Messina, Tuesday, February 11, 1812. With the Admiral's consent, I, he, Genl Maitland, Donkin and Capt. Hall met to consult about the Flotilla. Each, excepting myself, read their written opinions.(1) The Admiral thought the Flotilla should be under the Navy. He objected to the present system as anomalous, as inefficient and as expensive. General Maitland produced an old letter from the Admiral in which the Admiral expressed a different opinion from the present one. He therein said that the Flotilla should belong to the Army. Donkin (2) in his paper had said that the same opinion had been Admiral Martin's, as well as Adml Fremantle's, when he had seen him at Palermo. The Admiral made the same qualification as to his meaning, and Donkin expunged the passage. Hall was against its being purely Sicilian, as proposed by the Admiral. I then gave my opinion, that I thought it ought to belong to the military commander for two reasons, as being an integral part of the Army as well as for the sake of preventing unnecessary expeditions on the Neapolitan coast. I thought it never would answer to make it Sicilian; that there was such corruption and inefficiency as to make it impossible to hope for complete efficiency. I saw the difficulty with respect to the Army, where I had complete power. I thought the best way was to make it as Sicilian as possible under our own superintendence. The Admiral was not pleased, but he kept his temper, and observed only that he was outvoted.(3)

(1) Genl Maitland and Donkin gave me copies of theirs.

(2) Lt-Col. Coffin, brought by Donkin having been lately in the Ionian Isles, and the friend of Col. Smith, said that he thought it his duty to let me know that Col. Smith had made himself very unpopular by his non-decision of judicial causes and by the grant of a pension, objected to by the Council to the relation of his mistress. Handsomely done and feeling by Lt-Col. Coffin.

(3) Dined with Genl Maitland.

Messina, Wednesday, February 12, 1812 (1) Sent off letters by courier to Girgenti to overtake the packet.

Wet day. Walked with Genl Maitland to the gate of the Citadel. He had been 4 years as military secretary to Sir Ralph Abercromby. Said he was an excellent man and with respect to his sense it was best described by the word wisdom.

(1) Wrote to Lord Wellesley No. 19, Lord Liverpool No. 7-8-9. Col. Torrens about Donkin's claim for barrack allowance; recommendations; summary of politics. Duke of Portland. W. Peacock for 20 dozen of my own Madeira and order to Molloy for 2 pipes of West India Madeira.

Lt-Genl Campbell, Hon.ble H. Wellesley, Genl Calvert.

Messina, Thursday, February 13, 1812. Saw the remainder of the 20th under Major Blake. The artillery under Lt-Col. Lemoine
Saw Rolle's Regiment (1) under Col. Sonnenburg; a good regiment, good officers.

Inspected the 2nd of the 10th under Lt-Col. Cashell, in very nice order; also two companies of Litton's.(2)

Saw the rocket artillery practice; apparently impossible to give any direction to the rockets. Seemingly useless as at present, but a most powerful arm if capable of direction.

Walked round the Citadel; determined upon making a cut from the ditch to the sea, so making a southern communication to Messina harbour.(3)

(1) above 600 Swiss.

(2) Lt-Col. Watson. Complaint by a Spaniard. Ordered enquiry to be made.

(3) Called upon Genl White, very ill.

Messina, Friday, February 14, 1812. Rode up by Carcarazzi (1) along the ridge to Antennamare. Very good road. Antennamare covered with clouds.

Genl Maitland rode down the pass from the ... pass. Riding a hot horse of Major Blake's I came down by the corkscrew hill. Donkin told me that he thought I valued too high the abilities of Genl Maitland, an excellent upright man, but not one of resource. He said that his manner disgusted people, (2) and particularly Hall, and was the cause of his interpreting his order from the Admiralty as being subject to me only. [He said] that Lord Wellington and Beresford had had a great quarrel about the command. [He spoke] of the errors of Lord Wellington, of his luck in the passage of the Douro (Lord Wellington believed Soult had only 1,500 when he had 10,000); of the great and unnecessary expense of the Commissary-General Department; of the intemperance of Genl McKenzie. Airey not fit for his command but more so than any other, disposed to jobbing.(3)

Dined with Sir John Dalrymple. Said Lord L[iverpool] was a rogue, always took the right side. Saw Mr Broadbent. Had been 18 months in Naples and had only left it 2 months ago. He said Joseph Buonaparte had been very unpopular in consequence of the system of persecution he had established, (4) by which it was reckoned that 22,000 persons had perished during his reign. Murat had stopped it all and said if there was any evil disposition he would check it in a different manner, *avec la mitraille*. This gained him popularity. He said the taxes were very severe, and the finances very much deranged. Murat was not unpopular personally, though the people were discontented with his government. There could be no doubt of Murat's detestation of Buonaparte and of his desire to make him[self] independent. He believes he would have attempted it, had there been a Russian war. That he was popular with his own army and with that of the North of Italy. He said that there were three parties: the French or Napoleon's party, the Murat Neapolitan, and that of the old government; that the Queen was at the head of the French party; that Murat had sent away Daure, the French Minister (I believe); that this had made a great noise; that on one of the birthdays of the Emperor, when Murat was in one of his violent furies against Bonaparte, he ordered the Minister for the Interior to knock down the Emperor's colossal statue, that the Minister, more prudent, had obeyed his orders, giving out as the reason that being made of paper it might catch fire from the illuminations of the *fête*. He said his Ministers were rapacious and disliked.

- (1) With Genl Maitland, Donkin, De Courcy. Lord Kinsale, his father, has the privilege of sitting covered in the presence of the King.
- (2) The Admiral told me that he would invite [a] Lt-Col. by name and 7 officers of his regiment to dinner without naming them.
- (3) Had an operation performed on an excrescence upon his wrist by Dr Brown.
- (4) Espionage and judicial and military proceeding.

Messina, Saturday, February 15, 1812. Genl Danero came and told me that the Army should be paid like ours or would be very much dissatisfied.

Duke of Castelluccio requested, although I advised him to the contrary, that I should submit a memorial of his to the Hereditary Prince.

The wind being fair we left Messina (l) in a gun brig on our return at half past 1 and arrived at Milazzo next morning at 2 a.m. Made sail in three hours after.

- (l) We were to have dined with Dr Borland.

Milford, Sunday, February 16, 1812. Foul wind.

Milford, Monday, February 17, 1812. Slight wind and foul. Fair in the evening. Lord and Lady William, Obins only passengers. Pylade, Capt. Dench, in company.

Palermo, Tuesday, February 18, 1812.(l) Landed at Palermo at 2 p.m. Called upon Belmonte in the evening with Lamb. Had a very long conversation with him, above 2 hours, about the Ministry. I told him it was necessary to go on and that I should require the removal of Ascoli and a new administration. He made great difficulties. He suggested that he should only be in the Parliament and that we should form a Ministry of Butera, Cassaro, Carini and Fitalia. After much conversation and innumerable digressions it was at last agreed that a Ministry [should be formed] composed of three barons, Belmonte (Foreign), Villa Hermosa (Finances) and Di Aci (War), Cassaro (Grace and Justice), with three of the present Council not to be suggested to the Hereditary Prince.

- (l) Found Mr Hill who had come in Comus, Capt. Smith.

Wednesday, February 19, 1812. Called upon the Hereditary Prince at eleven, to pay my respects. He talked of the *tripotage* that there was to set us at variance, and that he was quite sure I would always support the authority of the throne. I said "certainly". He said the only way to prevent distrust on both sides was to speak plainly and openly; we might differ

and sometimes he hoped to convince me. He talked of Raimondi's return and the order he had given for his arrest. He reminded me of his intimation to me that all persons who had gone to Naples previously to his return should not be punished. I recollected it. He mentioned that he had given out a dispatch respecting the return of the Neapolitans, which I had not seen. I asked if it included the military. He said that he had resolved that every officer asking for it should have it. He preferred a separate request to a general order of notification.

On my return I found the Duke of Orleans with Lady William. I asked him if he had seen the Hereditary Prince. He said he had, frequently, but that he had never spoken with him. He believed the Queen influenced the Prince not directly, but indirectly. He did not know that the Queen had received any satisfactory intelligence from England. She said that I had exceeded my powers and would be recalled. He believed she did not give up hopes of returning to power. He talked of the Cassetis being strangled. He had desired his sister to tell Lady William of it. He did not seem to disbelieve it.

He agreed that the cause of the Hereditary Prince's not going on with his business, was from the confusion of advice, doubts and distrust with which he was embarrassed. He was afraid of his mother, of the British, of the barons. He had not courage and power of mind sufficient to make his decision. I asked who guided him. He said he did not know. He believed Parisi had much to say to him. He said that Serrati, who had never been with the Queen for many years, had now visited her at Santa Croce.

I saw afterwards together Belmonte, Villa Hermosa and Di Aci. I strongly impressed upon them the necessity of giving credit to the good intentions of the Hereditary Prince. From all I had seen, it was my decided belief that he was honest and well-intentioned. They would not allow it. They quoted two instances of the perverseness and opposition of the Court to my views. They happened to be totally wrong in their facts. I observed that it would have been more easy to have conducted the affairs with an unwilling Queen, as it would have been done by force; but then [at] the first opportunity everything would have been immediately undone. Now the good intentions of the Prince deserved respect and to persuade a stupid, distrustful man would be a work of time and difficulty, but not impracticable. The good, if done, would be permanent. They agreed to do everything I wished.

Thursday, February 20, 1812. Went to the Hereditary Prince at ten o'clock. Showed him the correspondence with Genl Manhés. I told him of Murat's quarrels and detestation of Bonaparte. I said I believed he would be happy to be independent. The Hereditary Prince observed that in a contest he would take perhaps part against him. "Yes," I answered, "if we would leave to him Naples, but that would not suit". He thanked me for this remark.

He showed and gave me the proposed increase of pay. He said, "Let us try this increase first and if it will not do it may be increased afterwards". I told him the objections against the order he had at my proposal dictated to tranquillise the public mind.(l) The first was whether soldiers should be permitted to question their destination. They should be willing to go wherever they are ordered. In the next place, if Italy is attacked, the disembarkation

would probably not be in Naples. Then the troops might say they were deceived if employed elsewhere and not according to the literal terms of the order. It was my rule never to deceive anybody. He agreed in this and therefore inserted "*per le spedizioni*".

I then said that if His Royal Highness would allow me, I would venture to express what I thought should be his reasoning upon the subject, viz. that "the English are my good and faithful ally. They have done more than their treaty, made great sacrifices. We have one common object, the subjection of the common enemy and in whatever manner I can most assist you may command me". Such would I have wished had been his language. He received this well. He answered it by saying that there must be limits to such assistance; that I would not have the troops sent to India or to Germany; that the reaction would be too distant and in meantime Sicily might be endangered; that Venice, any part of the Adriatic, might be construed into the immediate interest of Sicily.

I then told him that it was [my] duty to speak to him upon two subjects upon which I felt a considerable degree of difficulty, because it would seem to doubt the good intentions in which I had an entire confidence. I told him my instructions required the performance of four conditions, of which two only had been fulfilled. There remained the removal of obnoxious persons and a new administration. I said the public were disappointed. They expected a change and nothing had taken place. They saw the same people in place. It became my duty to require the removal of Ascoli and Castrone. He said I had asked for four of whom Medici, one of the best heads, had already gone.(2) I said I had asked for none by name, that I had only mentioned Ascoli and Medici as persons the most hated. He said he should be glad that they were permitted to remain for the sake of his parents whom he respected and esteemed. He said that it was perfectly known he did not like the Duke of Ascoli, and I added it as sure that "the Duke of Ascoli does not like Your Royal Highness". I added that I was aware of the delicacy of his situation and from delicacy such a proposition should rather be addressed by me to Circello than to himself. He shook me by the hand and thanked me for my consideration.

I then spoke to him of the administration. He said, what could he do? I would not [wish] that the dignity of the Crown should be humiliated. He said he had made advances to the barons, which had not been received. I said that these gentlemen would not wait upon His Royal Highness without being asked; and that I had told them that Lt-Col. Poli was to convey to them a message from the Hereditary Prince inviting them to come to him, which message had never been delivered. He said on horseback he had met Belmonte and had asked him to come to him, that Belmonte never called. I said I was sure that there was some mistake. I offered to send him, which the Hereditary Prince begged me to do. I told him I thought Belmonte was the most *éclairé* person I had seen; that I believe his principal object was the welfare of his country, and was certainly none but well meaning. The Hereditary Prince observed that Cassaro was vain also. I said it was not so at present.

I saw Belmonte in the evening and delivered to him my message. He said the Prince had never given it to him. The Hereditary Prince might have intended it, but from awkwardness have failed to make himself understood. I urged him strongly to make himself agreeable to the Hereditary Prince, and not frighten him nor give him a hold to reject him. I told him I was sure he would gain him. Belmonte seemed to have an objection to appear to court him

too much. He said he had always been upon the reserve with the royal family, who had [in] consequence never failed to treat him with respect.

He said he had been upon the most intimate terms with the King. One day in the water together, the King took a thorny sort of shellfish and planted it into Belmonte's thigh and hurt him very much, upon which Belmonte looked him seriously in the face and told him "that may amuse Your Majesty, but does not please me". The King never took any liberty with him afterwards.

I told him that I am sure he would succeed. I hoped soon that the Hereditary Prince's suspicion of me would vanish and that his fear of our power would alone remain. He said he would call upon him the next day. He talked of public opinion and his fear of losing it. I told him that the only way to retain it was to deserve it and be indifferent to it. He did not agree in this opinion. (3)

(1) It concluded by my assuring the Army that they should only be employed "*negli stati del re e per il suo mero servizio*". Alteration, "*e per le spedizioni*".

(2) I suppose he meant Ascoli, Medici.

(3) I told Belmonte the speech of Genl Goldemar to Col. Coffin: that we had effected, without spilling a drop of blood, a revolution which, effected by them, would have shed torrents. But he added, as long as the Queen remains so near, things never will be quiet.

Friday, February 21, 1812 (1) Belmonte came to me in the morning and said he had just come from the Hereditary Prince, and was content with the conversation. He excused himself for not coming by saying it would be presumption to go without being ordered. That he was anxious upon all occasions to show his respect for his person. The Hereditary Prince said he (Belmonte) could not wish to see the dignity of the Crown degraded and *avili*.

He said, on the contrary: the greater the state of weakness in which the Crown was, and its present state of weakness was very great, the greater was the necessity of upholding it. He begged the Hereditary Prince neither to believe in the report which might have been made to him of his virtues or his vices. Of his vices he hoped to convince him that they were not such as had been represented. Regarding his virtues, it had been said by the Queen that Belmonte could prove what he pleased; he hoped His Royal Highness would not think so and would not in consequence suppose that what was truth only came from his lips in the shape of specious and captivating delusions. He told the Hereditary Prince that he had no wish for himself, that his whole desire was the *bien-être* of the Prince and of his country.

He told the Hereditary Prince that it was necessary he should overcome some of the prejudices of his education. He had been surrounded by people who had deceived him. If in the course of his conversation, he ever said that which the Hereditary Prince should not understand or object to, he begged him to stop him, that he might explain. He made a comparison to him between Charles V and George III. One, he said, died in a convent affected with the tedium of despotism, the other had been visited by insanity, but to the last

hour he lived the idol of his people and the admiration of the world. Such was the difference between a despotic and a free monarch.

The Hereditary Prince told him he had several long conversations to have with him. He said he was always at his disposal.

Called upon the Queen and Prince Leopold with Mr Hill. Not at home. Went from thence to the Hereditary Prince. Saw him and the Princess. From thence to the Duke and Duchess of Orleans. The Duke told me of a conversation he had had with the Hereditary Prince the night before. The Duke began with him by asking if he had seen me. He said "yes, you saw him afterwards". The Duke answered, "yes, for a moment". The Hereditary Prince made several attempts to speak to him and as often put off the conversation. He at last began, and the Duke spoke his mind very openly to him. He told him that he knew my opinions and that he believed I was not satisfied that more was not done. What could he do more, was his answer. He told him that it was a question between his sitting or not sitting upon his throne. He advised him to send for Belmonte. (2) The Hereditary Prince proposed that I should see Belmonte. The Duke said no, it would appear as if everything was done by the English. It was more for his interest and dignity to send for them himself.

The Hereditary Prince said that in the present *échauffée* state of the public mind it would be dangerous to call a Parliament. It had yet two years to run. The Duke deprecated that very much. The Duke advised him to see Belmonte and not to let him go without fixing the time for his next audience.

(1) I inspected the 81st, Lieut.-Col. McKenzie: a very serviceable regiment; and the 1st 10th under Major Travers: a very nice, good regiment.

(2) The Duke told the Hereditary Prince that he had to overcome his prejudices against Belmonte and that Belmonte had the same task to perform respecting the Hereditary Prince.

Saturday, February 22, 1812. Rode out with Mr Hill.

Inspected a battalion of Grenadiers commanded by Lt-Col. Masi. Manoeuvred badly.

Sunday, February 23, 1812. Went to a *déjeuner* or rather dinner at Belmonte's (Acqua Santa). He told me that he had seen the Hereditary Prince the night before, and had a long conversation with him, with which he was satisfied. The Hereditary Prince pressed him to come into the administration. It was necessary both for the Prince and himself to consider well before this step was taken: the Hereditary Prince, whether he expected him to follow blindly his orders, which he would not do; himself, whether the government would be conducted upon the principles he thought right. Otherwise to enter the Government one day, to leave it the next, was doing no good whatever. He called in the course of his conversation the Hereditary Prince his King. The Hereditary Prince said he was not the King. He said "Pardon me, that is a matter of opinion. The duties are devolved upon you by the act of the sovereign and you are King". He told the Hereditary Prince that what was wanted was to secure the property and person of the subject by law, which should be

equally binding upon the Prince. He said he was now a sultan. It was not the sultan but his pashas who oppressed and oftentimes rendered themselves independent. The Hereditary Prince said: "you would not call a Parliament in these times of fermentation". Belmonte said it was the most propitious moment. The Hereditary Prince adverted to the young hotheaded men. Belmonte said, "it is not they who are to direct us". He talked of the extremity to which things might go. Belmonte said I (Lord William) should not allow it. He should be the first to stand by the throne; His Royal Highness could not suppose he wanted revolution and that, born to the situation he was, he could wish to lower himself to an equality with his groom. Belmonte had begun the conversation [by saying] that the Hereditary Prince must get rid of the principles and advisers with which he was surrounded.

Monday, February 24, 1812.(1) I reviewed two battalions of Grenadiers, pretty good, and a battalion of Esteri commanded by Lt.-Col. Tschudi; very good.

After the review Belmonte called upon me. He pressed me to urge the Hereditary Prince to advance. He said that the public was dissatisfied and that he was fearful the public spirit would droop. I combated this idea. I told him I thought the public opinion did not signify. I must confess I was not well pleased with it, as I had seen no signs of decision or magnanimity at the time of the banishment of the barons. Our great enemy was the distrust of the Hereditary Prince. This was to be overcome, and that done, everything would go on well. It was most important to have the Hereditary Prince for our ally and friend, acting upon Belmonte's principles from persuasion of their truth and not by compulsion. I could force him when I pleased, but what would be the consequence? That this would not be well received in England and would render him always an unwilling and counteracting associate.

He urged me to procure the removal of Ascoli and Castrone. He told me that he had mentioned this to the Hereditary Prince, who had observed that he had desired me to ask it as Minister of England. The Hereditary Prince was not averse to it. I consented to do this. I went in the evening to Circello and took him a Note respecting Ascoli and Castrone. He said it was hard upon the King. I did not deny it.

We talked of finances. He wanted our present advances to be divided among the 12, instead of 6, following months. I did not consent.

We talked of the expense of the Flotilla. He said it was hard to make the Sicilian Government pay for our immense Flotilla. I told him if his Government had complied with Sir J. Stuart's requisition for aid, this would not have happened. He answered, "*n'en parlez pas*".

(1) My brother sailed at night in Pylades brig, Capt. Dench, with a dispatch to Lord Wellington. He was to call at the fleet and show it to Sir E. Pellew.

Letter to Lord Liverpool January 27 enclosed. Letters to Sir E. Pellew, Mr Wellesley, T. Sydenham also sent.

Tuesday, February 25, 1812.(1) Prince Villa Hermosa came in the evening and said he had seen the Hereditary Prince who had sent for him through Cattolica. He talked of the Parliament as requiring an account of the expenditure; but he said there was the Dogana which was independent of Parliament. Villa Hermosa said yes, but still it was to consider whether the Dogana did not put great obstacles to the inland commerce. He received him kindly and showed good dispositions. He invited him to return on Thursday.

The Duke of Orleans told me that the Queen was always giving out that she was to return to power. She had said to the Duchess of Orleans that she only waited her confinement to go to Catania. The Duke asked the Duchess if she believed the Queen would go. She said: "No, no!". The Duke believed the Queen knew all what passed at every Council.

The Duke said that he had seen a very strong letter from the King to the Queen upon the subject of the demand that Ascoli should be sent away.(2)

(1) Dispatched No. - to Lord Wellesley; No. - to Lord Liverpool; Col. Torrens: 1. Col. Smith; 2. Lissa, 3. Genl Humber; by packet to Girgenti.

Pylades returned blaming gale from the North-west.

Duke and Duchess of Orleans, Mademoiselle d'Orléans, Lord and Lady Montgomerie, Mme Verrac, Madame Montjoye, Admiral Fremantle, Genl MacFarlane, Duke of Leinster, Mr Hill, Adm. La Tour, Count La Tour, Marquis St Clair, Haward and Joinville, Saluzzo, Prince Belmonte.

(2) Villa Hermosa told me that the Queen had violently abused Cassaro to his face, saying that he (Cassaro), the Hereditary Prince and myself wanted to make her process.

Wednesday, February 26, 1812.(1) Prince Belmonte returned with me from the inspection. He told me that people had endeavoured to make Di Aci dissatisfied that he had not been invited to see the Hereditary Prince as well as he and Villa Hermosa. I told him that I never heard the Hereditary Prince mention Di Aci's name and I had little doubt but that he did not like him, attributing his opposition to the King, from whom he had received so much favour, to ingratitude.

Belmonte then told me how he had signed the paper: that he, Belmonte, had taken it to him and he had hesitated at first. Belmonte went home and brought him a book written by a rogue employed for that purpose by the Court and rewarded for it, in which it was mentioned that the barons had the right to remonstrate in any manner against any attack upon the Constitution. Belmonte said that he had put off his dinner to look for the passage, saying that he was of that constitution that he could neither eat nor sleep when once his mind was in fermentation and was anxious to have anything done. He took the passage to Di Aci, who took it directly to the Queen and told her that, priding himself as well upon his attachment to the King as [on] being a good Sicilian, he had signed the paper. She was furious. Belmonte said that having been at college with Di Aci, having been a fellow sufferer with [him], he could not come in without him. And I told him I thought he ought not. I was sorry that anyone had been spoken to but himself. In Villa Hermosa's manner

there had been something more like to increase than to diminish that disgust which was our great enemy.

He told me a curious conversation the Hereditary Prince's *valet de chambre*, a very old servant and privileged to say anything, had had with his master. "*Ainsi vous (2) avez vu Belmonte. Vous avez bien fait. Il était longtemps avec vous*". "Yes", answered the Hereditary Prince, "when Belmonte is with me, I am not aware that time passes". "You will do well to see him often, for the man whom I hear praised in the street, in the church, in the opera, everywhere, cannot be a rogue or a fool. See him often, even if you do not employ him, for you will make yourself popular by so doing".

The Hereditary Prince had said to Cassaro that he intended to make Belmonte a Councillor and Villa Hermosa, Minister of Finance. He said he believed Belmonte to be an honest man; that some of his reasoning he could not agree in. Belmonte said that Villa Hermosa would prefer being Minister for Grace and Justice, but that Belmonte had impressed him with the importance [of] the finances as being the principal means of calling a Parliament. Belmonte said the great object was to divide them.

After him I saw the Marquis Artale, the head of the police, which he had resigned from having heard that he was not agreeable to me. I said he was quite mistaken, that I was happy that a person of his character and firmness had received the appointment.

The Admiral then came and we had a long conversation about the Flotilla. I told him my objections to letting the control out of my hands. He said that it should be always at the requisition of the commanding general. I told him that there would be a double uncertainty, 1st of my agreeing with the Admiral, for although he knew the world and was a reasonable man, and that I might agree with him, yet I was not sure of it, because I had observed that where independent and rival authorities were nearly balanced, four times out of five they could not agree. The second was the Sicilian Government. With my whole command of the Army I found every day the difficulty of effecting any improvement. It would be the same with the Flotilla. I did not know what might become of it. My wish was that there should be a separate Flotilla, as well as a Navy, which was equally necessary for the defence of the south coast against the Barbaresques, their worst enemies; that I thought the finances would give both, and that it would be well even to reduce the Army for this purpose. He asked what I advised him to do. I told him if there were not the means afforded him of doing the business as it ought to be done, to have nothing to do with it. I told him that until a new administration was formed, it would be in vain to try to do anything, and that I thought it better not to decide anything till this was encouraged. It was settled that nothing should be done for the present.

(1) Lord Fred sailed again. Added another letter to Sir E. Pellew.

Inspected two battalions of Esteri, the 3rd not as good as the 1st and 2nd.

(2) "*Vous*", not "*Altesse Royale*".

Thursday, February 27, 1812. (1) Circello called upon me about Ascoli and Castrone (Note given in some days before). He said that the Hereditary Prince and the Queen both

thought that Ascoli should go. He said that the Queen was employed in effecting it, but that the King was very much attached to him and [Ascoli] was at present, in his retirement, a great comfort to him. He hoped I would not press it immediately, and that a little time might be given, to which I consented. Circello said he ought to go voluntarily, if he was a man of honour. I told him that Ascoli had said the same thing himself to me.

As to Castrone, Circello said that he should also go away somewhere. I asked him why he was not to be arrested. It was known that Raimondi had gone to his house and had escaped from thence, and that he had always been employed by him. Circello then gave his defence as to this particular transaction, and I asked if he, or anyone else, could believe it. He said no. Why then not arrest him, rather than, by affording such public mark of the partiality shown him, encourage and confirm the public opinion that the Queen was the real guilty person and Castrone only the agent, and therefore protected. I would not give up the point of the arrest, and he was to report it to the Hereditary Prince.

Belmonte came and gave me an account of a conversation of 2 hours and a half he had had with the Hereditary Prince the night before. He said generally that he had not found him so well disposed about the convocation of a Parliament as he had been before, and therefore he concluded that somebody was working upon him. He said he also perceived that he required the repetition of many things in order to have them more clearly in his recollection, that he might repeat them and procure answers.

He spoke to him about Di Aci, and said that the Hereditary Prince had seen Belmonte and Villa Hermosa but not Di Aci. What had he done? Belmonte said he was not so culpable, if there was any fault, as the rest, and more particularly himself who was the first mover. The others had been employed in obtaining signatures. Di Aci had done nothing. Belmonte said that nobody had served the king with the same fidelity. He had once saved his life. When he and Belmonte used to dine with the King, Ascoli dined with the inferiors and had thus insinuated himself into the King's favour. He said that the ruin of Di Aci entirely arose from Ascoli's ambition.

Belmonte said that he hoped the Hereditary Prince would see him. He said "very well, let him come", not much pleased. Upon which Belmonte said: "No Sir, if this is your disposition I will not carry the message. For I have also a hard task with Di Aci, namely to persuade him to wait with a proper feeling upon your Royal Highness. It will take me an hour or two to do this". He went on and said particularly, "Your Royal Highness wants him because he enjoys the public consideration". The Hereditary Prince afterwards said in good humour, "Well, I shall be glad to see him whenever he pleases". "No," said Belmonte, "you must fix a time", and it was settled that he was to call there on Saturday.

When Belmonte saw that the Hereditary Prince was less disposed towards the convocation of a Parliament, he said: "*je vois que les vieilles perruques ont encore approché Votre Altesse*"- The Hereditary Prince observed that it would be better that all the changes should proceed from himself. Belmonte said, "no, if you make them, there is not the same security as if they were passed by the Parliament and approved by you".

Belmonte told the Hereditary Prince how the Queen spoke against him not privately, but before her servants, the very soldiers who waited upon her, it lowered him and affected the tranquillity and security of the country. Belmonte said that, while they were speaking, they

came to announce to him the time of the Benediction, a ceremony which he never omitted. Nobody could be more superstitious than he. He said, "let it wait"; an hour passed and the Hereditary Princess came in. He still took no notice; at last he got up. Belmonte mentioned this to show the interest which he took in his conversation, even to the forgetfulness of those ceremonials of which he was most observant.

The Hereditary Prince acknowledged to Belmonte that he went to see his mother every day. Belmonte said he need not forget the duties of a son, but he must not forget those of a king. In the evening Villa Hermosa told me of his conversation with the Hereditary Prince.

Belmonte said that he was with the Duke of Orleans when the Queen had called upon the Duchess. The Queen asked him if he had seen a *Moniteur* of Naples wherein she was very much abused. He said no, but he had heard of it. The Queen said that she was no longer sensible to the abuse poured upon her. She did not care about [it], and at any rate she should be consoled by the ill said of the English.(2)

(1) Very bad weather. Wind very foul.

(2) We went to call upon the Princess Fitalia, who had been brought to bed two days before. It is the custom, as soon as a child is born, for the event to be announced by a letter in form from the husband, and everybody, men and women, are introduced to the lady in her bed.

February 28, 1812. Di Aci came and told me that he was to call upon the Hereditary Prince in the evening for the first time. He still was quite *monté* and he seemed disposed to speak violently. I advised him not to do so; that his great object should be not to frighten the Hereditary Prince, or to increase his natural distrust. He consented to follow my advice. Lamb told me that he had seen Cassaro who told him of a conversation he had had with the Queen. She said the Hereditary Prince, he and I wanted to make her process. Cassaro answered: "Madam, you are in the middle of your subjects". She desired that [she] and the King might be permitted to go to Catania, and have three thousand men for their protection. She said there was nothing but *novità*. Cassaro said that he did not know of any. She answered: "If of forty, three are not executed, you say nothing is done. I know that I cannot resume the government and I ought not to govern the Sicilians. I am not fit. I hate them, and if they were as honest as I am, the King and the Hereditary Prince would say the same, for they think the same". Di Aci came in the evening and related his conversation with the Hereditary Prince, with whom he was satisfied. He believed him to be honest and well disposed. Nothing could have gone off better than the conversation.

Belmonte also came, but being unwell, he was to return the next morning. Belmonte told us that the Hereditary Prince had said to him that he wrote every day to the King and he knew that the Casa Reale and Foreign Department were reserved for the King's own superintendence. I doubt the extent of the latter condition.

Saturday, February 29, 1812.(1) I called by appointment on the Hereditary Prince at eleven.

I showed him first the paper sent by Turri from the Magdalene Islands through the King of Sardinia to Mr Hill.(2) Turri's communications were thought of so much importance that Mr Hill sent him to England. His Royal Highness would observe that the language is very high; that they will have nothing to do with any power who may wish for any establishment in Italy. I told him that I did not think this much signified; that the first object was the expulsion of the French; that whatever might be the views of the Italians, it was ridiculous to suppose that they, a populace, could resist the great power of Bonaparte, and whoever had seen the Spanish Revolution must know that their final success, if obtained at all, must depend upon us. It therefore did not signify what they said now, but we must necessarily have very much to say in the ultimate arrangement. I told him that Lord Wellesley himself had made the same observation about our allies, to whom, although we were under no engagement, yet we could not entirely forget their losses and rights. The Hereditary Prince seemed pleased with this. I then begged his utmost confidence, to which he answered that I might be assured of it and that he had never spoken upon the subject of Italy to anyone.

I then read him parts of Donkin's conversation with Goldemar. On the abuse of the Queen by Goldemar, the Hereditary Prince observed, "you see that she never would give in to the plans proposed by the French". To that part talking of Murat's independence, he observed, "Could it be arranged so that Murat should have compensation elsewhere and Naples belong to me?" I said Murat never would give up Naples. Then he said: "Of course you must think it better that I should have Naples than he". "Most undoubtedly". I then read him, by Poli, Genl Maitland's letters, containing an extract from Mr Wilkins. He did not make scarcely any observation upon [them]. He had an evident indisposition to believe in the possible disaffection of the Sicilian Army.

I then told him of a letter I had written on the 27th of last month to the British Government informing them of my sincere belief in His Royal Highness's intention to call forth the resources of the country and by so doing to place the island in security; that I conceived in three or four months a large disposable British force would be ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that might offer on the Continent. I was saying "this is the 29th February", but he stopped me and said "*Parlez franchement*, you mean to say that we have done nothing". "Monseigneur, précisément," I said.

I told him there were two things to be done and they could not be done too soon. First a new administration and secondly the convocation of a Parliament. He asked me if it would not be dangerous to call a Parliament thus early. I told him I knew what his fears were - that in the present state of fermentaion of the public mind it would be dangerous; that the Parliament might go too far. I told him my opinion was quite the contrary - that once their early assembly would behold the complete confidence reposed in them, [they] would be content with much less, and would give him more money; whereas if he delayed it, they would attribute it to distrust, and in the interval they would be plotting and would require much larger concessions; that there could be no danger from the Parliament; he would have Ministers who alone would overcome all obstacles, and that I would guarantee him against all revolutions. He shook me by the hand upon this assurance.

I continued: "I am anxious for this being done soon because it is impossible for me to leave the country with a single man until the nation was quite of his side".(3) It was necessary for him to *enthousiasmer la nation* and not until then would Sicily be safe. That I could not but think the Army dangerous, that [at] any rate, even if they were perfectly contented, there should be some counterpoise to this force. The English were one, as long as they stayed, but there ought to be one in the island. It would be necessary to raise Sicilian troops. I told him of an idea I had to propose to him to raise a Sicilian Brigade by way of experiment at our own expense. If it succeeded, the Brigade could be turned over to them; if it failed, the loss to be at our charge. The Hereditary Prince approved the plan.

He said he had seen Belmonte and that he talked *sagement*. Villa Hermosa was *plus retiré*. Of Di Aci he said that he had been more ill used than any, as he had lost everything. I told him they were all pleased with him. I related to him what had passed between me and Di Aci, that I had told him His Royal Highness probably thought him ungrateful; that upon my mention of this word he had flown off. I told the Hereditary Prince that I had assured Di Aci that he (the Hereditary Prince) had never mentioned his name. I believed him to be a perfectly honest man.

I told him of my wish to take Elba or Corsica as a good port to keep up the communication with Italy.

He then told me in confidence of two transactions. First a man had been stopped with two letters from the Queen to Naples, marked outside I, II. One was to the Queen's physician. The other to some relation of the Duchess of Sangro. He opened one in my presence (to the physician), and read it. It talked only of her misfortunes and of family matters; of the Hereditary Prince it said that he was *illuso*. The Hereditary Prince said that he had some warm scenes occasionally with his mother. He offered to open the other letter, but I said I did not wish to see it. With the letters there was a paper of directions, all requiring information about the French armies etc. in the Kingdom of Naples.

The other transaction was the arrest of Meliti. He said he had certainly been to the Queen to whom he had told his plan; that she told him he was mad and would expose himself if he attempted it. The Hereditary Prince quietly said the Queen ought to have prevented him. This conduct of the Queen could not but influence his, the Hereditary Prince's conduct in this affair, and what he proposed was to stop the proceedings, to send the man to one of the islands in order that he, being an evil disposed man, might do no harm. He then spoke of Castrone and Ascoli. He said he wished the latter out of the way, that he did him harm with the King and that the Queen was trying to effect [it]. He hoped when Ascoli was gone, to be able to satisfy his father as to his intentions; and in a couple of years he had no doubt they would both (the King and his mother) be satisfied that everything had been for the best. He objected very much to Castrone being arrested: he was not accused. He ought to go, he thought. I urged strongly his arrest. I did not succeed.(4)

I called upon Belmonte afterwards. He seemed disappointed that I had not settled with the Hereditary Prince the names and places of the Ministers. I told him that he could best object to any arrangement that might not be satisfactory, by declining to belong to it, but he said this would be difficult for him to do. He told me his arrangement about Joseph Cassetti's letter to the Queen. I was to see Gambardale in his presence.

- (1) Belmonte did not come being unwell.
- (2) I never mentioned Turri by name.
- (3) I told him that his finances would alone compel him to assemble his Parliament.
- (4) The Hereditary Prince told me that the King reserved to himself only the Casa Reale, and not the whole of that, only such as regarded the King's private family. He talked of his *devoir filial* and that it should never interfere with his *devoir souverain*.

Palermo, March 1, 1812. The Duke of Orleans called upon me. He told me that the Marquis de St Clair had called upon him by desire of the Queen and had expressed Her Majesty's wish to consult him. The Duke said he dined with her Majesty twice a week and that opportunities were, therefore, always at her command if she chose to make use of them. The Queen desired to know what the Duke advised her to do under the present circumstances. The Duke answered he had already given Her Majesty advice when the change took place; that was, if she recalled, not to interfere in affairs, to leave the palace, and the further she went away the better; that if she did not mean not to interfere, it was better not to go than to make the appearance and during the whole time to keep up her former intrigues. The Duke said that his advice had always been like the prophecies of Cassandra, always true and always rejected.

The Marquis de St Clair said it was the Queen's wish to unite all parties; that she thought there should be a constitution both for Sicily and for Naples. The Duke congratulated the Marquis upon these discoveries. The Marquis said that the Queen wanted to see Belmonte, that he alone had not called upon her, while all the others had either come to her or made advances. The Duke begged to be excused but he could not possibly believe this last assertion. He said the Queen had mentioned to him before her wish to see Belmonte, but he had not given the message. He did not know that Belmonte would go and in the [circumstances] after the injuries done to him, he should be ashamed even to meet his countenance in the street.

The Marquis asked if it would not be an advantage that the changes to be made in the Constitution should have the King's assent. In the course of the conversation he observed that Belmonte and the others must look forward to the time of the King's return. The Marquis said that he (the Duke) must expect a better settlement from the King than from anyone else; that it was the Queen's desire to see such a settlement made. The Duke said that his interests had certainly been neglected.(1)

I called upon Belmonte in the evening. The Hereditary Prince had been unwell and could not see him.

- (1) The Duke told the Marquis that he had been as much disliked as anyone else, but that he had not been touched from the opinion that, although he had done no good, he had done all in his power to prevent mischief.

Monday, March 2, 1812. I called upon the Hereditary Prince by appointment at eleven and remained with him for two hours. He had always been very confidential before, but today he appeared to open his whole soul.

I went to him upon the subject of rations, which Mascelli said it would take a month to prepare and as the soldiers were very ill off, I proposed that they should receive in the meantime a compensation in money. He then stated the difficulty of the finances, that the troops were paid to the 15th, etc. but he would speak to Tomasi and Mascelli. He then referred to a demand for 12,000 oz. I had made for the Flotilla. He wanted it not to be made or to be put upon the year.

He then said, "I see you're pressing me on all sides". This was said after a while. I said I was. I could consent to give them temporary aid that was very necessary, such as to pay off the transports, (I) but that I did not wish to enable them to continue their present system. He said: "I see it. You want to reduce me to the necessity of changing my administration and of convoking a Parliament". I acknowledged that I did. I said that nothing could go on well till those two events took place; that at present nothing went on. I thought it most important that he should know the exact state of his affairs, which I did not believe he did. I was quite sure he was not aware of the state of his finances, or he never could imagine that he could keep up his present army. He said: "I see you want to make me reduce the Army. All you do and say goes to this". I said it did, "and when you know your finances you will be of the same opinion". I thought his present army was positively dangerous and useless as well for defence as attack.

He asked me what I thought the military establishment should be and how the present army should be reduced. I told him of the danger of limiting [it] to foreigners. This was the case at present. With our well-paid foreigners we should think England in great danger if we had nothing else to look to. What would be the case with ill paid, ill fed and discontented [troops]. I said that the reduction would be easy. Let the Neapolitans go that pleased, but the foreigners enlist to our own regiments. Raise the Militia and Sicilian troops. Begin with a brigade of the latter. The Italians in their service I could take into the Italian regiments destined for the service of Italy.

I said all this might be done and would be done when there was a new administration. He then stated the difficulty and doubts that he entertained and he begged I would receive them in confidence. He said that he proposed to put Villa Hermosa as the Minister of Grace and Justice. I said he would be very fit for it, but I thought him better as Minister of Finance, and as another reason, the Parliament would have confidence in his administration of the finances and would probably grant more money. He wished very much to keep in Tomasi, to which I objected that he was clever but having all the demerit of the 1% tax, and odious for having joined the Court party. I said I believed Medici more clever and that he had retreated before the 1% tax had passed. He said Villa Hermosa was *plus retiré*, and one of his opinions he seemed not to have liked, which was that the revenues of the Crown heretofore independent of Parliament should be considered for the future like the other revenues granted by Parliament.

He talked of Di Aci as Minister of War, but objected to him. He said he was hot and not clever, and had been very odious when he was the favourite of the King. I did not know

this. He proposed Cattolica. I said he was a man with wild plans. He said he was very much attached to the Crown and his country. He mentioned Carini; I did not encourage this, knowing his unfitness. I afterwards came back to Di Aci and said I should like him. He was a bold man, having now the public consideration; that I thought in Parliament he could do either great good or harm.

He talked of the Grace and Justice; I proposed Cassaro. He thought he would not take it and suggested Troisi, but he said he was a Neapolitan and therefore objectionable. I told him I thought Cassaro would take it.

After long conversation I said that the most pleasing way to the public would be to make Belmonte Secretary for Foreign affairs; Cassaro, Grace and Justice; Villa Hermosa, Finance; and Di Aci for the War. He said he could not give up Circello: he was so honest a man. I said he certainly was, but he had not talents and to him was certainly due, as the Queen told him and called him a *bête* for it, my return to England in consequence of the stupid Note he then wrote. I said "let him be in the Council".(2) I said it would be advantageous for his government in England that the Foreign Department should not be filled by persons in the old system. He repeated his former idea of bringing back Ruffo. I told him I thought no one so fit as Belmonte and if Italian affairs once took a good appearance, a man of talents like Belmonte might be of great use.

He said he thought of putting Belmonte into the Council so that he might have his advice in every department. He spoke in praise of Belmonte; that he spoke very reasonably and wisely, and explained himself well. I said he had been democratic in his [youth] but he had recovered of that passion, chiefly cured by the French Revolution. I told him that he had said this to me, as well as his opinion that it was only necessary to revive the ancient laws without innovation, to which I professed myself a great enemy; that he checked the young men who would go too far.

He talked of the Constitution and of his idea of doing slowly but well what was wanted for reformation. He proposed to assemble his Ministers and to desire them, with him, consult upon and to decide upon those changes measures and to submit them to Parliament its new to and for way their sanction. I agreed in this as the best and as anticipating the wishes and demands of Parliament. When this was all arranged he would then call the Parliament.(3)

I urged him most strongly over and over again to make his administration and to assemble his Parliament as soon as possible. The sooner it was done, the better would all be pleased and the more easily the Parliament would be led. [I said] that the removal of the Duke of Ascoli and Castrone would give satisfaction; it would be increased by a new administration and would be complete when the Parliament was called. I could not consider the country safe till the latter epoch was arrived. He was afraid of the danger, of doing harm, of revolution. I said it was quite impossible that any of these results should take place. To lead the Parliament was the difficulty. I advised him strongly against half measures. He confessed his doubts and fears. He said they turned his head. I combated them as vain and he said, "They perhaps arise from my *anciennes habitudes*, which I may get Over in time". I pressed him for an early arrangement; that I could not leave the island until it was settled and I supposed he would not wish me to go till the Parliament had met. He said, by no means. He repeated my promise of preventing revolution.

He said he could not throw himself entirely into the barons' hands. He did not know them well enough and suspected them. He begged I would not say so. He showed them confidence. when he knew them better, it might be real.

I told him of the mission of St Clair to the Duke of Orleans. It did not seem to make any impression upon him. He did not believe in the Queen's desire to resume the reins of government. I told him I was quite of a different opinion. Human nature was the same everywhere. She could not divest herself of habits of forty years' continuance - that of governing - and I prophesied that she would make the attempt, and if she failed, would go away. He said he believed the King and Queen would be very glad when all was settled. I doubted very much if the latter would.(4)

I said I thought it cruel to the King to take Ascoli from him. The Hereditary Prince shook me by the hand upon my saying this. If the administration had been settled, the Duke's absence would not have been necessary. He said that he had ordered Castrone to go away.

I called, in the course of the day, upon Villa Hermosa. He said he had received several messages from the Queen inviting him to go there. He had always answered that he could acknowledge no private communication. He did not believe they came from the Queen. The messenger asked if he would believe her handwriting. He said he did not know her handwriting and could therefore not be more convinced. If the Queen wanted to see him, he was always [ready] to pay to the Queen his duty as subject, but Her Majesty's wish must be notified to him officially, and in that case he should think it his duty to call previously upon the Hereditary Prince. He received no further communication.

I went from him to Belmonte and told him parts of my conversation with the Hereditary Prince. I asked if some compromise could not be made so as to provide for Tomasi, who was desirous evidently of making his peace. He said no, his character was bad and had never been good. He told me that the Duke of Orleans had told him of his having seen a letter from the King reproaching the Queen most bitterly for Ascoli's departure: he who was "*son conseil, son épée et sa plume*". He begged he might hear no more of the conquest of Naples, of Moliterno and of those *brouilleries*. He begged to be considered as an *homme mort*.(5)

(1) I agreed to put off any demand for the Flotilla till the 1st of April.

(2) I thought Circello a bad Counsellor: his principles were entirely despotic.

(3) The Hereditary Prince said, in answer to my observing that he must reduce his army and that 2 or 4,000 men would make no difference as to the conquest of Naples and that this was to be achieved by the constitution and happiness he should establish here, he said Moliterno had always told the Queen the same thing.

(4) He told me the Queen was resolved to go to Vienna, but she wished first to have arranged a settlement for herself, for Leopold and her 2 daughters, and she wished that to herself to be guaranteed by England. I said this might be difficult, we had nothing to do with their internal family arrangements; and I asked if this wish proceeded from distrust of the Sicilian Government or as a precaution against the possible loss of Sicily. The Hereditary Prince said the latter. I said in that case that confidence might well be

placed in the British Government, as it had never deserted any of the royal families in distress, whether friends or foes.

(5) Mr Hill told me that Mr Drummond appropriated one day for his dispatches and would see nobody. On all other days he never troubled himself about business. Mr Hill said that his dispatches were well written, but upon reading some of them said "I have been with you some days and never heard a word of all this". "No", said Drummond, "one must compose something". Hill observed to me: "se non é vero é ben trovato".

Tuesday, March 3, 1812. Belmonte called upon me and advised me to urge the Hereditary Prince to a decision.

I talked a good deal to Poli. He expressed the Hereditary Prince's doubts and fears. He said the Queen was going and that the King would never return.

Wednesday, March 4, 1812(1) Belmonte called upon me and told me that the Hereditary Prince intended to make a lawyer Minister of Grace and Justice. He begged me to object [to] it; that the whole of the profession were ill disposed. I told him the difficulty of my saying to the Prince exactly what his administration should be. Belmonte recommended Prince or Duke of Lampedusa. I said I never had heard of him. I could not recommend a man whose general character I was not acquainted with. He was annoyed that I would not take his word for it.(2)

Heard of poor William Cavendish's death. Very hurt by it.

(1) Cephalus, Capt. Clifford, came from Malta with convoy. Mr Mackenzie arrived here in Badger from Fleet, Mahon. Dined here: Duke of Sangro, Aguilar, Quin, Lt-Col. Poli.

(2) Fardella told me that Castrone was arrested. Circello told Lamb, the day before, of the same thing, saying that it had been done at my desire. Fagan told me that Castrone had been with him and had said that Ascoli had correspondence with the enemy. See paper of conference.

I saw two German battalions: Lt-Col. Olmenstein, Genl Hondstedt's, good; Lt-Col. Slutter, before commanded by Genl Humber, very good.

Thursday, March 5, 1812. I went to the Hereditary Prince at eleven by appointment. I read him my first instructions for the purpose of showing him more clearly the really honest and friendly intentions of the British Government. I made him this remark and I observed, if the British Government had gone beyond these intentions they had been forced to do so. I then read to him a letter I had received from Sir E. Pellew, in which he states the actual commencement of war between Russia and France; and I then told him that I wanted to make a little moral upon this fable. The opportunity of making an effort upon the Continent might immediately offer and if it did it would be impossible for me to take advantage of it.

I begged him to recollect my instructions. The removal of the obnoxious Ministers and the appointment of others agreeable to the country. I was ordered not to pay the subsidy until these points were obtained. I had, however, recommenced the payment, placing reliance upon his assurances. I now wished to appeal to his justice and should beg him to place himself in my situation. Could I justify myself to my Government for this neglect of their orders? Having the orders and the means of executing them, could I be justifiable in allowing a [period] of time during which this country could have been placed in a state of security? I asked what was to be my excuse.

He said, my good dispositions and my reliance in his intentions. I said I certainly had that reliance, but that I must say that I had been deceived. If I had acted as I might have done in the beginning, the affairs of the Kingdom would be already in an advanced train of settlement.(1) I observed to him that the fact of nothing having been done in seven weeks was the best proof of the bad advice by which he was surrounded and of the necessity of the orders of the British Government. He said it was not their fault but his. It was his intention to take in Belmonte into the Council and Villa Hermosa into the Ministry. I had observed to him, as a further proof of the necessity of a change, that after seven weeks he had proposed to keep 3 out of 4 Ministers. He said, no, Gargallo he did not care about. I told him he had before proposed that he should remain: Tomasi he highly praised as a clever man. I said he was not popular, he could not be.(2) I said to him that abler men perhaps than any of these might be found but that it was not the custom to put any but men of high rank into the Government. I said besides talents, those that enjoyed the public opinion were wanted. He had said that Pantelleria and Partanna were men of talents. I told him that the public never would be satisfied with the partial change he proposed. He said I was deceived as to the public opinion, that those I thought popular were not so and vice versa. I told him this was always the Queen's language. He said Di Aci was not liked, and he would not make him Minister of War. He would find some other person for it. I said to him: "You know my orders and you know, speaking *franchement*, that I have the power to enforce them". He said: "do you mean to dictate the Ministers to me?". I said, no, I only meant to require that the persons to be Ministers should be agreeable to the country. He said they were. I must differ with him.

I asked him how any administration could go on composed of persons having such different political principles, such for example as Belmonte and Circello. He answered that he thought it an advantage, for by that means the head of the Government heard all that could be said for and against every question.(3) I said I differed with him, that I considered a Council should have the same general views as to the system to be carried on and that the use of a Council was to hear the wisest and best opinions and advice as to the execution of that system.

I told him he would lose all his popularity. I told him I had not pressed immediately a compliance with my instructions because I wished him to have the credit of everything that was done. He allowed this. I said no prince had ever so fine a game. He said: "you say this is so easy, but I cannot understand it".

I told him I was neither doing justice by his country or my own. I told him the island never would be in safety till the country was at his back. To obtain this he could not too soon

make a new Ministry or call a Parliament. He asked if I thought a Parliament would give him more money. I said I did. They had refused hitherto, because they had seen so bad a use made of it. I had no doubt that Parliament would require an account of the expenditure. This was due to the nation. "But", he added, "not of the Civil List". "No, certainly". That was not the case in England, not for secret service, I added. This, he said, would also be necessary.

I showed him a letter from Cassetti asking to see me. He hesitated. He said the Ministers had seen him. He was a rascal. Did I believe that he had anything of importance to communicate? He said that I had received a bill from him. I said I had. I had obtained it for the purpose of ascertaining his handwriting.(4) I suspected the letter to be a forgery. He said I had sent my *aide-de-camp* to have Bombace released. I said that I had. Bombace was employed by me. He said he thought it would have been more frank if I had come straight to him. I told him that I had not done so, because any enquiry from him would have created suspicion and have thwarted my views. He said: "You do not distrust me". I said: "No, but I do those that surround you". He still made difficulties and I said "Your Royal Highness cannot object if you think nothing wrong has taken place". He said he did not, but he added "you will not believe such a rascal as that is. I know he is a double spy and a rascal". After a good deal of conversation, I again asked if he objected to my seeing him. He said: "No, but what you hear shall be shown to me". I said it should. I then asked if I had his leave. He said he would send me a written order. I said "No, Sir, I am one of Your Royal Highness's officers and your verbal permission will be sufficient. If any time is to be gained, I do not know what means will be taken for preventing Cassetti from speaking to me".(5)

He spoke to me about Moliterno and said he would send him to me with a letter from himself.

(1) I also told him the anecdote that I had told Lord Wellesley, that those instructions would answer no end; and so convinced was I, that I asked leave to return to England when I pleased.

(2) He said he could not remove Circello, he was an honest man. Besides, he said, I knew that Ruffo had been sent for who was a Sicilian. I admitted Circello was honest but he was a despot, and his advice ill suited the present times.

(3) He said it was the head who was to conduct the Government.

(4) Cassetti told us that in consequence of not hearing from me, he sent for his former judges Averna and Leone, and told them on the 4th of Bombace have been with him and of having asked for his handwriting by Prince Belmonte's desire. This was immediately told to the Hereditary Prince.

(5) The Hereditary Prince told me that the reason why Castrone had not been sent away was that he, the Hereditary Prince, had ordered him, but he had refused, stating his preference to imprisonment and a trial.

I and Capt. St Laurent were three hours examining Cassetti in the Citadel. Dined with Lord Montgomerie.

Friday, March 6, 1812. Returned to the Citadel with Captain St Laurent and Lamb. Mr Hill read me a view of the propositions he was to make to Sardinia. Poli told me in the evening that he had dined with Belmonte and that they had settled what he (Poli) should represent to the Hereditary Prince. Poli said that he and Belmonte agreed in everything. Spaccaferno told me that Cassaro had advised the Hereditary Prince to make Belmonte Minister for Foreign Affairs and Di Aci Minister of War. The Hereditary Prince had said he was too violent. The Hereditary Prince told Cassaro that he had promised me to be Minister of Grace and Justice. Cassaro said that he had revoked that promise at the Hereditary Prince's request.(1)

(1) I recollect this.

Saturday, March 7, 1812. (1) Prince Belmonte came and told me that he had been 3 hours and a half with Poli the night before.(2) Poli said that I was pressing and urging the Hereditary Prince, who was anxious to arrange everything, but that it was necessary to act slowly and with caution. Belmonte observed that the Hereditary Prince should rather be in haste than myself. The British troops might be driven out, but the reconquest to them would be easy whenever they chose, but how would the Hereditary Prince regain his lost possession? Belmonte said that it was only surprising to him that I had so late awakened from my sleep and that I had only now required the execution of those measures which were necessary to the security of the island. He said there could be no danger if there were in the Ministry persons who could lead the Parliament, with the Captain-General, the British Commander, to prevent all possible revolution.

Poli then asked his ideas about the Ministers, and he began with Tomasi. It was proposed to put Villa Hermosa in his place and Cassaro for Grace and Justice. Belmonte said that Poli laboured much when he began to open about Circello, for whom the Hereditary Prince felt great interest. Belmonte said there were two very good reasons why Circello should not remain. One, that he was a Neapolitan. The other, that he was a *sot*, and he at last made Poli allow that he was not only a *bête*, but a *méchante bête*. With respect to the Minister of War, Belmonte said that as long as the island was defended by redcoats and the British Commander-in-Chief was Captain-General, so long the office of Minister of War was of no consequence. It was only necessary that the Minister of War should draw well with the British Commander of the Forces, and the best way would be to leave his nomination to me. In one, two or three years, when Sicily might be left to its own exertions, then the talents of a Minister of War might be of consequence, and if necessary a change might be made. The appointment of a Minister of War was not a contract of marriage which was never to be broken. Poli agreed in this.

They then talked of [the] Constitution. Belmonte said that it was only necessary to revive the ancient laws with certain modifications adapted to the times. What they wanted was security for person and property. He gave as his opinion that Parliament need not be called immediately; that the alterations necessary might be made by the Hereditary Prince and sanctioned by Parliament. He said that it was indifferent which way it was done.

I did not agree with him in this last opinion, which he said he had given by way of agreeing with the Hereditary Prince in a point not very material. But I begged him to state to the Hereditary Prince that my opinion was different both because I could not leave the country until that event took place and because it would have the greatest possible effect in Italy. He was to suggest directors under the Secretaries. He was to say that I asked after the Council, which had not been mentioned by Poli, and which Belmonte in consequence thought best not to touch upon either, and proposed that all the last appointed ones should be other, with Circello of the old set.

He said the Hereditary Prince had desired the Duke of Orleans to speak to me and to beg I would not frighten him.

Belmonte, in expressing to Poli the entire reliance that might be placed in the English Government, said that notwithstanding this Government had not contributed anything to the war and had received our money to an immense amount, yet we had never done what we might have done, taken the King and sent him to Malta or England, and held his country for him during the war.(3)

(1) Madame Castrone called. She said her husband was an innocent man. She said everything he had done was by order of the Queen.

(2) He said that Poli expressed the Prince's wish that he (Belmonte) should be the *intermédiaire* between me and the Hereditary Prince.

(3) The packet arrived. Had been since Monday from Girgenti, the river so much out. Left England the 4th February.

Major Marshall came.

Sunday, March 8, 1812. (1) Belmonte came and said that he had not seen the Hereditary Prince last night.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He told me that the Hereditary Prince had been with him and had complained of my having pressed him upon the Ministry and the convocation of Parliament. The Hereditary Prince said that they wanted to have out Tomasi and the good old Circello. The Duke said that in their relation to England, it was necessary to have a Minister who should represent advantageously the state of affairs, which Circello never had done. Tomasi was certainly clever, but he had changed his principles.

The Duke said that he could not possibly call his Parliament too soon. The Hereditary Prince expressed his fear of its becoming a second National Convention. The Duke said, no, if he took his measures rightly. The Duke asked if he wished him to speak to me. He said no.

The Duke said that he had been at dinner with the Queen some days before, and that while he was there, the King's *valet de chambre* came and said that the King had sent for his sword, cocked hat and uniform. The Queen was somewhat agitated and asked the Duke what he could want with these. The Duke joked about it and said he supposed he meant to put them "*dans son armoire à la Ficuzza, au lieu de Palerme*". She desired him not to *plaisanter*. The Queen said the King meant to go [to] Trapani. The Duke asked why. "To go

to England". The Queen asked if I would give him a frigate. The Duke said that he could not tell. The Queen then said that he would go to Milazzo. The Duke said he did not think he would. The Duke said that the Queen was in bad spirits as well as the King.

Belmonte told me that one of the means with which the Queen frightened the Hereditary Prince was by telling him that the Parliament would make her own and the King's process. He also said that the Queen and Hereditary Prince cried together yesterday and afterwards laughed very heartily.

La Tour told me that he had dined with the Queen, that she was very *triste* and talked of going to Cagliari.

I went to Belmonte between 9 and 10. He had been with the Hereditary Prince, who agreed to the general arrangement proposed to him. Belmonte told him that he had found me very *triste et froid* and expressing my apprehension if I was unable to justify myself to my own Government. He repeated much the same as to Poli, who had evidently well disposed him to do what was wanted. The Hereditary Prince said he would do all I wished as well respecting the Ministry as the Parliament. He said it would require some days to prepare the Queen, to calm and tranquillize her. He seemed to apprehend no difficulty from the King, but whether the arrangement pleased or not, it was to be executed. The Hereditary Prince said the King and Queen wanted my assurances that nothing should happen to them, that is, no process or harsh proceedings. Belmonte said that he was sure there was no intention. He said it was true that many queens had been tried, but the only persons that could accuse her were her own servants, who to justify themselves might lay the blame upon her. Belmonte mentioned to the Hereditary Prince his opinion that all his Ministers who were rich should serve without salary. This pleased the Hereditary Prince.

The Hereditary Prince asked Belmonte what could happen to him in case he did not agree. Belmonte answered that it was in my power to do what I pleased; to put the King and Queen and His Royal Highness aboard a ship and send them where I pleased and that with the consent of the whole Sicilian nation.(2)

(1) Capt. Grant told me that Major Marshall had said to him that even if he should go back tomorrow, he was quite satisfied only with the notice I had taken of him.

(2) Madame Minutolo brought a letter to Murat, which she wished me to forward asking leave to return to Naples.

Monday, March 9, 1812. Tomasi came and spoke to me about the island of Lampedusa which his father had leased in perpetuity. He wanted to go to Malta to endeavour to break the contract. He meant to offer it to the British Government.

Moliterno came with a letter of introduction from the Hereditary Prince authorizing him to treat with me as belonging to the Italian Patriots, whose cause he states his wish to protect. Moliterno showed me a letter from Naples dated December 1811, said by him to be [a] copy of his last cipher. He changed his former assertion about himself as an agent and a general. He proposed an Italian Constitutional Legion to be raised. He wished to know if he was to be employed by the English and what answer he was to give. He intended to give in

his dismissal. I told him that I was ready to support the Italian independence, but I did not think this the time to make any public declaration. I begged him not to do anything further with respect to his dismissal till I saw the Hereditary Prince.

Col. Lorne came. Did not think much of young Foresti. He was not very wise and in Ali Pasha's hands. The father and son never agreed. Said that Ali Pasha pretended that he was promised Santa Maura, (1) but by whom could not be discovered. Thought the Greek light infantry might come away. Thought that a proclamation should be given out in the Seven Isles; that any resident plundering in Ali Pasha's territories should be given up. This would satisfy Ali perfectly. Thought 100 barrels of gunpowder sufficient. Sir J. Stuart had only given 50.

Belmonte came. Told me that Cattolica had wanted to meet him. Villa Hermosa had proposed him. Belmonte refused to see him.

Fagan saw the Queen. Conversation in another place.

Called upon the Princess Paterno about the marriage.

La Tour told me that at Wagram and Aspern all the marches and movements of the Austrians were in masses of either battalions or divisions: that the French had 50,000 cavalry and 570 pieces of artillery, none of their squares had been forced. He mentioned having spoken with the Archduke Charles about masses in comparison with squares before the last war, and the difficulty regarding the former was the disposal of the mounted officers. La Tour after the war spoke upon the same subject and the Archduke told La Tour that there had been found no embarrassment for the cavalry only charging one side, and the horses passing off on each side and galled by the fire were unwilling to return to the attack, so that the mounted officers were always safe on one of the sides.

La Tour had spoken with the Queen about the Army and had observed to her, in support of my wishing to change and reform it, that upon the last occasion when union was wanted for better resistance, it was divided into an English and French party etc., all of which could not have been so if it had well managed.

She said of the Ministers: "these proposed are good enough, but we want men".

Mr Mackenzie [said] that he was at Morlaix from March to November 1810. He thought Bonaparte sincere at first. He was remarkably civil to Mr Mackenzie. Offered to keep him. Mr Mackenzie would not consent. Mr Dumoutier (2) and he dined alternately at each other's houses. All the people of Morlaix hated Bonaparte. They acknowledged his talents, but [said] that they had only produced misery to them. They proposed to exchange the whole English against the whole French; £1 per head being paid for the surplus. Bonaparte would not acknowledge the Spanish Government. This was got over by our settling it for them, no mention being thus made of the Spanish Government. The exchange broke off upon the King's speech declaring his intention to make common cause with the Spaniards. When Dumoutier read it, he said at once "this will break it off. The Emperor's passion will be so great." Mr Mackenzie had obtained the release of many French youths of Morlaix confined in England. He asked for the liberation of a particular friend of his own. Bonaparte answered that he had a particular pleasure in refusing his request.(3) The French Government were anxious to induce Mr Mackenzie to commit himself.

Saw a man, Alfieri, a native of Elba. Had no information to give.

- (1) Major Leake denied it.
- (2) Son of a very celebrated emigrant, had [been] envoy at Baden. Order to relate all his personal conversation.
- (3) Mr Mackenzie said that he received 2,000 letters a week from the English and allied prisoners in France.

Tuesday, March 10, 1812 (1) Lt-Col. Poli came. I sent for him to complain of the promotion that had been made without my knowledge. He explained it by saying that nothing was meant and that it was done in compliance with my arrangement with the Hereditary Prince that he should fill up the vacancies. I said this was supposed to be by me to have been already done. Lt-Col. Poli excused the Hereditary Prince, saying that nothing was meant. It was unhandsomely done.

In the course of the day I wrote to Poli to beg to see the promotions before they were published.

In the evening he brought me a letter from the Hereditary Prince to him explaining more particularly the arrangement.(2) Moliterno brought two letters from the Hereditary Prince enclosing one from the Queen.(3)

- (1) Undaunted, Capt. Rowe, brought letter of Sir E. Pellew of the 7th saying that 2 lines of battleships and 2 frigates had escaped from Toulon on the 5th, wind south-west, supposed either for Genoa or Adriatic.
- (2) Letter returned.
- (3) He was to return with them the next day, I not having time to read them.

Wednesday, March 11, 1812. Lt-Col. Poli came and explained the Hereditary Prince's conduct about the promotions.(1) He said it never should happen again. Told me Circello had been very instrumental in persuading the Queen to stay away. He said I was mistaken about him. I told him I was not. I believed him honest and attached to the English alliance. He said the Queen would go away after the Duchess of Orleans' confinement. I said that she would wait answers from Medici.

Fagan gave me an account of a conversation he had had with the Queen the night before. Brought me a copy of a letter from the King to the Queen.(2)

Moliterno brought me copies and originals of the letters mentioned yesterday.(3)

I went to the Queen by an invitation sent in writing to Fagan, at a little after 12, and remained till near 2. She frequently shed tears, but she was more tranquil than I had seen her usually before. She complained of the degraded state of the King and of the Queen. She said she never could have believed that this would have happened which has, to have been so treated by an ally of twenty years, for whom they had sacrificed so much. I endeavoured to tranquillize her, to satisfy her as to our intentions and, expressing my confidence that the

day would come when she would think otherwise, I repeated my former declarations that Great Britain had no other objects but the honour and independence of her family.

She asked, if Murat had taken Sicily, what Ministers he would have appointed. I pretended not to understand the question. I said he would have made himself King and have named a French government. She said the present Ministers had been forced upon the Hereditary Prince. I said he never had expressed himself to that effect.

She talked of the Parliament and asked if I really thought it safe to assemble it at a time of so much fermentation of the public mind. I told her it was my decided opinion that it could not be called too soon. She said she had great apprehensions. Talked of the convocation of the États Généraux in France. Thought it might lead to revolution.(4) I asked how this was possible. The best way at any rate was to satisfy the nation. She then observed if I really believed all the proposed new Ministers were for a Parliament (she alluded to Cassaro). She asked if it would not be better to have the calling sanctioned by the King. I said this appeared unnecessary as the King had given full powers in all things to the Hereditary Prince. "But", she added, "he is always King. *Il n'est pas fou comme le vôtre*. He has not abdicated". She said that the Hereditary Prince always, as was his duty, gave an account of everything that passed to the King.

She talked of Italy, asked what we could do there. I said that if there was a Russian war and things were settled here, we might be ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity. She said the King, whatever I might think, was beloved in Italy. I urged as the first great step to conquest in Italy, the establishment of the happiness of Sicily, which would be viewed as the model. She said they had a constitution here. She praised Lady William, hoped to see me frequently. She wished for nothing but the union of all. She said she was nothing. She cried often. Perhaps, she said, she had not known the good of Sicily. Complained that the barons had not gone to pay their respects to the King. She said frequently, "time will show who is right".

(1) I complained much of the Prince's conduct in this business.

(2) *Vide* account of this conversation by himself.

(3) Received from Prince Belmonte a letter from Cassetti.

Gave a large dinner to English and Sicilian officers. Sat down 30. Prince Hesse and aide-de-camp. Genl Hondstedt and a.d.c.; General Bourcard and a.d.c., Rosenheim and a.d.c.; MacFarlane; Campbell; Fardella; Capt. Clifford; Col. Olmenstein; Major Lensingen; Major Ompteda; Lt-Col. Travers; Major Slusser; Count La Tour; Capt. Milnes; Capt. St Laurent; Lord Montgomerie; Mr Hill; Mr Mackenzie; Marshal Acton; Admiral Guillichini; Lt-Col. Hawker.

(4) She said that the King loved the Sicilians. He did not regret leaving Naples for this reason. *Credat* - .

Thursday, March 12, 1812. (1) Fagan came and said that the Queen had wished him to go to her last night. He had not gone. He was convinced of the Queen's uniform hope and determination to return, of the insincerity of the Hereditary Prince and of the necessity of

force to keep them in the right way. I told him I thought it better he should see the Queen frequently, so that we might know her sentiments. Major-Genl Rosenheim came to talk about his division. He condemned the present mode of promotion, thought regimental rise to the rank of major preferable, said the Army was wretched. The Hereditary Prince now took from the list of the eldest, after an examination had been made as to superior qualifications, a system liable to great abuse. He also thought the regimental administrations a good system. It had answered perfectly well in Naples. He found great fault with the administration of *vestiario*, introduced in 180- by Col. >La Mara<, the present Governor of Termini.

Belmonte called. He had called yesterday upon the Duke of Orleans. Upon his entering the room, the Duke and Duchess, who were together, set up a great laugh. He asked what it was. The Duchess said she had been commissioned by the Queen to engage him to wait upon her. I told him I thought he ought, when he was Minister, not as upon the individual but upon the Queen. He gave a different opinion. He said in public that he had no objection to pay her all the homages she could desire, but in private what she wanted, and for the purpose of misrepresenting what passed, he very much objected [to]. He said he and the Hereditary Prince had talked about the same thing. He had said to him the same sentiments, and he had asked the Hereditary Prince, "if the Queen, after the first interview, desires to see me again or talks about politics, what am I to do?" The Hereditary Prince said "We must, both of us, think of this; if it was my father there would be no difficulty, mais ma mère a une telle tête, une telle tête".(2)

The new Brig.-Genl Campo Reale (3) came, as also Caltanissetta. He wished me to ask for him the pay of brigadier of cavalry, in consequence of the expense to which he had been put as captain of justice. I asked if his father had not paid these. He said not, that he had paid at first 8,000 oz. but that it had not sufficed. He then talked of his family and there should be no difficulty about it. I asked why he retarded it. He said that he wished other things in dispute to be settled: his father to stop the process. He said that he was willing to leave it to arbitration, each side choosing an arbitrator, leaving to me the final arbitration upon points on which the arbitrators disagreed. I said this was very fair. He mentioned an affair in which Castrone had written (or sent) letters forged in Caltanissetta's name, for which he had been sentenced to be sent to one of the isles. The falsehood was detected and he was not sent.(4)

(1) Dined at Belmonte's, 28 people, all English. Round table. A beautiful entertainment. Dined about 7 o'clock.

(2) Belmonte said that Rosenheim had been once a favourite of the Queen.

(3) Son of Sambuca, *ami de la Princesse Partanna*.

(4) A *valet de chambre* of his waiting at table when the King dined with him, upon occasion of some difficulty said: "leave me alone, he *marche à l'anglaise*."

Friday, March 13, 1812. Count La Tour told me that he had seen the Queen the night before. Moliterno was present. The Queen said that she believed Moliterno was *fou*, that he

called her *cittadina imperatrice*. She begged him to let the "*cittadina*" *de côté* and to make her *imperatrice* I told Count La Tour that I thought the Queen occupied herself a good deal about Italy and that her project was to put the men disbanded from the Army into Italian regiments under Moliterno. He said that he was sure the Queen did not give up hopes of returning to power, that she had great influence over the Prince; and his opinion of the Prince was that he certainly would prefer unlimited power, but seeing that this would not do, he would prefer being forced, in order to justify himself in the eyes of his parents.(1) She said that the Hereditary Prince told her everything. I told the Admiral that I had in idea to ask the Queen's removal to a greater distance from Palermo.(2)

Prince Belmonte came in the evening and told me he had been two hours with the Hereditary Prince. Belmonte spoke to him about the Senate of Catania and represented to him the necessity of attending to their complaints. It would be highly useful "*pour notre cause*", as they returned members to Parliament and as Catania was one of the principal cities in Sicily.

Belmonte told him I was very impatient.

The Hereditary Prince told him before they became Ministers they must wait upon the King and Queen. Belmonte told the Hereditary Prince that I had advised him to do the same thing and he then told him his answer to me and after a long discussion the Hereditary Prince said to him, "*vous avez raison*".

He talked to him also about the Constitution and the reforms intended for it. The Hereditary Prince proposed that these should be proposed by him and submitted for the sanction of Parliament. Belmonte asked him if he thought it more for the dignity of the Crown to give or to receive the law. If he proposed that which the Parliament would not consent to, he received the law. If on the other hand all new proposals came from the Parliament, he with his veto could refuse his sanction and he gave the law. The Hereditary Prince said, "*vous avez encore raison*".

Belmonte said of him that it was necessary to do him good, that he should be his *valet de chambre* with him morning, noon and night; otherwise something always occurred to undo what had been done.

I told Belmonte that I was then going to Circello to require the Queen's *éloignement* from Palermo. I had not mentioned it to anybody in order that no one might be compromised, neither the Hereditary Prince himself nor his new Ministers. He approved very much of the measure; but he was evidently discomposed either because he had not been let into the secret or because he wished to have the credit of such a recommendation. I think the latter, because he immediately observed "you know I recommended it to you long ago". It is a pity that too much *amour-propre* should cast any shade upon such shining abilities, such undoubted courage and such real patriotism.

I went to Circello at half past 9 p.m. I told him I was come to him upon an affair of importance and of necessity, in my judgement, to the *bien-être* of affairs. It was the *éloignement de la Reine*. He said, from Sicily. No, I answered, from Palermo. The reasons I gave were that she was doing mischief. I mentioned the affair of Meliti, her influence with the Hereditary Prince, her keeping the King in continual torment. These circumstances, taken separately, might make me wish her removal, but would not justify my asking it. The

requiring it I founded upon the information I had lately received from Casseti, of the existence of an actual correspondence with Murat.

Circello did not say a single word upon this last circumstance. He said that such was her disposition, that opposition only made her more determined, that he thought it better to leave her alone and that the change about to be made would undoubtedly induce her to depart. I doubted this very much. I had the experience of six years to convince me that nothing but force would induce the Queen to do what was right. He said that it was difficult to lay a hand upon the Queen. I asked if she would like to meet a Parliament and all the charges that would be made against her. What I asked was for the comfort of the King, of the Prince, of herself.

I asked how this was to be effected, and I proposed that he should mention it to the Queen. I said it could not be done by the Hereditary Prince or the new Ministers who were disliked by the Queen. I had not even communicated to them my resolution. He said he must excuse himself from it; with one foot and 3/4 out of his office he could not undertake so unpleasant a commission. I said he was still Minister for Foreign Affairs and that I in my capacity of Minister also had made to him officially this application. He still refused. I then said that I must send him an official Note.

He asked in the conversation where the Queen could go to. I said to Catania, as she had once proposed. All Sicily was at her choice. Upon my way home it occurred to me that it would be better to write to the Queen, through the Hereditary Prince.

I saw Belmonte on my return home to whom I told what had passed.

Poli also came and gave me a letter from the Hereditary Prince, desiring to see me at eleven on Monday, when he hoped everything would be settled.

(1) This I dare say is a correct opinion.

(2) Mr Hill went away with the Duke of Ascoli, Count La Tour, Mr Seale, his secretary.

Saturday, March 14, 1812. (1) Belmonte came and brought me a letter from Casseti, saying he would tell me all.

Mr Mackenzie told me that from Odessa, the government of the Duke of Richelieu, we might get any quantity of corn we pleased at a very moderate price. Odessa had [a] winter port. Duke of Richelieu, many years Governor, very popular and very good man. His wife in France, and has recovered from Bonaparte a good deal of the family property. He therefore has taken no part in military affairs. Meat one penny per pound. 10,000 oxen driven up every year to Moscow for the tallow only. Meat thrown away.

Mr Mackenzie says the people in Russia are the happiest he ever saw. Slavery is but a name, there is not a beggar. Every proprietor is obliged to take care of his peasant. Roads very good and travelling very expeditious. He went as a volunteer to the Russian Army in Persia, and then they entered Circassia under an escort of 125 men and a gun. They were followed the whole way by the natives whom he described as barbarians, armed with bows and arrows. The Russians were beat by the Persians, who had 40,000 cavalry. Of a Russian

corps of 5,000 only 1,200 returned, destroyed by sickness. Mr Mackenzie said that at that time the Russians thought of nothing but going to India. They considered it easy.

(1) Wrote to Sir E. Pellew, by l'Ec1air, Capt. Bellamy.

Sunday, March 15, 1812 (1) Prince Belmonte came and informed me that the Admiral had promised through Brissac a passage to Malta for Raddi, a person attached to the Legation at Petersburg and a Carlo Benedetti, a famous spy of the Queen. Belmonte was afraid of the effect the representations about to be sent by the Queen through these individuals to the courts of Vienna and Petersburg might have, and begged me to persuade the Admiral not to give them a passage. I said that the Queen's representations would go somehow or other, and that I thought the effect would signify very little. He told me that he was always *impatiente* with my *froidueur*; that we English had "*trop de loyauté*".

Leone, the Uditore Generale, came. He said that he had been employed by Averna for the trial of Cassetti. He said that his impression was that Cassetti had been invited to come. He came at Prince Belmonte's recommendation to give me such information as I might wish of the proceedings against Cassetti. Lamb went to Cassetti, by permission obtained from the Hereditary Prince, through a letter written to Poli.

Mr Mackenzie told me that he went in a Russian frigate from Corfu to be landed at Trieste. Pozzo di Borgo was with him. A man of remarkable eloquence and superior ability. Said the Duke of Serracapriola was a gambler and a dissipated man whose attachment was not to be depended upon. Ruffo a very clever, cunning man.

Said Dumoutier was connected with the wife of Metternich, a very clever woman. Dumoutier, when Secretary of Legation of Dresden, had become acquainted with her and she and he were offended by the wife of the Minister there. Dumoutier was 7 years [there] and the etiquette at that court being that the Elector never speaks with anyone under the rank of a Minister, Dumoutier had never once been spoken to by the Elector. Saxony took part with Prussia against France. Dumoutier was made German interpreter to Buonaparte during that war, and afterwards was made sole manager of Saxon affairs. He revenged the insult done to Madame Metternich, by turning those who offered it out of the country. He said that to gratify his malice against the Elector for never having noticed him, he at his first dinner with the Elector, talked so continually with the Electress as not to allow her time to eat her dinner. He said that he understood Bonaparte to have been very much in love with his present wife.

(1) Lt-Col. Mackenzie told me of the death of Capt. Johnston, 81st Regiment, son of Gen. Johnston.

Monday, March 16, 1812. Belmonte came. (1) Repeated what I had omitted to say before, that the King (2) had written to Serrati to say that he would not go to Palermo in order not to see the person (*la personne*) who had caused him to descend from his throne. Serrati had

advised the Hereditary Prince strongly to take Belmonte and Villa Hermosa into the Government. Belmonte repeated what he had before said about Leopold's going to Gibraltar, that the Queen persuaded Drummond to write her a Note proposing it, which she showed to Belmonte. Belmonte said to her: "upon such subjects it should be official". He dissuaded her strongly from sending Leopold. He said the Governor of Gibraltar would either force him to remain in the suburb, or would not let him land. When this event really did happen, she reminded Belmonte of it.

I spoke to Belmonte about Di Aci and the prejudice there was against him. I said there was a long interval between Aci and himself or Villa Hermosa. He said yes and added: "Where will you find such another man (himself)? *C'est une barre de fer avec le coeur d'un Spartiate dans le milieu des esclaves*".(3) He defended Aci. He said certainly he had been the humble servant of the King. (This I only obtained [from] him in consequence of his wishing to make a comparison in favour of himself). He said "if the King was to tell Ventimiglia, 'Tell that woman I wish to speak to her', would Ventimiglia do it? No, rather his hand cut off. But this Di Aci has done". He said that he was now popular from the part he had taken and the sacrifices he had made. But he said: "Let him be one of the Ministers and if he does not answer, he can be removed with honour to some place about Court". (4) The Duke of Orleans came. He told me that the Queen had written to the King to say that she should go to the Ficuzza, in which case the King said he should go away further. The Duke said that the Hereditary Prince had spoken to him two or three times lately. He told him that his family had been saved by my not going away. Said the Queen wanted a settlement of 10,000 oz. per month upon the King, the same upon herself, 7 upon Leopold, 2 upon the Duke of Orleans.(5)

Fagan had been sent for by the Queen and described to me the state of fury and despair in which he had found her.

(1) Belmonte said the Queen certainly thinks of going away. Mademoiselle Bitterman was to marry Lucchesi, Butera's aide-de-camp. She said the marriage could not now take place as she was going away.

(2) The King said he wished for the sake of his health to go the milder climate of the Colli.

(3) Belmonte said that had he been in England there would have been *siècles* since he would have been Prime Minister, but at his age he was nothing.

(4) At the time the Queen had made a convention (peace) with the French, she was negotiating for the coming of the Russian and English. Belmonte wrote to her "*de ne pas traiter les affaire politiques comme elle traitait celles du coeur*".

(5) Talleyrand communicated to Bonaparte that Lucchesini had said that the King of Prussia declared that war should be the alternative. Bonaparte said "Tell him I cannot. Let there be war". Talleyrand remonstrated with him. Buonaparte laughed at him and said, "never mind. Lucchesini is a man of letters and an Italian, and therefore a coward".

I sent the letter by Milnes to the Queen.

[Tuesday], March 17 1812 . Called upon Cassaro. He seemed of opinion that the four Counsellors, Partanna, Pantelleria, Cattolica and Cutò, should not be put out of the Council; that they should attend the ordinary Councils, but not the general ones. He consented to be Minister for Grace and Justice.(1) He said he had a proof of the Prince's loyalty. He had seen a letter to the Queen in which he stated the necessity of his going on with dispatch. He mentioned Caccamo, the King's [confessor], having asked him if he would not like the King to approve of his appointment as Counsellor. He sent Prince Butera's confessor to him (Cassaro) to propose that he (Cassaro) should write a letter to the King to be carried by Caccamo to the King. Cassaro said he had no occasion to write to the King.

I went from thence to Belmonte and proposed to him the idea of Cassaro to keep in the 4 mentioned by Cassaro. Belmonte was very much against it. I suggested to him the policy of not making enemies in the Parliament. He said it did not signify. He was sure he could manage the Baronial Branch. It was necessary to secure the elections of the Demesial Branch. Of the Ecclesiastico he was not sure; he believed they would be against him. He was prejudiced against Cassaro, evidently.

I went by appointment to the Hereditary Prince at 11. He said that he wished everything to be settled, and that quickly.(2) He was determined that nothing should stop him. "Let us begin", he said, "with the Ministers". He then mentioned Belmonte as Foreign Minister, Cassaro for Grace and Justice. He said Cassaro at his request had consented to take it. Villa Hermosa, Finances; and Di Aci's name was then mentioned. He said; "Do you think Di Aci really fit for this situation, does he really enjoy the public opinion?". I said that I certainly had heard stories against him, that he had stolen the military chest. I said if this was true, I certainly should be sorry to see him Minister. I had thought well of him because Lord Amherst liked him, and that he had sacrificed everything for his country. He begged me to enquire if there was any foundation for the story. I said I would.

He then asked what I thought of Floresta or Buscemi for directors in that department.(3) I said, Floresta I objected to. Some awkward letters of his to Spadea had been found. Buscemi I did not know.

I talked of his letter of yesterday requiring my security to certain points; I asked his meaning in articles

1: of the King and Queen's security. He said he meant that there should be no trial or disrespect paid to his parents. I was sure nobody would think of it.

2: That there should be no recrimination; that they should go to the fact, to the correction of the abuse without looking into the cause of it.

3: That there should not be required any act on the part of his father, meaning abdication. I said that I supposed he meant abdication. I said that it was possible the Parliament might require the assent of the King to any changes that might pass. Such an idea I knew had occurred, and the Queen had mentioned it to me. I said I had answered to her what I thought, that "the King having given to you his full powers *ut alter ego* his consent was not necessary", but if it should [be] it would be very easy for him, the Hereditary Prince, to obtain it. He said "by all means".

4: pleasures of the King. Nobody could wish to curtail them. I said there might be allusion intended to the settlement [of the] Civil List. He said that he had before mentioned this

subject. I observed that if security and regularity of payment was alone wanted, perhaps I could pay the amount from the subsidy, upon condition that an equal sum was given from the Treasury to military purposes.

He talked of the Constitution. He asked how I thought the changes should be made. I said that I thought he should state his principles, leaving to Parliament to act upon them, and reserving the sanction to himself. He said he had an idea of forming a separate Council for the consideration of future changes into which he proposed to call the Praetor and the Archbishop, who had the most influence in Parliament. I said Belmonte was the person who was to lead the Parliament. He said he thought him very clever, but expressed not having an entire confidence in him. I said his eloquence was great and that [as] he had turned the Parliament against the Crown, so he would influence it for it. He was very much for keeping the four Ministers proposed to be kept by Cassaro. He meant that they should only attend the Councils upon separate branches, not the general ones. I did not agree with him.(4)

He talked of my letter to the Queen which, he said, I must be aware would shock her very much. I said I was, but that I thought it necessary and for him particularly. He said I might be sure she did not influence him, and she was now so *effarouchée* that she was resolved not to speak to him any more about business. I said her removal would be equally advantageous for the King.(5) As for him, he said that he was quite resolved never to interfere- He was *respectablement ferme*. He said the Queen was determined to go as soon as the Duchess of Orleans was brought to bed and the season would permit.

He asked me for my proofs. I begged to be excused giving them. I did not accuse the Queen. I did not want to try her. He said: "Have you any written papers?". I said no. "Then," he said, "you have only Cassetti's depositions". I said, that, with other circumstances amounting to proofs. He said he wished the Queen's innocence to be cleared. I said it could not. It was matter of opinion and nothing could convince me to the contrary. The French General said "Why those mysterious communications?". He said he had always opposed them. He pressed me for Cassetti's depositions. I begged him not to press me for them. They could do him no good: the Queen might ask for them; he had said he would not show them; it would place him in an awkward situation. I said I had been in hopes the Queen would not have mentioned it. I said that I should not, in her place. To my friend I might.(6) He said: "you are a man; she a woman and tells everything". He did not press me any more to give them to him.

He talked of the Ministers going out and he said he thought they should have some allowances. I said he must take care of his Parliament. They would remonstrate and would certainly examine into the finances. He said then it would be sought to make a general revision.

(1) Cassaro was against the Parliament.

(2) That he wished other things to go on (meaning in Italy and without), which remained suspended.

(3) I forgot Settimo, proposed before.

(4) Serrati or Cappelli he proposed as Ministers for the Casa Reale. I preferred the former.

- (5) Wanted Castrone to go to the other side of the island.
- (6) Made great protestations of his friendship and confidence.

Wednesday, March 18, 1812. (1) Marquis Spaccaformo presented me his brother who had obtained a commission in the Guards.

Moliterno came and asked what answer I had for him. Showed me a letter from the Queen to him, speaking favourably of her own intentions. He wanted me to make a small expedition to Italy merely to give the signal and to light the flame. I told him I should be ready to assist, but I did not think the time yet come. He said he should retire from the service. He asked what I thought. I told him as the Hereditary Prince seemed to wish to keep him, he had better not go for the present.

Belmonte came and told me that information had been given of an intention to poison me at the dinner of today. By accident Butera sat in my place. He gave me the names.(2)

He mentioned having been 6 months in England in 1788, the year of the King's illness, in Poland and of the journey with the King to meet the Empress of Russia (Lord Whitworth was Minister), of the journey in Russia when the Empress went to the Crimea (Lord St Helens was our Minister).

He told me of two persons having called yesterday upon Prince Villa Hermosa from the Prieur Serrati, whose object was to engage the Prince Villa Hermosa to write a letter to the King, an intrigue attributed by Belmonte to the Queen and the Hereditary Prince, in order to involve him (Belmonte). Villa Hermosa refused to do so. He talked of the perfidy of the Hereditary Prince, and his conviction, as expressed to me in the first instance, that nothing but fear would secure his friendship. He said they had removed all the correspondence from the Foreign Office, and a great deal from the Military Office.

He mentioned a report of the Queen that it was Belmonte's wish to set aside the Hereditary Prince and make the Duke of Orleans Regent. He said that the Duke was his friend and he would be glad to do him all the good in his power; but he appealed to me if he had ever suggested such an idea, if he had not proposed that he should be employed abroad.

(1) Blassano, Capt. Stuart, arrived from Mahon in 4 days from Sir E. Pellew to inform us that French ships had returned to Toulon.

(2) Prince Butera, Capt. Lucchesi, Prince Luperano [and] aide-de-camp; General [] [and] aide-de-camp; Genl Campbell, Genl MacFarlane, Lt-Col. McKenzie, Major Farren, Capt. Muller, Capt. Jones, [captains of] Kenah, Amiel, Torrens, Rosenhagen, Stuart, Fremantle.

Thursday, March 19, 1812. (1) Pasqualino came to defend himself. I told him all the reports against him. He praised himself and asked my protection. Col. Micheroux with [] of *vestiario* called.

Belmonte came. Told me that the King's confessor Caccamo had been also with Cassaro to invite him to write to the King to consent to his coming into the Ministry. Cassaro

answered that he knew but one King, who was the Vicar-General; that the King, besides, had never been very kind to him and, further, that the taking place was not agreeable to him, and only done for the sake of his country. There were therefore the objections both of duty and inclination against the proposal. Belmonte said this answer was perfect. He ascribed this to an intrigue of the Queen and Hereditary Prince and gave it as a trait of the perfidy of the latter. I attributed his conduct rather to *faiblesse* if he really was acquainted with it.

He said when he saw a priest come into his room "*voilà un coquin*". He said the Hereditary Prince's confessor, an old man of 80, had been with him and had spoken the most delightful sentiments respecting the duties of the Prince, distinguishing between those of King and of son, *fiils respectueux*.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He said the Duchess was just come from Santa Croce and was agitated. The Queen had endeavoured to impress her with an opinion that she (the Queen) believed that I had been urged to write the letter I had to her Majesty, by his (the Duke's) instigation, and that the Hereditary Prince was in his hands. He said the Duchess was not influenced by these opinions.

The Duke said that the King was very much affected by what had passed; that he was alarmed; that the Queen wished to take him away with her; that it was desirable to prevent it.(2) I asked how was the King to be approached. The Duke said if the Duchess had been well enough, nobody could have undertaken the commission so well as herself. She knew the King and Queen perfectly. I proposed writing through Circello. The Duke said there was a danger of his showing the letter to the Queen, and we could not know the impression she would convey with it. The Duke reminded me of what he had before said, that the King was a man of first impressions. His future opinions and conduct depended upon the first representation. I proposed to go myself without notice. This, he said, might do. He would consult the Duchess. He believed the Queen would go to Catania.

I called upon Belmonte in the evening. Told me that Poli had dined with him. Talked of pensions to the retiring Ministers and mentioned an intention of the Hereditary Prince to give them the honorary title of Secretaries of State. Belmonte reprobated this measure.

Received accounts of the capture of the Rivoli, French 74, off Venice, Commodore Barre, by Victorious, 74, Capt. Talbot, Weasel, Capt. Andrew, in company. French had Rivoli, three brigs, 2 settees. 1 brig blew up. Rivoli lost 400 killed and wounded. Victorious, 140 killed and wounded. Victorious total loss 506 including 60 sick. Rivoli 800.

(1) Dined at Lord Montgomerie's.

(2) The King said his wife was quite changed and was an old woman. The Duke said that the King talked of going into a monastery. He also said that he was very much attached to Sicily.

Friday, March 20, 1812. Called upon the Hereditary Prince by appointment at 11. Talked of Di Aci and asked if I had enquired if there was any just ground against his character. I told him that I had sent MacFarlane to Bourcard, who had said that he knew of nobody so

fit for the situation. The Hereditary Prince seemed very much surprised. He still harped upon it and asked if I really believed he was fit.(1) I said I believed he was, and if we found the contrary we could always remove him. He mentioned the names of the other Ministers.(2) He then talked of the four Councillors to be removed. He asked if I had spoken to Cassaro. I said I knew his opinion to be against their removal; he thought it would make a strong opposition. The Hereditary Prince said he thought the same. But I said that I was quite of a different opinion. He asked why. Because they did not enjoy the public opinion. Cattolica was always of the strongest side. Pantelleria, he admitted, was a man whose principles were not quite understood by him. I told him I thought Partanna was the best. He agreed with me. I said the great object at present was to procure union in the Council, and I thought these persons more likely to disturb it than not. He had three persons to depend upon, Belmonte, Cassaro and myself. They were to carry through the civil government, I was to support it. He then asked whether Fitalia and Carini should not also be removed from Council. I said I thought better not, that they would strengthen Cassaro[']s side in the Council. It was necessary to preserve a balance. I said I could not forget how these persons were appointed by the Queen. He said "Aye, aye", and seemed to imagine this to be the real reason why I wanted to get rid of them. He then said: "Well, then they are to go out. You will have no objection to my putting this upon your shoulders". I said, "none in the world".

We talked occasionally of other things, of the rations and Council of Administration. He seemed to think with us that this was the better system. He said "yours is somewhat the same". I said "yes, but not so good". He spoke of Cassaro as of the person of those he was to take as the one who had the greatest share of his confidence. He talked of the changes. I advised him to assemble his Ministers and desire them to form a plan for his approbation. He suggested Belmonte and Cassaro and proposed that I should be present. I objected I should prefer communicating with His Royal Highness only. He said that it was his wish that I should know what passed. I said our way in England I thought best, where the Ministers consulted and submitted their opinion to the King. He asked if I thought it better than in the presence of the King. I said these were details which did not much signify. He said he did not understand them yet. I said I thought on opening the Parliament he should only express general principles with which there would be no disagreement. The particular measures, first approved by him, should be proposed by his Ministers and appear as their measures in order that the Parliament might not be discussing his opinions. When passed, he would sanction or not, as he pleased. I thought it important that responsibility should attach to Ministers and not to the King. The King should do no harm. If the Government went on ill, Ministers were removed and the thing was settled. He entirely approved of this principle.

I talked [to] him of assembling the Parliament. He said it would take 4 months. I said this was long. He expressed a wish that I should not go away before it assembled. I hoped it might be assembled sooner. He said that he would consult Belmonte and Cassaro as to the most expeditious mode of doing it.

He talked of the finances. I said I thought Villa Hermosa was more esteemed than any man in the country. He said he believed so. I said it was very necessary to have an *état* as soon

as possible of the receipts and disbursements, that it might be known how much could be required for [the] Army and Navy.

He talked of the reduction of the Army, and asked my ideas of doing it. I said I always retained my first opinion, that the Neapolitans should be kept in preference. They were good soldiers. And I asked if he did consider them as subjects of the King. He said yes. I proposed to take the Esteri into the German Corps. He said it was a very good regiment. But I said they were *étrangers*. I asked if he preferred them to the others. He did not speak positively, but he seemed to allow he did. He said they all wanted to enlist with us. He proposed to open the door. I recommended to do nothing till we saw what we could or could not keep. He proposed putting down in writing what we were agreed upon. He wrote it in Italian:

- 1: Belmonte etc. to be Ministers.
- 2: Four Counsellors to be removed.
- 3: Butera to belong to Council.
- 4: Cappelli to have the Casa Reale.
- 5: -

I wrote my assent in words prescribed by him. He then talked to me about rewarding the Ministers about to be removed. I advised him strongly against it. He was very much for it. I told him I thought the recompense to Medici and the others was an insult to the public. It would be taking from himself all the credit of the measures he was going to take. He said: "do you object [to] it?" I said that it did not concern me. I told him if I could have any personal feeling independent of the public good, I should wish it. He was indeed acting magnanimously towards me. I had wished to give him all the credit and none of the blame. He was making me a return, by wishing to make it appear that he was compelled to the change, but was always attached to the old system and its agents. He proposed to give them the honorary title of Secretaries. He wrote down his ideas and proposed to me to say "*Je ne m'en mêle pass*". I begged him not to require of me to write anything; that I could not state half my opinion, that I could not advise him to act so. He then desired me to write my whole opinion. And I wrote "*Je ne m'en mêle pass. Mais le changement du ministères étant fait comme concession au désir public, la distinction des anciens Ministres qui ont le tort des conseils qui ont été suivis paraît peu politique.* W.C.B"

I then added "*J'en excepte le Marquis Circello qui mérite toute recompense et honneur du Souverain.* W.C.B."

He spoke to me of Saluzzo,(3) rank of major for Lucchesi.

Belmonte came and proposed to me to send the Père Caccamo to the King to remove his disquietude. He had mentioned it to the Duke of Orleans.(4)

(1) He said: "it is for you I ask, not for myself", for he should say that it was My Lord who advised it.

(2) Belmonte, Cassaro, Villa Hermosa.

(3) I strongly praised him and recommended him for my aide-de-camp.

(4) Dispatched by the Constance, Capt. Rosenhagen, to meet the packet at Cagliari. To Lord Wellesley, - , to Lord Liverpool, Duke of Portland, Mr Hill.

Saturday, March 21, 1812. (1) Belmonte called upon me. Mr Mackenzie told me that Pozzo di Borgo was a man of great ability. I told him I heard that his intrigues had been a great cause of our loss of Corsica. He said he had heard so. He said it was certain that he had done Lord Minto a great deal of injury at Vienna.

(1) Dispatched by Badger, Capt. >Marly<, Lord Wellesley, No. 10. Sir E. Pellew, J. H. Herries, recommending Mr Dickinson. Private: Lord Wellesley. Munster. Mr Lamb, Genl Druet. Dined here: Baron and Baronessa Grammonte, Principessa Larderia, Mr and Mrs Thompson, Prince Belmonte, Duke of Leinster.

Sunday, March 22, 1812. (1) Great quarrel. Capt. Smith and [].

(1) Arrived Comus from Cagliari. Brought letters from Mr Hill. Packet from England had passed Cagliari day before.

Monday, March 23, 1812. (1) Called upon the Duke of Orleans in the evening. He told us the King was in a state of great *abattement*. He shut himself up in his room and saw nobody.

(1) Pylades, Capt. Ferguson, arrived in 14 days from England with dispatches. Answers to Douglas was only 23 days on his passage.

Tuesday, March 23, 1812.(1) Belmonte told me that St Clair had gone in to the Queen and said before Leopold and the Duchess of Orleans that the numbers of blackguards then in her antechamber should be *chassés*, it was they who were the cause of her ruin. The Queen was very angry and said: "*comment vous osez à me parler*"?

Fagan had seen the Queen and represented her distress. I offered to lend her 5 or 6,000 ounces. Fagan returned and she was delighted.

(1) Went to see the nun, Lady William's friend.

Wednesday, March 25, 1812. (1) The Duke of Orleans called upon me. He told me he had had a very long conversation with the Hereditary Prince. He had kept the sermon waiting above an hour. The Hereditary Prince told him of the letter that I had written to him. He did not show it to him. He said that I had required again the absence of the Queen. He said that this measure was attributed to himself (the Duke of Orleans) and to Belmonte, and that it became them to endeavour to dissuade me from it. The Duke said that he knew nothing of it; that if he had, he should not be ashamed of saying so; and he said that he was not afraid

of anyone, of the King, of the Queen, or of himself. The Hereditary Prince wished him to see St Clair. He said that he had no objection to see him, but he (the Duke) should not send [for] him. The Hereditary Prince might do so if he pleased.

The Duke told the Hereditary Prince that that very day he had dined with the Queen, but that she had not spoken to him. This was said in answer to a question of the Hereditary Prince if he had seen the Queen lately. The Hereditary Prince complained much of the hardship of forcing away the Queen (2) and said that he doubted whether he ought to allow it. The Duke told him what he had before said, that he could not prevent it, that he had no real power. The Hereditary Prince said that his mother would live quietly. The Duke asked: "you believe so?" The Duke said it had been unlucky that the Queen had not retired at first to the Ficuzza. The Hereditary Prince said he thought so too, but, the Duke observed, it might be a question whether the King would have consented to her coming. The Hereditary Prince answered, "*Cela est vrai*". The Hereditary Prince asked what more I wanted. He had done everything I had desired, enumerating the several acts.

The Hereditary Prince observed to him that when he had his new Ministers, might not he take other advice? The Duke observed that this was called in England "behind curtain advice" and had always given great dissatisfaction. when the Hereditary Prince said that the Queen was quiet and did not interfere, the Duke asked if he did not know that she was always talking of the return of the King to power. He said yes.

The Duke told him of the arrival of the Pylades. The Hereditary Prince said with some apparent pleasure that Lord Wellesley was out. The Duke said yes, but my dispatches were from his successor. The Duke said they contained an approval *en entier* of my proceedings. He asked if it was so. "Certainly", the Duke answered. He had a letter from me to that effect, and read it to him.

The Duke asked if he was to carry any message to me. The Hereditary Prince said no, by no means; but he wished the Duke would see St Clair.

The Hereditary Prince told him that in my letter I had made a great distinction between the Queen and the King.

Fagan told me that when he said to the Queen that I had received letters approving my conduct, she put out her tongue and said: "then all my hopes are gone". With reference to the loan, Fagan told her that in my public capacity I must do my duty, but in my private situation I was desirous of showing her every kind of attention.(3)

Belmonte told me that Cassaro had said to the Hereditary Prince that the dispatches sending away the old Ministers were full of obliging remarks, while those appointing the new ones contained not a favourable word.

Di Aci had come the day before to complain that he was not in Council. He was very wrongheaded. I was displeased with him. Belmonte had seen him and brought me a memorandum; he wished me to engage to place him in Council in a day or two. I said that I would not promise, but that I would do it if I could; that in fact his appointment had given more difficulty than all the rest. I said I was sure he would give trouble, and that I depended upon him (Belmonte) to prevent it.

(1) Packet arrived in ... days from Girgenti.

Imperiéuse, Capt. Duncan, from a cruise.

(2) The Duke of Orleans told me, not at this conversation, that the Duchess was quite satisfied that the Queen had brought this upon herself.

(3) Fagan returned at night and said that the Queen refused to give a receipt to me for fear of its being brought before the Parliament. I said I could not dispense with it, and I desired him to say nothing more about the money until they should send for him.

Thursday, March 26, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. Told me the reason, according to report, why the appointments of the new Ministry were not out, was that a sum of money, 16,000 oz., remained to be paid to complete an improper sale of public property to one Ferrarese, in which Tomasi was concerned. This sum was to go part into the Queen's pocket, part into the Hereditary Prince's.

The Admiral told me that he had had a long conversation with the Queen the day before; she was *abattue* and talked as if she was not going away. He spoke of my own conduct in terms of strong approbation. He said he had urged me to go on more quickly, but now it was all over and that nothing unlucky had occurred, he considered my conciliatory system to be the best. If ever I should be compelled to any act of harshness, I should stand justified. I told him that I knew my mode of acting was best suited to the taste of the King's Ministers, but that I myself could not approve it because I was conscious of having lost two months of time, which, if I had forced the Hereditary Prince to go on, might have been employed in putting the country in a better state of defence.

The Père Caccamo, the King's confessor, came by my request in the evening, but Capt. St Laurent not being here, I could not understand him. (1) Lady William went to Court to see the ceremony of the Queen washing the 12 Apostles; 12 beggars with powdered wigs, like those of judges, with white dresses were brought up, and one of their feet washed and kissed by the Queen. The Hereditary Prince performed the same ceremony with 12 boys. An evening ceremony, which upon Fardella's and Bourcard's assurances that we (I and MacFarlane) were not expected, we did not go [to], but Poli told Lady William that the Hereditary Prince would have taken it as a compliment. No carriages allowed to go in the streets Thursday and Good Friday.

C. [told] W.-F.-N.- I did not like - .

Boule de chair.

Good Friday, March 27, 1812. (1) The Père Caccamo came again by appointment at 12 o'clock. I told him that I wish to make a good man happy and that it was through his means only that I thought this could be effected. I told him I understood the King was alarmed, that he feared me, his people, his Ministers, and his Parliament. I said all this was without foundation; that he was very much respected; that Belmonte, of his Ministers, had always talked of him with respect, and that if they should ever act otherwise I would be the first to prevent them. I had no view but the happiness of the country. The Père recommended the Queen. I said her departure was necessary for the happiness of the King and all the rest of

the family.(2) He said the King wished her gone. He asked if I required she should go immediately. I said no, she was to stay [until] after the Duchess of Orleans' confinement. He talked of Moliterno, a friend of his. He said the King was not happy, except when he was with him. He advised me to write to the King, and he would carry it.(3)

- (1) Another packet arrived [from] England with newspapers down to the 4th March. 1st packet that landed at Trapani. Pylades returned with convoy.
- (2) The Père went afterwards to the Queen and told her I still insisted upon her absence.
- (3) The dispatches appointing the new Ministers came out.

Saturday, March 28, 1812. (1) Sent my letter to the King to the Père Caccamo.(2) Di Aci and Belmonte called. Di Aci said he had seen the Hereditary Prince the day before, that he had complained that not a word about his long services had been introduced into the dispatch. The Hereditary Prince said earnestly he would take it back and have it altered, if he pleased. Di Aci said no, by no means. Talked about Flotilla, and division of duties between the men-of-war and the staff.

Belmonte stated that the courier who had brought the dispatches was coming to him, when a servant of the Hereditary Prince came in great haste and stopped him and brought him to the Hereditary Prince. The courier afterwards excused himself to Belmonte, but Belmonte told him he did very right. The Hereditary Prince directed Belmonte to bring to him unopened all the dispatches which he might receive from the Ministers at Foreign Courts. Belmonte made no objection.

Belmonte said that all the Ministers had been appointed without salaries. He said Di Aci must have one and that to him and Villa Hermosa salaries should have been given, which they should have repaid into the Treasury. He required that I should make this arrangement with the Hereditary Prince.

Di Aci said that the Hereditary Prince had proposed that the Army should be kept to its utmost strength in order to make expeditions on the continent. His opinion on the contrary was that it should be small and that a part of the war money should be appropriated to a Navy.(3)

- (1) Pylades sailed again.
- (2) The Père Caccamo said that the King wished the Queen gone, but not with the appearance of being driven away. The Père admitted that she had been the cause of all the misfortunes that had happened. The Père said the King was afraid of being insulted both by the people and his Ministers. This is Capt. st Laurent's recollection of conference on the 27th.
- (3) A placard stuck up that the Hereditary Prince was Punch and the new Ministers were to play him.

Sunday, March 29, 1812. Belmonte came. He had been at Court. He had had a long conversation with the Hereditary Prince. He said the Hereditary Prince had expressed his wish that the Parliament might meet as soon as possible. He knew the Queen's language to be the same. The Queen said she should be glad if it could assemble in 7 days. He could not very well understand this haste; he suspected some trick. I said the desire of operations in Italy was the cause, a preliminary to which was the assembly of a Parliament.

He said he had written to Jannucci to propose to wait upon the King. He received a very civil answer saying it was not necessary. The Hereditary Prince proposed to him then to meet the Queen. Belmonte answered that as the King would not see him, he supposed the Queen would not.(1) He said a wife should follow the example of her husband, and the wife of a King owed him, besides respect, submission. (This was clearly said to a person exercising very despotic authority within his own family).

The Hereditary Prince desired that all business with me might be done in writing. Belmonte observed to the Hereditary Prince that business of importance should be written, but other matters would be better discussed and that it would have but little the appearance of confidence and friendship. The Hereditary Prince again desired that all letters should be brought to him unopened. Belmonte said that it should be done as he directed. If he wished to have the letters opened and contents stated, well; if unopened, well. But he would say that it was usual for the Minister to open such letters. His Royal Highness might make a *simulacre* of him, if he pleased, to him it was indifferent. He might give him little or no business, as he pleased.(2) The public only required that measures contrary to his opinion should not be taken, because he must then justify himself to the public.

The Hereditary Prince said they must reflect upon the measures to be adopted in Parliament. Belmonte said, if meant by reflection was the submission of his ideas to the consideration of Parisi, Tomasi and Circello, enemies to the future system, such reflection would do only harm. The Hereditary Prince said such was not his intention. Belmonte gave him the good advice that his policy was to leave the Parliament nothing to ask; and that by so doing, even if they were disposed to go further, his generosity would defeat them. He expressed this very ably.

Belmonte told the Hereditary Prince that he trembled before his father and mother. "As we are known to our *valets de chambre* so are you to your country, whose interest it is to watch you".

"When there is a constitution", he said, "Your Royal Highness will neither watch us nor we you". Meaning that every man's rights and duty would then be defined. Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince was very friendly and confidential, and said the most flattering things to him. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince's character was like that of women, subject very much to change, with irritable frames. He never found him in feeling or opinions two days alike. One day he was all kindness, another cold. The same with myself, one day he said that he had the utmost reliance in me, another he talked with fear and alarm of the exercise of my power. I explained this, according to my judgment, as being the effect of the last advice upon a very weak mind.

The Hereditary Prince proposed not to allow procurations to the Parliament, but that the towns should send their own representatives. Belmonte said this could not be, it was

contrary to the Constitution, which allowed the Universities to name attorneys. It might and would be well for the Parliament to determine this hereafter. Belmonte supposed this was proposed upon the idea that this agency would be given to troublesome people of Palermo, whereas the members coming from the towns would be more easily gained.

(1) If they went to the Queen, Belmonte said, it should be all together and in the presence of others. The Hereditary Prince agreed in this.

(2) He said he should not do like Circello, who spoke highly to the Queen for having opened his letters and said he should complain to the King if it ever happened again. Belmonte said he had then the *entrée* of the Queen's apartment, and one day the Queen came out in a fury and said: "*cette vieille méchante bête, il m'a insultée*". Belmonte put his hand to his sword thinking someone was about to attack her. She then told him the story. She said Castrone had brought Circello's letters, which she had opened, as she assured, by mistake. She repeated: "*cette vieille méchante bête*". She complained to the King, who desired that Circello would write a most humble letter to the Queen, begging to be permitted to go and ask her pardon.

Monday, March 30, 1812. (1) Called upon the Duke of Orleans. I told him that a priest from the Père Caccamo had been with me to say the Queen was not to go to the Ficuzza on that day. The Duke said the Père was an excellent aide-de-camp, and he said it the more from having seen the influence within the family which such persons had. Belmonte came in. The Duke said there was something going on. He judged so from the gaiety of the Queen and the appearance of all those about her. Belmonte said there had been a scarcity of meat the preceding day, always a day of feasting, (2) being the termination of the 40 days' fast. On this day also there was a complaint of the bad quality of the pasta or macaroni. (3) I said that having the day before asked for an interview with the Hereditary Prince, I had only received on that morning an answer fixing it for the following day in the evening, in account of church service, which they both said was over.

The Duke told us that the real reason of the Queen consenting to his marriage, was in the view and hope that he, with St Clair, Moliterno and Leopold, would always give her a preponderance against the Hereditary Prince or with the King. In the same way, she wished for the Duke to unite with Moliterno in the Neapolitan expeditions. She wished Belmonte also to be Minister of War, but when they both refused, unless a more regular system was established, she was very angry. (4)

Belmonte told me on the same day afterwards that the Queen had been in love with the Duke, but that he had made the *nigaud* and pretended not to see it. He said the same thing had happened with himself, and he had observed the same conduct and in this insensibility he had committed an offence never to be washed away.

We talked a great deal of Moliterno. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince had talked of Moliterno and said that I had the same "*préventions contre lui*" as all the other English generals. Belmonte said that we English thought *sagement*. The Hereditary Prince wished Belmonte to see Moliterno; he said he was always ready. We agreed that Moliterno might

be of use, that he should see Moliterno and should say to the Hereditary Prince that he (Belmonte) had spoken to me and had succeeded in removing some of my *préventions* against him- He said that one of his counsels to the Hereditary Prince had been not *de repousser* anybody. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince had heard of my letter to the King and had expressed himself much satisfied with it. Belmonte pretended not to have known of my having written such a letter. They remarked that the Queen always asked who led such a person and that she had sometimes taken it into her head that the Duke led Belmonte and Belmonte the Duke. She had great anxiety to find out who was Belmonte's mistress, in order to influence her.(5)

The Père Caccamo came in the evening and brought me a letter from the King. He said he had written it in his presence. He said the King was anxious that the Queen should go away; that he had been writing all January and February to her to this effect; that she wanted to have gone to the Ficuzza as today, but the King would not allow her; that he would not go to the Solanto fishery for the same reason; that the Queen was always sending couriers; that his wish was to be quiet.(6)

He said he had only confessed the King for a year, that had he been the confessor, the barons would not have been exiled, or the 1% tax imposed. He said the day the King signed the act appointing the Hereditary Prince Vicar-General, he was with him continually and did not go to his dinner until the King had signed. He said the King had offered him the bishopric of Syracuse and another, which he had refused. He wished to die a monk. He was satisfied with the girdle of his order and his small convent. He observed Partanna had died the day before. What had he carried with him?

(1) Lady William went at 10 p.m. on board the Milford to go to Malta.

Howard, Joinville, Mener, Fazakerley, Obins, Lee.

(2) *Effectivement* one English soldier and Sicilian were stabbed in drunken [brawl].

(3) Belmonte said the Hereditary Prince had ordered the Duke di Gibbs to write a very proper letter to the Praetor, Count San Marco, upon these subjects.

(4) They both said they conceived one of the reasons which influenced the Hereditary Prince in his eager desire for the Italian operations and in his support of Moliterno, was that as the King had not renounced the throne of Naples, they had said "get Naples for the Queen and you will be quiet in Sicily". I rather think that he is as much a Neapolitan as his father or mother. Everything tends that way.

(5) The Duke showed me a strong paragraph in the *Morning Chronicle*, February 29, against our conduct here. He said, as was true, that it was a leading paragraph and not from Castalcicala.

(6) He also said that the King thought it necessary she should not only leave Palermo, but Sicily also. The King said that he had been married 44 years and that they were so many years of *martyre*. Capt. St Laurent present.

Tuesday, March 31, 1812. Called upon the Hereditary Prince by appointment at four. Talked of Moliterno whom he was very anxious that I should take into the British service. I

told him Belmonte had been pressing me, I believe instructed by His Royal Highness. I said I found Belmonte more inclined than I was. I would endeavour to get a person to go with Moliterno's officer to Naples and to Malta. He said he wished to appear anxious to espouse the cause of the Italian patriots. I spoke to him about *carne* rations for soldiers, Parliament. He said that it should be assembled as soon as possible. He wanted me to employ Moliterno very much. I showed considerable reluctance. He had no objection to the Italian Battalion being posted on the south coast of Sicily, at Sciacca, -or elsewhere. He said: "I see you look *plus tranquille*". I said that I was, that I thought now affairs would make progress.(1)

(1) I called today upon the Duke of Orleans to take leave. He told me that the Duke of Kent in his last letter had mentioned the expectation of the Prince Regent of seeing the Queen in England, but, added the Duke of Kent, "my opinion is that she will be sent either to Malta or Sardinia". I told the Duke of the desire of the King as communicated by the Père Caccamo, that the Queen should go away.

Wednesday, April 1, 1812. Captain D'Aguilar had great unwillingness to execute the commission to Vienna. He had written me a letter the day before declining it. In the evening he changed his mind, and on this morning, seeing he was very thoughtful and anxious and not at all above the difficulties, I let him off and made another arrangement.(1) Just as I was going away, Belmonte comes with a message from the Hereditary Prince in a memorandum written before the Hereditary Prince that he might not mistake him. The Hereditary Prince proposed that a general order should be given out to the Army by the Hereditary Prince inviting the Italians of his army to join the Constitutional Army of Italy (adverting to the regiments I was about to form). The Hereditary Prince was most anxious for my decision upon it before I went away. We agreed as to the absurdity of the proposition, *feu dans son derrière*. He said the Hereditary Prince was all anxiety. My representation of Belmonte's earnestness the day before had had the happiest effects upon the Hereditary Prince. It was agreed that he should answer to the Hereditary Prince that he (Belmonte) had found me with one foot in the stirrup; that I could not delay and that His Royal Highness's proposition required consideration and no particular despatch.

I left Palermo at 12. I rode my own horses to Lercara, 36 miles.(2) First 30 miles very good, carriageable. Last 6 very bad. Put up at the house of the principal person, who entertained us. Had dirty house and miserable place. The host very civil and kind. His name Sartorius.

Found there Major-Genl Campbell and Capt. St Laurent, my companions.

(1) Dispatched Capt. D'Aguilar with a letter to Ali Pasha and 100 barrels of gunpowder as a present. Captain D'Aguilar was also bearer of dispatches brought by Pylades to Mr Canning at Constantinople.

To Mr S. Foresti, G. Foresti, Maj.-Genl Airey. Capt. P[oeltl] took letters from [Turri] to A[gucchi] to Mr K[ing] who was to discover the authenticity. Mr M[ackenzie] wrote to Mr

K[ing] and Mr J[ohnson]. Left with Mr Mackenzie, No. 1 to Lord Castlereagh, No. - to Lord Liverpool.

(2) Arrived at 6 o'clock.

Lercara, Thursday April 2, 1812. Set out at 6 a.m. on a hired bad horse, but very safe. Arrived about 12 at the first halting place, 23 miles.

Set out again in an hour and arrived at Girgenti at 5 p.m. Met by the whole town, the Bishop, Prince Raffadali commanding the Militia, who had come on purpose from Palermo. Slept at Signor Don Luigi Raimondi. (1) The father, a very fine old man above 80. His sons: one a Canonico, the other wearing a fine British uniform granted him, as he said, by Genl Oakes in his quality of Commissary to Malta. Saw the brig off. Set off at 6 in the evening to join brig, but meeting Consul, who said it was blowing hard, we remained at Girgenti, where we were entertained very hospitably.

(1) Contest between Mr Raimondi and Mr Sterlini (Consul) who should receive us. Fagan had made the arrangement. The Consul sent his son the preceding day to Lercara to urge us to come to him. I told him the thing was done, but I would call upon him on my return, and so settled it.

Girgenti, Friday, April 3, 1812. Had a good deal of political conversation with my host who was violent against the Sicilian Government. The great cry, both here and at Lercara, was against the Neapolitans. One of the brothers Raimondi, on exclaiming against the weight of the taxes, suggested that they should all be abolished, except the *macina*, which was the best and most productive. I in vain endeavoured to convince him that there could not be a worse tax and that it would be better to abolish it. I observed that it weighed directly upon the poorest. I approved particularly of the 5% upon property.

There appeared to be a great deal of cultivation upon the road, but the crops not good. I saw no separate cottages upon the road. All the people seemed collected in villages, for fear, I suppose, of the Barbaresques, which, with such bad roads as they have, must be a great hindrance to cultivation. Crossed *fiumare* 36 times. Called upon the bishop, a respectable man. Visited the cathedral, remarkable for a whisper being heard from one end of the cathedral to the other.

I rode with an immense cavalcade to see the temples, of which two are in great preservation. Beautiful temples. The site of the old town is remarkable, being upon a sort of elevated tableland, appearing concave from the natural elevated hill, which surrounds [it], forming a kind of glacis to the interior and a wall to the exterior. The soil being rocky, the outside had been scarped. The Canonico showed us the position occupied by the Roman army when they blockaded and afterwards took Agrigentum by storm. The most surprising temple of all (1) was that dedicated to Jupiter Olympus. A head (one of the statues forming the two stories which filled the front and rear of the temple) remains, of immense size. Also other parts. The capital also of one of the pillars. The site is perfectly clear and shows the

wonderful size of the whole. It is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus. As we got to Girgenti, Lady William landed from the Milford, with the Admiral, Obins, Fazakerley, Howard, Joinville. Lady William went in a *lettiga* to the temples.

(1) Hercules, Juno, Lucina, Concord.

Milford, Saturday, April 4, 1812. Went again on board at 5. Ship under weigh. Arrived at Malta at 2 p.m. Fair wind all the way. Genl Oakes invited me to his house; a most beautiful palace. Pictures of Catherine of Russia and King of France, Louis XVI. Dined with Genl and Mrs Spencer.(1)

(1) Capt Fairclough, Genl Spencer's aide-de-camp. Found Italian Battalion there. Capt. Marshall, son of Dr Marshall of Lynn. Lt [] a.d.c. to Genl Oakes. Major Vivian, military secretary. Mr Laing, public secretary. Mr Tyres, Deputy Paymaster-General.

Malta, Sunday, April 5, 1812. Went to church. Prayers by Mr Laing. Sermon by Mr Miller. Dined with Genl Oakes, 24 present.(1)

(1) Admiral Langhorne, Admiral - , Capt. Talbot of Victorious at Malta with his prize, the Rivoli. Capt. Hope, Salsette, asked him to get me some wine from Archipelago. Mr and Mrs Locker.

Malta, Monday, April 6, 1812. (1) Went round the works with Major Vivian who had been at Malta before the place was taken. Very civil and intelligent. Dined with Genl Oakes. Invited by Dr and Mrs Sewell to dine with them on Wednesday. Genl Oakes' evening party.

(1) 62 vessels came in this morning to Malta.

Malta, Tuesday, April 7, 1812. Dined with Genl Oakes.

Malta, Wednesday, April 8, 1812. Embarked on board Cephalus, Capt. Clifford, with Genl Campbell and St Laurent. Saw the Rivoli before. Sailed with a fair wind; came foul in the night. Ship very uneasy. All sick. I had not been so before for many years.

Cephalus, Thursday, April 9, 1812 Wind foul and strong all day.

Cephalus, Friday, April 10, 1812 Calm the greater part of the day. In the afternoon a fair breeze from south-east.

Cephalus, Saturday, April 11, 1812. Passed between Marittimo and Favignana at 8 a.m. Wind very strong from the south and south-west. Came into Palermo bay about 5 p.m. Worked into the anchorage. Landed at 8 p.m. Called upon Belmonte.

Palermo, Sunday, April 12, 1812. Called upon the Duke of Orleans, to congratulate him upon the safe delivery of the Duchess of a daughter, about a week before.(1)

Belmonte called and about the same time Di Aci and Villa Hermosa. Di Aci complained much of the conduct of Fardella, who had taken an order he had given as Minister of War to the Hereditary Prince, and had deferred its execution. Di Aci told us what had passed between himself and the Hereditary Prince upon that occasion. They had been both angry. The Hereditary Prince said that he kept persons on purpose to watch his actions. He said (the order had directed that a certain part of the ammunition belonging to regiments should be placed in the magazines) "have not the English their pouches full; and would you disarm our troops?" (meaning that it was necessary to be prepared to act against them). Di Aci strongly remonstrated against this doctrine. Di Aci then told us that he would resign if his order as Minister of War was to be questioned.

I said that his order, as coming from the King, ought to be immediately obeyed. There could be no doubt of that, but in the present instance, I doubted whether the order he had given was within the limits of his authority. It seemed to me that it was a detail belonging to the Captain-General. He had brought with him a large French Encyclopedia to show under the head of *Ministre de la Guerre* what were the duties of that office. I read it and disagreed with him. Belmonte said that all Di Aci wanted was to be my aide, and that he would be satisfied with any distribution of the powers and duties I should make. He said that we had better follow for the present the ancient system. He seemed not to know what it was [or what] to do. I said we all understood it, but that the present question was one of power; that Fardella had got, as head of the Staff, what he, as Minister of War, in his opinion, ought to have. And that was the question. The question was to lay over.

Villa Hermosa said that he had found the finances in the greatest disorder; that he had made, as well as he could, a statement of them. From them it appeared that the war required 118,000 oz. per month, whereas with the subsidy they could only [raise] 83,000, and this calculated upon the receipts of last year. It was agreed that Di Aci should write to Villa Hermosa stating the demands of the military branch; that Villa Hermosa should answer and that these answers should be laid before the next Council, when the necessity of the reduction would appear, and must be decided.

They all talked of their situations. Villa Hermosa said that he had proposed to the Hereditary Prince a director. The Hereditary Prince had approved but not appointed him. All their offices, they said, were filled with persons who in fact were spies. I told Villa

Hermosa to insist upon the director, and to resign if the Hereditary Prince did not give way. I would then interfere.

Belmonte said the Hereditary Prince had pressed him very much to call the Parliament. Belmonte said he had not sent the papers to the Hereditary Prince, waiting for my return. They all agreed upon the necessity of the Queen's absence.

Fagan came. The Queen had been godmother to his daughter.(2) She had been present at the ceremony of the confirmation, on that morning. The Queen had told him that she would go and remain with the King at the Ficuzza, where, she said, they would be a bore to each other.(3) Fagan told me that the King walked about the room frequently repeating "*Sanctus Deus, Sanctus fortis*", and other pious exclamations. The Queen said her son was weak and that Belmonte and the Duke of Orleans wanted to set him aside.

I called upon Belmonte in the evening. He showed me the heads of the measures to be proposed to Parliament. He said that he was in great forwardness with the details. He had worked upon the subject at Favignana, but he was without books. He had entrusted the Abbe Balsamo with the compilation.

(1) He told me that once I had been away St Clair had been with him to ask from the Queen his advice as to what she ought to do. The Duke answered, whatever I wished. St Clair said that I was so impracticable. The Duke observed that he was afraid the Queen had found all the British Ministers the same. The Hereditary Prince called afterwards upon the Duke, who told him the advice he had given to St Clair. The Hereditary Prince took him by the hand with great satisfaction, asking if it had been really possible that he had so spoken to St Clair.

(2) About 5 years.

(3) Poli called upon me in the evening. He talked to me about Castrone not being allowed to go to Sardinia. Where could he go? Might not he be let out? I said the Queen must go away. I was decided she should. I showed him correspondence with Genl Manhès.

Monday, April 13, 1812.(1) Went to the Hereditary Prince at half past 10 by appointment. He agreed to Italian Battalion coming to Sciacca. Wanted me to employ Moliterno in the command of it. I said it was impossible; his rank was too high, and that otherwise I did not feel myself authorized to put troops in British pay under the orders of Moliterno, who had been always ill represented by all British authorities, and against whom there was on the part of my Government a *forte prevèntion*. He said Moliterno would take his discharge. I said I was satisfied he would not. Where could he go? The Hereditary Prince said to England, to plead the cause of the Italians. I said nobody would listen to him if he did. I thought the best way was that he should remain quiet till a favourable opportunity might offer for action in Sicily.

We talked of the poverty of Sicily and riches of Malta. I told him of the trials of some of the Calabrese for disorder, and my determination to make an example of them.

Fagan spoke to the Queen about her departure, pressing it very much. He had also communicated in confidence to the Queen's confessor, described by him to be a very good man, my determination to make the Queen go away.(2)

(1) Dispatches No. 30 to Lord Castlereagh; also answer to private letter, March. No. 11 to Lord Liverpool. Secret to ditto. Answer to his by Pylades.

Acknowledgment of letters. All these dated 31st March and sent to Trapani. Dined with Genl MacFarlane. Clifford sailed for Tunis.

(2) Mr Mackenzie said that three Governors of Verdun had put an end to themselves upon being threatened with trial for misconduct to the British prisoners.

Tuesday, April 14, 1812. Signor Machado, a Spaniard sent as an agent from the Spanish Government, called upon me and read me his instructions. They were: to cultivate a good understanding with Austria; to invite her to join the good cause, but not to engage her to commit herself! No subsidy or pecuniary assistance on the part of Spain!!; to state the impossibility under their present circumstances of granting them; to make himself known to the English agents at Vienna and to cooperate with them in everything. It was stated in the instructions that Spain had the means of continuing the war for many years. If any insurrection should break out in Illyria or Dalmatia against France, to go immediately to the leaders and to declare Spain the ally and friend of all enemies of France; to discourage Austrian officers from coming to Spain, where they had not the means of satisfying them. A Spaniard for his country might serve with pleasure under every privation, but this could not be expected from foreigners. Asked me for the names of our agents at Vienna, which request I begged time to consider. I consented to give him letters to Gen. Oakes and consuls at Salonica and Smyrna.

He gave me four prints of the Pope, which he had had made. He mentioned to me a very interesting correspondence between Bonaparte and the Pope, when the former was at Berlin. The latter had published a certain number of copies, which he had given to the different Courts and Ministers. He said that the Pope for a long time had been led by the Cardinals, who were good but weak. From the time he had acted upon his own judgement, his conduct had been perfect. He mentioned an anecdote of the Pope. The Marquis Chiaramonte, the Pope's brother, had asked for some *cordon* of Spain, which upon the strength of his connection, had been given by Spain. The Pope heard of it and begged that it might not be given, as he, as Pope, knew of no brothers or connections.(1)

Fagan came and read me an account of a conversation he had with the Queen the day before. He advised her to go to Castelvetro. She said of me that I should never see the face of God for the oppression I had committed upon the King and herself.

St Clair told Fagan that the Queen was high and that I did not take the right method of producing her departure. He said he should be glad to speak to me. I told Fagan to say to St Clair that I should be glad to see him.(2)

(1) Marquis Spaccaforno and his brother, Lt-Col. Statella, came. The latter had had a quarrel with an officer of the 81st. He (Spaccaforno) had begged his pardon. MacFarlane arranged this well.

(2) Mr Mackenzie spoke of Mr Coleridge who had been Secretary at Malta, and a great favourite of Sir A. Ball. Sir A. said that he should be glad to give him £500 per annum to have him 3 days a week at dinner. The merchants at Malta, when Coleridge was obliged to leave it for sickness, gave him letters of introduction and a draft for £500 wherever he might land. Some other person in England gave him an order for £5,000, which he equally refused, though poor. He is honourable, a very able writer, a poet; writes for the *Courier*, and lectures at the Royal Institution.

Wednesday, April 15, 1812. Fagan came and told me he had seen St Clair, who had said if I was decided the Queen should go away to a distance he could not be of use. She was *résolue* only to do so by force. (1) The Parliament might do what they pleased with her. St Clair said they could bring nothing against her. She had never corresponded with Bonaparte. She certainly had written strongly to the Emperor of Austria against the conduct of the English. St Clair said that the Queen had many more friends than she had a month ago, and that the town would be disgusted with any ill-treatment shown to her. Mr Gibbs told me that the Queen's jewels were in pawn to the bank for 80,000 ounces, supposed more than their real value.

The Duke of Orleans came. He said that he had heard that Villa Hermosa had refused to pay the Queen's expenses at Santa Croce. The Duke explained to me that the expenses of the palace were always regularly paid out of the Treasury, but those of the country houses, being extraordinary expenses, were paid by an order from the King. Those at Santa Croce amounted to 2,000 oz. per month. The Duke said there was no order in her household. She did not wish [it]. There were 100 people belonging to her establishment fed every day. Everybody took what they pleased. The Duke said the Duchess had received a note from her mother which began "whatever fate attends me". The Duke said he always avoided reading the Queen's letters to the Duchess, but the Duchess had obliged him to read this. He supposed it was written to work upon the Duchess. I told him she declared she would not go without force. He supposed that she wished the act to make a noise in Europe. They all flattered themselves with the interest of Russia and Austria in their behalf, and she and all her ministers were holding out hopes of return to power.

The Abbe Balsamo came. He told me that it was their intention to resume the lands belonging to the nation and to the clergy, which had been sold illegally by the Crown. They had sold for half a million. He talked of the plant *sulla* and said it grew all over Sicily without being sown. After wheat came *sulla* and then wheat, and the wheat was generally better after *sulla*. It propagated itself, he supposed, by the roots that were in the ground. (2)

(1) Fagan said that the presents made by the Queen to his daughter two days before were worth £250. He said it cost him much, after such an act of kindness, to say to her what he did. He passed the door three times before he had courage to enter.

(2) Dispatch packet lost near Masara by >courier< Trefontani. The first that had gone to Trapani. It was on its return for Malta.

Thursday, April 16, 1812. Called upon Belmonte, and he told me of a remarkable conversation he had had with the Prince. He told the Hereditary Prince that History would have him down as *le fils le plus dénaturé* for having driven his father and mother from the throne and for having *fait le procès* to the latter, that he might keep it. And he added, if ever such occasion should arrive, he begged now to intimate to the Hereditary Prince that he must leave his service in order that he might not appear as the instrument of such transactions.

The Hereditary Prince asked how he could be charged with such an intention, when he was always undertaking her defence. He said, "The Queen will always be intriguing and those intrigues will end in her own ruin, which will be attributed to you". He paused for some time. Said: "I see it is necessary the Queen should go away, but I cannot do it". He said: "what can I do?". Belmonte told him, "The Queen is always saying those *paroles détestables*, that the King has not abdicated; and, who knows that, should he return, it may happen in some intrigue or cabal that your brother should be put upon the throne, and if a different system should be pursued under such a prince, by which the great object both of the British Government and Sicilians should be obtained, what does it signify whether it is Ferdinand or Leopold?(1) You see, Sir, that I am only consulting your interest and uniting together your own and that of your country. It is for this reason that I have placed as the first article in the resolutions of Parliament, that your appointment as Vicar-General is confirmed". The Hereditary Prince took Belmonte's hand and said, "I see you are my friend and that you are really attached to me". The Hereditary Prince expressed his perfect conviction of the necessity of sending away the Queen. But he said he could not be the instrument. He said the King alone could do it.

Belmonte said that the Père Caccamo was the only person that could approach the King. The Hereditary Prince was of the same opinion, that was the only chance. As Belmonte went out of the room, the Hereditary Prince took his hands and said he was his friend. Belmonte observed that he said so today, but tomorrow he would be of a different opinion.(2) Somebody would be working upon him in the meantime. He told the Hereditary Prince that he saw a great difference in his feelings towards him. The Hereditary Prince begged to keep the conversation secret, to which he answered, that if he had not always professed to be a man of honour, His Royal Highness had perhaps one of the best securities for the conduct of men and that was his interest, for he had committed himself.

Called upon Lord Montgomerie and Mr E. Hunter. Rode with Mr Mackenzie round Mount Pellegrino. Mr Mackenzie told me that Bonaparte had been very civil to Riddell, who had made the picture of the comparative altitude of all the mountains in the world, and had very much assisted him in the work. Riddell received a letter from Bonaparte dated the day of the battle of Jena, stating that if the work was not finished by a certain time, Bonaparte would have nothing to do with it. It is supposed that this was written with the view of its being remarked that at all times, even the most important, his attention was universal.

He mentioned from Dumoutier's authority, who was his German interpreter in that campaign, that Bonaparte could always lay down and sleep, that he was surrounded by guards when he did so, that the cooks had always dinner ready for him, that he called for it at all hours. His view seemed to be that nobody should guess his intentions, that he behaved very ill to all about him, that they were all very much afraid of him. Dumoutier lamented it as a blot in his character, that he was most ungrateful to all who had been kind to him. He mentioned instances of families in Italy who in his campaigns there and in times of need had lent him large sums of money, never repaid one of them. Dumoutier talked of him with no affection.

Dumoutier told Mr Mackenzie that he was ordered to write every day an account of every word that passed between them in private. Mr Mackenzie said he ought to have told him. Dumoutier said that he regretted to have received such an order. It was Dumoutier's object to commit Mr Mackenzie to commit himself in abusing Bonaparte; but he carefully avoided it. Dumoutier once asked him what terms he would give to the kind of authority exercised by Bonaparte in France. Mr Mackenzie said he could refer him to a French writer who had very correctly defined it, Montesquieu. Dumoutier pressed him to say it. Mr Mackenzie avoided it for some time and at last said only "Despotism". Dumoutier laid hold of it and said: "So you mean to call the Emperor a despot?" "By no means", answered Mr Mackenzie, "I only stated the term given by Montesquieu, a French author, to such power". Mr Mackenzie mentioned his having been 5 weeks with Genl Bennigsen's army immediately after the battle of Friedland. He said that the Russian Army had retired for 70 miles without the loss of a cannon or a man; that the spirit of the army was not diminished; and that they wished to continue the war.(3) But the Emperor was very weak, and had been deserted by the Ministers who had advised the war. The Russians had a reinforcement of 20,000 men within a few days' march, under Genl Labani or Labanoff. Others were coming up in succession. When young Talleyrand came to propose the truce, he immediately asked Genl Labanoff. Luckily Labanoff had just come up in advance of his corps and was in the house. Genl Bennigsen said he should be most happy to introduce him. Talleyrand would of course imagine that the reinforcement had arrived.

The meeting of the two Emperors was arranged in the middle of the river Niemen on a raft. Bonaparte had arranged [it] and had taken the best boat for himself. Alexander came to Bennigsen's headquarters before he went away, looking like a boy going to his master. It was before the time. Bennigsen begged him not to go till the time fixed. He would not take his advice, and when in the carriage, he ordered the carriage to go as fast as possible. He arrived three-quarters of an hour before the time and remained waiting upon the bank. At the moment fixed, they both set off and Bonaparte having the better boat arrived first. They remained two hours together. At their parting, Bonaparte paid him the old compliment of Frederick II to Loudon, that he would rather have him *de son côté* than *vis à vis*.

The Emperor very much lowered himself afterwards by going across and living with Bonaparte. Bonaparte completely gained him. At the reviewing of the French troops, Bonaparte made a point of going first, leaving the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia in the rear. The latter was one day so offended that he left the field.(4) Bonaparte made a visit to the Queen of Prussia and made her this compliment, that although persons

had been pleased to bestow him the title of conqueror, he never felt less so than at the moment.

Called in the evening upon Belmonte. It was agreed that I should write a letter to the Père Caccamo. I begged him to make the draft, which he said he would bring tomorrow. He made the Hereditary Prince laugh very much by proposing that he should go himself to the King. I told Belmonte that I wished every other means to be tried, but if all failed, I would force her.

He said that he could gain a complete *empire* over the Prince, if things were to remain upon their old footing; but in making a new constitution, it might be different. Belmonte said he apprehended great opposition from Cassaro relative to the feudal rights of the nobility. I thought so too.

Belmonte said that he had pleased the Hereditary Prince very much by warmly defending the Duke of Valentinois' claim, a Neapolitan, to additional pension. He combated the Hereditary Prince's opinion in the Council. He said: "Your Royal Highness will not let them go, and will not content them when here. How can you expect such [a] system to succeed?". The Hereditary Prince told the Duke that he had not understood that Belmonte was his particular friend. The Duke said he had seen him three times in his life. Then, added the Hereditary Prince, it is strange, for he was your warmest advocate.

(1) *on ne regarde qu'au fait sans beaucoup considerer les moyens.*

(2) In reference to this, but I forget exactly how, he said he had always told the Queen what would happen, and it had so turned out; also, that his mother had not taken his advice, and had quarrelled with him; that he had maintained his own liberty of opinion and had never given it up to her. He had not gone near her since and he was capable of following the same conduct towards him.

(3) Lord Hutchinson after the armistice went away and required Mr Mackenzie to go too, but he refused and made Lord Hutchinson very angry. Genl Bennigsen is a Hanoverian, 60 years of age. Stout and good officer. Very much beloved, but too mild for the Russians.

(4) Bonaparte made the Emperor Alexander consent to take part of the King of Prussia's territory.

Friday, April 17, 1812. Belmonte came and told me that the Hereditary Prince had renewed his conversation with him about the departure of the Queen, and proposed to Belmonte that I had better write to the Père Caccamo. Curious coincidence. Belmonte asked if he should state to me the Hereditary Prince's wish to that effect. The Hereditary Prince said by no means whatever. Belmonte brought the draft agreed on last night, and I sent it immediately to the Père.

Belmonte told me that Cassaro had said in Council that there were some sacrifices which he could never advise the Hereditary Prince to make. Belmonte answered that he and Villa Hermosa were Counsellors and that he hoped that he (Cassaro) did not believe that they could ever persuade the Hereditary Prince to do anything contrary to his honour or the advantage of his country. Cassaro observed that he only said supposing such [a] thing to

occur, such would be his advice. Belmonte proposed when I had seen his proposed measures, that I should speak to Cassaro, which I agreed to do.

Belmonte told me of his intimacy with the King, who had great kindness of him. The King said of him: "Others who approach want money, and if I give it them, they ask for more; or honours or places. Belmonte is the only man who never asked for anything". The Queen said: "He is ambitious". "All are so", said the King, "and they begin by asking for something. He has never even begun. Belmonte also speaks his mind. He attacks my opinions, he gives me advice such as no other gives. I am sure he likes me". From that moment the Queen determined upon his destruction, and she half succeeded. I asked if it was known exactly how his exile had been contrived. He said, yes; the Queen through Ascoli had represented to the King that it was his (Belmonte's) intention to take the crown from the King to put it on his own head or on that of the Duke of Orleans. They had argued this measure for a long time before, but the King had always refused.

Belmonte said that he had mentioned today to the Hereditary Prince that the King had never remained where the Queen was. The Hereditary Prince allowed it. The reasons he gave me were that the King did not like the annoyance given him by the Queen, and, knowing his own weakness, was desirous to avoid by his absence the being obliged to yield to importunities of hers which he disapproved.

Another reason was that the King had always had his *amourettes*. The Queen cared not a pin for this, but she took advantage of it. Pretended to be jealous to gain some point or other. She herself had told Belmonte that she disliked the King. She had related to him an anecdote of a favourite child having died, which caused her great affliction; that the King, to console her, had slept with her that night, saying that having lost one it was necessary to get another. She observed: "In addition to my grief I was to have the additional mortification of sleeping with the King". She pretended that all her children were the King's. She took Belmonte into her bedroom to warm themselves by a fire that was there. She said: "*Vous voyez ce lit, je ne l'ai jamais profané*". Belmonte smiled. She said: "*Vous ne le croyez pas*". He answered: "*Je suis obligé de croire tout ce que me dit Votre Majeste*". We talked of Leopold. Belmonte said that he was *mou comme son frère*, that it was owing to his education and mode of life. The Queen had kept him like a prisoner, had never let him have any women. He was so ignorant that he complained to the physician of certain signs of virility, erections. The physician Vincenzo laughed at him and congratulated him upon it, wishing he was as fortunate, and advised him to take advantage of his youth and health. Leopold had the *bêtise* to tell his mother, who was enraged with the physician. Leopold had still contrived to see a woman and had become diseased. The Queen turned away all the servants and has cut off all such commerce. Belmonte remonstrated with the Queen and said it might lead to worse practices. She ridiculed the idea, it might be "*belle et bonne*", but she would not allow it. He said that if he had children, his plan would be quite different; at 16 he would put the rein upon their neck and advise them to beware of excess for the sake of their constitution and of their character.

He talked of Genl Acton. Said he was very *adroit* and had qualities. He said he never would employ him (Belmonte) at home. He offered him the Russian, French and Spanish embassies. He was afraid of his influence with the King. He told me how Acton had sent

away the Queen. He had told the King that he must go away, that things were going on ill. The King said: "You shall not leave me". He answered that he was an Englishman, and free; and could not stay. After pressing, he stipulated for the Queen's absence. The King ordered her to leave Naples directly, and she went.

I said the King pretended to be fond of her and had related with great feeling his own fears about her recovery at her last illness. Belmonte then gave me the following proof to the contrary. The Queen, when at Vienna, was dangerously ill. Belmonte received accounts of it. He went to the King, uncertain whether he had heard of it, and of the effect likely to be made upon him. The King did not appear affected. Belmonte, to ascertain whether he knew the circumstances, asked the King if he had had letters and he had, and that the Queen was very unwell. Belmonte attempted to console him by saying that before she had had violent illnesses from which she had recovered, upon which the King observed: "*Per questa volta non vincerá*", and was by no means disconcerted.

Saturday, April 18, 1812. Lamb came and told me that the Queen had intercepted my letter to Caccamo sent yesterday evening through the monk, the companion or assistant of the Père.

I told Belmonte of it, who happened to come in soon after.

Lamb had told me before that he had been informed by M[ilano] that the Queen had intercepted the Père Caccamo's first letter to the King. The Hereditary Prince came and spoke to his mother of this letter soon after. The mother observed that this was a clear proof of the existence of an understanding between them. "*Bête qu'il est*" - she cursed him in all languages.

Fagan came while Belmonte was with me and told me the Queen had sent for him to say she had intercepted my letter, and desired him to say to me that she was resolved not to go and that she should return on account of her health to the palace (See her conversation detailed).

A great deal of our conversation turned upon the mode of getting rid of the Queen. Belmonte proposed that the Hereditary Prince should be frightened. I said his fears would have no influence on the Queen, who hated him and had lost her power in great part over him. I suggested that the King's authority was the best and perhaps the only way; that, if this did not answer and any other stronger measure was to be adopted, it would be well first that on my application the Hereditary Prince should call a Council at which I should assist; that supported by this Council any act would seem more justifiable.

I came in to Belmonte again (Lamb present). It was agreed I should send a duplicate of my letter to the Père by an officer. Belmonte undertook to ask the Hereditary Prince's consent to order horses. Belmonte went and returned. Belmonte took a copy of the letter to the Père. The Hereditary Prince was very much pleased with it. He thought it right to send it, but begged that the officer might go in coloured clothes not to alarm the King – *son pauvre père* – who was melancholy and timid; and he also begged that he might go with hired horses, that it might not appear that he had any participation in it.

Belmonte then spoke to the Hereditary Prince about the Queen's return. The Hereditary Prince did not know it and did not believe it, and desired him to tranquillize me upon the subject.(1)

I wrote to Fagan to know how the Queen had come to the knowledge of my letter. He said he had heard of it as soon as it was sent the evening before, and of course concluded that it had been intercepted as was stated.

Di Aci had come in the morning with a statement of the military expense. He stated there to be 69,000 oz. per month applicable to military charges and 10,000 oz. per month received by the Treasury once in every four months. The deficit amounted to 37,000 oz. per month. How was this to be made good?

(1) On the 17th Belmonte had spoken to me about Castrone. The Hereditary Prince wished him to be let out. I objected to this. He could not go to Cagliari, as was proposed, because the King would not have him. I then proposed that he should go to Tunis or Malta. Belmonte then stated this to the Hereditary Prince, and gave as my reason it was better that

he should not be at liberty, that he might not betray some dangerous secrets. The Hereditary Prince was pleased with this reason and exclaimed "*Brav'uomo*".

Sunday, April 19, 1812. Fagan came and brought me an account of this conversation with the Queen. He repeated that the Queen, four or five days before, had said that she should come into the palace on account of the great expense of living at Santa Croce. She always accused Belmonte and the Duke of Orleans of a design to expel her family.(1)

Fagan, in reference to my letter to the Père that had been intercepted, said there could be no doubt of the fact, because an hour after I sent it, Fagan's informer belonging to the Queen came down in great anxiety and repeated the general purport of the letter, and the following morning the Queen showed Fagan a copy of the letter. Fagan said that the Queen had unsealed my letter, taken a copy of it, and sent it on.

Belmonte came. Told me that he had written to Castrone, to know whether he would go to Tunis or Malta or remain in the Citadel. He preferred the latter. Belmonte said that he had recommended the latter to Castrone's brother-in-law. Villa Hermosa came in. We talked of the finances. He showed us some statements. It was asked me if I would take all the troops in pay that the Sicilian Government might not be able to pay. I said no. He said there was no money, and proposed to me to make an advance. I said I should decline. They said they could pay no army. I said, let the question be put to me; I would say no, and then the matter would be brought to an issue. Belmonte agreed to do so the following day. When it was ascertained that they could not go on, they would come to me; and as the price of my assistance I should require the execution of the treaty by which His Sicilian Majesty was bound to keep up as many troops as possible. If it should appear that their revenue was consumed in unnecessary expenses, a reduction must take place.

They then talked about the Constitution. Belmonte brought a part of it. He proposed that I should make my remarks in French. They would do what I desired, and afterwards I must agree to do what they wished.

They expressed their fear of Cassaro and wanted me to speak to him. At the last Tuesday's Council, the Hereditary Prince had desired Belmonte to write down his ideas upon the subject. Cassaro was to do the same. They desired that Cassaro, before giving in his paper to the Hereditary Prince, should show it to me. They knew that Cassaro had very strong prejudices, that his opinion would be different from theirs, and it was desirable that the Hereditary Prince should not adopt his sentiments. It was suggested by Belmonte that I should say to Cassaro that, being responsible for the security of the country and for the execution of the objects of Great Britain and Sicily, that I hoped he would show me previously what he intended to propose.

I accordingly sent for Spaccaforno, and I told him what the Queen had once said, that Belmonte and Cassaro would never agree in Council.(2) I told him that I knew they were both ambitious and vain men; that I was afraid of their not agreeing and that of such disagreement our enemies, and perhaps the Hereditary Prince, would avail themselves; that I wished to make them agree, if possible - to be the mediator and referee between them; and that, for this purpose, I had requested of Belmonte to show me his opinion, and wished

Cassaro to do the same, in order that we might, before they were shown to the Hereditary Prince, reconcile any variety of opinion. Spaccaferno said he would do so.

I received from Gen. Maitland a proposal from Capt. Hall to attack a flotilla of the enemy in Tropea. I proposed to Capt. Down(3) of the Redwing to protect the expedition. He at first consented and afterwards objected. He did not think himself authorized to quit his station.

(1) Fagan anxious that the Queen should be allowed to remain.

(2) Belmonte told me that Cassaro in Council had made use of a very unfair expression toward them. Belmonte said that with a *froideur* that would [have] surpassed all the blood of England and Holland united, he had given his answer. It was necessary for him *de se glacer*. I might judge how much he had forced his nature. Cassaro acknowledged he was wrong; and the Hereditary Prince was extremely satisfied with Belmonte.

(3) without a palate.

Monday, April 20, 1812. Don Cesare Airoidi came to say that the Government had discontinued the bakeries of the Committee from making bread. He said that [at] each oven there was every day a tumult and acts of violence for the sake of obtaining their larger loaves. He came to me expecting there might be a riot on the discontinuance of the *fours* or decrease of the loaves. I advised that for the sake of giving satisfaction it would be well to sell the bread at a decreased price, the Government bearing the loss; or, if nothing was to be done, that the public should be previously informed by *avviso* of the change and of the reasons of it. Otherwise they would come in crowds for bread, and there might be disorder, more particularly as there were so many persons who wished to encourage it, and that the conduct of the Neapolitan troops would be doubtful. I desired Airoidi to go to Belmonte, who went immediately to the Hereditary Prince. Belmonte came to me and said that the Hereditary Prince approved the *avviso*, but with respect to the sale of the corn at a reduced price, he objected, not knowing how the Government could suffer the loss.

While Belmonte was here, the Padre Galati came, to whom my letter to the Père had [been] delivered and who had given it to the Queen. He brought me back the Père's answer. I charged him with the fact. He denied it, but I left him with a threat that I would have him punished.(1)

Belmonte advised that the monk should be made to disappear. It became a question as to the arrest of the persons spreading discontent, and in the pay of the Queen. I showed him two lists. He proposed that I should give him an official Note. I observed it was interfering too much in their affairs.

I went to Villa Hermosa in the evening, about the grain. He was against doing anything. He said he knew this population very well and it did not answer to caress them.

(1) Received an answer from Père Caccamo saying he could not interfere further in the business.

Tuesday, April 21, 1812. I called with MacFarlane upon Di Aci, to remonstrate with him upon his interfering with the details of my department.(1) He said it was the *antico regolamento*. I said we must be directed by that actually in force. I told him I could not submit to it. He had mistaken his office; he ought to have been head of the Staff. As Minister of War, he had the management only of the civil business; I, of the military business of the Army. It was the case in all armies. He always kept saying that he was my adjutant and begged I would draw the line as I pleased.

Belmonte came. We talked about the Queen. (2) He said I must make her go; that after my letter to her, all my influence would cease if I did not enforce my advice; and, besides, that there was so much intrigue under her direction that they would have great difficulty in conducting the government if she remained. He proposed that I should either write to the King or do it by force. I agreed, and had always thought that the first was the best plan; and it was necessary in the letter that I should offer to show him the proofs of her treachery. Belmonte then, of his own proposal, wrote the draft of a letter.

(1) Di Aci had made a colonel and two lieut.-colonels without any communication with me. He had ordered them to be transferred from one regiment to another, etc.

(2) Fagan had continued to advise the Queen to go away (see his conversations with her). She, as constantly, refused.

Wednesday, April 22, 1812. I was unwell and could not call upon the Hereditary Prince.(1) I desired Fagan to call upon the Queen, to tell her that I was decided she should go; that it was for her advantage to do so; that in Parliament there would be violence against her, which her absence would disarm; that it would be the best way of obtaining that *assegnamento* for the royal family which was desired. I desired she might be told that a journey and temporary absence would satisfy me. If, however, I was compelled to take her by force, I should take her out of the island. I also added that her whole views were upon Naples, which could only be accomplished by my means. It was in my power to prevent her going, and certainly I should take lesson from her opposition to me here, and was determined that she should not put her foot into the Kingdom of Naples, if taken by me.

Lamb had seen Milano, who had told him a great deal about the Queen: that she was the most deceitful creature in the world. When most gay and apparently indifferent, her mind was particularly engaged. When she covered her face, as she [did] occasionally, she was only thinking how she could deceive you.

(1) Invited myself to dine with Graham but could not go.

Thursday, April 23, 1812.(1) I called upon the Hereditary Prince at ten. He asked what I wanted. I told him I came to complain against one of his subjects who had insulted me. I then told him what he knew, that the monk had taken my letter to the Père Caccamo direct to the Queen, who had opened and read it. I demanded satisfaction. He seemed to make

light of it, and said that instead of trusting to such a channel of communication, it would have been better to have sent an officer of my own. I answered that the Père Galato had always been the companion of the Père Caccamo, was made by him the special messenger to me upon all occasions. To the Hereditary Prince's observation that I had made use of an improper channel, I remarked that I believed his Royal Highness had sometimes made use of the same, and I related to him that the Queen was not less angry with the Père than myself, for concealing from her a letter which he had from the Hereditary Prince to the Père, at the same time with my own.

He then made a difficulty upon punishing him, upon which I became a little angry, and said that it would be an insult to anyone, but to the situation I held, it was particularly. I said that I had told the monk that I had a great mind to march a battalion and take him out of his convent, and punish him. The Hereditary Prince said he trusted I would not have done such an act. I answered that I would not be insulted and that the monk must be punished. He then desired I would make a Note of it.

I spoke to him then about 4 unhappy people that three days before had been taken by the Barbaresques from near Marsala, out of their houses. I said: "I am sure it would be easy to prevent it by dispersing a regiment of cavalry along the coast". I observed to him the prodigious injury done to the country and to agriculture by those incursions. It obliged the inhabitants to shut themselves up in towns at the top of mountains. How could distant parts with bad roads be well cultivated? There must be an immense loss of labour. I enlarged upon the encouragement that should be given to agriculture, and that Sicily should supply all those parts now receiving corn from Greece. The only answer I could obtain was that it would *abîmer* a regiment of cavalry. I allowed this, but was this to be put in comparison with the advantages?(2)

Fagan came and said that he had just come from the Queen, where he had been for two hours. She expressed her determination not to go, and she would not obey the King's orders if they were given. He had not bought her as a slave. I then determined to write to the King and to send Lamb with it, but I resolved previously to show the letter to the Queen. The Queen gave Fagan all the Hereditary Prince's notes to her, written during the month of April, one, two and three per day (fifty-two down to the 23rd). There was nothing material in them, but enquiries after her health and expressions of duty and affection! She hates him, he fears her!

(1) Dined with Mr Lamb: Belmonte, MacFarlane, Grant, St Laurent, Mackenzie, A'Court.

(2) I told the Hereditary Prince that Fardella had resigned. He pretended not to know it. I said I was sorry for it. The Hereditary Prince said thm he would give him a lecture and advise him to continue. I said I believed he did not like Di Aci. The Prince said they were Sicilians, and knew each other.

Friday, April 24, 1812. Called upon Di Aci with MacFarlane. We settled several points about the Army. With respect to the new organisation, he said it was his business. I disagreed with him. I was bound to defend the country, and that of course the constitution

of the Army regarded me essentially. I informed [him] of the mutual engagements entered into between me and the Hereditary Prince when I took the command.

In talking of Scoppa, he said that he had changed the arrangement of his office so much that Scoppa gave in his dismissal. He pretended to have mislaid it. He presented a second. He thus appeared unwilling to grant it. He gave it to the Hereditary Prince, whose favourite he was, and it was the Hereditary Prince who appointed him Lieut.-Colonel.

I went from him to Villa Hermosa. He told me that he had written a dispatch for the calling [of] the Parliament, explaining that it was convoked for the reform of abuses, to establish the rights and liberties of the people. Cassaro objected and the Hereditary Prince inclined to his opinion. Belmonte did not support Villa Hermosa as vigorously as he ought, and Villa Hermosa was desired to redraw his dispatch.

He also said that the Hereditary Prince proposed to him to sell some of the public property, to go on till the meeting of Parliament. Villa Hermosa objected, and asked my advice. I approved very much what he had done, and recommended rather giving in his resignation than yielding. It was the weakest part of the conduct of the late Ministers. He showed me a state of the finances. There were 87,000 per month applicable to the War Department. The estimate amounted to 121,000 per month; deficit = 34,000.

Fagan came and told me that he had just seen the Queen, who had expressed her determination not to go away. She might be shot through the head by a ball, but she would not go. She told Fagan that she had received a letter from the King, placing the Army under her orders if force was attempted to be made use of against her. Fagan wished this not to be repeated, as she said it not meaning to discover the secret.(1)

Marquis de St Clair came to me by my appointment. I told him I wished to speak with him about the Queen; that she considered me her enemy, whereas I was her friend. I did not pretend to conceal that I thought her administration excessively injurious to the country. I attributed to her all the evils that existed, but this being over, I anxiously wished that the change should be made without individual injury. I said that the Queen's presence was very hurtful. It gave a sanction to all the ill-intentioned to spread discontent. I stated the necessity of the Queen's temporary departure. It would disarm the violence of the Parliament, that would certainly be levelled against her. The old Ministers would be attacked, and they would lay the blame upon the Queen.

He said the Queen was proud, and only to be led by *douceur*; that she had hoped once, after my calling upon her, to be on good terms with me. He said the Queen never meddled with business; that the Queen spoke incautiously, but that whoever knew her paid no attention to what she said; that persons brought her the most unfavourable expressions as used by me; that she was irritated by these. I told him this latter imputation upon me was groundless; that as to leading the Queen, I knew nobody could do it; the best impression was always effaced by the last conversation; and as for myself, I had had but too positive proofs of my own inability.

He said it was necessary that she should be surrounded by able and honest people, which had not been the case. He said the Duke of Orleans was better adapted to lead her than anyone else, but that he unfortunately had shown too decided and sudden a partiality for the opposite party. He had not used that degree of *ménagement* that was requisite to guide the

Queen. I told him that it was my intention to write to the King, but before I sent the letter, I thought it fair by the Queen to show it to her. He also asked where could she go. I mentioned Catania. He said there was a French party there. I said it did not signify. He also observed that there were many more persons ready to take her part than before.

(1) The Queen's presents and civility to him and his daughter have evidently influenced him much. He said in this conversation that she was very much attached to him. He would not trust her for the world. He begged I would not communicate what he told me. It was for my guidance only. It would be dishonourable for him to repeat what she said. Weak, vain man; good-hearted.

Saturday, April 25, 1812 (1) I wrote a letter to the Hereditary Prince advising him strongly to insert the objects for which the Parliament was called.

I sent to St Clair my letter to the King. I took some letters from the Duke of Kent to the Duke of Orleans. He said he had seen the Queen a day or two before, not having seen her for some time. His presence, he said, produced some consternation. He believes it was imagined he was bringing some message from me to the Queen. Upon that occasion, she happened to say that she had received letters from Cagliari, and gave them to him for the Duchess' perusal. She said, "There are some letters from Ascoli", but added, "Never mind, you may take them". The Duke told me he had read them. There was a heavy complaint on the part of Ascoli that the King had never written to him. He said it was a melancholy *séjour*. Ascoli said he believed the reason was that he had taken his family with him. I did not exactly understand this, but I suppose it to mean Donna Flavia, his mistress. Ascoli said in his letter that it became tiresome to read all day long. The Court were very civil to him. I told him of my intention to write to the King and of sending the letter previously to the Queen.

Fagan came and repeated what he had before said, that the Queen wished to go to England. I told him she was making a fool of him.(2)

Belmonte came and he approved very much of my sending my letter to the Queen. I showed him the draft and he approved it. I thought it possible she might take fright and go away.

In the evening Belmonte came and brought me the second part of his Constitution. After, he, Di Aci, MacFarlane, Lamb and myself assembled to talk upon the military establishment. Di Aci the most puzzle-headed man I ever saw. I agreed to take the Esteri - one Italian regiment complete; to take the Albanese back to their own country. It was settled that all of the Corpo di Mare who wished for their discharges should have them. I agreed for 12,000 oz. to undertake the expense of the Flotilla.(3)

(1) Packet arrived from England with papers down to the 20th March. Thirty days on passage. Received an account of Badajoz taken by assault, from Gibraltar.

(2) The Queen said a day or two ago to Fagan that all her misfortunes were owing to the King having no courage (*petto*). Ascoli was the only man about him who had.

Mr Coleridge called the Maltese improved Saracens and the Sicilians degenerate Europeans.

(3) Di Aci dined with us.

Belmonte said that he had spoken again to the Hereditary Prince and persuaded him to introduce the desired expressions into the Dispatch for the Parliament at the Council. Cassaro being present, the Hereditary Prince began again to yield, when Belmonte merely laughed and said, "Has Your Royal Highness forgot so soon the coasts of Italy?", and he consented.

Sunday, April 26, 1812. Belmonte came. He told us how he had driven Pantelleria once out of the Parliament by a personal attack he made upon him, about twelve years ago. He proposed in the House that the conduct of each should be put to the test. He wanted nothing and would take nothing. The other, he said, wants to be President of a Tribunal. Pantelleria left the House soon after and showed himself no more. He said Pantelleria was *audcieux* in the last Parliament, when he attempted to unite all the branches into one and succeeded. Previously his friends had dissuaded him. He was sacrificing himself. He disregarded their advice, made the trial and succeeded.

He said Villa Hermosa was timid in Council, though a most decided character. His courage was negative rather than active.(1)

(1) Attended prayers with the troops.

Prince Larderria brought me a letter from Fred and from Mr Hill.

Called upon Fardella. Found him very unwell. Lieut.-Col. Mackenzie, 81st, said he was close to [] when taken at Toulon. He need not have been taken. He thinks it was owing to delusion and obstinacy. He was wounded but only in the wrist. He sat down and would make no exertion to save himself.

Monday, April 27, 1812. (1) Fagan came to me. Was sent for twice last night and twice today by the Queen from the Bagaria. Being ill he did not come till this morning. She gave him notes upon my letter to the King. She said that she had seen many English, and I was the first liar she had met with. She supposed I had learnt the trick at Madras.

Fagan saw some letters from the King to the Queen. In one of these the King talked of the Hereditary Prince as an ambitious and ungrateful son.

The King also said that the Queen must not be angry that he had sent the Père Caccamo to the Hereditary Prince. She supposed it was to desire the Hereditary Prince not to allow her to be sent away. The King in his letter called Père Galato an *intrigante*. The Queen said she should print my letter and her remarks upon it. She said she might go away when the Parliament began to sit, but not till then. She would not be driven out like a strumpet. The King also said in his letter that he would not come to Palermo now that the time was not yet come when he could resume the reins of government with honour and glory to himself.

The Queen said she might be put to death, but at the block she should declare her gratitude to Fagan. He could not be an Englishman! He must be an Irishman, or of some other country.

She said that I had said at Paterno's: "We are going to drive the old lady away"; and that the Princess (the Queen taking her off) answered: "My Lord, you do extremely right". She said that she had written the notes three times over; that the first were too violent, and that she had been advised to make them less so. She said to Fagan: "See how he trusts you. He would not send this through you, but through St Clair".

Belmonte said that it was resolved that the Père Galato should be sent to one of the Lipari Islands to a convent there; which I said was quite satisfactory to me and, I added, they might bring him back the next day if they pleased.(2)

I showed the notes to Belmonte in the evening. He said he never failed to speak to the Hereditary Prince about the new Constitution. He always introduced it in every conversation.

(1) Saw the line out.

(2) Informed that Caccamo had orders not to call upon me. Lamb by M[ilano] further information: that the King had ordered the Hereditary Prince not to make any change in the Constitution without reference to him; and that if the presence of the Queen made the assembly of the Parliament objectionable at Palermo, it might be held elsewhere.

Tuesday, April 28, 1812. Called upon Cassaro in the morning and talked to him about police and other things.

From thence, went to the Hereditary Prince. I showed him the plan for the new Italian Levy. He begged to have a translation of all the papers.

I proposed to him to add a passage to the *Dispaccio* calling a Parliament. I said that what had been expressed was sufficient for Sicily, but not for Italy. He said it would be time enough to state these things in a proclamation when the invasion took place. I replied to that the Italians would not be satisfied with words, that they would judge *par les faits*. The word "constitution" was necessary to be introduced; it was to that word that Italy looked. The Hereditary Prince observed that the reform of abuses was inserted. I said that this would apply to a despotic as well as a free government. No inference could be drawn from that. I could not persuade him.

Lamb carried my letter to the King. He received him in the doorway of his room and said nothing except that he would send an answer *per mezzo del suo figlio*. He gave Lamb no opportunity of speaking to him. The King, he said, appeared very much agitated.

I saw Villa Hermosa and Belmonte. The former told me of a speech of Cassaro's: that he thought it was his duty never to forget that he was a Minister of the King and therefore to advise him not to part with his prerogative. Villa Hermosa said this was part of the old prejudices which went to consider the King and the people as always in collision.

Wednesday, April 29, 1812. (1) Called upon Belmonte in the evening. He told us that the Hereditary Prince had talked to him about the Queen's going away, in consequence of Belmonte having told him of my letter to the King. The Hereditary Prince somehow or other observed that it would be *dur* on my part; upon which Belmonte said that all Sicily was complaining that I was too indulgent; that the Hereditary Prince knew that she had been continually intriguing; that she had not remained quiet, and was fomenting discord. The Hereditary Prince also observed whether it would be possible. "Impossible?" Belmonte answered, "not even *difficile – désagréable, si vous le voulez*".

Had I not, Belmonte said, taken every means, by confessors and other means? Belmonte said if he had been English Minister he should not have been, he believed, so scrupulous. Belmonte also begged him to be upon his guard. He did not know my orders, but as he had been chosen, so if he was found not to answer, his brother or some of the English royal family might be chosen in his stead. He begged him to be cautious how he involved himself with the Queen. The Hereditary Prince said he would *réfléchir* upon the best means of procuring the Queen's departure.

(1) I walked up to Mount Pellegrino.

Thursday, April 30, 1812. (1) Called upon Prince Di Aci at his country house under Mount Pellegrino. He had seen the Hereditary Prince the night before(2) and had represented to him the total want of provisions and money to purchase them for the Army. The Hereditary Prince proposed that the Commissary should take by force what was wanted. Di Aci represented to him the impossibility of such a measure. The Hereditary Prince then insisted that the Commissary should be punished. Di Aci showed him that it was not the Commissary's fault, but that of his former Ministers who had made no provision for the future whatever.

I saw Belmonte in the evening at his house, He said he had been four hours in a Council of Finances;(3) that this time had been occupied in details, in questions of no moment. Belmonte then observed that as yet they had paid no attention to the subject of most importance: the state of the finances and the means of carrying on the government. The Hereditary Prince proposed the sale of the public property. Villa Hermosa gave a very decided opinion against it. Cassaro strongly supported it. The Hereditary Prince said with some anger that it was the duty of a Minister to consider how new resources could be procured for paying the charges. Villa Hermosa answered coldly to this, when Belmonte defended his uncle with great ingenuity and eloquence. He said that the fault was to be attributed to the former Ministers who, in the sale of the Government property, had destroyed the source of the future revenues. He said it was not by increasing the burdens of the people, but by a reform of the abuses and expenditure, that the income must be increased. After that speech the Hereditary Prince shook Belmonte by the hand before them all. Belmonte said nothing could exceed the marks of friendship and kindness shown him by the Hereditary Prince.(4)

Belmonte said to the Prince that it was necessary to make the reform of the Army immediately. The Hereditary Prince asked, "How much?" Belmonte answered, the war charges were 120,000 oz., the deficit 40,000 oz. The military establishment must consequently be reduced by one-third. The Hereditary Prince begged Belmonte to speak to me. He said there was no use in doing so; that I had been continually pressing the reform of the Army and of the military establishment; that nothing was done; that, on the contrary, I had consented to do everything they asked, whereas they did nothing I required, although all I asked was for their own advantage. Information today that the Queen talked of a new Ministry: Cassaro to remain; Pantelleria, Finance; Ruffo, Foreign; Fardella, War. The Queen probably talked of it.

- (1) 5,000 salms of wheat came from Malta, bought by me for the population here.
- (2) Di Aci told me that the Hereditary Prince noted everything, as he supposes, to report to his father.
- (3) Present: Villa Hermosa, Cassaro, Butera.
- (4) Belmonte said that he never spoke but when invited by the Hereditary Prince.

Palermo, Friday, May 1, 1812. Dr Armstrong came and said that he had dined with the Queen two days ago, and that she herself and through St Clair had thanked him very much for his conduct. He smiled when St Clair so spoke to him, for he said he had done absolutely nothing. He had avoided always politics, and that was all.

He said that a Maddalena, a physician about the Queen, had spoken to him about Mrs Orby Hunter; that the Queen knew Lamb's attachment to her and hoped, through her means, to be upon better terms with me. The Queen wanted to know how she could see her. Armstrong conjured him to, advise the Queen not to have recourse to me as so unworthy of her, that he knew me and was satisfied neither Lamb nor anyone else had any influence with me. He said the Queen looked very unwell, she was very *distracte* and he was satisfied she was mad.

Belmonte came. He had been with the Duke of Orleans. It was his name day. The Duke had received a letter of reproach from the Queen, to which he had returned a very clever answer. Belmonte had gone to seek the Hereditary Prince at the Duke of Orleans'. When the Duke announced him, the Hereditary Prince's face showed signs of fear. The Duke of Orleans remarked it to him, with a compliment to Belmonte, saying: "I am sure he saves you a great deal of trouble. *Il vous mâche bien les affaires. Il est 'cauto' et vous est fort attaché*". The Duke of Orleans said that Ministers in these times had not always what was agreeable to state. The Hereditary Prince said "*C'est bien vrai*".

The Hereditary Prince told Belmonte that he had written a letter to me and had desired the proofs against the Queen. Belmonte said: "You do not think Lord William will be so *bête* as to send them. He will show them to the King". It was precisely what I had decided and told Lamb before Belmonte came.

Lieut.-Col. Poli came by my invitation. I told him I had sent to talk with him upon public business. I wished to express to him my regret that things did not go on quicker. The

Hereditary Prince was spoiling his cause both here and at Naples. Here they would attribute everything to force, and there no favourable opportunity could be seized if it was offered. Poli said the delay was owing to the Hereditary Prince's ill health. He thought he would not live. The Hereditary Prince often said so. His physician had told Poli that he feared an apoplectic fit. His pulse was often convulsed; his stomach was very weak; his food passed undigested; his energy was all gone. He had lost his head. This was owing to his embarrassment about the Queen.

Poli delivered to me a letter from the Hereditary Prince which he had written by the King's order. The King, he said, was very much against her departure. I observed that he wished her to go, but not to be sent away in disgrace. Poli wanted me to be satisfied with having all those that surrounded the Hereditary Prince sent away. The same end would be gained by different means. I told him I was quite of a different opinion. I told Poli that the Hereditary Prince appeared to me not to have confidence in anyone. I told him I had always heard that he was distrustful and timid. Poli denied such to be his character. He said that he was sure his Ministers did not say so. The Hereditary Prince had told him (Poli) that he liked them much better than he had thought he ever should. He urged me very much not to press the departure of the Queen; at least to try the experiment. If it did not succeed, I should be then better authorized to insist upon the Queen's departure. He frequently said: "You are right in your principle; I agree with you, but cannot the object be otherwise obtained?" He said the Hereditary Prince was determined not to communicate with her any more upon public affairs.

Saturday, May 2, 1812. (1) I went to Di Aci to complain of his interference with my duties.

He told me that there had been a Council the day before and that the Hereditary Prince had consented to all the propositions respecting the Esteri, Albanesi etc. He authorized Di Aci to tell me so, and that the Dispatch would be out immediately. Previously, however, the Hereditary Prince sent it for the King for his approbation. The Hereditary Prince desired Di Aci not to tell me this. Di Aci said that the Hereditary Prince had observed that I was forcing him to this reduction. Di Aci told him it was indispensable from the state of his finances, but that otherwise, if the English forced it, he could not resist. Cassaro said the same and added: "I call His Royal Highness to be a witness that frequently I have given him the same advice".

(1) I dined with Mr Graham, Di Aci, Tomasi, McKenzie, Pauline. Capt. Steinberger and Ensign Zaubli arrived from Vienna. Dispatch came out for the Parliament.

Sunday, May 3, 1812. (1) Villa Hermosa came and told me that "*tanto per il Real Servizio*" were words introduced into the *Dispaccio* about the Parliament, which he had wished to have omitted.

He talked of Cassaro and repeated a speech of his, that His Royal Highness might give up his privileges: he was the master to do as he pleased; but he, as Minister, could not forget the duty he owed him as sovereign. He told me that the Government had lost 120,000 dollars by the lottery, that this was a most unexpected blow. He asked for nothing. I volunteered lending him the sum, but required that Belmonte should write me a very strong Note.

(1) I gave to Belmonte a letter addressed to Circello, Minister of Foreign Affairs, brought from Vienna.

Sent my answer to the Hereditary Prince's letter through Poli.

Monday, May 4, 1812. (1) Fagan came. He said he had seen the Queen yesterday. He brought me a note given by the King to Père Caccamo, presenting the communication he was to have with the Hereditary Prince.

The Queen complained that she was deserted by everybody, but she hoped not by him. She said that the King in his letters abused me very much, and called [me] by the vilest names. The Hereditary Prince also, the Queen said, when he was to see me, observed: "*Mamma*, I am going to my executioner (...)".

The Queen complained very much of my conduct. Fagan asked Her Majesty if she was sure that she had not committed herself. She could only know it - far be it from him to suppose it. But if she had, she must allow that I had acted towards her with the greatest moderation. The Queen, he said, seemed impressed with this remark and did not deny positively that she had not committed herself.

Fagan asked me what he should say to her hereafter. I told him to say that I declared that I knew she had committed herself by writing to the enemy, although I did not believe that she had any serious intention of giving up the island. She had been instigated by her love, even to madness, of intrigue (this I believe to be the truth). She said I had no letters, and she supposed Casseti and others were detained for her accusation.

The Queen talked of the heads of the new Constitution. She talked also of Belmonte having said that queens could be brought to trial as well as other people; that this had happened to the Queen of Sweden and others.

Fagan also told me of his wife, whom he had confined in a convent for intriguing with the American, Mr Dodge, who had f - her. He showed me the letters she had written those few days. Taken poison, but luckily a physician gave her an emetic and saved her life. She now expressed herself sincerely penitent and he thought of forgiving her and letting her out. He asked my advice, which I of course declined. He hoped Lady William would countenance her, which I promised to ask.

Belmonte came and told me that my letter to the Hereditary Prince had made His Royal Highness vomit up his dinner; that he must take some time to contrive how to show it to the King; that I might be told that the Queen would certainly go away; that he hoped I would not press very much her departure. It was agreed that he should say in return that I was very much obliged for the communication and that I relied with confidence in His Royal

Highness' arrangements. He said the Hereditary Prince was pleased with the letter, which he said was very respectful. He was against asking me for an advance to pay the lottery, which I had agreed to, saying that advance after advance there would be nothing left. Di Aci told me that some of the adherents of the Queen gave out that the air of Palermo did not agree with her.

(1) The Milford arrived in 22 hours with convoy from Tunis. Lady William landed at 9 p.m. - had been unwell at Malta and Tunis. Brought 330 slaves, redeemed at 315 dollars each.

Tuesday, May 5, 1812. The Admiral told us that the Bey of Tunis would not hear of the Sicilian Government; would not take their corvettes or have anything to do with them. He said they had so often broken their word with him. He said he would have given up all his slaves for nothing, if the English flag had been flying in Sicily. The Admiral paid him 50,000 dollars down. The Bey required no promise for the rest. He was satisfied with his word. The Minister's name was Sabbatah - was a Georgian slave and a clever man. He wanted to marry the Bey's sister, but the Bey would not let him. The Minister was rich; if he died without family his treasure would go to the Bey. Insurrection at Tunis lately between the Turks (8,000 on the whole), foreigners, and the Moors or natives. The Bey took part with the latter.

Neither the Bey nor his Minister could understand why we did not take Sicily. Sabbatah asked if Scotland was not an island, and if England was not about the same size as Sicily. Lt-Col. Poli came in the evening. He said the Hereditary Prince had heard that I meant to go to the King. He begged I would not. I said I had no such intention. He said that the King did not like to talk upon business, and that it deranged him very much. I told him that the Duke of Ascoli had told me that my speaking to him upon business would give him a bowel complaint. He said: "They all have such stomachs". My last letter to the Hereditary Prince had had just the same effect upon him. He said the Queen said the most injurious things of him.

Wednesday, May 6, 1812. (1) Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince had not yet shown my letter to the King. He drew from him his opinion of the Queen by speaking of the King, whom the Hereditary Prince always praised and of whom he said he was sure.

Lady William was told by Mrs M. that the Queen had shown to the Duke of Orleans a deciphered letter received from Vienna, in which Ruffo informs her that the Emperor offered her an asylum in Austria.

Belmonte told me the same thing the following day, with this addition, that Ruffo also stated to the Queen, by way of marking the certainty of the fact, that he had mentioned it to Mr King. I observed to Belmonte that it was odd that Mr King, from whom I received letters by the same courier, had not mentioned the circumstance.

(1) Heard that the Queen had ordered her books to be packed up. This proves nothing as she never read in her life.

Thursday, May 7, 1812. (1) I spoke to Belmonte.

(1) Dispatched packet no. 33 to Lord Castlereagh; to Lord Liverpool; Duke of Portland about 600 etc., groom []; Lord Wellesley: private letter, regret at his departure from office; Lady O. Sparrow; Mr Plumer; Gen. Calvert; Col. Torrens; Sir H. Wellesley; Mr Stuart; Gen. Campbell; Mr Booth, pickles, cocoa etc.; Messrs Collyers £10 per annum to clerk of agent of packets at Falmouth.

Friday, May 8, 1812. (1) Saw Di Aci. He told me (and showed to me) the Dispatch about the reform of the Army. He said that it had cost the Hereditary Prince very great sorrow. Di Aci said he saw him grieve. He had a hard task to perform with his father and mother. Fagan saw the Queen. He informed me by letter that the Queen had expressed her determination to go to the Ficuzza on Monday, to urge the King to see the proofs upon which I founded my accusation. Lamb heard from M[ilano] that the Queen had abused the Hereditary Prince most extremely.

(1) Dispatched additional letters for packet: no. 34 to Lord Castlereagh; Col. Torrens about Col. Watson and Quartermaster >A'Court<; Mr Baker. Too late for the mail.

Saturday, May 9, 1812. Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince had insisted upon seeing the Constitution. He feared very much for the effect of Cassaro's opposition. He wanted me to impose upon Cassaro and to tell him that as England would not allow any opposition to its views for the interests of both countries, from the Queen or other quarters, so I could not submit to any.

Sunday, May 10, 1812. Arrived Princess Amelia packet in three weeks from England. Brought letters down to the 14th March.

Obins said he had received a letter from Locker, with the following story: a marine in the Caledonia said an angel had appeared to him in [a] dream desiring him to eat nothing.

Monday, May 11, 1812. (1) Breakfasted with Belmonte, to see procession of slaves redeemed from captivity and brought back by the Milford. The procession was preceded by men veiled, supposed noblemen who, perhaps by way of penance, are employed unknown in administering relief to the distressed. Then followed about forty monks from every

convent of the city, each deputation bearing a cross. Then the Vicar of the Archbishop with all the functionaries of the Cathedral. Then the Praetor and Senate; afterwards came the slaves, each with a branch of olive in his hand, accompanied by a religious order formed for the purpose of redeeming captives. The whole closed by a battalion of Grenadiers. The last part of the slaves was particularly affecting, each of them offering to Lady William and the Admiral their thanks for their deliverance.

Nothing, in fact, could be more disgraceful to any Government than this very event, arising in its own profligacy and weakness, which would not, in the first instance, protect their states, and would not, in the second, expend £25,000 only in the redemption of 400 unfortunate victims, when millions have been thrown away upon favourites - and at last to have this done by foreigners!

(1) The Queen dined with the Duke of Orleans.

Tuesday, May 12, 1812. The Duke of Orleans called upon me. He said the Queen was going today; that they were all to meet at her house at twelve; that she had said expressly that she should return to Palermo. He said that the King was going to Solanto, but that the Queen had declared, if he stayed more than two or three days, she should follow him. She had shown the Duke Ruffo's deciphered letter (it was dated the 18th January), mentioning that the Emperor had assured him that he would [have] *gradito* the Queen's visit; that she should have an asylum in his states; that the Emperor was to write to the Queen to this effect; that Ruffo said he should send a copy of the Emperor's letter in cipher and keep the original. Ruffo says he had mentioned the subject to Mr King (Mr King in his letter of the 24th said nothing of it).

The Duke showed me the Queen's letter to him on his name day. It was darkly expressed. The Duke interpreted it into reproach. It did not strike me so. He showed me his answer, which was very well written. He defended himself and said his crime towards her had been always to tell her the truth, and to have had his opinions verified by the fact. He told me it was his rule never to receive a tap from her without returning it, and that her practice was to let loose vague expressions, which might reach anywhere or nowhere.

I mentioned to him my information that Circello had been employed in bringing about a reconciliation between the Hereditary Prince and his parents. He did not know it; he thought it very likely. He said, at the palace the day before, the Queen had been much enlivened after her conversation with the Hereditary Prince. I said there could be no doubt of the Queen having abused the Hereditary Prince violently, and having interfered very much in politics; and yet it was odd that in the 40 notes of the Hereditary Prince sent to me by the Queen, there was no reference to politics whatever. He explained this by saying that the notes of an English lady of fashion have no comparison in number to those passing in the royal family; that it was a rule laid down by the King never to introduce any serious subject in them or in their ordinary conversation. They did not dare trust each other.

He spoke upon the subject of my letter to England proposing to employ him. I asked if he had any answer. He said the Duke of Kent had written that the Prince Regent and the

Ministers were very well disposed to him. I asked if he thought the Hereditary Prince would object to his having a command of Sicilian troops if going to Italy. He said no. I asked if he was sure. He said he had never talked with him, but he thought so because he was convinced that the Hereditary Prince would be glad to get rid of him. But I submitted whether the same distrust might not make him apprehensive of the influence he might gain over the troops. He thought not; and then, talking of the Hereditary Prince's *méfiance*, he said it was excessive: he trusted neither father, mother, wife, child nor anyone else. Such had been the impressions so successfully and constantly inculcated upon his mind by the Queen.

The Duke said that he believed the Hereditary Prince was jealous of his going to Spain, because he, the Hereditary Prince, wished to be his father's deputy (the King having pretended to a right to be Viceroy in Ferdinand VII's absence).

I took the liberty of mentioning the injury that he received from the residence of his mother at Mahon. The Navy all paid her attention and received in return impressions very unfavourable to his character. These they of course uttered again with the warmth natural to their habits and circulated all over the world. He said it was very true but he could not help it. He had only to oppose to such calumny his own conduct. He then mentioned that by a decree of the Council of Ancients his estates confiscated had been returned to the family, but by a subsequent decree a pension of 100,000 francs had been assigned in lieu of the estates. This had been received by his mother till very lately. His mother having refused to acknowledge this transaction, and having inserted in her receipts always this sum as part of her property, he did not know how she subsisted now.

She had never asked anything of England, till very lately, for fear of losing this. Faulmon was the son of a tailor, and had so disgusted his sister with his brutal treatment of her mother that Mademoiselle was obliged to leave her. The Duke believes that it was Faulmon's intention to take the Duchess back to France. He said the Queen had behaved neither well nor ill in this business. She wished Brissac to interfere, and the Duke believes that Brissac wished to occupy Faulmon's place. Brissac was much the most gentlemanlike. Menichini came about Tschudi, He wished me not to disband the regiment in a way that had been reported. I said the report was without foundation; although I knew he had made all opposition and was an odious character, yet my constant principle had been to do injury to no one, provided that the public object was obtained; and, with respect to Tschudi, if there was one mode of doing the same thing more agreeable to him than another, it should be adopted.

Wednesday, May 13, 1812. (1) Saw Lieut.-Col. Poli at my own request. I asked him if the Hereditary Prince had yet communicated my letter to the King. He said he had not. Poli then informed me that the King was at last convinced of the propriety of the Prince's measures (the Hereditary Prince has never yet seen the King). He had had a long conversation with his mother, in which he persuaded her to be quiet and satisfied, and his hope was to reconcile the King and the Queen with the present Ministers. It was the

Prince's intention to meet the King at Solanto. He told me all this in confidence, and that he should be able to communicate to me more in a few days.

I asked him when the Queen meant to go away. He asked if the Ficuzza would not be considered a sufficient distance. I said no. He said, what harm could be done by her if she was in the country and all her spies and emissaries were taken up? I answered that we had seen the mischief that she had already done. It never would cease but with her presence. I told him that her own imprudence had put in my power the right of sending her away, and of that right I was determined to avail myself. Whether the King did or did not see the proofs, and whether he was or was not satisfied with them, I was equally resolved that the measure should have effect.

He urged me very much not to do it. He said it would kill the Hereditary Prince. He said it so vexed him; he was so ill. I said I could not believe this; that I knew the Hereditary Prince, and everybody belonging to the family, would be much happier. I observed to him that not four days ago the Queen had abused the Hereditary Prince extremely, and that the King a few days before had called him an ungrateful and ambitious son. How did this accord with what he now told me, of the change in the King's manner of thinking? He answered that this was some days ago, but now it was different. He could not explain more. I told him my determination would be always the same. We had experience for forty years of the Queen's character. She had nearly lost both countries. We had seen what she had done since the Hereditary Prince's appointment. It was all the same; there could be no security. I was resolved she should go. The mode should be arranged, with every possible consideration - *suaviter, fortiter*. He himself had assured me frequently that the Queen would be quiet, that she would not interfere; but had he not been deceived throughout? He said the Hereditary Prince would leave his situation. I hoped he would not, but if he did, the Parliament would find another to fill his place. All this is humbug, and there is some intrigue at the bottom, which is at present unknown to me.

Mme de Montjoye told me that the Queen had been furious the day before with the Hereditary Prince, and had called him a *chef des révolutionnaires*. The Duchess of Orleans had today received a letter from her, written in the most dejected style. She said that her *procès* would be made.

Mr Liston told me that Bernadotte had certainly not owed his elevation to Bonaparte. His conduct at Hamburg and in Holstein had pleased the Swedes, who hoped by the appointment of a French general to secure to themselves the favour of Bonaparte. Bernadotte went to Paris and asked Bonaparte's consent. He gave it, not pleased with the event, and not thinking he would succeed. Bernadotte asked a letter from Bonaparte to Alquier, the French Minister, for his assistance. An official letter was written and Alquier gave all his aid, much to the annoyance of Bonaparte. Bonaparte afterwards urged [and] set up the King of Denmark as a candidate for the situation of Crown Prince, in opposition to Bernadotte. It was Bonaparte's intention that Eugene Beauharnais, the Viceroy, should have been King of Sweden. When Bernadotte succeeded, his first steps were to make himself as popular as possible. He sent away all his French servants. Made his son speak nothing but Swedish, and makes him cultivate by every means the affections of the people. He did not disguise his hatred of Bonaparte whom he always termed *ce queux-là*. He had asked both

Russia and England whether they would enter into alliance with him. But both had kept back from declaring themselves. Since Lord Castlereagh's appointment, still greater caution had been observed.

Mr Liston also told me that he had heard from Pozzo di Borgo, who had seen the Emperor of Russia about a year ago, that nothing could be more satisfactory than his conversation. Nobody seemed to understand more thoroughly his relation with France, the views of Bonaparte, his own danger, and the best means of combating it. He had said that if the French were successful, they might take Petersburg. He should retire but would not yield. The language of Rumantzov, the Minister, had also changed. The Emperor was certainly making most magnificent preparations.

(1) Argo, Capt. Warren, son of the [], arrived with Mr and Mrs Liston, Mr B. Frere, Sir R. Wilson, Mr Hamilton, Mr Turner, clerk of Office.

Thursday, May 14, 1812. (1) Mme de Montjoye told me that the Duchess of Orleans had received a letter from the Queen at the Ficuzza, written in a very calm style and speaking of the Duke, her *respestable mari*.

Prince Belmonte told me that he had spoken to the Hereditary Prince respecting my desire for an answer to my demand for the Queen's absence. The Hereditary Prince begged him to tranquillize me, and to advise me not to press any more the departure of the Queen, who was already at a great distance. He asked Belmonte if he knew what else had happened to make me more urgent. Belmonte answered that he could not conscientiously advise me not to do that which I thought so essential; that it was my opinion, and his, that the Queen must go away before the Parliament met. He advised the Hereditary Prince to employ Poli, who was adroit, to draw the secret from me. Belmonte also added that it was my great object that things should be settled as soon as possible, in order that the Army might be employed upon active service.

(1) Mr Locker, on Kite, arrived with dispatches from Lord Wellington and Sir E. Pellew.

Friday, May 15, 1812. (1) Went with Mr Liston to wait upon the Hereditary Prince. He talked to him of the King of England. Mr Liston introduced very well his good qualities as King, and the wisdom he had always shown in giving way with a good grace to the wishes of his people. The Hereditary Prince talked to him a great deal of the war with Russia. It was Mr Liston's opinion that the Turks could not accede to the conditions of the Russians respecting the provinces near the Danube, as upon them the town of Constantinople was entirely dependent for bread.

Fagan called and showed me a note from the Queen, I suppose to Maddalena, in which she said that she could not yet persuade the King to protect (not the word) her against *le minaccie*. She said that she employed herself in reading when she did not abandon herself to her *tetre riflessioni*. "*Mille e mille complimenti all'onesto Fagan*".

Mme de Montjoye told me that the Queen, while with the Duke of Orleans, getting - I believe - into her carriage, had abused three or four corporals of the Esteri for enlisting with us and deserting their own masters. An old corporal stepped out and said in the Duke's hearing: "I have been thirty years in the King's service. I am naked and starved. It is therefore I go to the English service". The Duke of Orleans said he could have hugged the man, if it had been decent to do so.

(1) My brother Frederick arrived in Nautilus, Capt. Dench. Had left Mahon, where was Sir E. Pellew, on Sunday. Arrived Clifford from Tunis.

Dined with Prince Paterno: 36 present, all the exiled barons and their wives.

Send two ostriches to the Hereditary Prince, present of the Bey to Lady William.

Sunday, May 17, 1812. (1) Resolved to send 6,000 men to Spain. Wrote to Gen. Maitland. Lamb of opinion I could not do otherwise by my instructions. Fremantle also. We all think that this force will do no good. But the departure of Murat with 6,000 men places Sicily in safety.

I talked with Fremantle about Algiers. Sir E. Pellew against violent measures, and also Locker. I think force the only likely chance of succeeding. Fremantle wishes to go and to take violent measures upon his own responsibility. If they do not succeed they can be disowned. The chances are in favour of success, but in case of failure the supply of the armies in Spain might be cut off. The Dey would never believe that a junior admiral could thus act upon his own responsibility, and the disavowal he would consider as a mean evasion. I agree with Sir E. Pellew that we ought to temporize.

Belmonte told me that the Duchess of Orleans had received a letter from the Queen in which she stated that the King had said to her that he wished to live in tranquillity, and that his repose must not be disturbed. He informed [her] that the only occasions when she could see him would be the hours of dinner and supper, and, if she pleased, she might assist at his party of piquet with Jannucci.

(1) Dined with Belmonte. Same party as at Paterno's dinner for Mr Liston.

Monday, May 18, 1812. (1) I called upon the Hereditary Prince to communicate to him my orders for sending a detachment to Mahon, where they would receive orders as to their future destination. He expressed no objection. He said the country was quiet and he thought the troops might be allowed to go.

"*Par exemple,*" he said, "*avez-vous vu Moliterno dernièrement?*" I said no. He said that Moliterno was determined to take his dismissal; that he wished, with the men who must be discharged, to make an expedition to Naples. He said "*Pourquoi non?*" I said that Moliterno must be *fou* to make such a proposition.

I was surprised that the Hereditary Prince did not object to the expedition. He seemed rather glad of it. He said Sir R. Wilson appeared a *garçon d'esprit*.

The Hereditary Prince also told me that he had heard from the Ficuzza that the King was always *ferme*.

Sir R. Wilson returned from the Ficuzza. He told me that the King had talked to him about his situation. The King said it was hard upon him to be forced to abdicate after so long a reign (54 years). I observed to Sir R. Wilson that this was not true. The Queen had told him that the most cruel act of all was setting up the Hereditary Prince in opposition to the father, and she added that she knew it was intended to set up the son if the father (that is the Hereditary Prince) did not do what he was bid. The King (Sir R. Wilson said, but it must have been the Queen), said that they wanted Naples and that if we could give them that, we might do what we pleased with Sicily. Sir R. Wilson told Lady William that he could not approve the extent we had gone. We had no right to do as much. Lady William observed that we had not driven her from the island. He said he knew that. The Queen had shown him my letters. Lady William charged him with having spoken first to the King about politics. He denied it.

Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince imagined that Sir R. Wilson had been sent by me to the King, and was annoyed by it. He also told me that the Père Caccamo had been with the Hereditary Prince. Belmonte said that he asked the Hereditary Prince why he always looked so frightened when I visited him. He denied being so.

(1) Lady William had a dance.

Mr and Mrs Liston went on board and sailed in the morning. Mr Liston gave me some papers about protection given to French privateers, etc.

Tuesday, May 19, 1812. The Duke of Orleans called upon me. He told me the story of what passed between the Queen and the corporal of the Esteri. He said that in her hall at Santa Croce he found a rank of several men of the Esteri. The Queen came out and spoke to them in German and expressed her hope that they would remain attached to their King. A German corporal said he had been thirty years in his service; that he was starved and naked, and complained that he was now obliged to seek service elsewhere. The Queen said nothing, and what passed was expressed without disrespect.

He told me he would give me a memoir upon Italy and offensive operations in the Mediterranean.

We talked about operations in Italy. I thought the best was first to attack Naples and then, uniting that army to ours, and taking advantage of those resources, to march on the north. He seemed to think that it would be better to land more to the north.

He talked of Belmonte and the Hereditary Prince. He said the first believed that he had the confidence of the latter, and that he was sure he was mistaken; that Serrati advised the Hereditary Prince through Poli. I told the Duke that Belmonte ascribed all the Hereditary Prince's contrary opinions to Cassaro. The Duke said he was sure Belmonte was mistaken. I told the Duke that the Hereditary Prince was very much afraid of me; that he got rid of me immediately if he could. I said Belmonte had frightened him with my name, and that I was satisfied nothing but fear would make him go on. His misfortune was to trust nobody, and

not to have sense enough to take his own line. He quite agreed in this. We agreed also that Belmonte yielded too much. We spoke with reference to the foreign dispatches, which the Hereditary Prince desired Belmonte to bring to him unopened. I said it might be well not to commit his mother by any dispatches written previously, but there the line should be drawn and all the future dispatches should be sent by him. He thought this right.

We talked of the Army. I told him its want of military spirit. We agreed that Sicilians and Neapolitans should be enrolled in distinct corps. It would give emulation. He quoted me the foreign corps in the French service as being inferior to none in bravery. He mentioned the Swiss. He said it was contrary to their capitulation to fight against the Germans, and they always, as a matter of form, refused to pass the Rhine; and cannon and a superior force was drawn out. Then they ceded to force. Upon one occasion Marshal Soubise was angry with the refusal and went up to Gen. Lachman, who commanded them, and asked what they were good for. The General answered "*de couvrir la retraite de notre armée*" - which they afterwards did at the battle of Rosbach.

Wednesday, May 20, 1812. (1) Came out to Prince Paterno's house at Colli.

Ventimiglia, Belmonte's brother, and Salvo told me that they had persuaded the Consuls not to elect the Praetor for their *procureur*. They had expressed their fears at first. They said "If the court used the barons as they did, what will they do to us poor people?" They consented at last, but then they wanted to choose one of themselves. The Consuls are five who elect, two blacksmiths and one silversmith.

Ventimiglia and Salvo dissuaded them from this and persuaded them to elect some person of rank. They then named four: Belmonte, Villa Hermosa, Lampedusa and Paterno, leaving the choice to the Hereditary Prince. The election took place as was agreed. The Praetor and Senate, who had always been named the representative, went to the Hereditary Prince and remonstrated with him. The Consuls went also. The Hereditary Prince address[ed them] "*Figliuoli*, why would you not as usual elect the Praetor?" Because they disliked him and he starved them. (Belmonte and Villa Hermosa had declined the honour as being Ministers. Paterno wished for it). The Hereditary Prince said he would consider of it.

The Consuls came to be presented to me with Ventimiglia and Salvo. I refused to see them. They had heard that Cassaro had seen one of the judges and they were to be prosecuted. My seeing them would [seem] like opposition to the Hereditary Prince, and I told Ventimiglia and Salvo that if I interfered at all with the Hereditary Prince, it must be by advice and in a different manner. I was sure the Consuls would not be molested and recommended their advising them to be firm.

(1) Dispatched letters to Trapani. Earl Liverpool no. - ; Lord Wellington; Sir H. Wellesley; Gen. Campbell, battering train to come to Mahon; Gen. Dowdeswell.

Colli, Thursday, May 21, 1812. Rode to town, chestnut horse fell with me when going into the Favorita gate. A good deal hurt in the foot. Horse put his foot on the broad stone in the centre of the gate and slipped down.

Went with MacFarlane to Di Aci. Told us that the Hereditary Prince was not *de bonne foi*. He was wedded to all his old opinions; his disposition was evident from the eagerness with which he lent himself to anything tending to despotism, or to the Neapolitans, and the reluctance with which he received propositions of a contrary nature.

Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince no longer mentioned to him anything of the Constitution or the Parliament. I told him I believed the Hereditary Prince was deceiving him. He said he believed so too. He said he should not submit to it, and that he, with his colleagues, would give in their resignation if he did: a step which I very much approved.

Colli, Friday, May 22, 1812. Laid up. Dispatched letters to Trapani to Lord Liverpool.

Colli, Saturday, May 23, 1812. (1) Duke of Orleans called in the evening. He had come from the Ficuzza the day before. He said both he and the Duchess had been very well received by the King, and particularly the Duchess, with the greatest kindness. The King was in great spirits. The Queen had the fever continually and was very much depressed. No particular conversation passed. The Queen was to go to the Bagaria and to come to Palermo for some days.

The King was very much given to devotions.

The Duke said that he had seen the Hereditary Prince, who had been very inquisitive about the Duke's reception. The Duke told him how it had passed, and that the King had made many enquiries about the Hereditary Prince's children. Though nothing particularly pleasing about the Hereditary Prince had passed, there was nothing to the contrary.

Belmonte had been here before. But hearing of the [election of Lampedusa] he said he was *ni viande ni poisson*, not good with any sauce. He told me that the Pretore had been with him and had represented to him the pains he had taken, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Hereditary Prince to receive his resignation. He begged Belmonte to urge him to do so. He said that he had told the Hereditary Prince that the people did not like him and they had perfectly the right to choose for their *procureur* in Parliament whom they pleased. He begged him to tell the Hereditary Prince that he would go to the *château* if he did not.

Di Aci also came. They were talking of the Hereditary Prince's conversation about me. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince always said to him, with reference to me and to my supposed violence: "*Gettiamo acqua, gettiamo acqua*". Di Aci said that he always asked him if I was calm.(2)

(1) Mademoiselle d'Orléans dined here.

(2) Lord Molesworth shot himself through the heart. Wrote a letter to the Admiral before he died. Thanked him for his kindness, which had delayed, but had not prevented, his resolution. He said he could not find happiness in this world. He signed himself "God's

devoted victim". Lord Molesworth's farmhouse was burnt, and the family were saved by their jumping out of window.

Colli, Sunday, May 24, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. He told me that he had spoken to the Hereditary Prince about the Pretore, saying to him that here was a man willing to resign; whereas if it had been otherwise, His Royal Highness should have dismissed him, because he had lost the public confidence; and when he (Belmonte) lost it also, he advised the Hereditary Prince to *chasser*; him immediately. He consented and desired him (Belmonte) to speak to Villa Hermosa upon the subject.

(1) Mr Burgmann arrived.

Colli, Monday, May 25, 1812. I went to town.

I called upon Belmonte. I spoke to him about Padre Benedetto, Villa Dorata and Paternó of Catania; that they had been our attached friends and I wished very much to serve them. He spoke to me about the Commandant of Favignana, who had treated him always with the greatest kindness and affection.

Fagan came to me. He said the King abused me exceedingly to those with whom he was intimate. He said that the Hereditary Prince had sent for the judge Gentili, to persuade the Consuls to re-elect the Pretore, and succeeded; but the constituents of the Consuls threatened them with death if they retracted from what they had already done. Gentili said that he had then persuaded the Hereditary Prince not to oppose the election.

Colli, Tuesday, May 26, 1812. (1) Came to Palermo and attended, at Belmonte's, a meeting with him, Di Aci and Villa Hermosa, about the deficit in the Military Department. I had a great difference with Di Aci about his plan for the Army. I said it was not a point to be decided in a moment. I should wish to show it to persons conversant with the service, and particularly to Fardella. Di Aci objected; he said Fardella would do all he could to upset it, as it was contrary to the former system which has been established by himself. I said that I did not know that the present system was bad, and it might as well be said that Di Aci had made this plan to upset the system of Fardella, whom he hated. I expressed my good opinion of Fardella as an officer. He said he was a coward (just the same character belonging to Di Aci the *>menteur<*). It might be, but he was very well informed. Why did he suppose I should be led by him, when to himself, rather, my prevention must adhere, whom I considered a patriot? etc. He said he should publish his plan. Unfortunately this man has more vanity than patriotism. He wants to have the merit of making a new system and cannot bear the idea of any participation. Therefore, whether the old system is good or bad, it must yield to a creation of his own. I will not permit it.

I heard there that the Queen had written to Cassaro to say that it was now time for the King to resume the reins of government; that it was right that the best of kings, of husbands and of fathers should no longer be trampled upon.

Cassaro had been to Solanto at half past 7 the evening before.

Lieut.-Col. Poli brought me his answer to a letter I had written about Milano and Torelli. He said the Queen was very angry with him. I said I was glad to find myself his companion. I asked why the Hereditary Prince did not go and see the King. He said he did not know that he should be allowed. I asked him if the Hereditary Prince had ever communicated my letter to the King. He said he believed not.(2)

Belmonte came in the evening and said he had advised Prince Di Aci to ask the Hereditary Prince to let me see his plan. He also told me that the Hereditary Prince had desired, that morning, to see the Constitution, observing that the not granting his frequent request was not amiable. Belmonte answered that there were certain occasions when amiability was out of the question, and that he wished to show it first to Cassaro in order that the plan might be as complete as possible; to which the Hereditary Prince consented. Belmonte then proposed that he, Villa Hermosa, Cassaro, Balsamo and myself should meet once a week to read over the plans. I said that I would rather be left out, that it was an interference which my government might not like, and that it would please me better not to be concerned in it. He said I should not appear. I was acting rather privately than publicly, and Cassaro's consent could not otherwise be obtained. It was indispensable for this. I said I would lend myself to it.(3)

(1) Mr and Mrs Concannon arrived from Naples by way of Tunis. In quarantine. Gen. Donkin and Mr Burgmann.

(2) Slept at Palermo.

(3) Belmonte observed laughingly, in my presence, to Poli, about a letter to the Hereditary Prince which he had opened by mistake (and Poli was saying to him that it did not signify), that when a Minister had the confidence of his Prince, it did not signify, but that was not his case.

Palermo, Wednesday, May 27, 1812. Marquis of Spaccaforno came. He told me that he came by desire of his father to tell me what had passed between him and the King. The King had expressed great displeasure with the Hereditary Prince; said he was an *infâme* and a Jacobin; that he had no right to call the Parliament without his consent. Cassaro observed that he understood that he had written to the King before he did so. The King required that the Parliament should be prorogued; that it was not right to call it in this state of fermentation. Cassaro told him that he and Villa Hermosa had given the same advice to the Hereditary Prince. He desired Cassaro to tell the Hereditary Prince to write to the King, as he was bound in gratitude to do. When Cassaro tried to defend the Hereditary Prince, the King would not listen to him. The King said that I had represented in England that he was mad or silly (and therefore that he had been set aside - doubtful), but that there had been one there (alluding, I suppose, to Sir R. Wilson) who would report that this was not the

truth. Cassaro answered that if such idea was entertained, which he did not believe, it must be upon account of his having given up all business to the Queen, and of never having seen me upon an occasion of so much importance. Cassaro asked him if he desired that he should report his conversation to the Hereditary Prince. He said "No".

When he came away the Queen asked Cassaro what had been resolved between them. Cassaro answered "Nothing". The Queen said the King was weak and incapable of taking any decided measure.

Fagan came and said that he had seen the Queen, to whom he had presented his wife. The Queen made her many compliments. She asked if we meant to invite them to the gala of the 4th June. She said that with respect to the 4th June, her opinion was that we ought to ask both her and the King, and they would not go because of their age, but would send all their children.

Belmonte came. He told me that he had seen Caccamo coming from the Hereditary Prince that morning. He asked the Hereditary Prince if the Père brought him good news. He told him that the King had invited him to visit him at Solanto on the 30th, the King's name day; that he was not to talk of business on that day, but that afterwards he might go to him as often as he pleased, and talk to him upon whatever subjects he pleased. (How is this to be reconciled with the conversation with Cassaro?)

The Hereditary Prince said his project was to unite all: the King, Queen, with himself and his Ministers. He observed of the Queen's writing to me to interest myself with the Hereditary Prince about Milano and Torelli, that she must have *perdu la tête*; that she had lost her influence with the King. Belmonte said she might lose it today, but she would have it tomorrow and, with all his (the Hereditary Prince's) *tête*, she would upset him if he did not take care.

Belmonte also said that he had been at Cassaro's but, not finding him at home, had seen the Princess. He told what he came about, and asked her if it was better for him to come again or to leave it to her to make the communication. She said "You know my husband's vanity" and "This will be best done by yourself". Belmonte then alluded to Cassaro's attachment to the ancient Constitution and feudal rights. She said that he had changed his opinions very much upon this subject and that she was convinced that my being present and expressing my approbation would obtain his.(1)

(1) Belmonte said that the Princess Cassaro had reported, of this conversation, that the King had said he had the right to sanction also what was done by the Parliament.

Thursday, May 28, 1812 (1) Came in and slept in town. Belmonte made me a proposition about the new plan, from Di Aci. MacFarlane spoke to Di Aci upon this subject. I told Belmonte plainly that if I did not see and approve the plan, it should not be executed. Clifford, unknown to me, had advised Concannon to come ashore without having pratique. I this day told the Admiral that it would be better for him to take the pratique regulations made for men-of-war under his own superintendence, which he said he would.

(1) Dined with Prince Villafranca. Twenty-six present: Prince and Principessa Di Aci, Duke and Duchess of Sperlinga, Prince and Principessa Paterno, son-in-law and daughter of Di Aci, Prince and Princess Villafranca, his brother, her brother, Prince Belmonte, Ventimiglia, Principessa Villa Hermosa, Duke San Giovanni, Mr Lamb, Gen. MacFarlane, Capt. Milnes, Admiral Fremantle, Marquis de la Grua, Duke of Angió.

Fred - his letter to the Praetor in my name. >Seagoing< men - and calling for enlistment []

Friday, May 29, 1812. (1) Lieut.-Col. Poli came. I told him that I had three things to speak to him upon.

First: we wished to invite the King and Queen to the ball on 4th June. He said it was very right. Lady William had asked the Queen. I wish to know how the King was to be asked. I supposed by the Hereditary Prince. He said yes, and he undertook to take the message.

Second: about the Parliament. I was anxious that it should not be prorogued. I knew that many wished it. He said he thought it better to defer it till after the feast of Rosalia, when the people would be assembled. I said the people were anxious for it, and it was more likely that the people would show their displeasure if the Parliament was not called, than they would if it was, and proceeding upon their business. I also talked about the Consuls. He said they had no right to do what they did. I remarked upon the absurdity of calling people to elect, and then confining their choice to one person only. He said this might be absurd, but was the custom, which could only be altered by the Parliament. He said it would be dangerous to encourage the example of the people taking in their own hands the correction of abuses. I combated this as much as I could, but to no purpose.

Third: about the departure of the Queen. I said when the gala was over it was my intention to renew my demand. He urged me not, that she could do no more harm since her creatures were taken up; that she had no influence upon the King; that it would hurt the Hereditary Prince and perhaps kill him (at which I laughed, but he as solemnly repeated); that anxiety upon this subject had affected his head and been the cause of all the delay that had taken place and that it might create confusion, as many would not submit to see this indignity shown to the Queen. I answered that all this might have been and was considered by me before I made the demand. But having done so, and still retaining the same opinion of its necessity, it was my resolution to persevere. I could not permit the Queen to remain at the Bagaria, but I would be content with her remaining at the Ficuzza. He thought the Hereditary Prince could accomplish this.

Moliterno came upon my appointment in consequence of his giving in his dismission if nothing was to be done in respect to Naples, and asking a decision upon his propositions from the Patriot party. I told him, although personally I might believe [him], he had shown no document to authorize me officially to consider him as an accredited agent.

With respect to Naples, I thought the moment favourable in some respects but unfavourable in others. He said 4,000 men would be sufficient, that he had that number belonging to him on his estates, ready to join him; that Neapolitan merchants here had promised him a loan of 50,000 ducats if he would embark with an expedition. He said the King, Queen and

Prince would allow the troops going to hoist constitutional colours; that they would receive such constitution as was judged proper, and that the troops should be under my command. He talked of a northern and southern kingdom. If I did not go, he would try something, but would not desert his party.

Belmonte came. He first talked of Di Aci. I told him what I thought of him. He had suggested the night before that I should speak to Poli about our difference. My answer was that it would be injurious to show the Hereditary Prince that we disagreed. He repeated this, saying that he had only been prompted to say this by his friendship for me, and he observed that advantage would be taken of our differences. I agreed with him. I said what annoyed me was his so totally misconceiving his own relative situation to mine, and secondly my observation that he was actuated entirely by vanity and egoism. I begged him to speak to him, and to try if it was not possible to make him understand the real duties he had to perform.

Belmonte then told me that he began to despair of our success; that the failure would be owing to my good nature and not taking a sufficiently decided tone; that I ought to make the King, Prince and his Ministers afraid of me; that when I had shown anger the thing went on rapidly. What he said was perfectly true.

He then said that he had been with Cassaro, and to his mortification and astonishment he had found him with the opinion that the Hereditary Prince had not the power to convoke a Parliament or sanction its proceedings, and that the Parliament had no power to change the Constitution. He openly acknowledged his alarm: that Belmonte's courage would sacrifice them; that they might be left without support and that they might suffer with their lives. Belmonte supposes that the King had frightened him. The King had certainly said to him that the Hereditary Prince had not the power to call the Parliament, and that he and the other Ministers would be the victims. Belmonte would not enter into discussion with him, but as the subject, he said, was vast, he put it off to another day.

Di Aci came in and brought me his plan. Some explanation and amicable conversation took place.

He then told us that he had talked to the Hereditary Prince about an expedition to Naples with the Neapolitan troops; that the Hereditary Prince had eagerly jumped at it. The Hereditary Prince had agreed most eagerly to it. He was of opinion with Di Aci that 500 Guards and a battalion of Grenadiers were all the troops required in Sicily and that all the rest might go away (*Ouaere how?*) Di Aci proposed to the Hereditary Prince that he was willing to agree that Sicily should be always independent of Naples, and governed by one of the family. The Hereditary Prince said: "Let us understand what you mean by the family. I suppose", he said, "you mean the King, or myself, or my brother, or my son" - evidently intending to exclude the Duke of Orleans. He proposed also that he should give the English Constitution both to Sicily and Naples. The Hereditary Prince said he would immediately write to the King and ask him whether he would see Di Aci's plan or Di Aci himself. He, the Hereditary Prince, was willing to agree to all conditions. When the King's answer came, the Hereditary Prince was to send for me.

Both Di Aci and Belmonte pressed me to agree to it. They should by that means get rid of all the Neapolitans. I said it was evidently good for Sicily, but not perhaps for Italy.

(1) Appointed Major A'Court Military Secretary. Major Marshall a lieutenant in Italian Levy and aide-de-camp.

Colli, Saturday, May 30, 1812. (1) Belmonte called upon me. Had not seen the Hereditary Prince. I proposed to him the removal of Di Aci. I said we never should go on well together. He said it would be very difficult. The Parliament was coming on. I suggested the Halberdiers and Militia for him. He said the only way would be to persuade him that he could be more useful to his country in some other situation, not that he was unfit for the one in which he was.

He talked a great deal about himself. Said that the Parliament of February [1810] was the first of his life, the most useful to his country, and the most glorious to his country. He succeeded in convincing the Parliament, contrary to the opinion of all his friends. In the succeeding session he was defeated by the treachery of Cassaro. He then said to his friends: "This will be our victory", and he determined that in England and not in Sicily the battle was to be fought. He said he immediately began to *travailler* the public mind in England by pamphlets and gazettes, and his efforts have been crowned with success.

(1) King's name day. Lady William went to Court, I unable, from my sore foot. Went in the town in the morning. Returned to dinner. Talked to L[amb] about T[urri].

Colli, Sunday, May 31, 1812. The Duke of Orleans came. Had been the day before to wait upon the King at Solanto. The Hereditary Prince had been also there, for the first time since being Vicar-General. He was pretty well received. The Duke had not seen his reception, but he had seen part of the interview, and several things said by the Hereditary Prince to the King were very coldly received by the latter. The Duke said the Queen was looking remarkably well, but not the King, who was not in as good spirits as he had seen him at the Ficuzza. The Queen did not invite the Hereditary Prince to dinner. The Hereditary Prince afterwards asked the Duke how he had found the Queen, whether not more quiet than usual. He said yes.

Lady William told me that the Hereditary Prince appeared to the bystanders very much frightened. He boasted to Belmonte that he was not the least so.

The Duke talked about his memoir, for which I thanked him, and the expedition to Italy. I regretted the going of the troops to Spain. He seemed to think that with a small force we might get Civitavecchia, Orbetello or Gaeta. He thought Orbetello better than Elba, to which I could not agree. His plan for the attack of Italy was much the same as Dumouriez's. He said if the Maida business had been followed by similar expeditions in other places, Bonaparte could not have kept Italy. His plans were pretty much the same as those of Dumouriez.

Belmonte came in the evening. He said that he came to propose to me, from the Hereditary Prince, that an expedition should be made into Italy. He proposed, if Naples could be

conquered, that his father should go there, and he remain in Sicily; or, if his father would not go, as he believed would be the case, he would go, and Leopold govern Sicily. He knew, he said, that the Sicilians again would never consent to be dependent upon Naples. Belmonte observed justly that this sentiment did him honour. Another might conceal it and endeavour to prevent the separation by all means possible. He also said that he hoped Naples, with such additional territory as might be obtained on the side of Rome, might be strong enough to maintain itself. Belmonte observed that this would be a favourable opportunity of getting rid of the Neapolitans and of founding the Constitution immediately and without difficulty. I begged time to consider the proposition and promised to give my answer in two days.

Colli, Monday, June 1, 1812. (1) Came in to town.

Belmonte and Di Aci came at the same time.

Di Aci said that the King was very much *monté* against the Prince and the present measures. He was repeating the King's conversation with Cassaro. Cassaro had said to the King that it was necessary, if there were nine steps of power, that he should descend three. The King said he would only go down one. The King had talked big, had jumped up from his chair with great violence and said he would come forward and die a martyr to the cause of the dignity and honour of the throne. Di Aci said that he knew him perfectly well and that he was an arrant coward and that these were merely words.

Di Aci said he had paid the subsistence of the soldiers for ten days. He had nothing for the officers. He could not go on afterwards. It was agreed that I should answer Belmonte's Note demanding money by refusing it upon the ground of the prorogation of the Parliament and the delay in producing those measures of reform so much expected. Di Aci said he would go to the Hereditary Prince and obtain his signature to a paper consenting to the meeting of Parliament at the time appointed and to the establishment of the English Constitution. I begged him not to insert the latter, because it would seem as if I had insisted upon it, which I had not - and when I even thought that it would not suit them. But Di Aci and Belmonte thought that it would be better that Di Aci should do this, as then the Hereditary Prince would be pledged and could not retract.

Belmonte remained. He gave his interpretation of the reasons why the Hereditary Prince represented the King as content and the Queen as quiet, when the reverse was the truth. He conceived that the Hereditary Prince through distrust and fear apprehended lest I and his Ministers, taking alarm at the decision of the King and Queen, might leave him and go over to their side. This seems to me natural enough.

Poli called upon me early in the morning to say that when the royal family went to a *fête* they were always attended by their own Guards. He pressed me again not to require the absence of the Queen. He said it would so hurt the Hereditary Prince. I asked why. He observed what he had not done before, that the Hereditary Prince would consider himself dishonoured in the eyes of all Europe if he permitted such an offence to be committed towards his mother. I said this could not be the case, because everyone knew he could not help himself.

I saw Mr Concannon. He said he had been confined at Verdun; that through Andreassi he got a passport to go to Vienna for an indefinite time; that he was at Vienna during all the last war and from a steeple saw the battles of Aspern and Wagram. Had been three years at Vienna; left it early last January; received a passport as a Danish merchant. Had no difficulty, except at Rome, where they were very strict in their examinations. Arrived at Naples on the 11th February; was 28 days on the road in a *vetturino*; remained there two months. The Danish Consul was an Englishman and knew that he was one. Two people only knew him. He went unseen by an English vessel to Tunis. Says French soldiers and officers are tired of the war and talk of Bonaparte with great freedom; that he had given way at last to the bishops who resisted (Fesch among the rest) to place him at the Head of the Church.

The Emperor of Austria is a very weak man, does all the business himself. Metternich a very able diplomat, but unequal to the task of Prime Minister. Anxious to preserve peace at any rate and not to commit the Austrian Government. Army very fine and full of good spirit. The Archduke not employed and enjoying no consideration. The other Archdukes not having any great reputation. Finances in a bad state. All ranks of people against the French.

Bernadotte had actually sent for Johnson to sign the peace. He declined going, thinking of more importance the business in the south. Otto, the French Minister at Vienna, behaving very well. The Empress, a very strong-minded woman, hating the French, but delicate in health.

Says there are 40,000 men in Naples. Murat had taken 15,000. Had refused to go upon Bonaparte's summons to join him; but at last consented. Bonaparte said to wish the Queen to resign, Murat to be the King of Poland. Not esteemed in Naples. All ranks wish to get rid of the French. Army well dressed and having a good appearance.

The Marquis Spaccaforo came in the evening by my desire. I talked to him of my intention not to have the Parliament prorogued; that I had the power of preventing it, because they had no money. He told me that his father was gone to the King.

(1) Letters received from Sir E. Pellew.

Palermo, Tuesday, June 2, 1812. Marquis Spaccaforo came and said that Prince Cassaro wanted to see me, and had a message to deliver to me from the King. He told me that the King did not wish the Parliament to be held till September, by which time he expected letters from England, and that I should be removed. Cassaro advised him to abdicate then, if things did not go as he pleased, and he said he would. I appointed six o'clock to go to his father.

I called upon Belmonte at five. There had been a long Council. He was asleep. I waited till he got up. He told me that upon going to the Hereditary Prince, he had assumed a *triste* countenance; that the Hereditary Prince asked him what was the matter. He answered that he saw that his (the Hereditary Prince's) downfall was likely soon to take place, together with his own and all that belonged to him. From the frequent conversation of the King with

Cassaro, and from the detestation of the Queen of the Hereditary Prince and <of> her influence over the King, and from the interference of the latter in public affairs, it was evident that the *crise* was approaching.

He told the Hereditary Prince that there were but two courses to follow. It depended a good deal, he said, upon character, which would be adopted. For himself, he should follow that which was last. The first was: to go, or write, to the King, that as in the course of his Vicariate, in which he had endeavoured to do his duty, he had been so unfortunate as not to please the King, to displease the English Minister and England and, as he feared, to disappoint the kingdom; and that [as] affairs was at last come to such a pitch of distress that for want of money he could not go on, he begged leave to resign the Vicariate, unless the King would allow him full power to do what he pleased. (Belmonte obtained positively the Hereditary Prince's own admission that he could not go on any longer. The very contrary of all his former declarations). Belmonte here introduced very cleverly all the duties he had to perform, and all the changes and reforms which it was necessary to make in the Constitution, and the immediate call of the Parliament.

The Hereditary Prince expressed himself quite convinced by this advice, but asked what was the other. Belmonte said that if he was in the same situation he never would give up the Vicariate. He would throw himself upon the protection and entirely into the hands of the British Minister. The Hereditary Prince said he liked the first advice the best. He knew the King was so timid that he would never return, and by adopting the first advice, the last consequence would follow. (It was observed: *plus m echant que b ete*).

Ruse of Belmonte: in the Hereditary Prince's antechamber he met Di Aci and Poli. Before Poli he said with an air of great disappointment to Di Aci that I would give him no money, and that a Note to that effect had been received by him. Di Aci affected equal surprise and horror, and Poli received the impression that was desired.

I went from him to Cassaro. Cassaro repeated to me the conversation he had had with the King. The King greatly complained of his situation as forced by me, and of the conduct of his son, and said he could no longer suffer it. Cassaro asked if the King ordered that he should only listen or give his opinion. The King said the latter. Cassaro asked how he could resist the will of the British Government. Even if he could get rid of the present English force, their fleets could blockade his ports and, aided by the people, who were disgusted, could again possess the island. Or, if they were gone, would not the French? And would not they then be worse off? Could His Majesty resist both enemies?

The King said no; but he added that he did not believe I had instructions to do what I had done. Cassaro observed that it appeared otherwise; that the first time I came and did not act, and went home for want of power. I returned and did act, having obtained [it]. Cassaro asked if Castalcicala had written that I had not the power. The King said no, that the British Ministers never would hear him. The King said that he wished the Parliament not to assemble till September, by which time he expected letters from England, and that I should be removed. (This followed later). Cassaro had advised him to adapt himself to circumstances and to be quiet. The King said that if the answers were unfavourable from England, he would do so.

He gave Cassaro a letter to deliver to the Hereditary Prince, desiring that the Parliament might be prorogued indefinitely, or rather without saying to what period. Cassaro observed that such indefinite prorogation was in fact *revocare il Parlamento*, and that could not be done with safety, for although there were some *têtes échauffées*, yet the whole nation and everyone expected something. The King objected to changes and to a Constitution, but Cassaro said that the King himself was a constitutional king. He could show him laws by which, for example, nobody could be confined without trial, as had been the case. The King was *un poco dispiaciuto* by this remark.

The King then showed Cassaro my letter to him delivered by Lamb, and he asked what was the affair of Meliti, to which reference was made. Cassaro told him that it was a man employed by the Queen to make trouble and disorder in the city. The King put his hand on his face and cried: "*Oh la pazza*, she is always surrounded by *birboni!*". The King told him that I had represented him as mad to the English Government. Cassaro said he did not believe it, but that it must appear extraordinary that he never would see me. But Cassaro said that I had remarked to him that if he would use his own judgment, and not devote himself so entirely to hunting and pleasure, and not yield so much to the Queen, that there was none of the family so fit to govern.

The King then desired him to give a message to me to say that he wished me to make an expedition to Naples with a part of the troops. He did not wish Sicily to be uncovered. Cassaro said that this message should be delivered by Belmonte, Minister for Foreign Affairs. He exclaimed angrily, "No!" Cassaro said he ought not to have so much enmity for the new Ministers. Cassaro advised him to see me. "Oh, no, no!". Cassaro said the King desired that he would not communicate his message to the Hereditary Prince before he saw me, as the Hereditary Prince *mi soffia* - blew me up as if with a bellows, that is influenced me.

The King also said, if I would make the expedition, he would consent to some novitá being introduced.

Colli, Wednesday, June 3, 1812. (1) Cassaro came to me for my answer to the King. I told him to say that I had always been and was still anxious to make an expedition to Italy, but that I had [been] prevented by their not taking those measures which I had recommended and which were necessary for the safety of the island. I could not now do it until the Parliament was called and a free Constitution established. I said there were great difficulties. Murat had a large army which was attached to him, etc.

Cassaro was against the assembly of the Parliament till after the feast of St Rosalia, as well as on account of the question of the Consuls and the Praetor. I said this latter appeared to me quite a *bagatelle*. What did it signify? I thought the King should give way. It was an insult to common sense to call people to elect and to prescribe their choice of one person alone. He said this should be remedied by the Parliament, but not by the Consuls. I combated this in vain. With respect to St Rosalia, I thought the people as likely to be unquiet one way or the other, but I would be responsible for their tranquillity. He asked if he might say so to the King. I said yes. I observed too that all his reasons were local,

whereas my business was to consider the good of Europe; that much time had been lost, the Russian war begun, and no one could say how soon the opportunity for an expedition might offer.

I asked Cassaro if I might speak of the King's message. He said I might.

I saw Prince Cattolica. He came to take orders about the King's guard. He took this opportunity of complaining of my having turned him out of Council. He said I knew his sentiments. He said all this in good humour. I answered in the same way that I had no personal ill-will to him; that I wished him well, and gave him credit for the correctness of his sentiments, as far as I knew of them. I told him the misfortune was to have come in at an improper moment, in direct opposition to my wishes, and to have attached himself to the Queen's party. He denied this latter charge. I told him a Council composed of such elements of discord could not possibly agree, and in order not to make any personal distinction, all those who had upon the occasion quoted be[en] placed in the Government were removed.

In respect to the Queen, he said he had dissuaded her from sending away the barons; that she had abused him very much for his advice, and on the 14th December, when the Queen called upon him to resist the English, he again gave her his strongest remonstrances against her conduct.

He told [me] of the Parliament. He said they probably should agree upon all the leading points of the Constitution, and upon the details only they might differ. He particularly specified the Civil List.

Belmonte came. I told him what had passed with Cassaro.

(1) Dined with Lord Montgomerie.

Colli, Tuesday, June 4, 1812. (1) I called upon Cassaro on my way to town. He said he had been with the King for three hours and a half, and afterwards with the Queen. He said he had succeeded in tranquillizing the King. He had communicated all I had said to the King, who had found reasonable the objections I had made regarding the expedition, and had consented to the assembly of the Parliament.

The King told him that he had received a whimsical and extravagant letter from the Hereditary Prince, containing [a] copy of my Note. The King had sent it to Cassaro, but it had not arrived before Cassaro left town to go to the King. Cassaro sent it back without reading it. Cassaro persuaded him to see the Hereditary Prince and to give way upon the subject, and to settle everything with [me]. Cassaro said he would go immediately to the Hereditary Prince and desire him to go to the King the next morning. The King said he would place a sentry to prevent the Queen from going to the King while the Hereditary Prince was there. Cassaro told the King that the Queen had written to me, to say she would consent to a Constitution.(2) The King lifted up his hands. The King told Cassaro that Moliterno had said if the King would ask me, I would consent to make an expedition to Italy. Cassaro said that I declared never to have said so to him. The King said he was a *birbone*.

Cassaro said the Queen had received him very ill, with her head down, with one eye looking up. Cassaro told her that he had satisfied the King as to the necessity of the early assembly of the Parliament and had tranquillized [him]. She observed that she had told the King that morning that he was not firm, and that she was sure he would yield to everything. Belmonte told me that Cassaro, after going home from me the day before, had declared that he would resign, as it was the object to carry things too far.

The Hereditary Prince in the evening appeared extremely happy. He said he was very content with the King; that the King was quite satisfied and heard reason upon points which he would not before listen to. The Queen did the same. He begged that I would be at my ease, all would go on well. Pressed me again about Moliterno. Said the Parliament would be prorogued till the 1st of July, because the procurations were not come, and also because he wanted to see the Constitution, which Belmonte would not show him. He asked me if I had not always said that this should be previously settled, before the Parliament met. I said yes. He begged I would assist him with money.

Mademoiselle d'Orléans spoke to me about the Duke of Orleans.(3) Said she was very anxious he should go upon service. His happiness depended upon it. I said I did not think the Duke had believed me when I declared that I did not know the cause of his leaving Spain, and of the prepossessions against him. She said he did not. He thought it impossible; he now did. I said I thought Lord Valentia had done him a great deal of harm.

(1) Great ball and supper, being the King's birthday. Present: Hereditary Prince and Princess, Duke and Duchess of Orleans, Mademoiselle d'Orléans, Prince Leopold.

(2) I sent Cassaro the Queen's letter to read in proof.

(3) The Duke of Orleans told me an anecdote of a Lieut.-Colonel who was ...

Palermo, Friday, June 5, 1812. Belmonte came. He said he had been two and 3/4 hours with the Hereditary Prince. The Hereditary Prince related to him his contentment with the King, and his conviction that everything would go on well. Upon not seeing Belmonte equally so, he asked him the reason. Belmonte answered that he had very little imagination, but some judgment. Of what was unknown he could only judge by analogy, and the past prevented him from having confidence in the King.

He recollected an anecdote. He was once intimate with the King, and was at the Colli when the Queen, Acton, Trabia and the English Minister were persuading the King to go to Naples. Old Trabia dissuaded the King, saying that Sicily was so attached to him that his subjects would not allow him leave to go. The King put on a smile of contempt and wisdom.

"I recollect what happened to Gustavus Vasa, who after eleven years of absence returned to Sweden, and in one week afterwards was put to death in the theatre. I never will expose myself to the same accident". In a week afterwards, however, the King went to Naples. Belmonte asked the Hereditary Prince if he could rely upon the intentions of a person which so easily changed.

The Hereditary Prince wanted Belmonte to show him the Constitution. Belmonte declared he never would, unless he gave him a written order to prepare it. "If I am ever tried, it shall be together with Your Royal Highness. I will have to show that this was done by your order". The Hereditary Prince said he would give him such an order. Belmonte said he was ready to answer any questions. The Hereditary Prince asked him about it. Belmonte gave him an outline of it. He said His Royal Highness would be pleased that he meant to do away entirely with feudality; to put at his disposition all the judicial and executive power. There would be no more *seignorial* courts because there were no more *seigneurs*, or barons. This pleased the Hereditary Prince very much. "But do not think that you are to have all this without yielding on your part. You would like to have feudality done away, and your own power remain without this restraint". (Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince objected to the confirmation of his Vicariate by Parliament). The Hereditary Prince asked him why he thought so. "*Porquoi, Monseigneur? Parce que votre père est despote*", his grand - and great-grandfather, and despotism was so *enraciné* in the family that they would never get rid of it.

Belmonte mentioned to me the conversation that Moliterno had held, in his presence at the ball, with the Hereditary Prince. He talked about his own expedition to Naples. He said that His Royal Highness wanted him to go, but it was to little purpose, unless at the same time such changes took place here as would second his efforts. There must be a Constitution. This must either precede or accompany any expedition. Moliterno said: "It is not Lord William, but Your Royal Highness that will not have the expedition, because it is you who will not call the Parliament and will not establish the Constitution which he wishes". Belmonte said he was a democrat. He did not deny; he was only obliged to relinquish his principles from having seen the impracticability of them.

The Hereditary Prince alluded, on this day, to that conversation, and said he liked such *franchise*. Belmonte said to the Hereditary Prince that although he did not hate kings as Moliterno did, perhaps he hated despots worse than Moliterno.

Belmonte brought me two proposals from the Hereditary Prince. First: that the Parliament should be prorogued to the 1st July, to which I answered that I could not agree, because there had been already so much delay, and in the present time the value of fifteen days to the cause of Europe could not be calculated. The second was to consent to Moliterno's going to Italy with Castrone's corps, Albanese, etc. I answered to the latter that I would myself speak to the Hereditary Prince upon the subject.

Di Aci was present during a great part of this conversation. He again spoke of the English Constitution and urged strongly that all the difficulties and differences of opinion as to a new constitution would be obviated by adopting at once the English Constitution. Belmonte (whose new Constitution this plan did not suit at all) very adroitly satisfied him that his ideas were the same, and appealed to me if he had not often said to me that his and Di Aci's ideas, without communication, exactly corresponded.

The Hereditary Prince, he said, had asked him if he had not seen Belmonte's plan. He said no. I feared lest Di Aci should have been jealous and displeased that Belmonte had not shown it. But the latter got off very well with the appeal in the preceding sentence.

Colli, Saturday, June 6, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. He told me that the Hereditary Prince had consented to the sitting of Parliament on the 15th. If it was then necessary to prorogue the Parliament for two, or three or five days, the Hereditary Prince hoped I would have no objection. Belmonte undertook to obtain my consent to this, if it should be necessary.

They talked of Belmonte's Constitution. Belmonte told him once for all that without a written order he would never show it him. After some conversation, Belmonte observed to him that the business would be much shortened were he to determine at once to adopt the principles of the English Constitution. The Hereditary Prince approved the idea, and said he was confident it would be agreeable both to his father and mother.

This readiness convinces me that he always thought he should have less power than the King of England. He had often remarked to me, when I had talked of the Civil List and of other parliamentary interference: "*mais le Roi d'Angleterre a ce et ce pouvoir*", not advertinq to the particular point in question, but generally as if it was intended to make a complete cipher of him.

Belmonte told him that what he had proposed was the old Sicilian Constitution, renewed, well washed and cleaned, and put into an English dress, *habillée à l'anglaise*. The Hereditary Prince said he would go that evening to the King and Queen and obtain their consent to it.

They talked of the expedition. He impressed upon him that secrecy was above all things necessary; that it was necessary that it should not be communicated to the King and the Queen; that it must be left to me to arrange it as I would. The Hereditary Prince then made the extraordinary proposition that he should accompany it. "*Mais Monseigneur*", exclaimed Belmonte, "Lord William *ne le permettra jamais*". The Hereditary Prince asked if we had talked of this. Belmonte answered: "Never. How could I foresee such an event?" and added: "If I was your subject and Commander-in-Chief, I would rather give in my dismissal", first because such expeditions were always uncertain, and might be attended with danger to his person and ruin to his reputation, [and] because jealous as I should be of my own glory, I must know that the merit of victory would be given to the Prince, while that of defeat to me. Besides, the presence of the Prince would always betray the motions of the Army; his remaining at the headquarters, its advance; his departure, its retreat. And he then added: "Speaking between ourselves, I may say to Your Royal Highness, without impertinence, that you are not a *prince belliqueux*. You are only known by your two retreats (*sorties*) through Calabria. Your family have had to boast of the greatest generals, the Prince of Condé and ... , but they gained their glory by go[ing] along the ranks in the day of the battle, and by exposing themselves like the soldiers". This was not His Royal Highness' intention or profession. He advised him to stay until I sent for him and that it was safe for him to go.

Di Aci came and Villa Hermosa. Villa Hermosa told me that the Hereditary Prince desired him to do with the Parliament whatever I pleased, and that he had therefore come to know when I would have it called. I said this was already arranged with Belmonte, who had seen the Hereditary Prince that morning. Villa Hermosa said it would be impossible to call it so

soon, the members not having arrived, the room not being ready and the Constitution not yet having been seen by the Hereditary Prince.

(1) 62nd and Grenadiers landed. 1-10th, Lieut.-Col. []; 87th, Lieut.-Col. McKenzie, and 6 Germans embarked.

Bought a mare of Lieut.-Col. Travers. 450 dollars.

Read in a French paper of Mr Perceval's assassination on the 11th May.

Palermo, Sunday, June 7, 1812. (1) The Hereditary Prince having consented not to prorogue the Parliament, I agreed to advance part of the money required of me.

Prince Belmonte came. He had seen the Hereditary Prince who gave him an account of his reception by the King and Queen. He went to the Queen first. The Hereditary Prince was quite content with his journey. Belmonte asked him how the Queen received the proposition for the English Constitution. He answered: "The Queen better than the King, but both very well". Belmonte expressing his surprise, the Hereditary Prince gave this natural reason for it: that both the King, the Queen and himself were afraid lest in the present times they might lose everything, and were therefore glad to consent to any plan fixing a line of demarcation around the authority of the King.

Belmonte proposed to him that in his speech to the Parliament he should mention his consent to the introduction of the English Constitution, to which he agreed.

Prince Di Aci came. He said he had a long conversation with the Hereditary Prince the night preceding. He gave me a paper with seven propositions that he had prevailed upon the Hereditary Prince to make to the King. The Hereditary Prince very much approved of them. Di Aci said that he had urged the Hereditary Prince to obtain the King's consent in writing. The Hereditary Prince said this would be very difficult; and would it not answer as well if he received his orders to do it? Di Aci told him no; that the King might change his opinion and that this could not be so satisfactory either to me or to the country. In case he refused, he must urge him again by a letter in the strongest manner, and Di Aci then advised that if he would not, he should abdicate, which the Hereditary Prince approved.

Di Aci also advised the Hereditary Prince to send for the Père Caccamo, and to induce him at the coming confession previous to the communion to prevail upon the King to adopt his own conditions.

With reference to the expedition, the Hereditary Prince said he would go upon it and asked if there was any frigate which could convey him. Di Aci said no: it would require 19,000 dollars to fit one up. Di Aci proposed that he should go in the same ship with me; but the Hereditary Prince asked if it would not be exposed. Di Aci said I would not expose him, and if the ship was in danger I would put him out of the way. He insisted upon Di Aci going with him, whom he called his attached friend. The Hereditary Prince said he would fight at the head of his troops, like his cousins the Archdukes of Austria.

Villa Hermosa had seen the Hereditary Prince the preceding evening, before Di Aci, and in talking of the new Constitution had said that by the Sicilian Constitution proposed to be

revived, the King could not make peace and war without the consent of Parliament. The Hereditary Prince was very much against this restriction.

Di Aci's visit followed. His proposition, therefore, of the English Constitution, which Di Aci described to the Hereditary Prince as containing much less restrictive powers on the authority of the Crown than the old Sicilian was, was cordially received by the Hereditary Prince; and the Hereditary Prince begged Di Aci to persuade Belmonte, Cassaro and Villa Hermosa to adopt the English in preference to the Sicilian. Di Aci said he had already persuaded Belmonte. On this morning the Hereditary Prince begged Belmonte to persuade Villa Hermosa. Belmonte said he would do so; there was only one point upon which he could not attempt to persuade him, and that was to be bold and courageous: for, added Belmonte, "If I have had so little success with Your Royal Highness in this regard, how can I succeed with a man of 54?". "*Vous me croyez donc [a] political poltron?*" "*Avec tout le respect possible, Monseigneur, oui*".

(1) Clifford arrived with Gen. Donkin and Major Thackeray.

Monday, June 8, 1812. I called upon the Hereditary Prince by his appointment. It was to talk to me about an expedition to Italy. I said I thought it might be made, if the Russian war went on. There were, I said, great difficulties: the strength of the Neapolitan Army and its attachment to Murat, as he always treated it well, paid it well, etc. I believed it to be 40,000 men. The Hereditary Prince doubted it.

The next difficulty was, and it must be stated frankly, the objection they had to the present dynasty. He did not believe it. He asked what my plan was. I said, to take three regiments from Malta and to add them to such of theirs as might be placed at my disposition. I had two plans with respect to their troops, either that they should place a corps at my disposal for general operations, or to prepare an expedition to Naples. He preferred the latter.

I said it was absolutely necessary to say at once to the people of Italy that we came not to impose any government upon them. He asked whether it would not be necessary to say something of the family, and from the King, in the first proclamation. I said: "Nothing". The mention of the family would create the greatest obstacle to success. If it was judged proper to say anything, it should be rather in his name than in that of the King or Queen. He was not known to them. They could have no ill-will.

But he wished to suggest whether he or one of the family should not accompany the expedition. What would the nation say if there were two young men who would not expose themselves for so great a cause? I said the idea did him honour, but it was to be considered what were the political objections, and whether it would not look as if we were going to impose this family upon them. He said if they were going to conquer, it might be objectionable. But going, as they would, upon the avowed pretext of giving a Constitution, and of offering himself only to their acceptance, it was quite otherwise. He talked also of giving an amnesty not only of persons but of property also, that is to secure to all the present possessors their landed property.

I urged against his going. He pressed me to consider his reasons, which I agreed to do. I told him that I had no object but success; that I could assure him upon my honour, as I had before told him, that I wished to place him again on the throne, but not against the will of his people. It was only by the people that Bonaparte could be conquered. He acknowledged this and said this was not a time to force the people. The best policy was to be just, conciliatory etc.

But, he added, "you must not take anyone else". I said: "I see Your Royal Highness has some suspicion: what is it?" I pressed him to say what it was. He said, the Archduke. I gave him my word of honour to the contrary, and assured him most solemnly that no pretender should be raised by me against him. I said I could only take three persons: his brother Leopold, his *beau-frère* (the Duke of Orleans), or the Archduke. I said, with respect to the Duke of Orleans, I would not take him. There were the same objections to the Duke as to himself, and there was the additional objection that he, the Hereditary Prince, might think he was going to set up for himself. To the Archduke I had already answered. I also said of the Duke of Orleans that I thought he had nothing to do with Italy. His concern was with the French, and if we ever marched north, there would be no objection to his going, to which he agreed.

He said, if there should be a deputation from Italy, then there would be no objection to his going. I said no, because that would be the pleasure of the people. He asked me to put in writing my ideas; also an assurance in writing that I would take no other prince and allow no pretender to his rights. I said I should, on my part, require as conditions to go to any part of Italy I pleased, and to manage it entirely in my own way. He said I might depend upon his secrecy, and that this should be as secret proper to be shown to no one.

He praised Di Aci very much: was of a surprising activity, he saw nothing like it. He said I had recommended him. He never thought he should have liked him so much. I asked if I might consult Fardella. He said yes, and that he was quite secret.

Belmonte came to me and told me that the Hereditary Prince had commissioned him to draw up the discourse to Parliament, and to insert in it the English Constitution. Villa Hermosa was directed to prepare it. Belmonte went to him. Villa Hermosa had already drawn it without this insertion. Belmonte said it was good, but too cold. He desired Villa Hermosa to ask the Hereditary Prince if he was to insert the English Constitution.

Di Aci came and began his account of what passed the day preceding with Cassaro. On the way to Cassaro, he was stopped by Moliterno, who told him first that he had seen the Père Caccamo, who had mentioned to him the seven propositions made by the Hereditary Prince through Di Aci's instigation.

Moliterno said that the Père had observed that too much was asked at once of the King, whose character was timid and impracticable; that the King had no objection to that of the English Constitution, but he had very serious ones to two others: one, separating Sicily from Naples; the second, requiring the absence of the Queen.

Moliterno also showed Di Aci a letter he had received from the Queen, where she complained of the proceedings of the Ministry; that they appeared to wish to collect at once *tutti [i] frutti* - all the fruits - of their operations; that their advice would be good enough, but she could not but be convinced that some poison lurked underneath.

Di Aci then went to Cassaro. He found there Fitalia and Carini. He told Cassaro he was come from the Hereditary Prince, to speak to him upon affairs of great importance, and proposed to call in the other two Councillors. Cassaro objected, saying: "Tell me first". Di Aci then proposed to him the English Constitution, at the mention of which he grew pale, but upon Di Aci continuing, putting him in mind of the French Revolution, of the disorders that followed, of the death of the King, the murder of the nobility, all arising from the fluctuation of public opinion; that the same might happen here and that he, Cassaro, would be the first to suffer; and that would it not be, in consequence, the best plan to avoid the same effects, by adopting at once a principle already settled? Cassaro consented at once; as did also, afterwards, Fitalia and Carini.

This morning Moliterno came to him and said that the King began to give way on the two other propositions. While he was there St Clair came in and spoke about the Guards. Di Aci asked if he had anything else to communicate; he said he had, about the Queen. Di Aci offered to retire with both, knowing very well that they came by concert. St Clair begged Moliterno not to go. St Clair then said that the King had great objections to the separation of Sicily from Naples. Di Aci said that even if I would allow it, the nation never would. St Clair then proposed that there should be a confederacy between the Italian Governments and Sicily, to which Di Aci said there could be no objection.

Then they talked of the article respecting the Queen. St Clair observed that it was using her harshly and cruelly, to which Di Aci replied that he was, on the contrary, consulting her best interests; that in the Parliament there would be recrimination; that the Parliament would probably make her trial, and who could foresee the consequences? But, observed St Clair, the English Minister has become more calm about the Queen's departure. "Yes", said Di Aci, "because he is a profound politician and he knows that the Parliament will, by her trial, take the odium of her departure off his hands". It was, then, his opinion that she had better go to Italy, as was proposed. St Clair also complained about her spies and friends being arrested, but Di Aci proposed that it would be good for her that they should be sent to Italy where they might best carry on the Queen's operations.

Before Di Aci came I told Belmonte that I was very sorry that they had adopted the English Constitution, which no one understood or could define; that it would cast a ridicule upon their measures; that I infinitely preferred his own plan, which was founded upon the principles of the English Constitution. He answered that having once adopted the basis, they could arrange the remainder at their leisure.

Colli, Tuesday, June 9, 1812. While we were at dinner the Père Caccamo and Prince Cassaro arrived. The Père brought me a paper of questions written in the King's handwriting, the original of which I saw. I received the copy.

To the first, I asked if the Père thought I should say so, if I really had, as was asked, exceeded my instructions. I said it was not for me to decide whether I had or not: that belonged to my superiors. I could only say that I believed myself to have executed them to the letter. With respect to the King's return, I said it rested only with His Majesty to decide; he gave to the Hereditary Prince his sovereign authority, and from him he could take it

again. To me it was immaterial. I must however observe that the Hereditary Prince had made certain engagements with me, upon the faith of which I had advanced money and given every assistance, and it was necessary these should be executed.

I never had asked the King to abdicate. It was not true that I had not desired it. I had desired it. When the Queen had asked me what the King had best do, my advice was abdication. It was true that I had never demanded [it], and until mentioned by the Queen as the King's intention, that the idea had never occurred to me.

I told the Père that I knew very well who had instigated the King, and that I had suffered very justly for my moderation. If I had sent her away, as I was entitled to do, this never would have happened. He said the Queen had not advised the King, and that the King had said he wished the Queen had been absent, as this act would be attributed to her. The Père said the King wished for, or had no objection to, the English Constitution. The King desired a written answer. I said I would take it and give an answer on the next evening.

Cassaro said that the King had been quiet when he saw him. He did not know what had excited him.

I declared the Queen should leave Sicily when the King resumed the government.

I also remarked that I could not answer for what the Hereditary Prince said to the King. I only was responsible for what I myself wrote or said. I did not know what passed between the Hereditary Prince and the King.

Palermo, Wednesday, June 10, 1812. (1) Lieut.-Col. Poli came by my invitation. I showed him the King's questions. He had heard of them from Cassaro. He said he was very sorry for them, and that the Hereditary Prince was quite in confusion. The King had not written to him. I desired him to acknowledge he was now mistaken about the Queen's not interfering and doing harm. He said that he had nothing to say. I expressed my surprise how he, who knew the Queen so well, could deceive himself about her conduct.

I told him what I proposed to say, and asked his advice. He thought the opinions I had given at the time to the Père were very proper. He said if the King appointed those in whom he had confidence, his first act would be to bring back Ascoli. Poli said that he was very odious both to Ascoli and the Queen; that Ascoli had said, when he was going away, that it was his (Poli's) intrigue to put me and the Hereditary Prince on good terms together.

I talked to Poli a great deal about Naples, and repeated to him my conversation with the Hereditary Prince, and advising the Hereditary Prince to have confidence in me. Poli said he had. I adverted to what he had done the day before, and requiring that I should assure what I had said on paper, in writing: he would [not] have done this had he reliance in me.

Di Aci came. I could only see him for a moment. He said the Hereditary Prince was in a great *smania* - inquietude.

Belmonte came. The Hereditary Prince had said nothing to him of the message from the King to me. He was evidently embarrassed and spoke to him in half sentences. Belmonte asked him what was the matter. He said "Nothing".

I asked Belmonte what he advised. He gave several opinions: either to answer nothing and say I could only receive such communications through the Minister for Foreign Affairs; or refer the King to my official Notes and the past transactions.

He hoped I would not abandon the Hereditary Prince, whom I had made Vicar-General. I said I had not made him: it was the King's act, not mine. I thought the King had been pushed too much, by Di Aci particularly.

I told him how much I had been disgusted with the Army, and my wish to get rid of it. If the expedition went on, I said, I had thoughts of saying to the Hereditary Prince that he must leave the whole to me, and that I would communicate with no one but himself. He thought I was right.

The Duke of Orleans came. He said he had been at the Bagaria with the Queen the day before. She had talked to him of an expedition to Naples, and asked if he thought we intended it. He said he did not know: some things made him think yes, others no. He did not know. The Queen said it was given out for the first time. He said he had not heard so. I showed him Di Aci's seven propositions, as made by the Hereditary Prince to the King. He said the King would object very much to the separation of Sicily from Naples, a thing desired by all Sicilians. He thought the Queen might be disposed to consent to it, as offering an establishment for Leopold. She had mentioned it to the Duchess. Her [the Duchess'] feeling was not against it. She was only averse to the one requiring the absence of her mother. Why, she said, could not they leave her poor mother alone?

I showed him the King's notes, as sent by Caccamo. He was sorry for them; he did not know of it. He said he believed the Queen relied a good deal on Sir J. Newport's speech on the Sicilian subsidy, and upon Lord Castlereagh's tame answer, as detailed in Pelletier, and also upon Sir R. Wilson's conversation, which the Duke believed had been in unison with the sentiments of the Opposition.

The Duke said the Queen had been inquisitive about Lord Melville's character, as if he might succeed to Mr Perceval.

The Duke said that the notes were a proof of the Hereditary Prince's steadiness. He said this in justice to the Hereditary Prince.

If the King returned, he said, Poli must take care of himself. He was a marked man, and the opposition of the Hereditary Prince they attributed to him.

The Admiral told me, in reference to the King's notes and the Queen, that he would leave with me his opinion in writing of the necessity of the Queen's absence.

Prince Cassaro and the Père Caccamo came in the afternoon to receive my answer to the King's questions, which I read to them. I asked after our friend, the Père Galato, whom Caccamo said had been very properly treated. They made no remarks upon my answer, but said he and Cassaro were to go the next day to the King at Solanto.

(1) Crocus, small brig, Capt. Adderley, with Lord F. Bentinck, Gen. Donkin, Major Thackeray and Capt. Jones, with dispatches for Lord Liverpool, Lord Wellington, Mr H. Wellesley, Sir E. Pellew and Gen. Clinton, sailed for the Fleet.
Cephalus sailed off Naples.

Kite, Capt. Crispin, with Major A'Court, went to Malta with freight 85,000 for Tunis and Tripoli.

Thursday, June 11, 1812. Belmonte came. He had just come from the Prince. He had observed to the Hereditary Prince that his countenance appeared dejected. He expressed his fear that he had heard some unpleasant news. The Hereditary Prince knew very well that Belmonte alluded to the King's communication to me. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince now saw how far the King had kept his promise with him. The Hereditary Prince said he was not *inquiet*, but that he was *peiné* with what had happened. Belmonte said, *en plaisantant*, that he should go to the Rossella, and the next day to Malta from whence he should venture first to trouble His Royal Highness with his news. The Hereditary Prince said he should retire to Sagana with Poli. "Will *Monseigneur* permit me, in the disguise of a *campiere*, to come and talk over past times, *ou venez-vous en >avec nous<?*"

The Hereditary Prince desired Belmonte to come and let me know that he could not hold the Parliament if the King's answer was unfavourable. If he went to preside at a Parliament which the King declared he had no right to assemble, he should appear as an usurper, and that he never would do. They, the Peers, might go there if they pleased, but he would not. He desired Belmonte to say so to me.

The Hereditary Prince told Belmonte he had followed his advice, and had desired to resign to the King, unless he gave him the full powers which were necessary. The King required that he should be entirely submissive to him, which he could not be. He had lamented for nineteen years the progress of affairs. The King and Queen had put him in Council. He had to manage between them when they quarrelled, and was forced to do many things which he disapproved. But the Hereditary Prince said that the King, notwithstanding his latter paper, would not resume. It blew hot and cold with the King. "You allow that at last", said Belmonte; "the word of the King is no longer unalterable, as you once said. No", said Belmonte, "I repeat, I never believe the word of a prince whose ears I can't cut off if he deceives me".

Belmonte told him that in his opinion the King would not resume. The King once quarrelled with Acton and the Queen, and they absented themselves. All the Ministers came direct to him, and he was so bored with the business that he immediately wrote for one of them to carry on affairs, as they had before done.

Belmonte, in again speaking of Moliterno's conversation to the Hereditary Prince at the ball, said that Moliterno said to the Hereditary Prince: "You know I have always said that I detested kings; that I like a republic, but there was no chief to be found to put at the head of it". If the Hereditary Prince desired to be put at the head of any of the Italian Republics, he must give a constitution to Sicily. The Hereditary Prince said: "*Très bien, Monsieur le Citoyen: Citoyen Prince*".

Belmonte perceived that the Hereditary Prince had an opinion as to the person who had advised the King to do what he had done. Belmonte asked if it was Circello? "No". Or Moliterno? "No". The Hereditary Prince would not say who he believed it to be.

The Hereditary Prince said: "You are surprised that *mon père, ma mère et moi* are so fond of Moliterno".

Belmonte said he could explain to His Royal Highness why. He expected, through Moliterno, to place himself at the head of some Italian Republic, and being there, to throw off the mask, and become a despot as before. "I read that in your heart. But this must be not done here by Your Royal Highness. Here we want a king, but a constitutional king, not a republican or a despot". The Hereditary Prince said he was unjust in having this opinion of him.

Friday, June 12, 1812. (1) Belmonte came and said he had asked the Hereditary Prince whether he was going to the Sagana. He said: "No, nor you to the Rossella". Cassaro had been with the Hereditary Prince after his return from Solanto, and told him that the King had not, in his presence, read the paper, but had merely said that he had done his duty and was quiet.

Belmonte said the Hereditary Prince was very much pleased and was satisfied there would be no change. Belmonte said to the Hereditary Prince: "But that is not enough: *il faut battre le fer pendant qu'il est rouge*. Write to the King and ask for his consent and sanction to what you have done". The Hereditary Prince said he had done so, or would do so. And he desired Belmonte to come to me and tell me that, waiting for the King's answer, it might be necessary to prorogue the Parliament for two or three days.

Lt-Col. Poli came. I showed him the King's questions to me and my answer. I gave them to him to be shown to the Hereditary Prince. He said that the Père Caccamo had desired him to say to me that he was to have an interview with the King in a day or two and would then call upon me.

Di Aci, Belmonte, MacFarlane and Sir J. Dalrymple united to explain and consider a proposition for placing 5,000 men at our disposition, we paying them certain increase of pay with a gratification upon their first enrolment. This was agreed to and approved by Di Aci. He then proposed that I should have this corps as I pleased, but he begged to have the arrangement of the rest of the Army. I would not see the Army *bouleversée*, as he proposed, without any reason or object. He was very angry. We parted.

(1) Princess Villafranca came to complain about her husband being made a Senator, which was filled by *cadets de famille*, and which excluded him, having thirteen votes, from Parliament.

Saturday, June 13, 1812. (1) Belmonte came in the evening. He said the Hereditary Prince had asked his opinion of the Archbishop of Palermo (a Neapolitan). Belmonte said that if His Royal Highness wished to establish the Mussulman religion instead of the Christian, the Archbishop would be the first to give his consent. "Why?" said the Hereditary Prince. "Because he knows no God but his interest, and a thousand ounces more or less would always guide his opinion and conduct".

I told him of the Hereditary Prince's conversation with me about Italy. Belmonte said that he was sure he had objected to the Duke of Orleans' going. I told him then what he had said about not taking any prince with me.

He told me of the good advice he had given to the Hereditary Prince, who wanted to force Villafranca to be a Senator, contrary to his will. Belmonte said: "You are taking your leave of despotism, and yet you wish to force this man to be a Senator. Why not, rather, say to him: 'I thought to do you a pleasure, but if you do not wish I do not insist upon it'?"

The Hereditary Prince desired Belmonte to unite with Villa Hermosa and Cassaro to settle the Constitution. Belmonte begged the Hereditary Prince to give him an order to that effect. Belmonte said to the Hereditary Prince, of Butera, that he would always be with the strongest.

(1) Admiral Fremantle sailed for the Adriatic in Milford. Maitland unwell.

Sunday, June 14, 1812. We went in the evening to see Belmonte's brother, as the representative of Catania, received in state, and as is the custom by the Senate of Palermo. Mr Concannon told me that Bonaparte's first wife, Josephine, was returned to Paris; that Bonaparte had fitted up for her a most elegant house; passed the greater part of his evenings with her, and that she was the only person he consulted. He was a predestinarian and was afraid of a prophecy that from the moment he separated from her, his fortune would desert him.

Monday, June 15, 1812. (1) I saw Belmonte in the evening. He told me that the Hereditary Prince had said, with reference to the Speech from the Throne which Belmonte had shown him, that he generally approved of it, but that he wished that part respecting the English Constitution to be differently expressed. He did not then say how.

The Hereditary Prince also said that he had sent for the Archbishop, who answers the Speech from the Throne, that he told him the guise in which he wished it written, and that the Archbishop had said that he would do it in whatever manner the Hereditary Prince pleased. Belmonte and the Hereditary Prince laughed and the former asked if the opinion expressed the other day about [him] was not correct.

Fagan called. He had seen the Queen on the 12th and brought me her conversation with him. He said she called me a *bestia feroce*. _She hated me, but the barons still more. She was very much displeased with the Hereditary Prince for having said that he should go to Naples, leaving Leopold here, and thus setting aside the King and Queen.

Fagan said she professed not to care about Sicily, but she still hoped to reign in Naples. She said that the Hereditary Prince had said to her that I had declared to him that she was incapable of governing both in Sicily and Naples; that she was detested in both places. She ascribed his conduct to ambition and to weakness. She gave Fagan a copy of her remarks upon the King's questions sent to Caccamo, but which he did not receive in time (he sent me a copy). She observed upon my only having put my initials to my answers to the

questions, a mark of disrespect. She was much displeased with the last paragraph of my answer. She declared she would not leave Sicily. She desired him to obtain my interference, as I had deprived her of all power and of everything, for the payment of her debts and for the settlement of a suitable provision for her (and [to] prevent recrimination).

My answer was that it was not my business. She had done nothing that I had desired. If she had followed ...

(1) Dined with Gen. MacFarlane. Some trifling disturbance in the town about bread.

Tuesday, June 16, 1812. Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince that morning had united his four Ministers in Council; by his (Belmonte's) persuasion, he had called in Di Aci, the fourth. The Hereditary Prince then proposed that the speeches proposed by Belmonte and Villa Hermosa should be read, as well as a third, which had been proposed by a person in his confidence, to whom he had given both. The Hereditary Prince then asked which should be read first. Belmonte said: "the Hereditary Prince's, *pour toute raison. C'était tout juste qu'il marchât le premier.*" It was read, and when finished Belmonte begged His Royal Highness to put the other two in the fire, for there was no necessity to see them: the Hereditary Prince's was so much the best. Belmonte then talked of his own justice, and said he was known for it, because it had always been his practice at once to acknowledge his error when he discovered it. This speech was immediately sent to the Archbishop.

Belmonte said that Cassaro had made a very sensible proposal, that at the time the speech was communicated to the Presidents of the different Bracci, it would be necessary at the same time to give them the basis upon which their discussion was to be founded. He said that the Presidents of the Houses were persons in whom little confidence Butera was quite *nul*. The Archbishop, everybody knew. The Hereditary Prince turned to Belmonte and said: "I believe it is not necessary to ask your opinion about the latter". Belmonte answered: "*Je ne dis pas le mot. Votre Altesse sait que je n'aime pas la mèsdisance*".

Cassaro then said that his son had lately translated the English Constitution into Italian, and that he had read it with great pleasure. (I said how lucky it was that Cassaro's son had translated this work and had thus obtained his father's predilection for this work. Belmonte said: "*C'est moi qui ai fait tout.* I told the Princess, *qui est plaine d'esprit*, to insinuate to her husband the English Constitution"). He would propose that the leading principles of the English Constitution should be extracted and sent to the Houses. This was entirely approved and upon its being asked who should propose this, Belmonte proposed Di Aci, who was active and liked work. The Hereditary Prince consented.

Belmonte said that he took this opportunity of speaking to the Hereditary Prince about the finances. He wished to say what Villa Hermosa had already said to him about the deficiency, that it amounted to between 4 and 500,000 ounces, that the utmost amount of what they could raise in addition to the present taxes, even in the enthusiasm of the moment, would be 100,000 oz. Cassaro interrupted him now and frequently in the conversation, always approving very much what he said. Cassaro observed that not even

the sum proposed could be paid. Belmonte observed that it would be necessary to make very great reforms, and particularly in the Army. He remarked upon Di Aci not yet having given in his plan. Belmonte said that it would be impolitic in the greatest degree to attempt to raise any large sum of money. First, the country was poor in the extreme; and secondly, the attempt would make the Hereditary Prince and the new order of things unpopular, and would make them like their chains and their former system. Cassaro entirely coincided in this.

I asked Belmonte how he proposed to introduce the details of the Constitution which he had prepared. He said that when the House had met it would be proposed that three members from each should form a Committee of Legislation whose work should be afterwards presented to the House for its adoption. This would give the new Constitution a degree of character and respect that would probably prevent the great difference of opinion that was to be apprehended.

Belmonte told me that in coming out of the palace he had met Butera, who had boasted of his exertions in the tumult, of his having seen the Consuls, etc. Belmonte's servant, who overheard this, said this was comical enough, and his own coachman had just told him that his master concealed himself during the whole time in his cellar.

Wednesday, June 17, 1812. (1) Butera came early. He was not pleased, evidently, with the course of affairs. He was frightened and displeased with the sort of neglect with which he had been treated. He talked of the egoism of all those in power and of profit and place being their sole objects. He said he was a warm advocate for the English Constitution. Anything was better than the speculations of these wild politicians. Although he should lose his first place in the Parliament and much consequence, he desired nothing but the public good. He hoped I would prevent disorder and tumults, and guide their operations.

I said I would do what I could, but that I could not interfere with the Parliament. I said what surprised me most was the Queen's consenting to the English Constitution. He said he had convinced her (!) by stating that England was powerful and had thrived under it.

He said: "You know how I have always thought that I have given the best advice and have done what I could in favour of the British alliance and of harmony between the two Governments". I said I had done justice to his sentiments, and in fact this part of his conversation was true. But I was most amused when, in reference to the tumults, he said, with a laugh of great contempt: "There were not a few, I believe, who shut themselves up in their houses" (he alluded to a report). "I could not avoid running downstairs without my hat, and exert[ing] myself for the maintenance of order. *Mais c'est mon caractère*".

Belmonte and Di Aci came. They came to represent that it was impossible to pay the Army, and that the force which I proposed to have placed at my disposition with an increase of pay to be given by the British Government, should be wholly paid by me. There was a great deal of general conversation. Di Aci said he came from the Hereditary Prince to ask whether I would take him upon the expedition, if I undertook it. I said decidedly not. But I begged him not to give any answer, as I was to see Poli in consequence of the Hereditary

Prince having sent for me, and having been unable from lameness to go, and of my having begged him to send Poli. To him I would, therefore, give the commission.

We talked about the Flotilla, and after much difficulty and objections it was settled according to the plan agreed with Hall. (Yesterday upon Hall's objecting to obeying any officer but myself, I told him why I could not consent to it, but that I would refer the question to the decision of Sir E. Pellew).

Poli came and brought me a long letter from the Hereditary Prince, containing an anonymous paper, said to be in general circulation (of which three copies, Poli said, had been sent to the Hereditary Prince). The letter expressed that he would not open the Parliament unless he received my assurance on certain points. He was very much frightened, and fancied that many of the articles were to be inserted in the paper, which would affect the rights of the Crown. I talked with Poli about the impossibility of my controlling the freedom of debate in the Parliament. I told him I thought the Parliament would do well to confirm his appointment to the Vicariate, but that I should think he would do well also to refuse his sanction to such an act. I said it would be necessary to consider of the answer, but I would send it that night.

Poli then read me a most sensible letter of the Queen to the Hereditary Prince. The substance of it regarded two points, the Constitution and her reception of the present Ministers. The Queen stated that she certainly would have preferred that there had been no change of the Sicilian Constitution, which the King had sworn to maintain, but that there had been only introduced into it such improvements as the lapse of time had rendered necessary. But as circumstances made it necessary to adopt a new constitution, she was decidedly in favour of that of England in its integrity, with the exception of the article of religion. The choice of this would prevent the introduction of wild theories, would establish known and ascertained boundaries between the Crown and the people. It would be agreeable to the Italians, nor could the English object to a constitution which was their own. In short, she expressed her perfect satisfaction with it. She also said that in 1802 and 1803 she had recommended the establishment of a free constitution in Naples; that her opinion had been overruled, but that time had proved her to be in the right. She desired nothing but the good of her subjects.

As to the Ministers, she said that she had no hatred to them; provided they did their duty, they should receive both her gratitude and affection. She had no objection to see them, but not before they had been presented to the King. If she saw them before, it would be immediately attributed to her a desire to intrigue.

It was a very moderate, sensible, well written letter; and so I told Poli. It was much to be regretted that she could talk and write so well, and acted always so ill. Her misfortune is to have all sense but common sense.

I spoke also to Poli about the expedition to Italy. I said I should be glad the Hereditary Prince employed him to treat with me about it. I said that Di Aci did not please me. He had a head which was so confused, and so full of projects, that I could not understand him.

Villa Hermosa came and brought me the proposed speech of the Hereditary Prince. He did not know who wrote it.

Belmonte came in the evening. He had been very unwell from a great loss of blood from the haemorrhoids. I sent for him to show him the Hereditary Prince's letter of the morning. He had said nothing of it to him in the morning.

(1) Capt. St Laurent sailed with dispatches for Count Revel in Carlotta brig, Lieut. Fleming. Wrote to Lieut. Fleming in the morning to beg he would come to me as soon as convenient. He wrote to me word that he would come, "in an hour, aye, Mylord, in half an hour if possible". He said his brig sailed at first like a *haystack*. He said it made his "face ache" to see something or other. He seems an original, had been first in the Company's service; made two voyages to India and China. Was with Sir E. Pellew for three and a half years in India.

Packet arrived from England, latest paper was the 12th, with an account of Mr Perceval's death.

Thursday, June 18, 1812. Parliament opened. Not able to attend, my foot being still bad. Poli came in the morning. I showed him the letter to the Hereditary Prince, which I had written but had not sent. He told me it would not satisfy His Royal Highness's apprehensions, and unless I did so, he was determined not to open the Parliament. He had brought with him the substance of that which the Hereditary Prince wished me to write (see paper). I told him it was impossible for me to give him such assurances. I could not say to the Parliament, where there was to be freedom of speech, "You shall not say so, or make such and such proposition". How could I confine the Parliament to the English Constitution, with the adoption of which I had had nothing to do? He said the Hereditary Prince did not expect that, he knew there must be liberty of speech. What then did he want? I asked. Poli answered that, if the Hereditary Prince did not give his sanction, that I would support him in it. Or rather, this was asked by a question from me. I then begged Poli to write after this idea, which he did; but this bending me too far, I wrote before him an assurance myself, which Poli having read, said would be satisfactory, and as I heard nothing more in the evening, and the Parliament was opened, I concluded that it was satisfactory.

I asked Poli what the Hereditary Prince had said to my proposal of the day before. He said the matter must be treated through the Minister of War; but, he added, I might also speak to Fardella.

Poli said that Villa Hermosa had proposed that there should be a congress of the Prince and his Ministers, at which I should attend to fix the British Constitution. He said that it would impose upon those who might wish for some other order of things. I said that, as for myself, I had rather have nothing to do with it; that I had avoided all interference and had not been near the Hereditary Prince in order that the public might not give to me the credit belonging to the Hereditary Prince. I said, in proportion as the State was weak, this delicacy was the more requisite. If, however, it was the Hereditary Prince's wish, and that it could be shown me that such step was necessary, I would not refuse myself to it. I told him that my opinion was that it would be better to appoint from all the Houses a Committee of

Legislation whose report would obtain respect. This would obviate the objection that there would be in the Parliament discussing and perhaps rejecting the Hereditary Prince's Constitution.

Poli told me that he had seen the Queen the day before, and had asked her why the constitution she had proposed for Naples was not established. She said that the French Revolution had then taken place. The public mind was in a degree of ferment and Gen. Acton opposed it.

I asked Poli what were the characters of Gallo and Campochiaro. He said Gallo was not worth much; Campochiaro was a well informed, clever man. I asked if the King had persons in Naples attached to him. He said yes. He did not name them. I asked among the Neapolitans here who were able men. He said Troisi, San Giorgio and Migliaretti, who was dead. I asked about Medici. I said that he appeared to me the most clever man here. He said he was, and he told me that one of the last things he had said to him was that if an English Constitution was established here, it should also be at Naples.

Belmonte came. He had just seen the Hereditary Prince, and upon his mentioning to him, with alarm and large staring eyes, the anonymous paper of the day before, Belmonte burst out laughing "*Comment? Vous riez de cela?*". Belmonte says he satisfied him that there was nothing whatever to fear from it.

Villa Hermosa came in and we talked of my answer to Poli about the congress. Belmonte objected to it, and said it would have an appearance of forcing the Constitution upon the people (this was probably not his real reason). Villa Hermosa thought otherwise, but at any rate it was impossible for me to attend such a congress from my lameness. But I asked what was to be done there. Belmonte said merely to fix upon the leading points of the British Constitution, by way of basis upon which the Parliament was to prepare the details of the new Constitution.

I observed upon the danger of this, that, as nobody knew exactly the English Constitution, some leading principles might be omitted by mistake, an omission which might be fatal to their liberties, by being construed into an intention on the part of those who framed the Constitution. I thought it better to say nothing. It was enough that the Hereditary Prince had pointed out the English Constitution as the model. The united Committee of Legislation could best settle the details. It was only necessary to take care, as would be easy with the majority they had in each House, that members having the same way of thinking should be placed upon the Committee. I also recommended them to adopt that part of the British Constitution which restricted the Ecclesiastical Branch to the bishops alone. The clergy were more to be influenced by the Crown than any others, and the influence of the Pope was an additional objection. They agreed in this, and by way of a conciliatory arrangement Belmonte proposed that all the present possessors should remain, but their seats die with them.

Villa Hermosa told me that the Hereditary Prince had said that he had opposed the introduction of a constitution at Naples (quaere English). He now saw his error, and wished to atone for it.

Di Aci came. He brought me all the papers relating to the arrangement of the Flotilla, as previously agreed between Hall and me (7,000 oz. per month to be deducted). He said the

Hereditary Prince had now resolved not to go with the expedition, and that he was disposed to do whatever I wanted.

Friday, June 19, 1812 (1) Capt. Owen told me that Cerigo was a very unprofitable island. It was taken possession of at Lord Collingwood's suggestion. There are many pirates upon the opposite coasts and the islands.

(1)Belmonte unwell: fainted away in the morning.
Lady William: toothache.

Saturday, June 20, 1812. The Duke of Orleans came. I told him the conversation I had had with the Hereditary Prince, wherein he desired me not to take to Italy any prince. I told him I imagined he meant him (the Duke). The Duke said no; he rather imagined it must have been the Archduke. He said he thought that difficulty might be got over on the part of the Hereditary Prince. He asked me, if it could, would I take him? I said I was not prepared to answer that question. I told him the objections: no consent from my own Government, and the fear lest the Neapolitans should conceive him an agent of his family.

He said these were reasonable objections; and he should be satisfied with them. But he thought his principles were so well known that he never would be considered in the character which I feared. He said that the Queen had always wanted to make him a *contrepoids*, but that he never would lend himself to it. It was known that he was English, and he declared that he was so. They wished him to be what Moliterno had always been. He said the Hereditary Prince had asked him if he had seen the *citoyen* under the throne, at the meeting of Parliament. The Duke did not know who he meant. Thought he alluded to Lord Montgomerie. The Hereditary Prince said: "Oh no, Moliterno", and praised him very much. He said Moliterno always called him *Citoyen Prince*, and he Moliterno, *citoyen*. The Duke said this was all the Queen's influence.

The Duke talked of his being employed, and said there were only two ways in which he could go, either in the command of Sicilian troops, or as a volunteer. He said the French never would join us until they had been once well beat, and then they would, and his name might be useful.

Major A'Court returned. Gen. Oakes would only give four companies of the 44th and the German Battalion. He only gave the former because A'Court observed that the Sicilian regiment to which I had a right would give me 400 men more. It seems that Gen. Oakes was sore at my not having approved his pecuniary arrangements for us. He refused, on this account, to hire the transports for us which we wanted. He did not like the precedent established of applying to him on all occasions. Gen. Oakes is an excellent man, but timid and fearful of responsibility. Major A'Court said the application quite distressed him.

Mr Adamich called. Had come from England in Serapis. (Asked him to get me six maps and a pipe of old Hungarian wine). Mr Adamich saw the Queen. She said she was very much in want of money, and asked him to convey a letter to the Emperor for whose

assistance she should apply. She said she did not know what to do with Leopold. Mr Adamich advised her to send him as a Minister to England. Mr Adamich said she did not seem displeased with the idea.

Belmonte came, looking very ill (Belmonte had taken a water, the composition of which is a secret, that stopped a great effusion of blood from his haemorrhoids). He talked of Villa Hermosa, of his obstinacy. He mentioned two instances. While at Favignana, Villa Hermosa was very anxious that they should be tried. Belmonte begged him to make no such application, as it would give an opening to the Court to win them by false papers, corrupt judges etc. He could not divert him from his purpose, and his only resource left him was to write to his sister to implore the Princess Villa Hermosa and all his friends not to forward to the Court the request, if received from Villa Hermosa.

Upon this occasion he wants to appoint as Gran Camerieri Marquis Ferreri and Campani, two persons of whom the public have the worst opinion. Villa Hermosa says they are able men, and will be useful to him. (Note: this was explained away in a subsequent conversation before me by Villa Hermosa, he saying that he wanted lawyers in the Finance). Belmonte had done all in his power to prevent him, but in vain. He observed that he would be attacked in Parliament: in that case he said he should resign.

Belmonte repeated his assertion made to Villa Hermosa and Balsamo when beat in the second Parliament of 1811: "*Des ruines de ma patrie je bâtirai l'édifice de la liberté*". He expressed himself very proud of this declaration, which had been verified. They both *pâlirent*, he said.

I told him of Butera having declared in a shop (Mr Barclay's) that he did not care about the Constitution, he only wished for the good of the people; that the Consuls should have their ancient powers, and that the liberty of selling bread at any price should be restricted. His aim was popularity. I thought the Hereditary Prince should speak to him. He wished me to do so through Poli.

Lieut.-Col. Poli had been with me in the morning. I sent for him to receive my secret paper of conditions upon which I would undertake the expedition. He made no remark. I asked him if the Hereditary Prince had been satisfied. He said he had not asked him. For the Queen's letter, of which I asked a copy, he said he had no opportunity of speaking to the Prince about it. He termed the expression in my letter of a desire to do her justice, "true generosity". I said I had said a great deal of harm of her; I should be glad to say some good of her in return.

Sunday, June 21, 1812. Fagan came. He had seen the Queen twice, and read me the substance of her two conversations. He told me that the sixteen articles in the anonymous paper had afflicted her excessively. She ascribed that paper to me and Belmonte and the others. She said it was evidently intended not to let her and the King return to Naples. She wept bitterly. She showed him a copy of the Prince's letter to me about that paper, my answer and my letter to Poli asking for a copy of the Queen's letter, which Fagan understood to have been addressed to the Hereditary Prince. The Queen observed upon its indelicacy: *di mandare via la Regina*, as if she was a common prostitute. Fagan said she

had no money and wanted me, as a measure of policy, to pay her debts (Fagan brought a letter he had received from and written to her upon this subject). I told him there was no ground for so doing. She had done nothing that I had asked. Fear had made her to do all that she had done. Fear would keep her away. She had no merit, and throughout had done all harm in her power to thwart the measures of Government.

Fagan said that Moliterno was constantly there. Pagan, like Butera, took great merit to himself for having persuaded her to consent to the English Consitution! "I believe", he said, "I have been of some service there". He said he was somewhat vain of the part he had acted!!! The Queen showed Fagan the Emperor's letter dated 15th April (see conversation).

Villa Hermosa and Belmonte came. Belmonte said he had told the Hereditary Prince of the part Butera was playing with the Consuls. The Hereditary Prince took a note of it. Belmonte said that I thought this of consequence, observing that I was not apt to take alarm.

Monday, June 22, 1812. The brothers Maddalena came. One brought me a petition about himself; the other a letter from Mr Adamich in favour of the Queen. Said she was a *buonissima padrona*. Asked for my kindness to her: she was in great distress. He said he had always advised her to speak directly with me, and not to believe what either the Hereditary Prince or Caccamo told her of my saying or doing, unless she herself heard it from my own lips, or saw it in my own handwriting; that Caccamo was a *falsissimo* mediator, intriguing with the Prince, the Queen and all others. They mentioned the Queen's complaining that she was dethroned by allies to whom she had sacrificed so much.

Di Aci and Belmonte came. They said that it had been decided in Council that morning upon an application of the Senate, respecting the price of bread, to leave it to the Senate (with a committee of the Consuls) to fix the price of bread as in London, but leaving full liberty of selling.

Di Aci said his business was to read to me the leading principles of the British Constitution as compiled from De Lolme, Pinkerton (?), Blackstone, in the course of *two days*. He told the Hereditary Prince that he had done it, but that he wished to show it me, to know that he was correct. I told him I could not give him this information, for I was no *légiste*. It was suggested that instead of sending this long work to the Parliament, there should only be sent a reference to the chapters in the different works.

Di Aci said he was waiting for my signature to the paper agreed upon between us and Hall respecting the Flotilla. I said I had sent it to Belmonte in order that I might have the Hereditary Prince's official assent to it. Belmonte said he had shown my Note to the Hereditary Prince, who had made some difficulties and said he should speak to Di Aci about it. Di Aci regretted that he had shown it to the Prince as it seemed that Di Aci had, as far as I could understand his quick Italian, not represented the transaction as it passed, but as an arrangement of which I had no knowledge. Di Aci then told us that the King had been shown the plan, and had asked four questions about it. First: why use the British instead of Sicilian boats? Answer from Di Aci, written immediately on the same paper: "Because the

British are lighter". Second: What flag were they to hoist? Answer: "Sicilian". Di Aci did not mention the others. Dinner being announced, here ended the conversation.

Tuesday, June 23, 1812. (1) Marquis D'Aguilar, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, came. He came to present to me the thanks of the Spanish Government for some interference about a Sicilian vessel which had actually committed an act which had offended the Dey, and about which I had interested myself with the Sicilian Government.

We talked of the views of this royal family upon the Regency of Spain. I asked him about the letter written by Saavedra to Lord Collingwood, inviting Leopold to come to Spain. He told me that Saavedra had written to Lord Collingwood to beg he would go with his fleet to Sicily and to bring the Hereditary Prince to Spain, if he thought the British Government would approve such a step. Lord Collingwood answered that he could not go away with his fleet, and advised at any rate a previous communication with the British Government. The Queen heard of this and upon the strength of it sent Leopold to Spain.

I asked him of the transaction concerning the Duke of Orleans going to Spain. He said he was secretary, or in the office of Saavedra; that in consequence of its being reported that if a member of the House of Bourbon showed himself in the north of Spain, the French armies and the south of France would join him, Saavedra had offered to the Duke of Orleans the command in Catalonia. He stated this to have been done at the instigation of Proval.

Bardaji was made Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Aguilar asked him if he knew of it. He said he had not known it. It appears that Bardaji was much averse to the appointment, as was also Mr Frere, and it was resolved in the Regency that the Duke should not have it. The Duke, finding the command filled in Catalonia, came to Cadiz. They gave him the command of Galicia; but it appearing both to Mr Wellesley and Bardaji that it was not desirable to have in Spain any of the family of Bourbon, Mr Wellesley presented a Note to the Regency objecting to it. The Duke then determined to address himself to the nation in Cortes. But it being stated that the Duke wanted the Regency, and through Proval had endeavoured to intrigue with some of the members to obtain their votes, there was much displeasure, and they either wanted or actually voted that the Duke of Orleans should be sent to the castle. When he presented himself at the door of the Cortes they would not receive him, and it was arranged by the Regency that he should leave Cadiz immediately; which he did accordingly.

Marsella, the Commissary-General, came and stated the impossibility of his continuing to supply the Army, and begged I would relieve him from his charge.

Belmonte came. I showed him a letter I had written to the Hereditary Prince about the Army. I had not sent it. He said he wished not to be supposed to have seen it, or Di Aci might be displeased that he had not dissuaded me from writing it. I related to him the complaint of the Commissary-General, that Di Aci interfered in all his details, and that the greatest confusion was the consequence. It was mentioned, by way of saving, that the bread was mixed with Indian corn and wheat, and was very bad. He begged to be released from his employment and said, although he had nothing, he would rather die than keep it.

I asked Belmonte if the Hereditary Prince had yet spoken to Butera about his conduct in the town. He said he had not, and that he was afraid to do it.

Belmonte and Di Aci came again in the evening. Belmonte came first, and said that Di Aci and Villa Hermosa had dined with him; that they had talked over Butera's conduct in the town; that he was going about with money, endeavouring to inflame the people and abusing the Ministers; that if this was not put an end to, Di Aci and Villa Hermosa both declared that they would leave office. I said this was a business in which the Hereditary Prince ought to interfere, but if he did not, I would. Belmonte said that Di Aci wanted to go and take him by the collar, but that was not right. It was no use to challenge him, as he would not fight, and a *paire de soufflets* would be the only result.

Di Aci came and said that the Hereditary Prince had sent Cassaro to the King, to inform him of Butera's conduct and language. The King said he was a *pazzo* and *sciocco*, to whom he would never listen. Cassaro was also bound to ask him if the message Torremuzza stated himself to be the bearer of, from the King to the Consuls, was true. Torremuzza said that the King desired him to tell the Consuls that if the Hereditary Prince did not do them justice, to let him know, and that he would. The King said it was a lie; that he never had said so; that Torremuzza was a rogue and desired he might be sent to the castle.

I observed that Cassaro was at the head of the police, and should prevent [Butera] from acting as he did. They said that Cassaro, with such agents as he had, Caltanissetta and Pasqualino, it was impossible for him to do anything. He had said this in Council to the Hereditary Prince, who said they should be changed. Belmonte had said in Council, two months ago, before the Hereditary Prince, that Cassaro was very kind to His Royal Highness' wishes in taking the charge with such agents. At [the] last Council he reminded Cassaro of his having said so.

(1) O'Farris told Gen. MacFarlane and me that as a measure of economy Prince Trabia had *paper* boots made for the cavalry, and in the month of *August* had the horses put out to grass on Mount Pellegrino.

Wrote to the Hereditary Prince about the Army.

Wednesday, June 24, 1812. (1) Sent early in the morning a copy of my letter to the Hereditary Prince to Prince Di Aci. Prince Di Aci came. He had just received my letter. He said he was ready to do whatever I pleased. He was not angry, but submissive (this is one of the many instances that have convinced [me] that the Sicilians in general are bullies and only to be managed by fear. They take advantage of the least concession and always construe conciliation into weakness. From having uniformly endeavoured to get everything into his own hands, to set my authority aside, he now, seeing me determined, is as yielding).

He said he should have been glad that I had shown him the letter before I sent it. It might have been otherwise expressed so as not to impute blame to him and at the same time to be better calculated to succeed with the Prince, who would oppose my propositions with all his might. He said what I wanted was very right and for the good of his country, and he hoped I

might succeed. He begged I would allow him to go immediately to the Hereditary Prince and say that he could not put his foot again into the palace.

He wished this in order that I might not imagine, if the Hereditary Prince would not consent, that it was in consequence of his instigation. He asked me what I wished him to do. I said I did not wish him to resign. All I wanted was more authority for myself.

He said it would have been better if in the beginning I had exactly drawn the line, and had assigned such portion of the duty and authority to [him], such to myself. It would have been better if he had been Minister of War under me than under the Hereditary Prince, but he had been obliged to do his duty. The Hereditary Prince had said to him: "You are my Minister, not that of Lord Bentinck". He complained that I had no confidence in him, and would never say exactly what I wished him to do. He said there were only three men fit to be Ministers of war: Fardella, the Duke of Floresta and himself. He said in the beginning that he was glad to leave his employ and to retire to his cabin. Speaking of what he had done to promote the cause, he said it was quite *incredibile*.

I said I did not wish him to resign. With the finance and *haute politique* I did not wish to have to do with it. It seemed to me as if he would be very glad to keep his situation on any terms.

Poli came. I talked to him of Butera's conduct. I said it was all the consequence of a weak government, which would have been still worse had I allowed it to be more mixed than it was. The Hereditary Prince should, from the beginning, have filled all the offices with friends and not have retained enemies. He had wished to please all and had pleased nobody. He had wanted to keep well with the Queen, with both sides etc., and thus there was no strength in his government.

Poli told me the Hereditary Prince meant to speak very decidedly to Butera.

I asked Poli if any Minister had ever had a decided influence over the Queen. He said, Acton alone. He said he had been Acton's intimate friend, and that he was a very great man. Belmonte came. He said he had spoken again to the Hereditary Prince about Butera. The Hereditary Prince said he had sent for him and meant to speak to him *aigre-doux*. He repeated his conversation, which had been very decided and very good.

(1) Gen. Maitland arrived in Zantiote.

Colli, Thursday, June 25, 1812. Butera came out to the Colli, but not finding me there he called upon me in town. He came in consequence of my letter. He denied all the things laid to his charge. He said that his great object had been to prevent revolution, and he had succeeded. This was the third time in his life he had done so.

In reference to a former occasion, he said he alone had stopped it. I might imagine he was surrounded by others. Not a man. He alone opposed his breast to a shower of balls. He was unarmed. He would not allow a shot to be fired; one man, however, disobeyed him. He was justly punished *for firing upon the people*, for the pistol burst in his hand and he lost a finger.

He said he had been accused of spending crowns among the people. It was altogether false. People were paid for spreading such falsehoods. The people were in fermentation. He had tranquillized them. He would not go out of his house, if I wished it. He linked the Hereditary Prince and the English. He had advised the Queen to adopt the English Constitution!

I told him he was not serving the Queen. I was afraid of recrimination. If he attacked the Ministers, of course they would retort upon the past Government. I had no wish but for the public tranquillity for which I was responsible. The whole of his conversation was a mixture of the greatest falsehood, meanness and vanity.

Poli called. He brought me an *esquisse* of the answer intended to be made by the Hereditary Prince to my secret paper. It stated merely that he agreed with me in thinking that without a Russian war and better intelligence from Italy, nothing could be attempted, and concluded by saying that on a point of so much consequence, he must consult with his father. I observed to Poli that I thought this was the worst thing he could do.

Belmonte came out. I went most part of the way home with him in his carriage. I told him that Di Aci had ordered a Neapolitan soldier so many *coups de bâton* for having abused the Sicilians. Upon my stating that I supposed this order came from the Hereditary Prince in order to mark his energy, I observed upon the danger of this measure in making the thing worse. My great fear was of an open rupture between the Neapolitan and Sicilian people. Belmonte called this act of the Hereditary Prince a *priapisme de vigueur*.

He told me that the Consuls had been with the Hereditary Prince to ask his leave to go and see the King. The Hereditary Prince said, by all means, he and his father were the same; if any thanks were due to him, they were due to his father also; that he was a *respectueux fils* and that he could only be gratified with any attention shown to his father. When the Hereditary Prince told Belmonte this, Belmonte burst out laughing, and Belmonte said: "You would be glad to prevent this, if you could".

Colli, Friday, June 26, 1812. I remained at the Colli all day. Belmonte told me that the Consuls had been with the King; that one of them made a speech, thanking him for the goodness of the Hereditary Prince towards them. The King heard them out. Thereafter passed a long silence, which the King interrupted by saying to them: "*Adieu, portez-vous bien*". The Consuls came home, not pleased with their reception.

Colli, Saturday, June 27, 1812. Mr Dolce told me that one of the Consuls had told him that one of his colleagues proposed to go to the Queen.

Belmonte told me afterwards that one of the Consuls had been with the Hereditary Prince to ask his leave to go to the Queen, which the Hereditary Prince refused, saying that his mother wished to live quiet and retired, and would not like to be disturbed. The Hereditary Prince told him this, which he had known before.

Belmonte's brother came in. we talked of the present state of affairs, the increase of faction and the total want of vigour in the Government.

I told Belmonte that I thought he was not sufficiently decided with the Hereditary Prince; that it was well at first to try to gain his confidence, but having failed in this, a new system should be tried. Belmonte was rather piqued at this. He said I must recollect that he told me in the outset that it was impossible for him ever to have the Prince's confidence; that he was of a most stupid, distrustful and despotic disposition. It was at my request alone that he had consented to come into power. I acknowledged I had been deceived about the Hereditary Prince, but I must beg him also to recollect that he had not been entirely disappointed, that he himself had been surprised with the progress he imagined himself to have made in the Prince's confidence. He talked of the *audace* with which he had addressed the Hereditary Prince. I admitted it. No man, perhaps, in Europe would have spoken with the same freedom. But this was not enough. It was necessary to act also, and I recommended that he and his colleagues should go to the Prince, and should resign their offices, unless more confidence was given to them, and unless the Administration assumed that degree of vigour without which disorder and disunion must ensue. He said he would do it, and that he, Villa Hermosa and Di Aci would call upon me next day

Colli, Sunday, June 28, 1812. Gen. Nugent left Vienna. He brought me a letter from Mr King containing the articles of the alliance made between Austria and France.(1) A secret article not inserted was that if the Allies were successful, Poland should be erected into a kingdom, Austria retaining her present part of Poland, but in lieu of her share of the conquest, she was to receive back the Illyrian Provinces. It was another stipulation that the Turkish Empire should remain entire. He told me that Prussia had prepared an army of 100,000 men to act against France. She had offered herself to Russia, who would not decide, but answered that she did not wish for war, but that if the French attacked her, she must by necessity defend herself.

In the meantime a large French army approached the frontier of Prussia, who then had no alternative but to ally itself with France. Its stipulation was to place 20,000 men at the disposition of France. France then made the same proposition to Austria who, unable to defend herself and most anxious to remain neutral, was also compelled to ally herself with France.

The question of neutrality or alliance was debated in the Austrian Council, and was at last carried in favour of the latter, but Nugent said that the Emperor had declared to him that he entered most unwillingly into the war, from which he would desist as soon as he could. The Emperor had given Nugent a letter for the Prince of Wales, in which he urged the Prince to employ his troops in Spain.

The Emperor objected to the attack of the Illyrian Provinces, as by the treaty he was bound to guarantee them. Nugent asked what French territory he felt himself bound to protect. He said such portions as joined Austria. Nugent then instanced Nizza, and asked if that would involve him, or an attempt to replace the Pope at Rome. The Emperor said he should be very glad of that. Or an attack upon Naples? The Emperor [said] that would please him best, as, in case of his ever being in a condition to resume hostilities against France, Naples could assist him.

Nugent told me that when alliance was resolved in the Austrian Cabinet, Schwarzenberg was written to, and he concluded the treaty in a few days, his own terms being at once agreed to. Schwarzenberg was prevailed upon by the French to send a copy of what was agreed upon to Count Neipperg, Austrian Minister in Sweden, with a desire that it might be shown to Bernadotte, and that he would endeavour to make him join the alliance. Metternich recalled Neipperg for this, and has sent to Denmark a Mr Gould (or some such name), a person quite attached to England. He proposed to send a person of the same character to Sweden. Nugent said that Bernadotte had done all in his power to instigate the Prussians to be firm against France, and was doing the same with Russia. Nugent says that Bonaparte had gained Schwarzenberg, in consequence of which he had lost all his credit; that the Archduke Charles had had nothing to do with the decision of the Austrian Cabinet. He had not been consulted. He was against the measure. He had been offered the command, which he would not take. The Archduke John had also been offered it, but had refused. Col. Geppart was Quartermaster-General, and attached to the good cause. He had begun to make all difficulties and delays. The nation was vexed with Russia, but most hostile to France, and with the Army very unwilling to go to war.

Belmonte, Villa Hermosa and Di Aci met at my house. The object, as stated before. They all agreed to do so. It was necessary that Cassaro should join. It was settled that they should go together to him that evening, and endeavour to persuade him to agree in the measure and to accompany them to the Hereditary Prince. In conversation, I asked what they meant to propose to the Hereditary Prince. They were of opinion the chief points were to change the Fiscal Pasqualino and the Captain of Justice Caltanissetta. Di Aci proposed as successors Villafranca and Artale. It was proposed that I should, at the same time, send in an official Note, urging the assembly of the Parliament, and observing upon the delay of its reunion, without any example in the history of Parliament.

(1) Gen. Nugent arrived on horseback from Messina in 54 hours.

Determined, upon Gen. Nugent's information, that the expedition should go to Spain and not to Italy.

Gen. Maitland went aboard and the ships got under weigh in the night.

Colli, Monday, June 29, 1812. (1) Gen. Nugent told me that the Emperor approved very much what had been done in Sicily; that his wish was to see the British power enabled to make Sicily available against the enemy. He approved of the Queen being sent away from Sicily. He was embarrassed by the Queen's letter asking for permission to go to Vienna. Metternich was very much against her coming, saying she was an intriguing woman and might do mischief. The Emperor thought he could not refuse. Metternich also entirely approved the proceedings here. Ruffo was a very good kind of man. He knew the Queen perfectly. Ruffo proposed to Metternich to send some person here to mediate or to advise the Court to pursue a better conduct, but Metternich said that he knew if he gave the Queen the least opening, she would take every advantage of it. Metternich told the proposal to King and Johnson.

Nugent had brought with him £5,000 in money and £20,000 in jewels for the Archduke. His Austrian Majesty was very much attached to him and entirely in his confidence. The Archduke had expressed to Metternich how much he was satisfied with everything that had been done here for him, that all the plans were the best.

Belmonte came in the evening and said that they had been not the evening before, but in the morning, to Cassaro. They had not gone the evening before, because the Hereditary Prince was gone to Solanto, and they were afraid lest they could not see the Hereditary Prince immediately and that Cassaro would in the meantime divulge their intention. They accor[dingly] went this morning to Cassaro. Di Aci spoke, and Cassaro, although red and embarrassed, agreed with them. He said he was going to the Prince, and instead of going together, he proposed that they should go in immediately, while he was there. They accordingly did so.

They told the Hereditary Prince that they came to represent the great inconveniences and danger that arose from want of union in the Government. He asked how that was. Belmonte spoke and said there were three kings: the King, the Queen and himself. His *respect filial apparent* led to the greatest evils, and unless he would give to them more confidence and the *faculté* to carry on the Government with vigour, they would not be responsible for the consequences, nor would they consent to participate in his fall, as must be the consequence. Cassaro strongly supported Belmonte's proposition. He said danger was increasing and, without a good police, could not be prevented. The Hereditary Prince asked what they wanted. Belmonte said, his confidence. He was Minister for Foreign Affairs, and not allowed to open the papers of his department. Cassaro, at the head of the Home Department, had two men, and his immediate deputies, who were good for nothing. In the Military Department the Army was discontented and in a state of disorganization. The Finances were in the utmost disorder. The most trivial subject was delayed and could not be executed till referred to the King.

The Hereditary Prince observed in the course of conversation that there must only be one head, alluding to me. "*Il ne faut pas que Bentinck se mêle dans toutes les affaires*". Belmonte then warmly defended me. He said I had behaved to him with the utmost delicacy. If it had been any other Minister, how many opportunities were afforded me, if I had chosen, to say "the finances are deranged, your Army is good for nothing, retire from your office until the peace". Nothing of this had been done. I had, on the contrary, given them every assistance in money, and he must give his decided opinion that I never gave any advice that was not very much for the advantage of the Crown. He told the Hereditary Prince that the real way of making himself independent was to reform his Army, his finances, to establish a popular government, to make himself strong by the affections of his people, and then he would be really independent and I should be simply the British Minister. Belmonte said that I did not wish to make [a] fortune. My desire was to return to my own country. This was most handsomely and very eloquently spoken by Belmonte.

The end of the conversation of the Ministers was that the Hereditary Prince was to go to his father, and request either that he should have full powers, without being required to refer to the King upon all occasions, or that the King should resume the reins of government.

(1) Dispatched packet to Trapani.

Mr Dolce brought me a paper in verse stuck up in several parts of the town, abusing me very much.

Received the Prince's answers to my two letters.

Colli, Tuesday, June 30, 1812. (1) Duke and Duchess of Orleans, Mademoiselle d'Orléans, Madame de Verrac and Montjoye, Lord and Lady Montgomerie, and Miss Forbes and Prince Belmonte dined here.

The Duke told me that he had been at the Bagaria the day before, where he had found the Queen in the highest spirits. She was convinced that the expedition was going to Italy. She told the Duke that I had asked for Moliterno.

We talked of the step taken by the Ministers. I told the Duke I had forced Belmonte to it, and I told him exactly how. He said Belmonte had not told him that. He said Belmonte had been taken in by the Prince; he had made him believe he had his confidence, when he never had given it. Belmonte began now to find this out himself.

The Duke said it was quite right that every means should have been taken to gain him. I said that it was now quite evident that nothing but fear and force would induce the Hereditary Prince to do anything. He said that the Hereditary Prince was now in part the King's Prime Minister. The Duke said that he had told the Hereditary Prince that this never would do, "*qu'il n'était pas du bois dont on fait de premiers ministres*".

I showed him the Hereditary Prince's answers to my letters. I said they were quite of a piece with all the rest. They never would yield till they were obliged. It was quite incomprehensible. The Duke said it was always upon the false idea of their own extravagant power. I showed the Duke the Queen's letter to Fagan about an *assegnamento*. I stated my belief of the Hereditary Prince being afraid of damnation in the next world if he disobeyed his parents. Belmonte had said before he was as afraid of the malediction of his parents as Cain was. The Duke said it was necessary to know the extent to which the whole family was influenced by the fears of religion, to be able fully to appreciate the justice of this sentiment.

Nugent told us that the cause of Madame de Staël being banished from France was in consequence of a book of travels in Germany written by her, wherein [she] described the people of Berlin, where Buonaparte was better received than in any other town. She said of them that they flattered with energy and yielded with submission.

(1) Sir P. Parker in Menelaus, arrived from Fleet with letters from Sir E. Pellew.

Colli, Wednesday, July 1, 1812. (1) Belmonte called. He had seen the Hereditary Prince that morning. He talked of their resignations, and Belmonte adverted to the expression *complot des Ministres*, which the Hereditary Prince had made use of. He said it was an ungracious term to address to persons who had been ill-used and confined for this same charge. The Hereditary Prince excused himself and said he only made use of it *en*

badinage. Belmonte then asked if he had seen the King. He said no. Belmonte said it could not go on, and that the Ministers would take their dismissions if they were not given. The Hereditary Prince answered in laughing that there would be no necessity for such a measure.

Belmonte mentioned, in reply to my saying that I would reduce the Hereditary Prince to an extremity and, by refusing the subsidy, leave him in the impossibility of paying his Army, that this would not answer, for Belmonte had once made use of the same argument to the Hereditary Prince, who smiled at it, and upon Belmonte's expressing his surprise at the Hereditary Prince's indifference as to a mutiny of his troops, the Hereditary Prince said: "Lord Bentinck is equally interested with us in preventing it, and he will not allow it".

He talked of Acton, and said he was, comparatively with others here, a great man. He was generous to his enemies. Belmonte said that he had the utmost confidence and friendship with him. He showed him all his papers and asked his advice, but would never give him an employment at home, always abroad. He feared him as a rival. He said that there was once a *complot* of Circello, *le plus vil vermisseau de la terre*, Castelcicala, Ruffo and Gallo, to destroy Acton. Acton discovered it, forgave them all, but required that they should do no more harm. He dispersed them in foreign missions. He related of Castelcicala that he became Acton's friend. Gallo was a man who was good for nothing but intrigue. Belmonte said of himself that in his own house they said he was *l'homme le plus bête que possible*, that he believed what everybody said.

(1) Minorca brig arrived with dispatches from Admiral Pickmore and Gen. Donkin from Mahon.

Resignation of the Ministers generally known.

Minorca brought news down to the 8th June. No administration then formed.

Colli, Thursday, July 2, 1812. Belmonte came in the evening. I read him letters I had received from England. I asked him what the Hereditary Prince had done about the resignations of the Ministers. He said the Hereditary Prince had sent Cassaro to announce it to the King. The King frowned very much, but made no answer whatever.

(1) Packet arrived from England with papers and letters down to the 4th June.

Dispatched letters for packet at Trapani.

Mr Heaton about bill for £2,000.

Colli, Friday, July 3, 1812. (1) Belmonte called upon me in town. I asked him what the Hereditary Prince had done about their dismissions. He said he had asked the same question of the Hereditary Prince and added: "*je parie que je devine* what has been done" - he added, "Nothing". The Hereditary Prince said, "Exactly". He had found the King at Solanto in a large company, and he had simply kissed his hand, and had not been able to converse with him.

Belmonte said to him that he must take care of himself. Their resignations were a proof to the public that the machine could not go on, and he must look to the consequences. He asked him, as was usual, in what sort of humour I was. Belmonte said that he had seen me the day before, and that I was more gay than usual. Then the Hereditary Prince exclaimed: "He has good news from England". Belmonte said that he did not know, but advised him to try *de me tirer les vers du nez*. The Hereditary Prince observed that this was Belmonte's business.

Belmonte advised me strongly to interfere either by a letter to the Hereditary Prince, by conversation or by an official dispatch through him. I asked him what had been decided about the Constitution. He said Poli had finished his compilation which contained 22 articles, as he understood, and had been sent - as he heard - to the King and the Queen. He did not know the result. The Hereditary Prince had directed this work to be made by Poli because in the compilation made by Di Aci, it appeared to the Hereditary Prince that sufficient mention had not been made of his own prerogatives. Belmonte cautioned the Hereditary Prince against omitting any necessary parts, because the books from which the extracts were made were perfectly well known to others, as well as to Mr Poli.

Belmonte told me that the Duchess of Orleans had told him that the Queen had said that Circello had composed the answers to my two letters. Belmonte observed that Her Royal Highness knew that the Queen was subject to distractions and did not always exactly recollect with precision the circumstances she might have heard (alias "lied"). The Duchess said: "Oh, no! He wrote them, and the Hereditary Prince had sent for him on purpose".

Nugent, talking of the battle of Aspern, said that Bonaparte began his attack with all his cavalry united, 25,000 men; first line, cuirassiers; second, heavy dragoons; third, light and hussars. The Austrian cavalry were driven back. The Austrian infantry were drawn up in masses of one battalion upon the two centre half-companies. The French cavalry did not break one of them.

At Fontanafredda, where the Archduke John obtained a victory over the French, when he was Quartermaster-General, he deceived the French. He found an officer in the Army who had been ill-used. He proposed to this man to enter into a correspondence with the French saying that he had been ill-treated and wished to revenge himself, and desiring the French general to send over to him one of his best spies. This was done, and Nugent furnished him with various documents, and even some of his own private correspondence. On the night preceding the battle he sent him a totally false arrangement and allowed some small detachment to be cut off in confirmation of the plan. The French Army put itself in motion to attack Austrian left. Nugent left there only a brigade, and marched with all the rest of his army by his right, so as to get completely round the left flank of the enemy. This movement was completely successful. The battle was won easily and the French lost 12,000 prisoners. Nugent said of the masses that they must be occasionally altered; it would not long succeed, because cavalry seeing they never could attack them, they would only bring against them artillery. He said in this form the militia were quite able to resist any cavalry. He retreated in this manner across a plain twenty miles in length, in front of a very superior cavalry. He said that certainly, a ball hitting the column, the loss was immense, but it happened less often. A ball had killed his horse, the captain of one of the masses, and a

great many men. There was disorder for a moment, and the column resisted an attack immediately made upon it.

(1) Arrived Ajax, Sir R. Laurie.

Colli, Saturday, July 4, 1812. Went into town. Belmonte came, and while with me the Duke of Orleans arrived. He told us of the Queen's flattering herself that there were only 1,400 British troops left at Palermo. This put her in the greatest spirits. At the same time the least thing alarmed her. He mentioned that, as he and the Duchess were going to Bagaria, they were passed by an officer of dragoons, mounted on a fine horse. The Queen heard of such an officer being on the road, and was very much alarmed by it. Upon the Duke's arrival, she immediately enquired if an officer had not been seen by him. He said yes. She asked how he was. He said he did not know. She then asked if Lamb was still at Termini. He said he believed he was. The officer then passed by the house. She got up in some agitation and said: "There he is. Is it Lord William's Piedmontese secretary?" The Duke said he knew St Laurent, and it was not him. "Who can it be?" she asked. Trabia said it was only some officer of dragoons who was taking a *promenade à cheval*.

The Duke told us that the Duchess had received a letter from the Queen complaining of the Duke's *mine* to her the night before. The Duke then told us that an invitation had been sent to him and the Duchess to go to a *fête* at the Bagaria, on account of Leopold's birthday, and his sister had been excluded. (This excellent person, Mademoiselle, was disliked by the Queen from being supposed by her to be of the Belmonte party. The Queen called her a Belmontiste). The Duke hesitated whether he would go or not. At last he decided to go, but not to stop, and his looks showed his displeasure. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince was deceiving us, that he was manifesting to the

Colli, Sunday, July 5, 1812. (1) Called with Lady William on the Hereditary Prince and Princess to invite them to our house at the feast of St Rosalia on the 11th. Nothing particular passed.

Went from thence to the Duke and Duchess of Orleans and Mademoiselle (Mademoiselle, to be pronounced long, not shortened as in ordinary conversation, when applied to Miss, as Mamselle. Such is the etiquette).

Belmonte dined with us. I read him copies of the letters sent to the Hereditary Prince. He talked of his own situation, and the awkward predicament in which they stood by their resignations not having been accepted, and nothing being done. He said that every day he urged the Hereditary Prince upon the subject. To his statement of the reasons of this measure and of the reforms necessary, the Hereditary Prince answered that the picture he had drawn was perfectly correct, his ideas of the reforms requisite, perfectly just, and he agreed in everything that Belmonte said, and he would immediately take measures for the execution. But, Belmonte said, nothing was done. The Hereditary Prince had been at the

Bagaria the evening before, but the King was again in public, and the Hereditary Prince had said nothing to him.

Belmonte told him that he (the Hereditary Prince) was in fact nothing else but the King's Prime Minister, and that they were the machines who executed his orders. Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince sent copies of every official paper to the Bagaria. Belmonte urged me very much to speak to the Prince and to frighten him. In reference to the two letters, he said they were merely negative.

He told me about the court's going to the Archbishop. He had offered his house two months [ago] at the *Fête-Dieu* to the Hereditary Prince, who answered under embarrassment that he had been engaged to the *Archevêque*. He had also engaged himself to Caltanissetta: the two persons most odious to the people. The court, with the exception of the last year, when they went to the Duke of Genevese's, had always gone to Belmonte's. This was a plain proof that he intended to declare to the people, "These Ministers are forced upon me".

(1) Sent two letters to the Hereditary Prince in answer to his of the 29th June.
Mr Locker arrived in Nautilus, Capt. Dench.

Colli, Monday, July 6, 1812. (1) At court Belmonte told me that he was sure of there being a strict alliance between the King, Queen and the Hereditary Prince. He told me that the Queen had said to the Duke of Orleans that she, the Hereditary Prince and Circello had had a consultation about my letters; that Circello had made such a bother in writing the answers which they had agreed upon and were dictated, that (as well as I recollect) the Hereditary Prince wrote them.

The Hereditary Prince had talked to him about his correspondence with me. He said there was a *mèsintelligence* which he wished him to explain. We asked Belmonte if he knew nothing about it. He answered that [there] were certain things which, not being trusted to him by His Royal Highness, he must deny his knowledge of.

(1) Hereditary Prince's day. Gala at court. Presented Dr and Mrs Sewell.

Palermo, Tuesday, July 7, 1812. (1) Went with Lady William to see two nuns take the veil. The only part of the ceremony that was curious was that of burying them, as if, by renouncing for ever the world, they no longer existed in it. This was performed by their lying down on the floor of the inner room, and were covered with a large cloth upon which was placed the cross and crown that they had worn upon their heads during the rest of the ceremony.

Belmonte, Villa Hermosa and Di Aci came to me to talk about their situations, whether they should take their resignations which they had offered, but which had not been accepted. They had asked of the Hereditary Prince: unity of the powers of government in himself; energy in the administration. He had answered that this should be done. I advised them, as they said the Prince had done nothing, by all means to take their resignations at

once. Belmonte and Di Aci were against it. They both adverted to the inconveniences that might arise, the discouragement it might produce, and the perhaps unfavourable successors to the general cause that might be appointed. I said all these things should have been considered before they had offered their resignation[s]; but having offered, they ought to follow them up. Belmonte begged me to consider the question thoroughly. I said the more embarrassment there was the better. The resignation of the Ministry and the withholding the subsidy were similar measures of embarrassment. They were negative, but I could do no more, and with respect to the Ministers, although I could not name those who should be appointed, yet I could do as much by objecting to such as might be offered.

Di Aci then read several memoranda to which he desired to have my answers. One was, what force by sea and land would be maintained. I answered: as much as possible, as much as the finances would allow. The rest regarded principally the sending away Neapolitans and Italians in the service who wanted their discharge.

Fagan came. He said he had seen the Queen three times. He read me a conversation he had had with her. He said that the Queen had told him that the Hereditary Prince had said of me that he could no longer bear *questa dura bestia* (meaning me). Fagan gave me a list of her debts which, with her letter about her assignment, she desired him to give to me.

(1) Sailed Menelaus, Sir P. Parker, for Malta.
Empty transports under Crocus returned to Mahon.
Wrote to Gen. Maitland, Gen. Oakes.

Colli, Wednesday, July 8, 1812. Duke of San Giovanni told me that the Braccio Ecclesiastico had met the night before at the house of their chief, the Archbishop. He had laid before them the instructions of the Hereditary Prince, of which a copy had been given me by Villa Hermosa. He laid before them no other paper. He insinuated that, for his part, he did not know the English Constitution, and he could not conceive that it could be adapted to such different circumstances and habits as were those of the Sicilians. It appeared to him that the reform of their own Constitution was all that he conceived necessary (so far, was confirmed by others). The Duke added that the Archbishop had also proposed to vote the Constitution which the King had sworn to maintain, and proposed to restore the privileges to the barons, which had been taken from them by a *circolare* of Caracciolo, one of which was *cuissage* etc. (this was not confirmed). The Duke seemed apprehensive what effects such a proposition might have upon the barons.

On my way to town I called upon Cassaro (Spaccaforno interpreting). I said I had not seen him since he had called upon me with the Père Caccamo. He said he had not returned for fear of its being thought that he was intriguing. He told me that the King did not read the paper, and had given no answer. The King had said it was his intention to come to the Colli after the Parliament. Cassaro saw the Queen, who made an observation upon the weakness of the King, similar to a former one. The exact words I do not recollect.

I found Cassaro very ill-disposed about the Constitution, very much piqued that Belmonte had not shown him his plan. He made all sorts of difficulties. He said the Braccio

Demaniale was not free. It had been gained or bought, exactly as in Medici's time, an objection he then made to it. He also said that the procurations had been given to younger brothers, *têtes à chauffées*, and instanced Belmonte's brother. I told him that in popular elections there would be always intrigues, either in the court or the opposition; that upon this occasion I believed the towns had given their procurations to Belmonte and Villa Hermosa, who had made such great sacrifices for liberty and for the good of the nation. He said that in any new constitution to be chosen, it was necessary, according to their present laws, that the three Bracci should agree, *nemine discrepante*. To all taxes the convergence of two houses was sufficient. I said that he must be convinced of the utter impossibility of such unanimous convergence. He stated his belief that the Braccio Ecclesiastico was unfavourable. There then would at once be an insuperable bar to any change.

I told him that I thought the conduct of the Archbishop in resisting the wishes of the nation quite unjustifiable; that he was a Neapolitan and that I did not see why he should be allowed to remain in the kingdom more than Ascoli or any other Neapolitan; and I begged Cassaro to tell the Archbishop that such was my opinion. I told him that the Constitution must be carried; that was my business. It must be done either by the Parliament or by force. I told him that his sentiments alarmed me. He said that the public thought Balsamo and the others wanted to force a constitution upon them. They had no confidence in him. They made a mystery of it. I combated this idea. I said, if they had published a constitution, if they had endeavoured to make a party of it, this would have been intriguing; but to form a plan was in his and every other man's power. I told him I thought the best mode of proceeding would be to have a committee of legislation. He thought not. He talked of *fedecompresso*, and thought the law as it now stood was the best.

Belmonte called upon me. He had seen the Hereditary Prince. He told him that the Archbishop had not shown to the House Poli's compilation. Belmonte asked the Hereditary Prince if he had given it to the Archbishop. He said he had. He warned the Hereditary Prince of the consequences of his conduct. He told him: "*Qu on vous trahit, ou vous nous trahissez*". He answered nothing to this.

I asked Belmonte if he was sure of the Baronial House. He said he thought he was. This was a month ago; but since that time the opposition had gained ground in consequence of my not having acted with more vigour, of the departure of the troops. He said the Queen had maintained to the Duke of Orleans that there were only 1,400 men left in the island. The Hereditary Prince had said to him that morning that there were very few English troops left. Belmonte said he believed the number was nearly the same, as the number gone had been supplied by others from Malta, the Italian levies and the German recruits from the Esteri.

The Duke of Orleans called. He said he had had two very long conversations with the Queen, respecting the appointment of Moliterno and my refusal to see him. The Queen had said to the Duchess of Orleans that I had asked for him, and the Duchess had expressed her doubts of it. The Queen now repeated this to the Duke. The Duke answered that he did not believe it, and told her that when the Duchess had mentioned it to him, he had asked Belmonte if it was so, who said no; and, the Duke said, he had made me the same question, which I equally denied. The Queen then said: "You then do not believe it". The Duke said

no, and asked if she had seen it in my handwriting. The Queen said, yes, she had. She had not the letter, but she would show it him some day or other, when he would be convinced.

The Queen then told him how all the thing had been arranged, that the Hereditary Prince had shown my letters to the King and the Queen; that the King had, with very great difficulty, been prevailed upon to give his full powers to Moliterno, whom he disliked; that the Queen had proposed a Council to be composed of the King, herself, the Hereditary Prince, Circello and Moliterno, to arrange everything; that the King would not attend, but said they might hold the Council if they pleased. Circello also excused himself on the plea of ill health, but he was required to attend. He wrote the two answers. My secret paper of conditions had been sent to him, to which he had written notes in answer. At this Council Moliterno's full powers were made out. Before it, when the King was objecting to him, the Queen sent Moliterno to him in one of the King's own carriages, with the royal livery. The King was very much displeased with this breach of etiquette, and would not see him.

The Queen then expressed her surprise that after I had asked [for] Moliterno, I had written him a letter refusing to see him. The Queen (I forgot this) began this conversation by asking the Duke: "*Qui est-ce qui ment*, who lies?" The Duke, thinking she alluded to himself, excused himself. But she said: "Is it Lord Bentinck or the Hereditary Prince? For one says he did, the other he did not ask for Moliterno".

The Duke said that the Queen told him that the Hereditary Prince had said that I spoke ill of him, the Duke, which I said with truth was not correct. The Duke said he was quite convinced of it.

The Duke said that I would have the command of the troops, but the Queen that I should not have it. How, he asked, could they prevent me?

When the Queen came last to town, she said to the Duke, showing him a note of mine: "Is that his writing?" The Duke said it was. He now, he told me, began to be staggered. She said: "Read and be convinced". This letter was a private note from me to Poli pressing for the Hereditary Prince's answer to my recent papers. I took no copy. It began by saying that on that day Maitland arrived, and it was important for me to know whether the expedition was to take place or not. I said if it was not, I must employ the force intended for Italy elsewhere. I also added that it was necessary to be prepared. I added [that] here it was the practice to wish to do everything but to be ready in nothing. Such expeditions would not suit us. "*For; such Moliterno was the best commander*". And it was upon this sarcasm that my demand for Moliterno was pretended to be created. The Duke said he had read the translation, which was perfectly intelligible and could not be mistaken.

I asked what he thought it could all mean. He imagined that they had carried it so far in the hopes that Moliterno having full powers, for the granting of which they would defend themselves upon a pretended mistake of my letter, I would not refuse him. The Queen said that she had sent it all to England. Circello acted as the Minister.

Mademoiselle d'Orleans was present at one of the conversations between the Duke and the Queen.

Belmonte spoke very highly of the Duke of Orleans. When he called upon Belmonte on his return from Favignana, Belmonte said his face was as white as a sheet and he covered his (Belmonte's) face with his tears.

Mademoiselle d'Orleans and Madame to Montjoye dined with us. Dr and Mrs Sewell and Prince Belmonte.

Colli, Thursday, July 9, 1812. (1) Came in to be present, with Lady William, to see a daughter of the Duke of Gela's take the veil. The ceremony was different from the other. No priests assisted, and it was performed not in church, but in the outward room of the convent, the company looking through the grille. The girl was about twenty, very pleasing and pretty-looking. It took place at nine at night.

When I came in I found Belmonte and Di Aci had been waiting for me for two hours. They could not stop any longer. They were going to the meeting of the Braccio Baronale at Butera's. Di Aci told me that Butera conducted himself very well. He praised Villa Hermosa. He opened the Hereditary Prince's instructions. Poli's compilation not produced. Cassaro said a few words, but no one else. Di Aci told me that he had been four hours and a half with the Hereditary Prince that morning.

I asked Don Ruggero Settimo what the Hereditary Prince had said to his brother, Prince Fitalia, the other evening. He had said to him that he had been represented as requiring the English Constitution. If the present was to be changed, he thought the English the best to be adopted, but he wished it to be understood, *senza equivoco*, that the King was ready to reestablish the Constitution as it was in the beginning of his reign, and to restore to the barons the privileges taken from them by the *circolare* of Caracciolo. Prince Fitalia answered that his duty would be regulated by his *honnêteté*, and the discourse the Prince had made from the throne.

(1) Resistance came in from a cruise.

Colli, Saturday, July 11, 1812. Beginning of the *fête* [of] St Rosalia.

The Hereditary Prince and Princess, and Mademoiselle Caroline, Prince Leopold, Duke and Duchess of Orleans, and Mademoiselle d'Orleans, came to our house to see the fireworks.

Lady William had an opportunity of speaking to the Hereditary Princess. She told her how much I regretted his [the Hereditary Prince's] conduct of late; that two months ago he was very popular, and could have done anything, but now he had changed and had gone over to the other side, as we thought. The Hereditary Princess said it was too true, that it was all owing to his attachment to the Queen and to her influence. Lady William said that I had not gone to him so often as I used, as he had now his own Ministers, and did not wish to trouble him. The Hereditary Princess [said] that it never annoyed. She said she would do what she could to keep him right.

Palermo, Sunday, July 12, 1812. Went to Belmonte's in the evening to see the races by horses without riders. An old English horse, belonging to one [of] Paternó's sons, won as he had often done before. We then saw the car with St Rosalia's figure at the top, lighted,

paraded down the street. It was drawn by eighteen or twenty bullocks, with four persons behind to prevent its going too fast down the hill. The Viceroy Caracciolo had attempted to put an end to this feast, but the people were very much enraged and crying out "*Festa o testa*". He gave up his project.

Di Aci told us that he had mentioned to the Hereditary Prince my having had conversation with Cassaro, in which I had threatened to treat the Archbishop as I had done Ascoli. Cassaro was present, and he desired Cassaro to mention it to the Hereditary Prince, which he did. The Hereditary Prince was not pleased at what I had said. Di Aci mentioned the meetings (general assembly) of the Braccio Demaniale at the house of Belmonte's brother. He said it would do harm, as it would frighten the Hereditary Prince. San Giovanni had told me the same thing, and that their opinion was that the privileges of the King ought to be curtailed more than those granted under the British Constitution.

Monday, July 13, 1812. (1) The Duke of Orleans told me that he had been, the preceding evening, at the Archbishop's; that Cassaro had begun a conversation with him, in answer to a question of his, when the Parliament was to meet. Cassaro stated that he had stated to the King and the Queen that by the original Sicilian Constitution, the King could raise no money, could not make peace and war without the consent of Parliament. He said to them: "You depend upon us, and the people require a change". He also said that the Archbishop was a Neapolitan; that it was not according to the Constitution, though it was *facoltativo* (a word not understood by the Duke) for the King, that a Neapolitan should always be chosen. It was an injustice to the Sicilian bishops, as it seemed to declare that not one of them could ever be fit for the office. The Hereditary Prince came up and interrupted the conversation. The Duke said that the Queen's manner had changed very much within these few days; that she was very much depressed. He said it was unlucky that the public could not know how much she was afraid. I said that she knew very well how much the public was afraid of her.

(1) Packet arrived from England in 24 days. Papers to the 13 June.

Opened our house again for the fireworks. Supper to the Duke and Duchess of Orleans. The Hereditary Prince and Princess went to Caltanissetta's.

Locker told me that Lord Melville had told him the following anecdote, which he noted at the time. In the first Regency, Mr Pitt's and his private opinion was that the King could not recover. Lord Melville had resolved to return to the Bar, and Mr Pitt to do the same after an interval of a year, which he would give to study. One day at dinner with Lord Chesterfield he received a note, which he read under the table and passed to Lord Melville. It was from the King. Mr Locker recollected the words: "The King renews with great pleasure his communication with Mr Pitt. He fears that during his illness public affairs may have fallen into some disorder, and he thinks it necessary that immediate measures should be taken for their re-establishment. The King desires Mr Pitt to call upon him the next day with the Chancellor". This was the first intelligence he received of his recovery.

Tuesday, July 14, 1812. (1) Di Aci called upon me. He talked to me about my Note to the Hereditary Prince, respecting the command of the Army, non-intervention of the Minister of War. He said it was right I should have the command; but the civil part of the business, as well on account of the Parliament as for other reasons, could not be well under me. He begged me to consider this, which I said I would. He referred to my letter wherein I said that the Army was not as well equipped now as when I took the command. He said it blamed him. I said I intended it to have that meaning. It was the effect of our want of accord, and of his extravagant notions of his own authority, which were unfounded. He said, as long as he was Minister of War, he was the Prince's Minister and must obey his command. He was a long time with me, evidently very desirous to retain his office upon any terms I want.

He said his department was very much in arrear; that the Army would be supplied with provisions for this month, but entirely by his *firma* and the contracts he had individually made. He showed me a paper by which there were only 4,000 oz. in the Treasury, and he had been unable to discharge two bills drawn upon him by our Commissary, for subsistence paid to their troops at Messina.

(1) Went to sleep at the Colli.

Colli, Wednesday, July 15, 1812. (1) Villa Hermosa called upon me. He said that there had been an assembly of all the presidents of the different branches of the public revenue. The [Hereditary] Prince said that I had withheld the subsidy, for what reasons he did not know, and that it was necessary as much money should be collected as possible. Each of the presidents said that they had little or nothing in their chest. To the person charged with the collection from the nobles, he said that he must have the arrears due from them. Upon the other answering that he would do what he could, the Hereditary Prince observed that if the sale of their horses and carriages must be the consequence, the money must be paid. Villa Hermosa, in order to settle the accounts with some of the universities, proposed that their arrears should be set off against debts from the Crown to them. The Hereditary Prince said no; what he had said was morally just, but could not be allowed in these times. He complained of Villa Hermosa as having a morality too *philosophique*.

(1) *Fête* of St Rosalia terminated in a procession of all the saints and some of the religious orders. Went to Prince Lampedusa.

Palermo, Thursday, July 16, 1812. Belmonte returned the day before from the Rossella, his country house near the Ficuzza, in better health. He said he had advised the Hereditary Prince, before he went, to *accrocher* himself as close as possible with England. His family had lost Naples because they thought with a small, ill-paid army they could contend with the great military despot of the Continent. That was their history, and with the same view they were now contending with the sovereigns of the sea, without having the enthusiasm of

the nation, without an army, and without a farthing in the treasury. He had begged the Hereditary Prince to consider the consequences. This passed before he went away. He had been within the palace but had not seen the Prince. He had only seen Poli, who told him affairs were in a most disagreeable state. Belmonte advised him to capitulate with me. Poli said that he thought there was no use to offer me any, as I would not accept it. Belmonte came in the evening. He had seen the Hereditary Prince. The Hereditary Prince showed him all my correspondence. The Hereditary Prince said that I interfered with his sovereignty, and wanted the administration of civil affairs, as well as the total command of the Army. Belmonte told him he had mistaken my meaning; that the only question in my letter was about the Army, of which I wished to have the control of the civil and military departments. He told him he was writing to me a letter, which he assured Belmonte should be very civil. Belmonte told him that civility was not all that was necessary. Belmonte took occasion to observe that these communications with me had not been conducted through him. He mentioned it as evidently marking the opinion of the public, that no confidence was placed in him. He did not mention it by way of reproach. He told him that he and all the other Ministers had their doubles; that Circello was his, and that they had their meetings and that His Royal Highness consulted Tomasi and all the rest. But this would all cease when Parliament had imposed upon him responsibility.

Friday, July 17, 1812. (1) Came out to the Colli. Belmonte came, but I met him as I was going out on horseback. He said he had been with the Hereditary Prince from eleven till half past two.

(1) Called upon the Marquis Ferreri in the evening, and Lord Montgomerie.

Colli, Saturday, July 18, 1812. (1) Prince Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince had desired him to propose to me that I should make some proposition to the Hereditary Prince. Belmonte observed that it would be useless to do that, as I had already stated what I had wished. But the Hereditary Prince said he wished it to be done, and Belmonte accordingly did so. I begged him to return from me the same answer he had already given from himself. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince had told him that it would be well to make me some *coquetteries*, and desired him to show me some correspondence with Serracapriola, Ludolf and Ruffo, their Foreign Ministers. Belmonte observed to the Hereditary Prince that there was nothing in those papers that I did not know. But the Hereditary Prince said it would have a good effect.

The Duke of Orleans said that he had been at the Bagaria the day before, and had found the Queen in excellent spirits and seemingly very content. The language was that the English were about to leave Sicily and that they were about to make a national bankruptcy. The same remark had been made by the Hereditary Prince to Belmonte, who answered that he had had heard the same language for the last twenty-five years but that notwithstanding our power had increased and we had been subsidizing all the world.

The Duke said that the Queen had remarked that she was going to the Ficuzza on Tuesday; that she hated the place; that if things went on as she expected, she would return, and if they did not, she would not stay there. She told him that her confessor was dying, and that Caccamo wanted to replace him. She said she did not like confessors who interfered in political affairs. She would have none either of his counsels or interference. The Duke said the road was covered with carriages of persons going to the Queen. The feeling and hope was on the Queen and the Hereditary Prince, that we were going away and would leave Sicily to them.

Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince hoped that the confusion which would follow from the non-payment of the troops would oblige me to pay them, and would fall upon my head by bringing down the displeasure of the British Government. Belmonte said that he had again warned the Hereditary Prince that directly the contrary effects would follow. The Duke said that the Queen had never said a word of the stopping of the subsidy, from the stopping of which she no doubt expected the same effects. He said that her conversation was confident and *persiflante*. She had a map of Italy before her and, alluding to Palermo, which she could not immediately see, she said: "Where is that *sventurata* Palermo?"

(1) Dined with the Duke of Orleans, Duchess (Mademoiselle not well and not at table), Lord Montgomerie, Prince Belmonte, Joinville and Howard.

Colli, Sunday, July 19, 1812. Dined at Belmonte's (Duke and Duchess of Orleans, Mademoiselle d'Orléans, Dr and Mrs Sewell).

Belmonte told me that Di Aci and Villa Hermosa had seen Cassaro and had shown him the proposed resolutions in the Parliament, to which he had generally agreed. They had found him much more favourably disposed than they had expected. The question was how the sanction of the King was to be obtained. They wished to employ me for this purpose, and it was proposed that I should have a meeting with them, to consider the manner of obtaining it. I agreed to meet them at Di Aci's at dinner on Wednesday next.

The Duke of Orleans told me that he had been dining with the Queen and the Hereditary Prince and that they were as gay as if nothing had occurred. He was sure that there was some project, he did not know what. The Queen talked of coming to the Colli after the Parliament, and asked what house would suit her, whether the Duke of Cannizzaro's or some other.

Colli, Monday, July 20, 1812. (1) Saw 62nd and Grenadier Battalion, under Col. Blamont. Villa Hermosa brought me a paper containing the resolutions proposed to Cassaro, with the alterations, underlined, that were proposed by him.

He told me that, at midnight of the preceding day, information had been brought him by the procurator of one of the sequestered estates that he and all the other procurators had received orders from the Hereditary Prince to vote as Cassaro should direct. He said that he immediately communicated this to Belmonte, and had just heard that the Parliament had

decided that they should not be allowed to vote at all. He said he had not seen the Hereditary Prince for two or three days; that the Hereditary Prince saw himself all the superior officers of departments, who should come to him; that the Hereditary Prince had sent for the Governor of the Bank, Lanza, to talk to him about loans; that the orders for the procurations to the sequestered estates were sent directly by the Hereditary Prince. He said it was a matter of indifference to him, but it showed the degree of confidence reposed in him by the Hereditary Prince.

He said that he had persuaded Cassaro to unite with me for the purpose of obtaining the King's sanction. He (Villa Hermosa) said that he recollected me to have once told him that the Hereditary Prince had required from me a guarantee that the Parliament, or the people, should not outstep their proper limits; that having done this on one side, I might perhaps have the power on the other to require the sanction of the King to any article that might be right, and not beyond their proper authority. He said Cassaro concurred in this idea.

(1) I sent my letter to the Hereditary Prince, dated 19th.

Colli, Tuesday, July 21, 1812. (1) The Duke of San Giovanni and Padre Benedetto came here at half past 7 a.m. from the Parliament, which had sat all night [and] was just broke up. They belonged to the Braccio Ecclesiastico. They said everything had been carried in their House. The Archbishop had opposed, but there were very few who joined him. On the largest division he had 16 to 35.

They said that no act should pass into a law until it had been approved by a Council of Bishops, who should have a veto. It was observed that this was making an authority equal to that of the King, and it was thrown out. It was also proposed that not only the King, but all the royal family should be inviolable; which last proposition was rejected.

Belmonte, Villafranca, Sperlinga, Airoidi and Settimo came in the evening. They were all in the highest spirits. They said Butera had behaved well throughout, as had Cattolica. Cassaro opposed a great deal, and was always supported by Partanna and San Cataldo.

The Commons were always unanimous. Bonaccorsi, a man to whom a procuration was given by the influence of Brissac and to whom the Hereditary Prince had directed that a procuration should be given, there being an equality of opinions in the university, was not allowed to remain in the House until he could show by what right he sat there. He never returned with the documents.

The first vote of the Commons was that the sequestered estates in the hands of the Crown, to which procurators had been appointed, ought not to be represented, and that the procurators should leave the Houses. The two other Houses confirmed the vote. Prince Belmonte was deputed by the House to go to the Hereditary Prince to ask his sanction. Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince was troubled, and opened his eyes wide, and stared. He hesitated very much about giving his assent. But Belmonte warning him against the difficulties in which his refusal might place him with the House, he at last reluctantly gave his consent. Belmonte said that although he said not a word, the success of his mission immediately got wind, and in going from the Prince to the House, he was applauded. On

entering the House, the House received him with the greatest applause. Belmonte made a complimentary speech upon the gracious manner in which the Hereditary Prince had given his sanction. They said that Paternó had proposed, as he himself had said, that the procurators of the sequestered estates should not be admitted into the Houses.

It was voted in the Braccio Demaniale that all the feudal rights, without any condition, should be abolished. The barons would not agree to this. They made a reserve that they should retain some, but that the universities should have the power of buying them (Quaere: what?) This was proposed by Cassaro and carried by him. It was only opposed by ten barons: Paternó, who proposed the total abolition, Villafranca, Sperlinga, Belmonte, Di Aci (Quaere: rest?)

Belmonte was obliged, when taking this decision to the House of Commons, to harangue them for three-quarters of an hour before he could persuade them to agree to the amendment of the Lords. They only consented upon being told by Belmonte that the other House would not proceed, and that the whole work might be spoiled for this single point. Villafranca said that Trabia had opposed at first, but afterwards agreed, and said at breaking up that he did not expect so much moderation, and blessed heaven that it had ended so well. Belmonte told the Hereditary Prince that he would now see the effect of relying upon Cassaro, who had been outvoted in everything.

(1) Prince and Princess Paternó, Catarinella Moncada, M. and Mme Minutolo, Count Adernò, Sir R. Laurie, Capt. Hoste, Rev. and Mrs Gouge (recommended by Mr York), Mr Rous (a son of Lord Rous), dined here.

Colli, Wednesday, July 22, 1812. (1) Dolce told me that the Commons wanted to vote that all taxes should be proposed in the Peers. He made them a long speech, and persuaded them that such was not the usage in England, and that it was one of the most important privileges of the Commons. I strongly advised him and Belmonte the day before that they should not proceed until they had received the Prince's sanction (royal assent) to the sixteen articles which were to form the basis of their Constitution.

The Duke of Angiò came to me. He had, as "a Peer of Parliament", asked an audience of me. He wanted to have my concurrence to an opinion of his that all employments should be given by both Houses of Parliament. He said they had no confidence in the Hereditary Prince; that by this means they should prevent his choice of bad subjects, and the Parliament, by keeping in their hands the means of rewarding those who were honest and attached to their country, would be enabled to encourage a spirit of public honour and patriotism. He reminded me of what he had said of the Prince's character.

I acknowledged he was right and I was wrong. It was certain that no confidence could be placed in him, but I still hoped that weakness rather than bad faith was the cause of it. I objected very much to the principle of what he had proposed; that they were now legislating for posterity; that they must not now act upon the insulated and particular character of one individual; that though there was now an interest different from that of the nation, this must cease hereafter; that a broad line must be drawn between the Executive

and Parliament; that Parliament was to advise and control; that by electing to offices the Executive would not have the responsibility they ought, and the Houses of Parliament would be a scene of perpetual intrigue, and as one party must soon predominate, they would in fact have the nomination to all vacancies, and the nation was in no respect likely to be satisfied. I did not convince him. He left his opinion with me.

Belmonte came. He had seen the Hereditary Prince to whom he had read over all the articles. The Hereditary Prince made no great objections to them. The Hereditary Prince said he had seen Villermosa, who declared that in consequence of the resolution of the Parliament to administer themselves the revenues of the Crown, they had made him a comptroller only. Belmonte said his uncle was wrong; that although this was done, the Minister of Finance was to be at the head of the administration to be formed for this purpose; and that in the committee these details might be easily altered so as to give him still more power. The Hereditary Prince said he (Belmonte) was never at a loss. They talked of the sanction. Belmonte affected indifference about it, and advised the Hereditary Prince to say nothing of it, if the Houses said nothing to him. Belmonte took me to Di Aci's to dinner.

On the way, he talked of the Hereditary Prince, and I observed that it was extraordinary that a man like the Prince, who was such a blockhead, should dissimulate so well. Belmonte said he had himself made the same observation to the Prince, who answered: "You cannot understand it. You lost your father at a very early age. You became early your own master, were brought up at college at Rome(?)" He had not been brought up in that state of subjection and dependence which made dissimulation a matter of necessity. This excuse was not much to his honour.

When we reached Di Aci, Cassaro, Di Aci, Belmonte, Villermosa and myself retired into another room to talk about the sanction. Cassaro said the King's consent was necessary, but that he was convinced he never would give it. I agreed with him as to the necessity of it, but I thought the Hereditary Prince might obtain the King's permission to give it in his (the King's) name. Cassaro said he thought it better to go on with the rest of the Constitution; but this evidently being objectionable, it was overruled.

Cassaro then proposed that the Houses should vote the Civil List and thus gild the pill they wished the King to swallow. I said that it was to be considered whether they could give the royal family as much as they wanted. Villermosa said that they wanted 40,000 oz. more than their present allowance (Their present allowance was per month 22,000 x 12 = 264,000 + 40 = 304,000). Cassaro very much objected to this increase, which I also thought too much. It was at last agreed, upon Belmonte's proposition, that the Houses should require the sanction; that if it was refused I should then interfere with the Prince in order to prevent the confusion and disorder that must arise, which I promised to do. They called Cassaro all the time *Eccellentissimo*.

(1) We dined at Prince Di Aci's in the country. Present: Prince and Princess Cassaro, Fitalia, Carini, Villermosa, Paterno, Di Aci's mother, Belmonte, MacFarlane, Naselli, Lamb, Mme Verrac, Mme Montjoye.

Colli, Thursday, July 23, 1812. (1) Prince Belmonte came in the evening. He said the Hereditary Prince had talked to him about my letter, which had produced the happiest effects. Belmonte had taken my official Note to him, which opened the way for the Hereditary Prince talking to him upon it. The Hereditary Prince read my Note and expressed his satisfaction with it, as my letter to him had given him reason to suppose that we intended to take possession of the country. Belmonte pretended not to know of my letter. The Hereditary Prince showed it to him, and seemed to consider it quite as a declaration of war. He was therefore most delighted when my Note talked of a treaty, which the Hereditary Prince desired Belmonte immediately to negotiate with me. Belmonte told him that he supposed the British distrusted him. The Hereditary Prince said he had sent the letter with the Note to the King. Belmonte smiled, and upon being asked the reason by the Hereditary Prince, Belmonte said: "*La Reine, Monseigneur veut plutôt dire*". "No", hurried the Hereditary Prince.

Belmonte charged him with having believed that he and others were the instruments of revolution and that I was the soul of it. Belmonte observed that I had kept my word: that I had engaged to repress revolution and to curb as much as I could all excess and extravagance. Belmonte asked if the Hereditary Prince believed that, if I had chosen it, I could not have produced a revolution three days ago. Belmonte said he had been lecturing him about the sanction.

Lamb told me that the Hereditary Prince, upon being asked why he gave his sanction to the vote not admitting the procurators of the sequestered estates, said the Houses were unanimous: how could he help himself?

Fagan sent me a letter from the Queen, not to himself, describing the resolutions of the Houses as *quest'odioso fatale esito* that was to produce much disorder.

Belmonte said the Duchess of Orleans had received a letter from the Queen, written apparently under much agitation, the letters of the words being of unequal length and the conclusion being: "*Whether Reine ou esclave, heureuse ou malheureuse, sur le trône ou mendiante, je serai toujours votre mère affectionnée*".

Belmonte said that Caracciolo, his first secretary in the office, had been employed by the Hereditary Prince to translate my letter. The Hereditary Prince was so very impatient to know the contents, while he was translating it, that Caracciolo said if His Royal Highness wished it, he would translate it to him *de vive voix*. He did so, and Caracciolo told Belmonte that he thought it his duty to advise him to take care what he was about, or he would be in danger of losing his throne. Carracciolo had before told Belmonte that the Hereditary Prince had employed him in business which properly belonged to him, his superior, and that he undertook it with great regret.

When the vote of the clergy assenting to the union of their House with that of the barons was brought up, the bearer expressed himself for the present members and their successors, when Butera exclaimed: "Certainly for you (the clergy) and *your children*".

(1) Duke and Duchess of San Giovanni, Don Cesare Airoidi, Don Ruggero Settimo, Padre Benedetto Caramella dined with us.

Colli, Friday, July 24, 1812. The Parliament again assembled. They voted that before proceeding farther, the King's sanction should be required to fourteen articles already passed, voted unanimously in the Commons. Cassaro opposed it and recommended that the Civil List should be first voted. Cassaro said that Belmonte knew that it was not the wish of the Prince. Upon this personal allusion, Belmonte interrupted him and said that when he passed the doors of that House, he forgot that he was the Minister of the Prince. He came there as a Sicilian baron, and his duty was to his country. He begged that the name of the Prince might never be mentioned within those walls. He then stated the impossibility, either consistently with the dignity of the House or with that of the royal family, of fixing the Civil List before they were acquainted with the exact resources and demands of the state. Cassaro had only five barons on his side (Trabia, Partanna, San Cataldo).

The Duke of Orleans came. He referred to the Queen's letter, mentioned in a former day, and said there was also this expression, *tranquille ou sur l'échafaud*.

He talked of the Army and of his ideas of its reform. He thought it should be new-modelled altogether, the Guards as well as the remainder. This would enable me to oblige a number of officers. I told him that there would be great difficulty about the Guards. He said Salis had done it before, and then the Queen was with him, because it was to the prejudice of the nobility, whose sons and relations were in the Guards, and whom she wished to mortify. She said it was necessary that the Militia should be entirely new-modelled; that host of officers was altogether useless.

Belmonte came and told me that the Prince had spoken to him and said that on Sunday he would show him all the papers that had passed between him and me, and wished him to arrange the misunderstanding with me. He said it would be impossible for them to continue without the subsidy. Belmonte said the Hereditary Prince was very curious to know why I was bringing more troops here. Belmonte said he did not know.

Colli, Saturday, July 25, 1812. (1) Belmonte and Di Aci came together in the evening. Di Aci said that he wished to have my advice whether he should give in his resignation or not; that the Army was on the point of being no longer paid or subsisted. I said that I thought he had better. To me it was a matter of indifference. I would rather there was embarrassment than not: it would hasten a conclusion. To him it was a mere personal question.

Di Aci told us of the robbery committed the night before by a Neapolitan officer who, upon pretence of executing an order of the King to examine a gentleman's papers, took his money. He was immediately apprehended. Also of an officer who went to the King and asked for his pay, as his family were starving. The King was very angry and offered him *two ounces*, which he refused, saying he wanted no favour but his right alone.

(1) Dined with us: Prince and Princess Fitalia and Carini; Gen. and Mrs Campbell; Sir J. and Lady Dalrymple, Midshipman Dalrymple; Duke of Anjou; Gioeni, his brother. Gioeni told me he had very stongly opposed the administration by the House of the Crown Lands and revenues as contrary to the British Constitution.

Colli, Sunday, July 26, 1812. (1) Belmonte came in the evening. He brought a packet of all my correspondence with the Hereditary Prince. The latter had given it him that he might read before their next meeting, when they were to arrange together what was to be settled with me. Belmonte begged from His Royal Highness precise instructions in this delicate negotiation, because not having the confidence of His Royal Highness, his father or his august mother, it would be immediately said that he was the friend of the English.

Belmonte said that he had had a long conversation with the Hereditary Prince about the sanction, which he advised him to give immediately, for five reasons:

1. Because the Parliament had agreed with a degree of unanimity that was most unprecedented, and nothing but the hand of Providence could have obtained.
2. Because His Royal Highness, fearing both the introduction of too much democracy and of the Spanish Constitution, had, by his (Belmonte's) advice, adopted the English Constitution, and the Parliament had, with perfect moderation and propriety, only followed His Royal Highness' instructions.
3. Because if disappointed, the nation might say that he was a *perfide* and had been deceiving, and might proceed to extremities against him and his family.
4. Because he had promised to the British Government to give a free constitution to Sicily, and the non-performance of his promise might expose him to their rage. I forget the fifth reason, but I think if he sent them back without being sanctioned, the Parliament, who had been kept back by me and by him, might still more contrast his authority, as they were well disposed to do.

He said the Hereditary Prince was very much *abattu*.

(1) Dispatched packet: Lord J. and Miss Cavendish, Leckie, Lord Amherst, Duke of Portland about county.

Colli, Monday, July 27, 1812. Went to town. Called upon Belmonte and took him a memorandum of the arrangements I wish to have made with the Hereditary Prince for the command and the treaty (see B Papers 1812).

I asked him what objections the Hereditary Prince had to the articles. He said he thought some were too strong. Many of them displeased him entirely.

Belmonte made no objection to my memorandum. I proposed the Halberdiers to Di Aci. He said that was not enough, and suggested his being made a Counsellor; but he not liking that, as being too high a rank for him, proposed his being made a Lieut. General (a *Maresciallo*) which I not objecting [to], he said it would be for him a very honourable retreat.

Belmonte talked of himself and said that he knew himself better than others; that they gave him credit for qualities which he did not possess. He was praised for wit and talents, but he had no praise for what he deserved most, the *droiture* of his heart, and I think he only did himself justice.

He begged me to speak to his brother, Villafranca, Sperlinga and Salvo who, he thought, were going too great lengths. He said *son frère avait de l'esprit, mais l'esprit devait avoir un pied sur l'imagination et l'autre sur le jugement*. Of the latter he had not enough, and therefore the former led him into error, and he was easily thrown off his balance. I did not like Salvo and could not speak to him. He advised me to speak strongly to them, and tell them that as I had on one side compelled the King to do what was right by them, so, on the other, I could not allow them to trespass upon the just limits of the authority of the Crown.

I returned to the House. Belmonte's brother, Don Gaetano Ventimiglia, came to me. He said he came from the Commons to thank me for the part I had taken, and that they wished to do nothing that was disagreeable to me. He mentioned an idea of his, that the Parliament should have a veto upon all appointments of the Crown, which I not approving, he had not brought it forward. He talked of the two objectionable articles.

Belmonte came, as did soon after Villermosa, and after him Di Aci. Di Aci told us that Cassaro had been with him the night before, and had told him that while he had been that evening with the Hereditary Prince, the Père Caccamo arrived and told the Hereditary Prince, in his presence, that the King was very angry at what had been done; that the Queen had worked up his resentment to the highest possible pitch, and had brought the King to determine to come in his uniform to town, to open his palace and to resume the reins of government. The Père Caccamo, who was present at his determination, excuse[d] himself for giving advice upon a subject not connected with his holy office. He recommended that nothing should be done with precipitation, and advised the King to see Cassaro before he took any step. The King consented to this, and sent him, Caccamo, to arrange it. Cassaro was to be at the Ficuzza the next morning at nine. Cassaro desired Di Aci to inform Belmonte, Villermosa and me of this event, and invited me to come in the evening to hear the result. On the day preceding, the King was to have come to the palace. Cassaro said that if the King was alone, he should have no doubt of persuading him, but as the Queen was there, he had fears of his success.

Di Aci said he had just come from the Prince, who was much agitated. He begged Di Aci not to resign. Di Aci said he could not do otherwise; that things had been growing worse and worse and he could not submit to the responsibility of seeing the dissolution of the Army. The Hereditary Prince said he was aware of the awkward predicament in which he was placed. He acknowledged that he had been deceiving me for the last month. He said he had been obliged to send everything to the King and Queen and to wait for their answer. The Hereditary Prince asked his advice, how to get out of his difficulties. Di Aci recommended to him to resign his office. The Hereditary Prince took hold of Di Aci's hands and thanked him very much for his advice.

All the party agreed that he was a *perfide* and hypocrite and no reliance was to be placed in him; that their heads would be the first to go, if he had the power, and that their only safety

was in the British protection, until the nation could be placed in a condition to defend their own liberties.

The others went away and Villermosa stopped and showed me two drafts of answers which he, as Minister of Finance, had written for the Hereditary Prince, to be made to the votes of Parliament asking his sanction to the fifteen articles. The first, according to my opinion, expressing his willingness to sanction to all, but begging them to reconsider the two. The second, sanctioning thirteen and refusing the other two. I preferred the latter mode.

Belmonte, before he went, had strongly recommended the sanction being given to all. The others could be modified afterwards.

Colli, Tuesday, July 28, 1812. I called upon Prince Cassaro between 10 and 11. He gave me an account of his visit at the Ficuzza. I had some difficulties in understanding him, as he spoke in Italian and Spaccaforo was not present, who generally has acted as our interpreter.

He said the Queen was present at his conversation with the King. The King began by saying: "*Che guai!* I am well determined [to] *cassare il Parlamento*. I will not sanction any of the articles". Cassaro observed to him that he had allowed the Parliament to be called in his name, and that the Parliament had been almost unanimous in voting their resolutions. In some small particulars only had they departed from the English Constitution. "But who wanted", he cried, "the English Constitution?" Cassaro told him that it had been announced in the Speech from the Throne. The Queen also observed, as well as the King, that they did not want it and had not mentioned it. Cassaro begged her pardon and said there was her own letter to the Hereditary Prince, when it was question of sending Moliterno to Naples. The King said: "But I cannot suffer quietly, *non posso soffrire in pace* these things". Cassaro: "Then Your Majesty intends to make war. How can you do so without money and without troops?" He thought His Majesty had been convinced of the impossibility, when at Solanto, of resisting the British troops and the nation.

He returned to the question of my instructions, and took some occasion of observing that if King George had been still on the throne, this would not have happened. Cassaro answered that the latter was no longer in existence, therefore out of the question. With respect to my instructions, it was to be presumed I had them as I had once come and gone back again and, after my return, I acted. Five months had now elapsed; was it not to be supposed that I had the necessary authority when my Government had not disapproved my conduct? Did Castalcicala say otherwise? No! And as for Medici, they would not listen to him.

The Queen asked if it would not be better for the King to go to Palermo. Cassaro recollected that Père Caccamo had said that the Queen depended upon a revolution. He therefore said that when the articles were approved, there would be no objection. A tumult might happen today, and the mob that might be for the King today, would be tomorrow against him. There was no depending. Cassaro advised him to see me and arrange everything with me. The King said: *No, questo Bentinck e' un uomo tanto duro*". The King objected also to going to the Colli. There were the English troops on one side; there was myself on another. There was the seashore near the Colli: there was danger on all sides. He

would not go there at present, nor would he see me. The Queen said that Pantelleria had informed her that he would have a felucca always ready to carry him away. He advised that the King should not give his sanction till the whole was done, when it might be possible, in their progress, to have them modified.

The King mentioned Butera as having voted for all the articles. Cassaro said yes. The King said: "What is become of all his great promises?" He said he could command the people. Cassaro said His Majesty must have known that he was always a man without sense.

Cassaro at last persuaded him to give his approbation, and the King asked him what he should say, and while the King was gone to get a pencil out of the next room, the Queen said: "The King is incapable of doing anything. It was with difficulty I could prevent him yesterday from abdicating". The King returned. Cassaro then dictated an answer to the following purport: "I approve the articles as the basis. I beg you will continue your work having in mind the good of my beloved subjects, etc." The King said: "No, that will not do", and he wrote to this effect: "I have read the articles and beg you will continue your work for the good of my subjects and when finished I beg you will forward them through the proper channels for my sanction".

Cassaro observed that this would not be sufficient. It was necessary that his approbation should be clearly expressed. The desiring them to continue their work was an implied approbation and therefore why not so state it? The King would not, and the Queen then suggested some alterations and proposed to write, but he would not let her. He then said that he would prepare it afterwards and send it to the Hereditary Prince.

The King had previously proposed to make no answer, but to leave it to the Hereditary Prince to decide. But Cassaro said that would not do. The Parliament would not be satisfied. Cassaro said there was no money, how could he go on? Cassaro said he believed Lanza, the Deputy Governor of the Bank, had been with the Hereditary Prince, but he did not know what they had agreed. He believed there was not a farthing to be had. The King said that that *briccone* had been at the Ficuzza the day before, but he had driven him away. The Queen said that the way that good man had been used by the King had made her grieve for half a day.

Cassaro said it was not possible to support the present expenses. The Army must be reformed. The King seeming to assent to this, Cassaro said there was a way of doing it, by placing 4,000 men, whom I had asked for, at my disposition. The King said, Never, mai. His *morale* would not permit them to go to Spain to be sacrificed. Cassaro asked if he had not sent his troops to Lombardy, and added that his morality might prevent him from sending the Sicilian Volunteers out of the kingdom, as it was contrary to their engagement, but the regular troops had not received any promise of that kind. The King said: "But in Lombardy I was serving with my ally". Cassaro observed: "And is not the King of England your ally?" "Yes, but I will not allow the troops to go to Spain, because England has cut off the succession from our line". The Queen said she would willingly go to Malta if the King could resume the government.

Cassaro showed me the Prince's letter engaging him to go to the Ficuzza. It was very tender and full of pious expressions. Begged him to undeceive the King about Di Aci and to tell him that Belmonte had done all in his power to curb the Commons.

Called upon Butera, Paternò, Prince and Principessa Sperlinga (Principessa told me about King), and Belmonte.

Belmonte told me that he had seen the Hereditary Prince that morning. He had approved very much of Belmonte's written explanation why the King should sanction all the articles. He said it must convince the King. The Hereditary Prince asked him if he had read my correspondence with him (Hereditary Prince). Belmonte said he had, and that it appeared that from want of confidence he had missed the opportunity of an expedition to Italy, and perhaps of becoming not only King of Naples, but King of Italy also. The Hereditary Prince asked what he advised should be done. Belmonte said the exact reverse of what he had done before. Belmonte said that there were two things of which the Hereditary Prince might rely: first, upon the superiority of our force. We had been able to keep upon an equality with Bonaparte and to rival him in all quarters of the world. Secondly: of our loyalty, for if we had chosen it, long since we could have taken Sicily if we pleased, and could have said for the present there must be an united government, and till a general peace the royal family must go to Malta or elsewhere.

Di Aci came while we were at dinner. He told me that he and Cassaro waited upon the Hereditary Prince while Belmonte was with him. Cassaro was very impatient to know if the courier had come from the Ficuzza. He had arrived. Di Aci and Cassaro went in together. Cassaro related his conversation with the King and Queen to the Hereditary Prince. It appeared, as I had understood it, that the King and Queen entirely depended upon a revolution in their favour.

Di Aci's account of the conversation agreed with mine of this morning, but there were some additions. When Cassaro talked of the uncertainty of the consequences of a revolution, the King turned to the Queen and said: "You see he confirms my opinion". The Hereditary Prince shed tears frequently. Di Aci, in reference to Pantelleria's conduct, said: "I will confess all to you: that was my mother's confidence. Pantelleria had assured her that he, Butera and Monsignor Gravina with the Braccio Ecclesiastico would never consent to the union of the Baronale and Ecclesiastico, and therefore that no risk was run in proposing the English Constitution because it could not be carried". Di Aci said that this was a deceit, and that he had been the means of its being defeated, because he had united at his house several of the ecclesiastics, Monsignor Gravina among the rest, and had brought them over to his way of thinking. If His Royal Highness had had confidence in him, this would not have happened. The Hereditary Prince merely observed that these were the *voleri di Dio*, the will of God.

The Hereditary Prince told them that the answer from the King was exactly what he expected and feared, full of doubts and giving no opinion. He said that he had written a long answer to the King of seven sides of paper, stating the consequences to be dreaded from his refusal, and the ruin that might fall upon his family. Di Aci told the Hereditary Prince that this was not enough. He proposed that the Hereditary Prince should write to the King that it was his intention to unite all his Counsellors, and to take their opinion in writing. If the King wished to see them, they could meet him at [] and he (the Hereditary Prince) could accompany them or not, as the King pleased. If, after hearing their opinions, the King chose to refuse his sanction, he (the Hereditary Prince) must beg leave to retire

from his office. He requested that the King would give the sanction himself, or give him full powers to do so.

Di Aci remarked to me that as all the Counsellors had already given their votes and were pledged to one side, they could not well give a contrary opinion in writing. I agreed in this idea. The Hereditary Prince in answer to Di Aci's observation of the effect of His Royal Highness' deceit, that he had practised upon his Ministers and me, said that if he had been in my situation, his doubts and distrust would have been much greater than I had felt.

Di Aci said that the Hereditary Prince confessed that he had ordered himself the troops to remain within their quarters, upon the expectation of the King's arrival. Di Aci said that Bourcard pretended not to know anything of the order. He expressed his surprise at this deceit being produced upon him by Bourcard [who] was his friend.

Di Aci said that he came by order of the Hereditary Prince to make that communication to me, Cassaro having misunderstood me, and having told the Hereditary Prince that I intended to wait upon him about the sanction, which I had never said.

Colli, Wednesday, July 29, 1812. (1) Marquis Spaccaforno came and told me that he had been sent by his father to add a circumstance that he had forgotten. The King had wished him, when the King came to the Colli, to be the Prime Minister, which he had refused, saying that all the odium would be upon him. He told me Prince Hesse had been sent for to the Ficuzza.

Belmonte came. He showed me a letter he had written to the Hereditary Prince, containing his opinion upon my correspondence with him. It was a very good letter. He advised the Hereditary Prince consenting to all I asked. They could not resist the British power, and entire confidence was to be placed in its loyalty. He suggested some modifications. Udienza Generale and the supreme decision on criminal matters to be left with the Minister of War. The Hereditary Prince approved the letter and said he should send it to the Ficuzza. He mentioned the Hereditary Prince being so pleased with his letter about the sanction, that he desired Cassaro and Di Aci to write their own opinions after the same manner.

He talked of Pantelleria's conduct, and said that in speaking to the King, it was of advantage to make use of metaphors. Pantelleria, in advising the King not to put his name to anything, said he must hold it like an egg in his hand, which he might preserve as long as he pleased and crush at once, by shutting when he thought the time favourable.

Balsamo and Villerosa regretted that he (Belmonte) would not communicate to anybody his views. Villafranca, Sperlinga, Ventimiglia (Belmonte's own brother) displeased with his silence.

Balsamo said that Belmonte had about 30,000 crowns per annum, and a capital in stock of 100,000 crowns. Was very fond of money. Villerosa has about 14,000 crowns.

(1) Dined here: Prince Villafranca, Duke Sperlinga, Chevalier Paterno, Don Gaetano Ventimiglia, Abate Balsamo, Capt. Stapylton, Capt. Du Cane.

Colli, Thursday, July 30, 1812. (1) Belmonte told us that on a letter the King had written to the Hereditary Prince, he had said: "*Je me recommande à Belmonte*". Belmonte also told us that the Hereditary Prince had mentioned to him that the Queen, in one of her letters to the Hereditary Prince, had said of the modification to be made in the treaty, she was glad Prince Belmonte had been instructed to treat with me about them, because she *comptait essentiellment sur son amout-propre*.

(1) Mademoiselle d'Orleans, Mme Montjoye, Mme Verrac, Prince Belmonte dined with us.

Colli, Friday, July 31, 1812.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans.(1) While there, a messenger came with a letter from the King, desiring I would go there the next day.(2)

I took it to the Hereditary Prince and told him of my intention of going there the next morning. He expressed himself very glad of the invitation, and hoped that everything would be arranged. He said: "If I have committed any fault, it has been showing too much filial respect". I told him that there could be no doubt of his having sacrificed very much to it. He was in great spirits, shaking me by the hand frequently. He said: "I hope you will bring us back some subsidy". I said, laughing, they were waiting impatiently His Royal Highness' commands. He begged to take a copy of the King's letter.

Belmonte came to me from the Prince and communicated to me, by the Hereditary Prince's permission, a letter he had written the day before to the King, in very strong terms. The substance was to request most earnestly that the King would give his sanction. He pointed out to him that whatever was his duty as son, he had also that of a father to perform, and his refusal might place him at the head of those in opposition to him.

(1) The Duke of Orleans told me that the Queen had written to the Duchess, complaining of his want of confidence.

(2) Fagan brought me a letter from the Queen, which he presented by saying: "I believe you will say that I have been of some utility". The letter was to say that she had persuaded the King to see me. Soon after his letter arrived.

Colli, Saturday, August 1, 1812. Set off from Palermo with Mr Lamb about half past 5 a. m. for the Ficuzza, where we arrived before nine. We went very fast. As soon as we came, we went into a room, where we were received by the King and Queen. The Queen came up to me and made me a short speech, the purport of which was to recollect that I was about to speak to the oldest and most faithful ally of the King of England.

She retired, and we went into the King's room, where we remained for near three hours.

The King said his departure from Palermo was not voluntary but forced by circumstances. They persuaded [him] that the consequences of opposition which he was enabled to give

would be to fill the streets with blood, and rather than be the cause of such calamities he went away.

He said that I was bound, as the Minister of his ally, to support him on the throne. He adverted to the language used about him, particularly in the last Messina Gazette, published by Chiavetta, for whom I had asked for a bishopric. He said that he had been told that he would be dethroned, *decaduto*, if he did not give his sanction to the articles, which he said he never would do, because he thought them calculated to produce evil and not good. He asked me if I was instructed to do what I had done. I answered that I was decided to see those measures carried into effect which were necessary for the safety of Sicily.

He asked if I would support him. I said I hoped he would not place me in this disagreeable predicament, but certainly if his refusal to comply with the wish, almost unanimous, of the nation should produce disorder, I could not support him. He appeared annoyed at this. He said: "I shall write down your answer and send it to England". He showed me what he wrote. It concluded that I would support what the nation might wish. I said that was not exactly what I did say. He was angry and said: "One minute you say black, another white: *Parla chiaro!*" I then explained that all the nation wished I had not engaged to support, because I had before engaged to defend the authority and dignity of the Crown. He, however, did not alter what he had written. He was very angry when I talked of the Sicilian nation. He said that no Minister before ever talked of the nation; his business was with the King. And he said: "You talk of *quattro ribelli* as if they were the nation". I asked who he meant by *quattro ribelli*. He said *quattro* was a Neapolitan expression of indefinite numbers.

He said the Commons were not properly represented; that the members had been bought and the procures obtained by fraud and force. I assured him it was the first I had heard of the fact. He complained of the Hereditary Prince but, he said, "I do not wish to recriminate". He said he had never seen the speech of the Prince to Parliament. He said this on my observing that the Parliament had only done what the Speech from the Throne had pointed out. For a long time he referred nothing to him. He asked, if I had appointed my son to manage my estate, whether I should not expect him to be subordinate to me. I said he had given him his full powers to execute measures which he himself did not like to do.

In the beginning he said: "You will see in this conversation that I am not so sciocco and *stolido* (so great a fool) as you take me to be" (the Queen had told him, I believe, that he was taken for an idiot). We smiled at this expression. I urged him about the sanction. He said he would never give [it], *mai, mai, mai*. Nor would he abdicate. God had given him the throne and he would not abandon it. He would not either give his son power in writing to confirm the articles. He said he would, by word of mouth, say to his son that he might continue the government, and his son might then do what he pleased (he added: "But this is not to extend to Naples"). He promised never to speak to him about public business. I said that the Parliament would not be satisfied, and they would not think him sincere if he refused to give in writing that which he had no objection to speak.

He said the time might come when he might be again called upon to resume the government. He asked if Cassaro had not told me that he had advised the King to give his sanction. The Hereditary Prince had written him so. I hesitated and he asked me: "Yes or

no?" I said I believed he had. The King said Cassaro had not advised him to do so, and read a letter dictated by Cassaro as he wrote it, which was to continue their work till the whole was finished. He said Cassaro was on all sides. When he came to Sicily, he ought to have cut off his head: *saltare la testa*. He was very angry with him.

I pressed him often about the sanction. He said: "You wish my son to govern". I said not, I hoped there would be no change. He said he must then be left to govern as he pleased. He did not think this a time for the Parliament to be held. Before he also could give his sanction, he must send into all the provinces to know if the articles passed were agreeable to the nation. He said he was willing to sanction the English Constitution, but this one was neither *carne* nor *pesce*, neither English nor Sicilian. He said he had not slept for fifteen nights, and that now having disburdened his mind, he should be tranquil and happy. His conversation was very much mixed with religion. He desired we might dine together as Christians. He should always be the sworn enemy of the French, and the friend of England. He said: "Take me and the Parliament out, to fight our enemies: see who will fight the best".

He was very anxious that I should guarantee the inviolability of the royal family. I said that I could not, that there was nothing to fear, but upon principle it was necessary to secure that as subjects they should not conspire against the King. Besides, with my experience of the past, I could not possibly give the security required. He said: "I know what you mean. I promise you that she shall be quiet, and do no more harm". He pressed me very much. I said it was not the English Constitution. He appealed to Lamb, who said it was not. He gave up this point.

He then required I should pay him his Civil List, and no man, royal or common, ever played the beggar better. I said he might rely with confidence upon the Sicilian nation. He said he had no confidence in the nation. He said he only relied upon me: meaning, I suppose, my nation. I told him the impossibility of my appropriating the subsidy that had been voted for one object to another; that he might be persuaded that as Great Britain had not abandoned any royal person in distress, so they would less do so so old an ally. He said this was spoken like an Englishman. He said England, he hoped, would never allow an old ally to beg for his bread. It was settled that I could not give it, but I would refer it to England.

In talking of Sicily, he said he knew them better than I did, and begged that I would recollect Ferdinando Borbone, who had foretold that this Constitution would lead to confusion.

We dined at twelve. The King had told the Queen what had passed. She was very much *abattue* and would hardly speak to me. She ate nothing. The King ate very little, and was very much dejected, till the subject of hunting was started and he then resumed his usual spirits, particularly in speaking of some greyhounds that he had, with which he had famous sport.

After dinner the Queen took me and Lamb into her room, where we stayed for near an hour. She held nearly the same language as the King. She asked if he had spoken to me of troops. I said, No. She said he had forgotten it. She said she was very much vexed that the King had not asked for the proofs of what I had advanced against her. She complained very much

of what had been done at Palermo. She denied that it was the wish of the nation. Made the same charge against the composition of the Parliament. She said there were remonstrations against the returns from all quarters of the island. The nation was not represented. The public opinion could only be known by sending to all the different provinces and collecting individually the general sentiment. She said the King was willing to adopt the English Constitution; that what was now done was an aristocracy, it was the government of the barons, who had preserved their own rights to the prejudice of the nation. She said she should always advise the King and her children to resist such oppression. I said that the Parliament had done nothing more than follow the directions which they had received from the throne. I said, with respect to the *diritti angarici*, that did not interfere with the rest of the articles, which were in strict compliance with the Sicilian or English Constitution. She said she would not stay here. It was worse than hell. She desired I would speak to the Prince, to have a frigate prepared for her. She would not go in an English vessel. It must be a Sicilian. There were two in the harbour: she would either go to Fiume or Trieste, and take Leopold with her. She said she never had the good fortune to persuade [me]. I said it was my misfortune always to find our opinions so widely different. I have ever said that I must always assert that however I might appear an enemy, I was the best friend of her family. She asked if I had not something to say to her. I said, No. She asked if I had not desired to see her. I said, No; I was always happy when Her Majesty did me the honour to call for me. "You did not do so?" "No". "Then somebody has *menti*. *Pour moi, ce n'est pas moi. Je ne mens jamais*".

We arrived in town about 6 o'clock. I saw Belmonte, and begged him to communicate what had passed to the Hereditary Prince.

I also saw Di Aci. His opinion was that the Hereditary Prince would not accept the government if his father was dethroned. He threw out that the Duke of Orleans might be appointed. He should be against it, as he was a Frenchman, and so probably should I be. My instructions could of course not support such a case. I said it was desirable, if possible, to avoid a dilemma, in which he agreed entirely. He said he should go to the Hereditary Prince and advise him to resign his office.

I saw afterwards Villa Hermosa. I told him what had passed.

Colli, Sunday August 2nd, 1812. I came to town to wait upon the Hereditary Prince. I found that he had gone to the Ficuzza by order of the King. I saw Poli, who had been ill. I called upon Belmonte and Cassaro. The latter recommended a strong Note being delivered in by me. He said he knew the King and if I did not follow up what I had already done, the King would immediately recant and fancy he had gained a great victory over me. We agreed that if the King persevered in refusing his sanction, the Parliament should send an address to the King, remonstrating with him.

Belmonte came in the evening. Talking of the King's refusal, he said that he knew them all very well, and said the King was never so near saying Yes as when he said No.

Colli, Monday, August 3, 1812. Upon getting up in the morning, I found a note from the Hereditary Prince informing me that he had found the King very quiet, and that he had authorized him to give his sanction, and desiring me to come to him at 12. I saw Belmonte before, who told me that the King previously required my guaranteeing the security of the royal family and supporting him against any attempt to transgress the limits of the English Constitution.(1)

I went to the Hereditary Prince at 12. He called me in first, and said that to his surprise he had found the King very calm and tranquil. The Hereditary Prince expected a bad reception, and I supposed he would have had one, as I told him. He said the King said that as he had now done all in his power, and as he was now unable to resist, he was satisfied. I asked him how he found the Queen. He said not angry, but very much afflicted.

He talked about the Army and pressed me very much to tell him what I proposed.(2) I said I was not quite ready to do so, and I begged to communicate it to him,, as it regarded the two governments, through Prince Belmonte. He said he saw he had lost my confidence. I told him he had, and not only mine, but that of the public. He had sacrificed his own interest to respect to his parents. He said he was aware of it. He asked why he had lost my confidence. I told him, because he had appeared an unwilling instrument in everything; that in the outset I had placed implicit reliance in him, as he acknowledged; that I was convinced he would proceed rapidly in what he had undertaken, and that as much would have been done in a fortnight as in the last six months. Everything proposed by me had been rejected, and his thought seemed always to have been how he could spare to me the least possible authority. I told him fairly that these opinions, both first and last, the existence and loss of my confidence, I had transmitted to England. He hoped I should soon communicate the recovery of it. I asked him if he thought the appointment of Moliterno a mark of confidence. He said he really believed my note to Poli implied the meaning. I asked how that was possible.

He asked if I had any objection to the Ministers being brought in, that we might all together arrange what was to be done in Parliament. He then told us that the King had assented to his giving his sanction to the articles. He had written a letter to the King by his desire, which he read us, stating that the Parliament had been called and the English Constitution

proposed by his orders, and expressing his opinion that the King's sanction was indispensable.(3) The King wrote underneath his authority.

The King, however, stipulated that I should guarantee the security of the royal family. I spoke plainly of the Queen, the Hereditary Prince permitting me to do so, and said that it was impossible for me to place any confidence in her after what had happened. It was settled that my security should be granted for acts past, not for those to come. This was thought reasonable by the Prince and all the rest, and so it was concluded. The other point was to guarantee that the English Constitution should not be exceeded. I referred to my paper of the 17th June, which the Hereditary Prince brought out and read, and which was considered to be, by him, satisfactory, and it was agreed that in my answer I should refer to this. It was then settled that as soon as Belmonte had sent me in an official Note, to which my answer might be given, an official paper should be prepared for the King's signature granting the Hereditary Prince the necessary authority to give the King's confirmation to the 16 articles.

The Hereditary Prince desired Villarmosa to read the articles one by one. He rejected that entirely respecting the administration of the revenues. He was disposed also to reject that of the *diritti angarici*, but it was thought better not to decide upon, but to suspend a decision till further explanation might be given. The same determination was made upon the last article, for its being supposed to open a door to propositions inconsistent with the British Constitution. I did not see it in the same light.

The Hereditary Prince objected also to the limitation upon the creation of peers, but Belmonte and the others dissuaded him from persevering in it. I remarked that I thought this had been the great defect of Mr Pitt's administration, that the number of peers brought the rank into discredit, and they were the best support of the throne. Before going away, he shook me by the hand and before them all said that he hoped he should soon recover my confidence.

Belmonte came in the evening to hear what I had to propose to the Hereditary Prince about the Army. I put him off till next day.

- (1) Belmonte was to prepare and persuade me to this.
- (2) The Hereditary Prince said that both he and the King had read Genl MacFarlane's report and they both thought it very reasonable and perfectly true.
- (3) Received a copy of this letter from Mr Fagan, to whom it was sent by the Queen.

Colli, Tuesday, August 4, 1812. MacFarlane and I went to the Olivuzza to speak with Fardella about the Army. He said many officers would resign if the Army went to Spain. He said Di Aci had made a great deal of money since he had been Minister of War. Di Aci's uncle, Marshal di Aci, had been Captain General; he had advised him (Fardella) to beware of his nephew.

Belmonte brought me a Note requiring my security to the two points agreed in the conversation.

Palermo, Wednesday, August 5, 1812. (1) I gave Belmonte the plan of the new treaty or convention. I sent back answer to his Note of the preceding day. He took memorandum of the relation I proposed to hold with the Minister of War. He took these to the Hereditary Prince.

(1) Swallow, Capt. Crispin, came with Mr Johnson, Wilkie (consul at Tripoli) and Col. Catinelli.

Thursday, August 6, 1812. Belmonte came (MacFarlane was present). I asked what effect my propositions had made upon the Hereditary Prince. He said he had objected very much to the Guards, saying that the command of these troops had never been with the Captain General. Belmonte told him that he (the Hereditary Prince) had said to Genl MacFarlane that if I so understood the command, I should have them. The Hereditary Prince denied that he had ever said so. Belmonte tried to persuade him, but in vain. I gave Belmonte a paper explaining the relative duties of Captain General and Minister of War.

While Belmonte was with me, came the Duke of Orleans. They had a long discussion together. The Duke said that the King's giving leave to the Hereditary Prince to sanction, and not committing his own name, was with the view of being able to undo what had been done, when the opportunity favoured. There was no sincerity in them; and it was this distrust that produced the violence which existed. He said the same cause, distrust of the King's sincerity, produced the French Revolution. Belmonte on the other hand said that what had been done could not now be undone, whatever might be the disposition of the court.

The Duke told me afterwards that Belmonte had not been near him for three or four days, fearing that he should attack him on account of the *diritti angarici* which it was said he might have overturned in the Baronial House if he had been more in earnest. The Duke said that Belmonte's vanity misled him. It had done so about the Hereditary Prince's confidence and here again. He was losing some of his partisans from not taking the trouble to manage them.

Di Aci came at my desire to talk about the Army. He told us that he had sent for several colonels of corps in consequence of the report that they were about to resign, and of the discontent they were said to be encouraging in their men. Tschudi and Gaetani said they would resign. Caracciolo told him that the officers did not like to go to Spain. Di Aci told him that the men should go wherever they were ordered.

Belmonte and MacFarlane came. Belmonte said that he came from the Hereditary Prince to ask the explanation of a passage in my Note. He gave me a written mem [orandum] about it. It related to the Queen, but the Hereditary Prince fancied it concerned his sovereignty and the possession of Sicily.

Di Aci said that there was no pay, and he feared confusion. I said I did not care for it. If it happened, I should assume of my own authority the command. Necessity would compel me to do so. The Hereditary Prince's authority must be set aside in that case, for the time. I

begged Di Aci to tell him so. He said he would, and went directly from me to the Hereditary Prince.

Friday, August 7, 1812. Di Aci came to give MacFarlane and me his sentiments about the Army. We generally agreed that the Guards should be reduced to 2 battalions of 300 men each, 1 Neapolitan, 1 Sicilian; 200 dragoons for the duty of the palace; exclusive of the corps paid by the subsidy. The Sicilian revenue to maintain 3,500 infantry, one regiment of cavalry, 170 horse artillery and He said that without the levy of additional taxes this force could be paid by the present revenues.

Belmonte came and asked if I had anything to communicate to the Hereditary Prince. He approved my answer to his question of the day before. He said he should soon become *abruti* and go upon all fours like a beast.

Villermosa came. He said Caccamo had returned to the Ficuzza. He told me Belmonte had consented almost to bring himself forward the Constitution, without having a committee. Villermosa said that my lecture to some of the members had been of use, and had made them more quiet. He recommended me to see Butera and encourage him.

Saturday, August 8, 1812. Went to call with Lady William upon the Duke and Duchess of Orleans. He thought the Queen would go away, that she had written two days before to say that she would go away, but had said nothing since. He also mentioned that orders had been given by her for the preparation of a frigate and two or three transports. Heard that many officers had given in their dismissions.

Sunday, August 9, 1812. Belmonte came. He said that no answer had been received by the King, relative to my Notes about the guarantee. The Hereditary Prince delighted with the passage of my Note stating the King's promise not to interfere.

The Hereditary Prince asked Belmonte what he thought I wanted, relative to the new treaty. Belmonte said he did not know, but if his opinion in the same situation was asked, he should say that we might ask for much more than we had and much more than it might be pleasant for him to agree. As yet, we had defended them, paid them, in part secured to them the sovereignty of Sicily, and what had we obtained in return? Nothing. It seemed to him that we could ask for nothing less than a corps of troops to be placed at our disposal. The Hereditary Prince desired him to come and ask what I had to say. I said I had nothing to add or to take away from what I had already proposed. I asked whether it should be a treaty or convention. He said a treaty. The papers and propositions had been sent by the Hereditary Prince to the Ficuzza and no answer received.

He said the Hereditary Prince was not pleased with the resignations of the officers. Belmonte said to him it was clear they had an interest different from his, and therefore they had better go away. I proposed, when they had resigned, to send them all away to some distant town, till the opportunity of their final departure should present itself. To mention

this too suddenly would have the effect of inducing many to withhold for the present their resignations. He approved this.

He said he had lectured the members of the House who were inclined to be violent. He told me Balsamo was preparing an abridgment of the Constitution, or rather a more curtailed project.(1)

Dolce told Lamb that Belmonte proposed the County of Modica for the Duke of Orleans. I did not believe it. Lamb did. This would give the Duke a seat in the House, which Lamb supposed Belmonte would like, as, with the Duke to aid him, he could rule the House. Dolce had asked several persons who were said to be present when Belmonte mentioned this idea, and they all had answered that he had said it.

(1) Père Caccamo reported to have returned to the Ficuzza.

Colli, Monday, August 10, 1812. I called upon Belmonte and begged him to propose to the Hereditary Prince that I should write a private letter to all the colonels of corps, expressing my desire that all those who were dissatisfied with the expected change should give in their resignations now. He said the Hereditary Prince would not approve from his desire to keep numbers about him. I said his (the Hereditary Prince's) idea was false, because one discontented man, if he stayed, would only make converts. He did not know what answer Caccamo had brought.

Spaccaferno came from his father, to say that he had received the day before a letter from the Queen, mentioning that Père Caccamo had been sent to town to speak to the *maestranze* and *provinciali* to know if they were in favour of what was doing by the Parliament. Cassaro had written a very strong letter to the Queen advising her not to listen to flatterers. Spaccaferno supposed that Caccamo did not intend to execute the Queen's commission.

Di Aci came with a calculation that he had made. He said the King had given no answer to the last communication, and that they were employed at the palace in preparing the document to be transmitted to Parliament, which was to contain the Hereditary Prince's letter to the King and his confirmation written below. Di Aci observed that the King's conduct was *mala fede* to the last. Di Aci said the cavalry had no forage after tomorrow.

Belmonte came after dinner and said that he did not know what answer, if any, had been given by the King. Said the Hereditary Prince was to write his reflections upon my paper.(1) Belmonte advised him to make them as few and as short as possible. Begged me to give him a Note containing the contents of the paper I had given [the Prince], which he would answer. Said that the Prince was now in the best disposition, was *parfait*, wished he had been the same four months ago.

Spaccaferno came again and said that Cassaro had been with the Hereditary Prince while Caccamo was present. He advised him strongly to sanction it at once. He must do it sooner or later, and he could not by any means be on good terms with the Queen. He therefore recommended him not to hazard his popularity and safety for an object that could not be obtained.

Spaccaferno said he was sent by his father to mention a circumstance he had forgotten in the morning. The *provinciali*, to whom the Queen referred, were the supposed writers of letters from the country which had been received by the King, and which spoke strongly against the present order of things. Cassaro wrote to the different towns to inquire about the writers whose names were subscribed. The names were discovered to be fictitious, and the letters were traced to a Baron Nideca (or some such name), an employe of the Queen, whose intrigue this was.

(1) Being much against the Guards, Belmonte observed how truly despotic this was, so like the Praetorian Guards. Would give up everything else, but not these.

(From the 11th to the 16th I attacked by a fever which prevented me from attending to public business. Was blooded, and took a good deal of physic).

Palermo, Monday, August 17, 1812. The Duke of Orleans called and gave me an account of his conversation with the Queen, the Duchess present, which lasted four hours. St Clair had previously called upon him and said the Queen wished, through his means, to be reconciled with Belmonte and me. The Duke told St Clair there was only one way for that reconciliation to be made: through the means of the King. The Duke told the same thing to the Queen, advising the King should express regret to Belmonte for what had happened. Upon which the Queen said: "Then you would have us thank those gentlemen for their conduct".

The Queen had said, in one of her letters to the Duchess, that there were some things which could only be said face to face. She had often insinuated that she had many charges to make against the Duke. The Duke therefore seized the opportunity and began by referring to those former passages and insinuations. He said that he knew of no crime that he had been guilty of towards her, [other] than of always having told her the real truth, to which she never would attend. The Queen said he was mistaken; said she had the greatest affection and confidence in him.

The Queen asked him what she should do. He advised her to absent herself and to leave everything to the English and the Vicar-General. She complained of the Hereditary Prince; said he was a *fils dénaturé* and under the appearance of filial respect treated them with neglect. The Duke asked in what he was wanting and if he did not keep them informed of everything. Of course, the Queen said, he did that, but he was not as obedient, it appeared, as she wished.

She complained of our desiring to take the Army away from them. The Duke said the alliance had not been an alliance of peace but an *état de guerre*. She had always been led by her illusions, and had listened to those who deceived her. These had led her into all her difficulties; had been the cause that no aid had been sent at the time of the invasion. The Duke told the Queen that she had always cut his throat, *coupé la gorge*, upon all occasions. It was she who had ruined his prospects in Spain and in regard to the command of the Army. He told her that her refusal of all my demands had brought her into her present situation; that my demands in July were different from those of last January, and that if she

did not take care, the future would be still worse than the past. She might recollect that he had advised that I should not go, but she had said: "Never mind, let him go". He had again advised that, before my return, the opportunity should be seized of releasing the barons. This was also neglected. He told her that I should carry everything I wished without moving, *sans bouger*.

She asked if this army was to be given over to me for the purpose of being used in Spain, where their rights had been disregarded. "*Je déteste les Anglais plus qu'en avant*". Declared she would not stay and would take Leopold with her to close her eyes. She said this to hurt the Duchess, who burst into tears. The Duke said she knew very well how to *jouer* all their feelings.

Belmonte came in the evening. He said he had spoken to the Hereditary Prince at my request and said that, if some decision was not made about the Army, I should be obliged to write him a strong Note. Belmonte said that the situation of the Hereditary Prince really moved his *pitié*. The Hereditary Prince said he had long since sent all the papers to the Ficuzza, but had received no answer; that the day before he had written to the King, to say that he must absolutely resign if the King did not answer him. The Hereditary Prince had strongly advised the King to agree to everything I had asked; that they had nothing left but to throw themselves into my arms; that my demands had increased with their opposition; that I once trusted him, but that had been succeeded by distrust; and that when they gave up the Army, there being then no ground for fear, I should probably be fond of them.

He also told Belmonte of a letter he had received from Castelcicala by the last packet but one, in which Castelcicala informed him that the Prince Regent, the Ministry, the Parliament, the nation were all unanimously of opinion that Sicily was tyrannized. Even he therefore advised the Hereditary Prince to consent to the introduction of a free constitution, and he advised also the formation of the three Houses into two, and the adoption of other forms of the British Constitution which would make his conduct more agreeable to English feelings. He recommended him strongly to do whatever I asked him.

He said he had sent this letter to the Ficuzza, and the answer sent back was that Castelcicala was either a fool or a traitor. The Hereditary Prince cried out: "*Que diable puis-je faire?*" Belmonte said the Prince was very much and apparently determined, if left to himself, to do everything that was right.

Colli, Tuesday, August 18, 1812. Admiral Greig came on shore. Brought me a letter from Admiral Chichagoff. He was sent by the Admiral to concert a plan of operations with me. With a view to maritime operations, the Emperor had appointed an admiral to the command of his army. The army in Moldavia amounted to 55,000 and had disposable about 40,000. The idea was to attack Dalmatia: to march through Turkey to Belgrade there would be no difficulty; or by the southern states of Germany, where he heard there to be much disaffection. I told him the great difficulty, in my opinion, of such an operation. He expected that I had some view of making an attack upon the south of Germany. He had heard from Stockholm that there was some such intention. The Tyrolese, he heard, were very disaffected.

He said Bernadotte had strongly recommended that the Russians should not hazard a battle; that they should make a defensive war, with very powerful diversions, one in the north, which he would make himself in Pomerania with 20,000 Swedes aided by an equal number of Prussians. He said he would stop all the supplies going to the French Army. Admiral Greig said that Prussia offered herself to Russia, who refused her assistance, saying she did not mean to go to war and therefore Prussia must determine for herself. He said the Emperor had resolved to crown himself king of Poland, and if he had, all the Poles would have been with him.

He said Italinsky had proposed to the Turks a triple alliance: England, Russia and Turkey. A Swedish officer had arrived at Constantinople proposing a quadruple alliance, adding Sweden to the others. The Porte made this natural remark: "You propose, both of you, alliances including England, and here is the English Minister who knows nothing of any such intention on the part of his government".

Colli, Wednesday, August 19, 1812. (1) Cassaro went to the Ficuzza to give in his resignation and to persuade the King to consent to the treaty and the demand for the command of the Army. He said he never had seen the King so weak. If the King gave an opinion which the Queen disapproved, she gave him a nod and said that it went for a *non dit*. The Queen was present during the whole time.

The King began by saying that he would break the Parliament and dismiss the Ministers. Spaccaferno showed me the articles arranged between his father and the King. He said the Queen would not allow Cassaro to kiss her hand. She said she was no longer Queen.(2)

(1) Packet arrived from England.

(2) Went to the gala in the evening, being the Hereditary Prince's birthday. Cassaro came back while we were at court.

Colli, Thursday, August 20, 1812. The Hereditary Prince sent for me (see his note). I went at one. He said the King had consented to give him the necessary powers, and had agreed, with some exceptions, to the demands I had made. He read over my Notes to him, and the King's answer. When he came to the Guards, which the King objected to give up, he said he hoped I should feel no objection. I said I had very great objections, both military and political. I said they were out of all proportion to the rest of the Army. Their conduct lately, in wishing to give in their resignations because it was desired to take them in foreign service, proved that they were as bad soldiers as they were citizens. The Sicilians were afraid of them, and as long as any fear existed, the hostility existing between the Sicilians and Neapolitans must always continue. I proposed that there should be a battalion of Neapolitan and one of Sicilian Guards. The Hereditary Prince feared they would disagree. Not, I said, if they were in separate barracks. He thought my having the command would do away all difficulties, and in time what I desired might be accomplished. He was very pressing for money. He proposed that a given sum of money should be allotted for this

corps. I remarked to him that if I did not require this disposition as to the Guards, the Parliament never would consent to an establishment which they feared.

We talked of my Note proposing my relation to the Minister of War and to himself. I explained to him that I proposed myself to take his orders and would wait upon him twice a week for that purpose. I said this was the case with our King, who had never allowed any Minister to interfere with the command of the Army, which he understood to be his own prerogative; that I, in like manner, considered the Prince as Generalissimo, and myself as a second in command. He was satisfied with this definition.

He made objections to the increase of pay. I was to talk to Di Aci upon this point. He proposed that a Note should be sent to me in answer to mine, being most regular. I observed that a *dispaccio* defining my powers should be issued, and he proposed to send for Fardella for this object. I proposed, as Fardella and Di Aci could not agree, that Di Aci should propose it and when proposed, that it should be shown to Fardella. The Hereditary Prince begged I would see Cassaro and hear what had passed between him and the King.

Colli, Friday, August 21, 1812. Saw Di Aci to whom I stated my resolution not to agree to the propositions unless the Guards were reduced. The Hereditary Prince himself had no objection to it. Di Aci said he would go and speak to the Hereditary Prince, and inform him that such was my resolution.

Colli, Saturday, August 22, 1812. I went to Carini in the morning and inspected the 2nd Italians under Lt-Col. Grant. Very much pleased with them. Saw the castle and returned at night.

Colli, Sunday, August 23, 1812. (1) Belmonte came to the Colli from the Hereditary Prince to urge me to give him some money. Belmonte observed to the Hereditary Prince that at last he was in a great hurry; that I had written him a Note a fortnight ago, to which at last I had only received an answer. The Hereditary Prince said it was not his fault, it was his father's. It was agreed that Belmonte should say that I would immediately, in writing, answer the Note I had received.

Belmonte said that the Braccio Nobiliare and Ecclesiastico were in very good order, but that the Demaniale was very violent. He wished me to speak to them, which I undertook to do.

Remained at Colli all day and saw nobody.

(1) Letter from Fagan mentioning the Queen's great despair at the letters received from England.

Colli, Monday, August 24, 1812. (1) The Duchess of Orleans in very low spirits about the Neapolitans. I told the Duke of the letters I had received from England and of my intention, when the Army was disposed of, to fix with the Queen her residence.

Told me that Lord Valentia had sent him the British Review containing the article on Galt's work. He had no doubt of its being written by Lord Valentia. The book was addressed in Lord Valentia's handwriting to the Duke. The Duchess observed a mistake of the Archbishop of Monreale being inserted instead of the Archbishop of Palermo.

(1) The Duke and Duchess of Orleans, and Mademoiselle, dined with us.

Colli, Tuesday, August 25, 1812. (1) Queen in despair with letters received from England. Belmonte came to Colli in the evening. He came to propose from the Hereditary Prince that the four men whose arrest I had asked for should be sent into the interior. I was to receive his Note upon the subject.

Di Aci came to represent the state of the Army, and brought me a plan with calculations of the expense of the corps as proposed by the new proposed treaty. It was agreed that we should meet the next morning.

(1) Richmond, Lt O'Shaughnessy, came with letters from Sir E. Pellew and Lord Wellington's glorious victory on the 12th. Also letters from Maitland, who had landed at Alicante.

Palermo, Wednesday, August 26, 1812. (1) Belmonte, Di Aci, Genl MacFarlane, Sir J. Dalrymple and myself met to talk over the organization of the regiments and the proportion of force that should be given to the British. It appeared that there were only 9,500 effective rank and file, of which between 3 and 4,000 ought to be discharged: some whose terms had expired, others worn out, others bad subjects. It was agreed that the corps going under our orders should be put on the footing of the Italian Levy, and the rest should have the same pay but not the ration. It was settled that I should have 3 regiments, and should raise a fourth. Di Aci consented to this last regiment after much difficulty. He had forgot that I was also to have a battalion of Guards. When he discovered his error at last, he was very much annoyed and wanted to change it.

It appeared that there were 5,000 persons employed in the Navy, for which they had nothing to show at all. I recommended that they should do nothing with their Navy this year, but creep on quietly till the next, when their finances might be in better order and they might make greater exertions. Di Aci resisted this. He said the men could not be discharged, that Admiral Fremantle would not allow it. Belmonte had proposed it to him.

Di Aci came out to me in the evening to the Colli. He said he had stated the subject to the Hereditary Prince, who was very averse to giving so large a force, and to the small sum to be paid over to them, that with it and their own revenues they could not possibly maintain the rest of their establishment. Di Aci proposed that the sum to be paid over should be 7

instead of 10,000 ounces, and that with the rest we might do what we pleased. I said I would consider it.(2)

(1) Cattolica came about the Guards. He said the officers were all indisposed. The Colonel a good officer, but having the same spirit with the rest.

He said that he and Belmonte had done everything in the Parliament. Belmonte will have told me how he worked. He had almost lost his voice. But the Commons made difficulties and delays which he wished me to prevent.

I asked him for a plan of the future establishment of Guards, which he sent me, very much reduced, but not as much as I wished.

Duke of Craco, who had absconded in consequence of being detected of having been the person who threw the bottle with combustible matter into the Parliament House, said to have taken refuge at the Ficuzza, where the King had ordered him to be arrested and sent to Palermo.

(2) Dined with us: Principessa Paternò, Adernò, Sir J. and Lady Dalrymple, Mr and Mrs Burgmann, Mr and Mrs Graham, Sir R. Laurie.

Colli, Thursday, August 27, 1812. (1) Remained all day at Colli. I wrote to Sir E. Pellew about the offer made of the Russians; also his opinion whether Sicily would be safe during the winter. Sir Robert Laurie very much displeased with Sir Peter for having left his station with a prize he had taken, to see it into Malta.

Capt. Duncan explained to me the quarrel between Mr Travers, his first lieutenant, and Col. Darley. Mr Travers had walked a whole day before Lt-Col. Darley's lodging with a horsewhip to insult him if he appeared. The whole appeared to have arisen in a misunderstanding.

(1) Wrote to Sir E. Pellew, by Capt. Duncan, Imperieuse, who was to send Menelaus from her station to the fleet.

Colli, Friday, August 28, 1812. Called upon Belmonte. Said Craco was not taken. He had gone to the Ficuzza to claim the protection of the Queen. The King wanted to arrest him, but the Queen asked him if he would condescend to become a *sbirro*. The King then ordered two guards to take him to Corleone and set him at liberty. Di Aci had received a letter from Craco saying that he was afraid to come till he knew the result of his trial. Di Aci wrote him for answer that if he was innocent, he had better present himself; if not, he advised him *de se brûler la cervelle*. Cassaro had sent to arrest him.

Belmonte said that in respect to the agreement the Hereditary Prince was more reasonable than Di Aci. Belmonte had said to the Hereditary Prince that in all our subsidiary treaties with Prussia and others the exact number of men corresponding with the subsidy had always been stipulated. Here we had slept for six years, but now we had awakened and had only asked what we had required in all other cases, and the Hereditary Prince agreed in its

being reasonable. Belmonte said the papers were all gone to the Ficuzza and that the Hereditary Prince, if he received no answer, would act without it.

The Duke of Orleans came. He said all the Queen's letters were expressed in great despair. She had said in one that she hoped they would not prevent the frigate from being prepared, as she was most anxious to go away. The Duke advised the Duchess to say that there could be no danger of such a result.

The Duke thought the most extraordinary good consequences might result from Lord Wellington's victory, greater than those of Austerlitz or any of the former victories. Talking of the French Army, he said the French were a low people; in some of the provinces only bordering on Germany, Alsace, were the men large. He had heard that many of the conscripts had perished in consequence of their youth, and he mentioned a new complaint that had crept into the army, the melting of the testes not yet completely matured, by excessive marching and friction against each other.

I told him of Admiral Greig's offer from Russia. He thought their march overland impossible and the only way of coming would be by sea. I told him I never thought they would come.

Di Aci came and showed me a calculation and plan, made by him, of the expenses of the corps to be under the British, and the army to remain behind. The total, including invalids, amounted to 14,000 men. I also gave him back his paper corrected, defining the relative situation of Captain General and Minister of War.

Villa Hermosa came in. He talked of resigning, from the want of confidence of the Parliament in him. We endeavoured to convince him that he was mistaken, that it was only a just distrust of the court. He was displeased that they had not agreed to the continuance of the Parliamentary subsidies to the time voted by the last Parliament, but had limited their duration to 4 months. I told him I should have done the same.

Admiral Greig came. We talked over my answer and questions to him, in reply to his first proposal. He agreed that it would be better the troops came by sea. He thought that 12 line-of-battle ships ready for sea in the Black Sea might, with their lower guns out, carry 1,000 or 1,200 men each. 150 transports might be obtained at Odessa, which would convey 10,000 men more. He gave 1 ton or 1 1/4 ton to each man. He believed the corps was well equipped. I expressed my opinion that after so long a campaign, and at so great a distance from Petersburg, they must be in want of many things. I recommended to him in his answer to specify what their wants might be. He said that the troops must be paid and fed by us, and that it must be considered as a corps at our disposition. He proposed Dalmatia and Trieste as the theatre of operations. I urged the difficulty, before they reached the north of Italy, of feeding an army in that part of the world.

We talked of the political principles to be adopted. He agreed that the people should be left to themselves, and those only adopted that should be agreeable to the British Government. With respect to the command, I said that Admiral Chichagoff proposed that the eldest in rank should command. My rank of Captain General in Sicily would probably be superior to his. I observed that if the Admiral came with 40,000 men I would, whatever his rank, willingly serve under him. If it was a smaller force, I should serve unwillingly, he being an admiral and I necessarily (as the supplies were all to be found by the British) having the

direction of the internal arrangements of this army. Admiral Greig did not think this unreasonable, but I undertook to consider it. It was a question whether he should return immediately or wait the next packet, when he felt confident I should receive orders about the cooperation. He did not think the corps from Russia could arrive before Christmas or January. I talked of preferring an attack upon Naples as disposing of one army, and having possession of the resources of a kingdom, before we engaged in other operations. He seemed to agree with me.

Colli, Saturday, August 29, 1812. Came to town to attend as an evidence upon court martial. Doubts whether I could give evidence or whether Judge Advocate could administer an oath to me, as being a superior magistrate. I desired it might be left to the court martial to decide the last question. There seemed to be no objection to giving evidence as to a matter of fact.

Di Aci brought me calculations.

Colli, Sunday, August 30, 1812. Engaged all day writing for the dispatch.

Colli, Monday, August 31, 1812. (1) Gave evidence at court martial. Asked one question only.

Belmonte came. He told me that no answer had been received from the Ficuzza. He said he believed the Prince was sincerely desirous that everything should be settled: the Army in my hands; the Parliament to be closed; and to be upon the best terms with me. Di Aci, who was present,(2) said he had a good character, a *poco di mala fede* to be sure, but very religious, well disposed and submissive to his parents from motives of religion. Belmonte repeated a conversation he had with the Hereditary Prince upon the subject of his parents. Belmonte said that he feared malediction as much as Isaac. The Hereditary Prince said that his conscience acquitted him respecting his parents. The malediction of his parents would be unjust, and he cannot make God [one] in the *complot* of his injustice.

Belmonte said that for two preceding days the Queen's letters to the Duchess of Orleans had been very violent and severe; that last received was quite moderate and gentle, excusing herself on account of ill health. In one she said that there was a God in heaven who would punish *les enfants pervers qui oppoiaient leurs parents*, alluding to the Hereditary Prince. At the same time she was writing to the Hereditary Prince the most tender letters.(3) Belmonte told the Hereditary Prince of the Duchess of Orleans' letters. The Hereditary Prince laughed and said: "You shall hear what she writes to me".

Di Aci said that when the Guards were asked, the King said "Keep the Grenadiers but give up the Voleggiatori", the favourite corps of the Prince. This was done to annoy him. Pignatelli had arrived the day before from the Ficuzza, saying the King had consented to everything, as he had been told by Leopold and the Queen.

I saw Admiral Greig. He spoke of my last letter. He said if they came by sea, they would want money to pay their transports. As for the command, he was sure it would be arranged to my satisfaction. If they came to Dalmatia, he concluded that they should find provisions in the country, and would only want occasional assistance from us. I said I would have something ready and would desire the Commissary General to meet him the next day.

(1) Dispatched the packet.

Curious letter of the Queen's copied by Lamb.

(2) Lamb was also present.

(3) Explained by a letter to Milano, of which I have a copy in Lamb's handwriting. 27 August.

Colli, Tuesday, September 1, 1812. (1) Col. Poli came to pay me a visit. Said the Hereditary Prince had had a very bad colic and was for some hours in danger; was supported that morning by two men, when going to Mass.

Mr Mackenzie told me that Admiral Greig had strongly advised Mr Liston to send Sir R. Wilson to the army. He said he was just the man to please the Emperor, who like triflers and liked being amused. Mr Mackenzie seemed to think, from the Admiral's conversation, that it was intended by Admiral Chichagoff that I should have the command.

He told me that the Admiral had said that Rumanzow had always persuaded the Emperor that he could have England whenever he wanted her, merely by asking. Admiral Greig, who was much in the confidence of the Emperor, endeavoured to persuade him of the contrary. He was not undeceived till after having sent an agent, a Dutchman (whose name he did not know), to Mr Thornton in Sweden, who received him with great indifference. The Admiral mentioned that he never thought Rumanzow a villain till very lately. He would not make peace with the Turks, till at last the Emperor himself sent orders to Kutusow to make peace and sent him the terms. Rumanzow, hearing of this, sent immediately a messenger express with directions to make peace upon any terms.

He said that Mr Canning, for the purpose of pleasing Persia, and induced also by the representations of Sir Gore Ouseley, had been the cause of persuading the Turks to require from Russia the cession to the Tartars(2) of Anapa and not to trade on the east of the Black Sea, from the Crimea to the river Phasis. The Admiral thought the Emperor would be much displeased with this arrangement. He mentioned some of the orders of Paul: that everyone should wear cocked hats; another ukase directed that they should be worn straight upon the head. He ordered everyone to wear upright capes to their coats and no strings, either in their shoes and at their knees.

Mr Mackenzie said a servant of his had been imprisoned twice, once for wearing too large a neckcloth, I forget the other. The Admiral said that when the Emperor usually went out, at 3 o'clock, the streets were deserted. Paul was a very well informed man and very quick at repartee. He meant well but was mad. Bennigsen was one of the conspirators and the cause of his death. All the rest were alarmed. He went forward, stabbed himself the sentry; and when he came to the Emperor, who offered to agree to whatever they proposed, he said:

"Whatever I undertake I accomplish", and they strangled him with a sash. It was said the Emperor had altered every part of the dress for the future: they supposed the sash was to be worn round the neck.

Admiral Greig and Mr Burgmann came to consider how any supplies could be given to the Russians. It was clear that we could send them no corn, as none was in store. It must be sent for, either to Smyrna or Alexandria. It seemed also clear that the only aid to be given them would be with money. We calculated that it would take from £50 to 100,000 per month. I said I perhaps could give £50,000, but of what use would that be? Admiral Greig pressed for that. I undertook to consider it.

Belmonte came. He said the Hereditary Prince had written a letter which had caused great consternation at the Ficuzza. The Hereditary Prince said that if the King did not agree, he should retire to the country and in order that his own sentiments and intentions might be known, he should give a proclamation declaring them. Belmonte had advised him to this. He opened his great eyes and said it was right. He said no answer had been received from the Ficuzza. The Queen appeared to rely upon the Russians.

- (1) Received accounts from Genl Airey of the Russians having crossed the Danube at Widdin. Sent the above intelligence and further letters to Trapani.
- (2) The Tartars are an independent tribe, but always attached to some great power, either Russia or Turkey.

Colli, Wednesday, September 2, 1812. Mr Mackenzie came. He told me Admiral Greig had said of the Emperor of Russia that he was a weak, uncertain man, having no generosity and no confidence in any one. Nobody had ever any influence over him. Mme Nouskin, to whom he had been so long attached, never got anything from him but a few roubles to pay her husband's debts. The Emperor was however very popular, principally from the pains he took to secure to his people the administration of justice. Constantine was very much hated for his horrible cruelties and crimes. The Emperor was attentive to him. The only way he took to check him was by publishing a proclamation for the apprehension of the persons guilty of such crimes of which the Emperor and everyone else knew Constantine to have been the author.

The Admiral had strongly written from Constantinople to advise the Emperor to give up Bessarabia, provided Serbia was left independent. He thought this indispensable for the honour of the Russian Army. Bessarabia is the province which Russia has gained by the last war. This cession would leave the Russian frontier where it had been.

The Duke of Orleans came. He said that some days ago Leopold had written to the Duchess saying that he hoped to be with her at a church fête that was to be given some days hence, on the square before the Duke's house. Perhaps he might be there sooner. On that day the Duchess had received a letter from the Queen, in which she said that she could no longer stay at the Ficuzza. Her room stank so much, and the *tortura* of the whole thing would soon kill her. She was resolved to come to Palermo. She was doubtful whether she should reside

at the palace or at Mezzo Monreale. She was resolved to go away as soon as the frigate could be prepared and should take Leopold with her to close her eyes.

The Duke thought she might come the following day. He thought this an opportunity of interfering and obtaining her absence from Sicily. He said that the Hereditary Prince had said to him: "*Nous ne serons tranquilles* until the Queen shall have left us". In which the Duke perfectly agreed. He said the Neapolitan party were not broken. He was much against any part of the Guards being kept; as long as any remained it mattered not what the number, the spirit would always continue. They were *lié* with the palace, with all the women of it; one with the other, that Neapolitan and hostile connection was always kept alive. I agreed in this but it appeared to me that we could not go this length. He agreed in the impolicy of the march of the Russians in the direction they had taken.

Belmonte came. He said he had told the Hereditary Prince that the Queen was coming, but he did not believe it. Di Aci followed. He said there was only pay and bread for three days, and that I must be prepared to say what I would do if tumult followed. I advised him as Minister of War, if the King would do nothing, to submit it to Parliament. He said he had seen Caccamo, who advised him to write a letter to the King, which he meant to do. It was also agreed that I should write a letter as Captain General to him as Minister of War, which I agreed to, and Belmonte and he dictated it in Italian, and it was written by Lamb and immediately sent, together with a copy to Belmonte, as Minister for Foreign Affairs .

Di Aci spoke of Craco. Said he was a *vaurien*. Had a wife and 7 children, whom he left in misery, while he kept a mistress with every sort of luxury. He was to be put the next day to the torture, in the *damusi*, to make him confess.

Dolce told me that the proposition made to the Peers that the consent of the three Houses was necessary to every act was a trick to frighten the Barons and that it had the effect. I desired him, as he was supposed to speak my sentiments, that we might talk over everything beforehand.

Di Aci allowed that Sir J. Dalrymple's remarks upon his calculation was correct.

Colli, Thursday, September 3, 1812.(1) Remained all day at the Colli. Heard that Cassaro had gone to the Colli. Lamb told me that his letters from England mentioned attempts being made to bring Canning in, and an offer to Lord Moira of the lord-lieutenancy of Ireland, who on his part made so many demands which it was impossible to satisfy. It was thought that it would be offered to Lord Wellesley.

(1) Packet arrived, 35 days, from England.

Colli, Friday, September 4, 1812. Admiral Greig came. I read him my dispatch of the 22nd of July to show him how strict my orders were to send everything to Spain, and how impossible under them to furnish any supplies of money. Admiral Greig saw the difficulties in which the corps was likely to be engaged and hoped they would return. He proposed to

advise Admiral Chichagoff to do so or, if too late, to march to Fiume and Trieste where he might subsist himself.

Talking of the Emperor he said, as an Englishman, he might say of him that he had been too dilatory and had been guilty of something worse than slowness. He said that Rumanzow had always said to the Emperor that peace with England was the affair of a *déjeuner*. The Admiral, who heard this and was at that time in the interior, desired his friend to tell him that it would require many *déjeuners* to settle this. Rumanzow thought we could not do without Russia; that she was necessary to our fleets, in which he was mistaken. Admiral Greig was aware of the want of preparation, but was afraid that our refusal to assist him might induce the Emperor to make peace sooner than he would otherwise do.

Admiral Greig said (in reply to a question I had asked him, what Mr Liston had said to him), answered that the first time he saw him, Mr Liston had answered that I had not 20,000 troops, the number estimated in Sicily, nor did he believe I could carry many out. He also said that to propose anything before the peace was made, or permission given by the Turks for the march of Admiral Chichagoff, I must necessarily answer that I could give no opinion. But the second time, after the peace was actually made, Mr Liston said I was a person to take a great deal of responsibility upon me, and that he would take his share also. I asked him if he had told Mr Liston to what extent aid would be wanted. He said no. I said that all I could give him in the way of assistance would be ammunition; that provisions I had not, as he had heard from Mr Burgmann; and that money, he saw by the dispatch, I was prevented from giving him. He did not know the calibre of muskets or cannon.

Prince Cassaro came by desire of the King to arrange with me about the Army. He was desired by the King not to let the Hereditary Prince know that he was charged with this commission for me. Cassaro said, however, that he had told it him in confidence. Cassaro asked the King for some paper, signed by his own hand, to authorize him to treat, which the King refused, but he said that he would give his word of honour. The Queen was not present.

Cassaro read me a paper written by the King in pencil, stating points which he was to require of me. The first was that there should be two battalions of Neapolitan Guards, one of which should remain here, and the other join the disposable force. Cassaro observed to him that hitherto he had been beloved by the people, but to refuse to trust himself to the Sicilians was showing a diffidence in them and was keeping up at the same time a corps which was hostile to the people. He ran therefore the risk of being hated instead of loved by the people. This staggered the King. He told the King the language held by the officers, who had said that they would show their bravery in the conquest of Sicily. The King was angry and said Ascoli would never have allowed them to use such language; that Cattolica was a man unfit for the command. At last he persuaded the King that it was most reasonable that it should be half Neapolitan and half Sicilian. But the King required that there should be 400 of each. I objected, but after much talking I answered that including everything, the number should be 700.

The next demand in the paper was 4 squads of cavalry, instead of three, to form the regiment of cavalry to remain in Sicily, but Cassaro persuaded him to give this up.

Therefore this was not asked. But as the proposed Horse Guards were not to be established, I proposed that the King's wish in this should be gratified.

The third was to keep the Cacciatori Reali, infantry and cavalry, instead of the Horse Guards, which, as being necessary to the King's comfort, I agreed to.

The King also required the regular payment of his and Leopold's pension with an addition, but Cassaro persuaded the King that this did not relate to me but to the Hereditary Prince.(1)

The King said he would not come to Palermo with the Queen, that was impossible. The Queen, who came in afterwards, hoped that the regiment of [the] Principe (Caracciolo) would not be given to the English, but Cassaro observing that it was desirable that the best regiment should go to the disposable force, and this being the best, the King said it was right it should go. The Queen said to Cassaro that she understood they were preparing her trial. Cassaro laughed at the idea. She asked if he would guarantee her from all attack or annoyance. He said he would on his part as chief of Justice, but he could not answer for the British Minister.

Belmonte came. He said the Hereditary Prince had been very ill, and dangerously for some time. The Hereditary Prince thought him [self] off, so much so that he told Belmonte that he had recommended his soul to God. He said the Hereditary Prince had laughed very heartily when Cassaro told him what the King had said about Ascoli .

I went in the evening to ask after the Prince. I saw his physician, the Marquess Vivenzio, who said he was very unwell. Upon my asking the cause and suggesting that it might be the great heat, he cried out, shaking with palsy all over: "*Ce n'est pas la chaleur; c'est sa mère, sa mère*".

(1) When Santoro was arrested, the Queen dismissed the rest of the band with 100 ounces.

Colli, Saturday, September 5, 1812. (1) Mr Mackenzie told me that it appeared from some of Admiral Chichagoff's letters in English to Admiral Greig that the Russians had received the same proposal from Milan as we had by Turri. Greig said it was a great secret and did not enter into particulars. Mr Mackenzie(2) said that the Admiral wished to have medicines and said that the Russian Army was totally unprovided with them. I said he must make a requisition for them.

I saw Admiral Greig afterwards. He hoped it possible that Admiral Chichagoff had not begun his march, and that the corps that had crossed the Danube was only to be more prepared for the march, if the Turks should consent. He did not know whether to go or to stay, and would do what I thought best. I declined giving any opinion. He said he had spoken with Johnson, who had satisfied him of the impossibility of the army getting through. I told him of the debate in the House of Commons, in which Lord Castlereagh had expressly said that they had held out no expectation to Russia of assistance from Great Britain; that it must be a national war.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He had received Mahon gazettes speaking of another victory on the 27th by Lord Wellington over Marmont's army.(3) He said the Queen had said nothing more lately of going. 8

Di Aci came.(4) Read me a proposed motion of his, declaring the succession of the Crown to be hereditary "unless the Parliament declared it otherwise"; also sanctioning by law resistance to the royal authority in particular cases. I advised him to omit these clauses. There was no necessity to sanction those acts which were acts of revolution, perhaps necessary, by law. He proposed that we should unite to settle future military arrangements. Belmonte came. He had seen the Hereditary Prince. A messenger from England had brought to the Sicilian Government, from Castelcicala, all the details of his conversation with Lord Castlereagh and the Regent. It filled twelve sides of paper in cipher. Belmonte said to the Hereditary Prince, laughing, that it might appear odd that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should ask His Royal Highness the contents of these dispatches, but although His Royal Highness did not exactly give him his confidence, yet he had much *bonté pour lui* and he begged to trespass upon it so far as to ask what these dispatches expressed. He told the Hereditary Prince that one way or other he should know them, if His Royal Highness would not tell him. The Hereditary Prince laughed and told him that Castelcicala said that he had seen the Prince Regent, and Lord Castlereagh he had spoken with frequently; that nothing could be more unsatisfactory than their language; that they approved of everything I had done. Lord Castlereagh said all would do well if they attended to my recommendation. Lord Castlereagh had said that they had no other desire but to support the reigning family, provided that due attention were paid to my advice.

The Hereditary Prince said that this dispatch, which was sent to the King the night before, would occasion the greatest *épouvante* at the Ficuzza. The Hereditary Prince said he accepted the terms with satisfaction, both for himself and his successors. He was assured of his crown. His policy and path were clear, to make common cause with England. He desired nothing better. But, he said, this would not please his parents. He said if his mother was gone, the King would be easily reconciled to what was going on.

(1) Doctor Holland called upon me, a traveller recommended by Lady Stamford.

(2) Mr Mackenzie said he had seen all Admiral Greig's dispatches to Constantinople and Chichagoff, all expressing his disappointment but much satisfied with the cordiality of my reception and with my favourable disposition.

(3) Not true, I fear.

(4) Di Aci told me that Salvaggio had asked his interest not to be sent on foreign service.

Colli, Sunday, September 6, 1812. Came to town to prepare dispatch for Mr Johnson.

Colli, Monday, September 7, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. He showed me the draft of his treaty. I gave him our own, which was much shorter. He was to take them both to the Hereditary Prince. I objected to some passages and also to the promise required of the King

of England, that he would do all in his power to obtain Naples for the family. Also to the relinquishment of all the pecuniary payments made lately from the subsidy, the deduction of which from the monthly payments of the subsidy would, if the subsidy had not been withheld, have been already paid.

I told Count La Tour of my intention to have gone to Italy if the Court had consented to my proposals.

(1) Arrived Carlotta with dispatches from Sir Edward Pellew, confirming accounts of Lord Wellington's being at Madrid.

Colli, Tuesday, September 8, 1812. Mr Johnson sailed with the messenger for Constantinople.

I saw Belmonte for a moment. He came to ask for news for the Hereditary Prince.

Dolce brought me the article proposed by the committee of which he was a member, regulating the press and establishing its freedom. The penalties seemed severe.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. I read him my letters received from Sir E. Pellew. He told me the hostile stories circulated by the Neapolitan party, that all their distress was ascribed to me, and that the improvements proposed by me were compared with the former advantages they received when enjoying the English ration.

Colli, Wednesday, September 9, 1812. (1) Belmonte brought me the treaty approved by the Prince, with the same points to which I had formerly objected. He had inserted them to please the Prince. I noted to him all the parts that were objectionable and to which I could not consent, which he wrote down. He said the article of Naples would meet with great difficulty.

At dinner(2) he told me that he had not shown the paper to the Hereditary Prince, as it was necessary that he should be present with the necessary reasons.

Di Aci came to settle with MacFarlane and me the military arrangements.

(1) Crocus, Capt. Smith, arrived with letters from Genl Maitland dated 22nd and 23rd August. Had retired upon Alicante.

(2) Dined with the Duke of Orleans. The dinner was for Admiral Greig.

Colli, Thursday, September 10, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. He told me that the Hereditary Prince had given up the parts of the treaty to which I had made objections, and that he did not think it necessary to send it to the Ficuzza so that it might be signed immediately. Belmonte had in consequence ordered it to be translated from Italian into French, and it might be ready tomorrow. He said that the Duchess had received a letter from the Queen,

stating that if her governors would allow her, she intended to come to Palermo on Monday.(2)

Dolce told me that the question in the Demaniale respecting a committee to be formed to arrange the magistracy was carried by two voices: 19 against, 21 for.

(1) Heard that the Black Sea was opened.

(2) Belmonte said that with the north wind his haemorrhoids were always worse.

Colli, Friday, September 11, 1812. Belmonte came. He said he hoped the treaty would be ready for signature tonight. He brought me a list of the subsidy that was due, and hoped that the money advanced for the purchase of slaves and a loan (I forget what) should not now be demanded. He said the Queen was to come on Tuesday.

Villa Hermosa came and showed me a private note from the Hereditary Prince to himself, desiring to him to execute a recommendation of Di Aci that a ship with contraband goods going to Naples should be stopped. He also showed me a note from Di Aci, proposing that this should not be done till the ship was at sea. He showed it me in confidence, and asked my opinion. I said I supposed that there must be a suspicion of some concealed papers, but Di Aci ought to have told him. I told him my bad opinion of Di Aci, and that I thought he was not to be trusted in anything.

I talked to him about the magistratures and told him my opinion that the nation could not pay 23. He said each district must pay for their own. I thought this objectionable, because it would fall hard upon the poor districts and all equally benefited; that a place like Palermo should equally assist to the general good; that all taxes ought to be raised by the Crown. I urged upon him strongly to pay the judges well; good salaries were indispensable to honest administration. It was better to have half the number of magistrates and pay them well.

Colli, Saturday, September 12, 1812. Prince Belmonte brought the treaty with two copies: in one the King of Sicily and his own name and seal stood first; in the other, the King of England's and mine. Major Marshall sealed it. I observed to him that I thought there was a mistake in one of the calculations in our favour, which could be afterwards settled by a Note. I thought it might amount to 10,000 oz. I begged him to mention it now to the Prince, in order that he might not be hereafter alarmed.

He said the Queen was to come on Tuesday.

I wrote to him to request the Hereditary Prince to issue the *dispaccio* fixing the powers of Captain General. Belmonte wrote me back a note saying that the Hereditary Prince would direct Di Aci to call upon me the next day.

Colli, Sunday, September 13, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. He said he had spoken to the Hereditary Prince about the error in the calculation, which at first alarmed the Hereditary Prince. Di Aci was present and Belmonte mentioned it and asked him if it was so. Di Aci

said he believed it was so. Di Aci was also annoyed that the balance to be paid over to the Sicilian Government had not been fixed so as to cover them from loss in case of further depression of the exchange. Di Aci said it had been so settled between us. I said I was not aware, and at any rate it was as broad as it was long, equal for both parties.

I told Belmonte the substance of my letter to the King. He said the Hereditary Prince had been very anxious to know why I had asked for post horses for the Ficuzza and whether I was going. Belmonte said he supposed not, as I had only required two. Belmonte said he could not tell him why I went. The Hereditary Prince was anxious, as Belmonte supposes, to communicate the intended mission and, if possible, the motive of it to the King by the night courier. Belmonte was persuaded the Queen did not mean to go away. He said that the Prince's feelings he conceived to be these: an anxious desire for her departure, but an unwillingness as son to appear in any way to posterity to have behaved undutifully to his mother.

Milner returned before dinner. The King was at dinner, received him very ill; appeared angry and only said that he would return an answer by his son.

(1) Captain Clifford sailed in Richmond, Lt O'Shaughnasee, with my dispatches and treaty for England. Begged him to hire me a second groom. Left all arrangements with him. Captain Milner went with letter to the King at the Ficuzza.

Colli, Monday, September 14, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. Said the Queen had had a fit the night before, and was very ill. The Hereditary Prince had gone to the Ficuzza at 7 and the Duke three hours afterwards. She had written to the Duchess of Orleans before the fit and spoke of the receipt of my letter. Was very much enraged and declared she would not go away. She added something to the letter after the fit, but written with a hand very much affected.

Di Aci came to settle with me and MacFarlane the orders to be given out about the powers of the Captain General and the new arrangements. He doubted the Queen's having had a real fit; a mere pretext not to go away. He said he had been with Cassaro, where he had found Brissac who was reading a letter received from the Queen, wherein she sent a copy of my letter, which she called *impertinentissima*.

Princess Paternò came with Adernò and the Duke of Ferla, the last of whom wanted a commission for his son in the Guards, and the other pretended to ask for a regiment for Adernò. I said that not having been in the Army, it was impossible. Prince Paternò paid me a long visit.

(1) Queen very ill.

Colli, Tuesday, September 15, 1812.

Prince Di Aci came. He told me he had seen the Hereditary Prince since his return from the Ficuzza. He had never been so well received by the King, who was extremely kind to him. He told him that he was resolved not to interfere with him and that he might carry on the government as he pleased.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans, who had returned from the Ficuzza at one in the morning. He said the Queen's attack was not so violent as the former one; that she was talking to St Clair and fell off her chair. He held her while assistance could be obtained. She was then put to her bed and she did not return to herself for half an hour; upon the former occasion she was senseless for above an hour. He found her weak but much recovered and as well as before she had been only after a week. He said the King was in excellent spirits and excessively kind both to him and the Duchess and the Hereditary Prince, whom he embraced tenderly and called him *mio amatissimo Francesco*. The King sat with the Duke and Duchess all the time of dinner, which was late, and put off his own evening ride. Talked of the Colli which, he said, was the most agreeable spot at this season. He was anxious to go there. Talked of the hares and of the game: the hares required to be killed; if there were too many, they were subject to an epidemical disorder.

The Duke said the Queen had written some days before a letter to the Duchess that was quite incoherent and illegible, and such as might have been presented to a committee of physicians in proof of insanity. But she had written afterwards a very long, *raisonnée* letter upon her situation, perfectly well written in all respects. He was convinced she did not mean to go and when he first heard of the attack, he thought it was a feint to avoid being sent away, but he was now sure of its being a real attack. He said she should come to town the day before San Gennaro's day, to confess and to make a marriage.

The Duke said it was a most delicate job the sending her away, that it would certainly meet from many with animadversion. The Queen had written that the letter was full of compliment.

I said that now, if it had been so resolved, after this attack and at this season, her departure was impossible. I then told him that I did not expect this; that my letter had that meaning but another also. I told him my orders were to prevent her interference and her residence was left to my own discretion. Nobody could think that that influence would cease as long as she remained with the King. He thought she might be induced by money to go away. I doubted it, power being her object and every happiness ceasing with it. I was sure she never would leave the island, as the door against her return to power would be shut for ever.

I went to Belmonte. He told me that his version of the King's extreme good humour and of the Queen's illness was this (he had mentioned his idea to the Hereditary Prince and the Duke, who both agreed with him). He imagines that the King, upon receiving my letter, was excessively angry with the Queen. He supposes him to have said to her: "You are always telling me that Bentinck has no instructions, and yet you see how he writes. I am determined this shall cease and I will have no more trouble". Belmonte supposes this to have affected the Queen excessively; that she had talked it over to St Clair, and that the effect was the fit. He said that the King was never so pleased as when he had made a resolution. His extraordinary kindness to the Hereditary Prince and his language to him confirms this idea.

Colli, Wednesday, September 16, 1812. (1) Saw Fardella and afterwards Di Aci about the military arrangements.

Belmonte told me that the letters received by the Hereditary Prince from the King within these two days were extremely kind. The Queen is not to come till Saturday, and only to remain three days.

Mr Mackenzie was telling me of his having learnt archery in Circassia; that they were wonderful bowmen, their arrows were headed with iron; at 150 yards they were sure of their mark. Their custom was to lay in ambush about the wells and watering places where the Tartars, their enemies, came to water. The Russians were very much annoyed and feared an arrow more than a musket ball; the ukase was terrible. Many of the Tartar Cossacks in Poland carried bows and annoyed the French very much. It required great strength and art and the exertion of the whole body to string a bow. When the emperor was made at Constantinople, he went out the next day to draw the bow, and stones are fixed all around Constantinople marking the distance of the shot. The difference between the late and former sovereigns as to distance is very evident. Mr Mackenzie saw archery at Constantinople and saw some extraordinarily powerful men. One he mentioned, that drew the bow sitting and excelled all the others.

(1) General MacFarlane expressed his uneasiness at the possibility of his being obliged not to go on service when I might go.

Colli, Thursday, September 17, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. Lamb gave him the official Note asking for Castrone, Milano, two Cassetis and Raimondi. It was a question whether the Hereditary Prince would give them up. We did not think he would, and to refuse them would place him in a very awkward predicament.

Belmonte told us that the Queen did not come on Saturday. The Hereditary Prince told him that that was the day when the King confessed and he imagined the Queen did not like to leave him alone with the Père Caccamo. Belmonte asked the Hereditary Prince where the Queen was to live, whether at the palace or Santa Croce. Belmonte said it was an advantage that she should not be with the King. Belmonte added that he would say an impertinence to His Royal Highness, if he dared. The Hereditary Prince desired him to say it. Belmonte said "but here the Queen will increase her influence over Your Royal Highness". The Hereditary Prince said: "No, no; the Queen has no longer the power of directing me. She has no influence over me". "Perhaps", said Belmonte, "but at any rate she will affect your health, which is weak". The Hereditary Prince thought this possible.

(1) We dined with Lord Montgomerie.

Colli, Friday, September 18, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. He told me that he had seen the Père Caccamo and had given him his opinion that he ought to advise the King to induce the Queen to go away; that it was impossible for her to resist the determination of the British Government, now more particularly that I commanded the Army and the Militia; that he might, by refusing, expose himself to humiliation.

Cassaro was near and Belmonte called him up and told him the advice he had given, which Cassaro strongly supported. Caccamo told them that he had once written to the King to the same effect, stating that the Queen's absence would alone ensure his tranquillity. The Père Galato gave his letter to the Queen, and it was from the King he learnt it, because the King told him that the Queen had observed to him that he, Caccamo, was writing to this effect to him, whereas, said the King, "I have never received such letters from you. What does this mean?" He explained it to him.

Belmonte talked to the Hereditary Prince about the persons asked for by me in the Note of yesterday. The Hereditary Prince was embarrassed. He said they could not be given up. "What will the public say to my giving up the means of accusing my mother?" Belmonte said this was a *gladium anceps*. What would the world say if he did not? That he knew of his mother's guilt. The Hereditary Prince called in Cassaro, who recommended that, as the insecurity of their confinement was the only reason assigned, the Note should be answered by saying that no persons had ever escaped and good care would be taken; and he desired Belmonte to tell me that it was impossible for him, as son, to give up those persons who were supposed implicated with his mother.

(1) Received letter from Admiral Fremantle relating to the march of the Russians.
Also letter from Mr Hill.

Palermo, Saturday, September 19, 1812. (1) Belmonte, in telling me that the Hereditary Prince's complaint might be dangerous, said it was necessary we should be prepared for that event.

The Duke of Orleans came. Told me that Leopold had written that the Queen was to come on Monday and was to reside at the palace. Stated how anxious she was that the Hereditary Prince should previously go out, but he was sure that he would not. King gone to some distance from the Ficuzza about an exchange of lands.

Talking of the Hereditary Prince's illness, he said his death would be a great national loss. This might have been said to feel my pulse. I looked at him, but his face discovered no symptom of any other intention than mere remark.

(1) The Hereditary Prince very ill. Belmonte himself better.

Desired San Giovanni to ask if Lt-Col. Amelio did or did not wish to command the battalion of Guards.

Occupied with the Inspectors Menichini, Rosenheim, Fardella and MacFarlane in arranging the organization of the regiments.

Sunday, September 20, 1812. Admiral Greig told me that Buonaparte had said to Count Tolstoi, Minister from Russia at Paris, that he knew the Russian nobility hated him, but, he added, some day or other *ils en répondront*.

The Grand Duke Constantine one day at parade asked Caulaincourt if the French guards could present their arms as exactly. Caulaincourt made no answer. He continued and said: "*Avouez* that they are not able"; upon which Caulaincourt replied: "*ils ne font pas attention à ces bagatelles-là*".

Admiral Greig said that the French were unpopular at Moscow. De Genet, an aide-de-camp of Caulaincourt, went there. He was ill received. It gave rise to the saying: "he was de Genet at Petersburg, but *géné* at Moscow". Admiral Greig, who was there at the time, heard him say that the English were more popular at Moscow.

The Admiral gave an example of the attention paid to political affairs by the Russians. He went into a peasant's house about 40 miles from Petersburg. The man sent out his family and asked him if he were not at war with England, and the reason why. The Admiral answered yes, but the reason rested with the Emperor. The peasant said: "I am told England is a very small island". "Yes". "And that it has a navy". "Yes, ten times as large as Russia". "Then" - he said - "our troops cannot go there, and from its small size it cannot come here. Then", he added, "why are we at war?"

Monday, September 21, 1812. (1) Belmonte told me that the Prince was very ill and too unwell to see anybody.

The Queen came to town. Private intelligence represented her to be in great distress.

Saw a letter in lemon juice from the Queen in which she states her anxiety and uncertainty about her own situation. Seemed to wish to go, but feared violence from the English on the voyage.

(1) Blew heavy gale of wind.

Came in Furieuse, Capt. Mocenigo, the night before. Letters landed in the morning from Genl Maitland and Fleet. In the evening came in Goshawk, with letters from Genl Maitland and his resignation. Wrote immediately to Genl Clinton to come to Palermo in order to go on to Spain.

Tuesday, September 22, 1812. Belmonte told me that the Queen had said to Cassaro that she would not go; that the Prince Regent (taking him off) had graciously permitted her, had had the *clémence* to allow her to remain near Palermo and visit her family. She appeared quite bold and determined, but a moment after, upon Cassaro telling her that the Hereditary Prince was going to the Bocca di Falco, she appeared alarmed and said very anxiously: "Is he certainly going there?", and said with the same anxiety: "Does he take his children with him?" Upon which Cassaro told Belmonte, laughing, "I tranquillized Her Majesty by saying 'every one of them'". It was the only comfort he had for all the fatigue and suffering he was

obliged to undergo. Belmonte said she said different things to everybody upon the same subject. He imagines her belief to be that, while in the house, either with the Hereditary Prince or with the family, I would not dare to give anything like offence or insult to them. He had seen the Hereditary Prince that morning, who was much better. Belmonte had shown him my Note about the Army. Said it was excellent. Belmonte proposed to communicate it to Parliament, saying to him that it would have more effect than any representation from Ministers. He told me also that they had had a Council about grain, when Di Aci had proposed that a forced contribution in grain should be made from all the island, to be paid for when sold at a fixed rate. Belmonte resisted this to the utmost of his power. He begged me to write to the Prince or Poli to represent the injustice and disorder that might be occasioned, and to say that, being answerable for the safety and tranquillity of the country, I could not but represent against the ill consequences of such a measure. I wrote to Poli the same night.

He talked of the Prince and the Queen. He said he was most anxious that she should go away, but his filial duty and his fear of what posterity would say of him would prevent him from agreeing to any active measure regarding it. Belmonte in conversing to him adverted to her influence over him, and said that she had described them as revolutionists, as persons who wanted to deprive him of all power, to dethrone him, etc. "Your Royal Highness has discovered the fallacy of these statements and has shown us kindness". Then he said smiling: "*Dunque mi credete buono adesso!*" (and now you think me good, then).

I had sent for St Clair in the morning, and told him that as he was interested in the welfare of the royal family, and in the Queen in particular, I had sent for him to converse with him upon the subject. I told him I had received no answer from the King and should apply to him again; I did not know whether to attribute this to the silence of the King or to the illness of the Hereditary Prince, who might have received his orders. I had orders to execute, and <that> I must and would perform them. The Queen was always flattering herself that I was exceeding my powers and that I should be recalled.

He said the Prince Regent had told Castelcicala that he had no objection to her residence near Palermo, to which place she might occasionally come to see her family. I said I could not know what the Prince Regent had said, but the assertion he had made was at variance with my instructions and I did not believe it. It appeared that the Queen had never any intention of going. He said she could not go; her age and no route open. I said I was convinced she never meant it by choosing a Sicilian Frigate. He said that was pique. He said that it had been unlucky that other means had not been adopted. She was to be persuaded by *la douceur* and *par des manières engageantes*. I said I knew there was no other mode but necessity. I begged him to communicate what I had said to the Queen. In this conversation I simply required the Queen's absence, without saying where.(1)

(1) Received note from Belmonte stating the Prince's wish that the Counsellors excluded might attend a great Council to be held on the supply matter.

Wednesday, September 23, 1812. Belmonte told me that the Note I had written to Poli had been translated and laid before the Council, and had all success by preventing the reading of Di Aci's proposition, who said it was useless and everybody was against him.

Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince has spoken to the Queen in the strongest terms to go away, and not compromise the King and all her family. The Queen said this to Nunziante, observing: "The Vicar General" (not "my son") "advises me to go away".

Fagan had seen the Queen. He gives a written account of his conversation. He said she abused the Duke of Orleans very much; that it was his plan and Belmonte's to depose the Prince. She said she would never see him again.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans in the evening. He told me that he had seen the Queen and thought, from her long pauses, that she meant to attack him. He said the poor Duchess had been badly agitated by her. The Duchess wanted the Duke to interfere with me. But he asked what could he do: was it her, or any other's opinion that her intriguing or her misery would decrease but with her absence? She promised not to interfere, but was it possible? He therefore could not interfere. She thought of doing so herself but I said I hoped she would not, as it could not be productive of any advantage.

He told me that the Hereditary Prince had taken courage and had strongly advised the Queen to go away. He said the Hereditary Prince had crawled to her room and the Queen had abused him very much. He said to the Duchess: "You know what I had to suffer". The Queen said to the Duchess she had been for two hours by the Prince's bedside during his sufferings to mark his countenance.

The Duke read me a letter he had received from the Duke of Kent and Dumouriez, in which they both mention Lord Bathurst having stated the strong terms in which I had written about him and his employment, but Lord Bathurst added nothing more.

Thursday, September 24, 1812. Belmonte came. He told me that the Queen had sent for Cassaro, who was to come afterwards to me. Cassaro had wished him to come to advise me of his coming and to propose to me by way of strengthening his case with the King that I should show him the proofs I had against the Queen.

Cassaro came afterwards,⁽¹⁾ and said that he had received a letter from the King in which he informed him that he heard I was to write to him again and that he did not wish to receive any more impertinent letters from me. He desired him to ask in his name that I should show to him (Cassaro) the proofs I had against the Queen, whom the King desired that I would leave quiet.

He said that the Queen had sent for him and asked his advice, which, begging to be excused if it was not agreeable, he gave her. He told her that she was universally detested and that the unfavourable opinion of the public against her had reached to such a pitch that when the Hereditary Prince was taken [ill], it was generally said that she had poisoned him. The Queen answered: "*Je le sais*". He advised her strongly to go away for a year. In that time things would be forgot and she might then return with comfort to her family.

Cassaro then asked me for the proofs. I told him that I could only show them to the King, which I was still ready to do; that it was not delicate, and I was sure it would not be

approved in England, that I should exhibit to a subject proofs of the misconduct of the Queen. But, I said, I would show him the dispatch from my own Government, in which he would see the conviction expressed by my own Government of the sufficiency of those proofs. He thought this very fair and it would answer the double purpose of showing the opinion of my own Government (always difficult) as to the truth of the facts, as well as their orders as to the measures to be taken in consequence. He thought the Queen would go away. He knew her well. She had always expressed herself very decidedly before, but that morning she had spoken doubtfully.

He went home and I followed him in an hour with the original dispatches, which were translated to him by the Marquis Spaccaforno. Cassaro took the substance. I told him these being the instructions of my Government, I could only show them to him in confidence. He wrote down, in consequence, what he was to say, which he stated and I approved. It was then agreed that he should add that I not only required that the Queen should go away, but that the day should be fixed; that when the Queen had made up her mind and had resolved to go, that to all the necessary arrangements I should be glad to give every facility and to consult her comfort in everything.

(1) The Queen said to Cassaro: "Even *ce petit imbecile de Fagan me conseille de partir*".

Friday, September 25, 1812. Di Aci and Belmonte came to me about the contraband of vegetables, and to propose that the vessels bearing the English flag and suspected of this traffic should be searched jointly by an English and Sicilian officer. Belmonte observed that the fixed price was so low that they were obliged to seek a better market. I said the proposition seemed reasonable, but I begged him to write me a Note, and not being conversant with the subject, I would in the meantime consider it.

Di Aci then told us that his physician was one of the three called to the council of physicians upon the Queen's case; that two of them said it was poison, the other thought not, but said it was poison engendered by the habit itself. The Queen was present. She said to the physicians, before the Hereditary Prince: "If you think him in danger, it will be necessary for me to send for the King that he may see his son before he dies". The Hereditary Prince wept, and so did the Queen. The Queen then said: "You see how my son's situation afflicts me. Have I not been to you a good mother?" He said yes.

Villermosa came. He said my Note of the day before had acted like a bomb. He showed me and Lamb the edict, the folly of which we pointed out to him.

Fagan came. Had been with the Queen for an hour and a half. Very violent, he had never seen her so much so. Cassaro had given her an account of my conversation with him. He said I had brought some papers in a little green box; that he was surprised I had shown them, as they showed I had not the powers I pretended to have.(1) She had always thought so, and now he had been convinced. He said that I was very violent, so much so that if I had been a Sicilian, I should be put in a madhouse; that I had said that 72 people were to be sent away. The Queen said that Bonaparte was a *joli enfant doux* in comparison of Bentinck. She would not go unless with the King, who was determined to accompany her. She said

the Sicilians might take her to the block; she should make them a speech (which I forget). I did whatever Paternò's shoe and the barons decided.

(1) !!! Can this be true?

Saturday, September 26, 1812. (1) Belmonte came. He said he had seen Cassaro, who had given him an account of his conversation with the Queen. Cassaro, foreseeing the probable objections of the Queen to his relating to the King exactly what had passed, had written immediately after seeing me to His Majesty. Cassaro then went to the Queen and told her that I had brought my dispatches to him, in which it appeared that the British Government was perfectly satisfied with the proofs and had given me unlimited powers. The Queen then endeavoured most earnestly to prevent him from communicating to the King the sufficiency of the proof. But Cassaro persisted in saying his duty obliged him to do so. The Queen never suspected that he had done so. The Queen was very angry and told him that he was *un de la généralité*, which piqued Cassaro's pride excessively, and he answered that he was so, but a crime the guilt of which would be in the proportion of one to an ignorant person, and ten to him, to Her Majesty would be a thousand.

She said to him, "and what do these English mean to do with me?" He answered: "To take you away with the troops". She said: "And have they the power to do so?" He said: "What prevents them from sending some regiments?" She said: "The populace will rise in my favour". "Madam, why will you deceive yourself upon this subject? You are surrounded by the worst people. Your antechamber, through which I just came, offered a spectacle that represents the *galères* rather than the room of a palace. Your Majesty should bar up that door (the private entrance), and leave only open that, the public approach". "*Savez-vous,*" she said, "*que le Prince vous déteste?*". He said: "I have no reason to think so, but if he does, *quoique je sois un de la généralité*, I am not in want and can retire without reluctance to the comforts of my family". "*Les Ministres,*" she said, "*sont jaloux de vous*". He answered: "*C'est possible*, but all I can say is that since a Government was formed, I cannot conceive an administration more united or acting together with greater harmony". She said: "I will make a capitulation with Lord Bentinck. I will stay with the King to the spring and the King and I will then go away together".

(1) Hereditary Prince dangerously ill. Fagan sent me word that the Queen had sent a person to him to say the Hereditary Prince was too unwell to hold the reins of government.

Paternò, president of committee, came about the grain. We went to Villermosa's together. Curious scene, Paternò cried.

Sunday, September 27, 1812. (1) Partens told me, but only upon my statement, very imperfect, of the Prince's symptoms, that his illness did not arise from poison. He said the symptoms would be continued and not periodical.

The Duke of Orleans came. He had dined with the King, who was neither in good nor in bad spirits. The Queen did not look very well. She said she had been threatened with another convulsion. The Queen had a long conversation with the Duke. He had expected to be charged with a commission for me. The Duchess had told him that the Queen intended it, and he had always refused. In the present conversation he answered not a word. It began by her paying him a great many compliments, assuring him of his respects and of her always having wished him well. The Duke answered that he was gratified at her saying so, and should be much more so if she really thought so...(the rest after).

The Duke said that the Queen was very much enraged with Cassaro for having written so strongly to the King. I had remarked that perhaps her anger arose from the freedom with which he had spoken to her. He answered that the Queen never cared what was said to her. The Queen had said to him that while the King was away shooting⁽²⁾ she should go into a convent. She was anxious to go back to the Ficuzza. The King proposed she should go into Caccamo's convent, at Santa Maria del Bosco.

Upon receiving Cassaro's letter, the King had sent for Caccamo. He had gone two or three hours before the violent convulsion of the Hereditary Prince. The Queen then sent for the King and the Duke thought it was done in great measure to separate Caccamo from the King. The Queen said she had a manifesto ready to be published to all Europe. She told him that the Prince of Wales had dined with the King of France at Oatlands and that, unless he promised to give the English Constitution to France, he should not have a single British soldier. The only remark the Duke made upon the political part of the conversation was: "*Cela ne serait pas si mal*".

(1) Hereditary Prince much better. King came to town at half past 5. He went immediately to the Hereditary Prince, and they both shed tears.

(2) His distant preserves were to be given up, and he was now going previously to kill all the game.

Monday, September 28, 1812. Prince Cassaro came. He went to the palace the evening before in consequence of my having asked him for an answer. He went at an unusual time and the King, when he was told of his being there, said he supposed it was *qualche diavoleria di Bentinck*. He saw the King and told him what I had stated. The King said he could not and would not drive his wife away; that he must speak to the Queen herself. Cassaro went to the Queen, who said she would stay till the spring, and then go away with the King. She would never separate herself from the King. Cassaro then proposed that she should go for the present to Castelvetro.

I said I was aware that she could not go to Germany for the present, that she might go to Malta. Cassaro said he had mentioned that to her, but she said she would not go there, where she should be a prisoner to the English. I then said that I should be satisfied with Castelvetro, provided the King promised me that she should go there immediately, that she should not return to Palermo, and that she should go away in the spring. Cassaro said the King would not promise in writing. I said I should be satisfied with the King's verbal

promise communicated by him, Cassaro. Cassaro said that he was received very coolly by the King, he supposes in consequence of the Queen's influence. He repeated to me again what he had said to the Queen about barring up her door. When he went into her chamber, the canonico Macchia (a person sent away) was there, and Baron Vardeca (a very bad character) had been there for two hours.

Di Aci told us that Cattolica had said in the Parliament that so many vagabonds wanted to go to her that the sentry refused them admittance; but a servant came from the Queen to admit them all.

Tuesday, September 29, 1812. (1). Lady William told me that Belmonte had said that he was desired to say by the Hereditary Prince how sensible he was of the interest we had taken for him. Belmonte told him that he, who had seen us nearer, could assure him of our sincerity. Belmonte told him that nothing that has passed was permitted to interfere with my sincere interest for him. The Hereditary Prince said: "*Comment ! n' ai-je pas fait tout ce qu'il a demandé?*" "*Oui, Monseigneur*, but not until you were forced". Belmonte said he was very much pleased with the attention and appearance of good will towards him on the part of the people. In effect, the first day he had gone out, everybody ran out of their houses to see him as he passed and showed great regard for him.

Spaccaforno came and told me that his father had given my message to the Queen, who (to use his expression) played the devil and said she could give no answer till she had seen the King.

(1) Received a letter from Genl Oakes mentioning that the Russian Army in Moldavia had returned to Russia.

Wednesday, September 30, 1812. (1) Di Aci came to invite, with MacFarlane, me, Sir J. Dalrymple and Fardella to talk over certain parts of the new military arrangement which appeared objectionable. Several points were satisfactorily arranged.(2)

I saw Belmonte. He said he had met the Queen in the Cassero. They had saluted each other. When the Queen came home, she told the Duchess that she had seen him and that she would give anything to have a conversation with him. The Duchess told her that Prince Belmonte had the same desire, and told her the fact that a few days before Belmonte, on the stairs of the palace, had believed she was coming, and had gone directly towards her, Di Aci trying to stop him. Belmonte then mentioned his having once mistaken the Queen for some other person and had gone up to her and shaken her violently by the hand. The Queen, not at all annoyed, asked what was the matter. He said it was in a distraction; said he had mistaken [her] for some other person. She insisted upon knowing whom. He answered that it was impossible.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans in the evening. He told me that the Queen had attacked him violently. She had said to him that she supposed he knew what was intended to be done against her; that she was to be driven away. She knew how honest he was, and that he

would not permit such a thing to be done. The Duke answered nothing. She then said: "*Vous parlerez pour moi a Lord William*". He said que *c'est un sujet très pénible et très délicat*. Upon this she got up in a great fury, abused him extremely and went out of the room. The next day the Duchess went to her, and she pretended to have entirely forgot what had passed. She said: "I have some faint recollection of having said something unpleasant to the Duke; did I do so? I did not mean it. I know his relations with Lord Bentinck. It would be wrong that he should interfere in this business". She praised him very much and said she had always loved him.

St Clair called upon the Duke and talked to him about, the Queen's situation and asked his advice. The Duke said it was better for herself and for everybody else that she should go away. St Clair said she could not separate herself from the King. The Duke laughed at him. St Clair also said that the King would not be quiet if she went away. The Duke put it directly to him if in three months, one month, even a fortnight the King would not be as content and reconciled as was the Hereditary Prince. He said "Yes, *mais au fond du coeur* he would be dissatisfied as was the Hereditary Prince". The Duke answered it did not much signify what was *au fond du coeur*.

The Duke told him that they had suggested every proposition themselves: who first proposed abdication? The Queen. Who going out of the kingdom? The Queen. The Duke said the best thing the King could do would be to abdicate, and then the Queen might stay where she pleased. St Clair said the King never would do that. St Clair said that the Queen had no influence and did not meddle. The Duke said: "You know that I, who know the interior as well as you do, know better, and you know otherwise yourself" (St Clair assented). "Why does the Queen at every moment hold up the King as King and say 'but he had not abdicated, he is always King'? Does this mean that he never means again to interfere with public business?" The Duke's opinion was that the King and Queen would both go and live for the future at Castelvetrano. The King liked it. The Queen, in adverting to the conditions which I required, said that one was that she should never see the King again (not true). He understood from Leopold that the Queen was to return on the 4th November.

(1) Genl Clinton and Borland arrived from Messina, and Mr Floyd, his aide-de-camp.

(2) Fardella and Di Aci, hating each other most horribly, met like friends. They act well here!

Thursday, October 1, 1812. Rode out with Genl Clinton and showed him Belmonte's and the Favorita. He told me Gordon was to be head of the Staff. Said he was very ambitious. He had been very *lié* with Huskisson, who, being much in Mr Pitt's confidence, introduced Gordon to Mr Pitt. Mr Pitt was very much pleased with him and offered to employ him in the Treasury at a salary of £2,000 per ann[um]. As the Deputy Secretary he had only one. The Duke, hearing of this, would not part with him and asked from Mr Pitt the same salary of £2,000 that Gordon had lost by not going into the Treasury, which was granted. Clinton thought it hard that the Advocate-Generalship had been taken from his brother. Was not

pleased at his own removal, but having had it 7 years he thought it less unreasonable. He seemed to think that it was as improper for Gordon, the head of his department, to leave his situation in England, and yet this was not objected to.

Friday, October 2, 1812. (1) Had my first visit with the Hereditary Prince since his illness. He thanked me for the interest Lady William and I had taken about him. He looked much clearer and better than before but thinner.

I submitted to him the new organization of the Army, and various points connected with it as contained in paper dated October 2. He said he had introduced the promotion by rewarding in the whole line upon a principle of justice. I told him all the inconveniences, and he agreed to the proposed change.

I talked to him about the graduation of the Guards. He said he had protested strongly against the measure to the King.

We talked about the removal by the Parliament of all the foreign officers from their situations. I thought it very unjust and he was strongly of this opinion. For the future yes, he said, but for the past no. He objected to Rosenheim as Inspector. He did not like his character. I proposed to leave it to be decided on a future day.

He thought that artillery, *génie* and *treno* had better remain as they were.

He thought it was better not to allow any of the Neapolitans to be mixed with the Sicilian cavalry. I advised him strongly not to allow it. I told him of the opinion of Di Aci that senior Sicilian officers should be placed in the Neapolitan regiments. In future the Neapolitans would be the weaker in Sicily, and the best plan was to mark the line between them as broadly as possible, because if passed, it must be to the prejudice of the Neapolitans.

He talked of the Parliament. He said the Barons wanted to establish an aristocracy and that all wanted to avoid paying. I told him I had prevented the Gran Camerario being re-elected from all the Houses. He proposed that Brancaccio and Lucchesi should be *aggregati* to the place, if I had no objection. I said none.

He was himself for making Di Aci *Maresciallo*. He said he should have proposed it. He said at the same time that he did not enough consider the Army.

The Hereditary Prince was very kind, but he did not finally decide upon anything, but desired that I would give him every separate proposition in writing, signed by myself, of which he would return me a copy. Had he confidence, he would decide offhand. I said this to Belmonte who observed this never would be allowed; distrust was in the very marrow of his bones.

(1) Genl Clinton sailed at night in Goshawk, Capt. Napier. Brought up with Lord Cochrane, whom he is said to imitate and to whom he is very like in countenance. Wears a very long tail. Came into the Navy very late in life.

Saturday, October 3, 1812. Had a long séance with Di Aci, MacFarlane, Sir J. Dalrymple and Fardella about the Army. Di Aci said he would propose to dress the troops in red if I pleased. I said now it was impossible, as all the clothing for the Army was already aboard ship and was blue. We talked principally of the artillery and *génie*.

Di Aci was very earnest, as he had been often before, that there should be frequent councils of all the Ministers. I strongly supported this. The question was how to persuade the Hereditary Prince to it. It was agreed at last that Belmonte should use my name with the Hereditary Prince to persuade him to it. It was proposed that I should assist, but I begged to be excused. Councils were now held occasionally, and nothing was ever done. The Government has in fact no power and energy. They are afraid of the people. The Parliament is the same. They all want character. Belmonte stated justly that they all wanted the most contradictory things. They first vote that foreigners shall not be employed in the Army. They next vote that no Sicilian shall be forced to serve, while there are only 2,000 Sicilians in the whole service, and the people will not enlist as soldiers voluntarily. They then desire a large army and navy, but will not vote any money for it.

We combated with Di Aci the policy of his measure to exclude foreigners from the command of garrisons etc. I said it was absurd, they having no army. It was a very just regulation to be adopted in future: but why disgust in the meantime the whole class of Neapolitans? The object he had in view should be introduced by degrees. I told them the Hereditary Prince's opinions, which I very much approved. Di Aci argued on the other side. Belmonte was quite of my opinion.

Admiral Greig told me that Count Panin had his estates about Viasma, where the French Army now were. He said Count Panin was one of the first men in Russia, a great friend of Lord St Helens, and Mr Elliot said to the Admiral that he was the fittest man in Russia to govern that empire and would be fit to govern any. The Emperor did not like him because he was too stiff and grave, ceremonious, for him. He never had relaxed from the most ceremonious conduct to the Emperor. The Emperor on the contrary dislikes all form. He said of Count Panin, "*sa cérémonie m'ennuie*". The Queen Dowager did not like him because he was one of the accomplices in Paul's assassination. He had long ceased to have any part in the Russian administration.(1)

The Admiral also mentioned a Count Pahlin as one of the ablest officers in Russia and the Governor of Petersburg at the time of Paul's death. He mentioned two traits of his presence of mind and of his cunning. The conspiracy had been known very long before, and had reached the Emperor's ears. He sent for Pahlin and asked him if it was the case, and that he could be one of the conspirators. He said both was true, and upon Paul's asking how he could have engaged in it, he answered that he had only done so for the Emperor's security, and that he had no other way of ascertaining exactly the views of the conspirators and of defeating their purposes. The Emperor was content. At the time fixed for the deed, all the conspirators assembled in the palace with the exception of Pahlin, the Governor and commander of the troops, upon whom they most relied. The greater part were for giving up the project and some had actually concealed themselves in the lower parts of the palace, meaning to destroy themselves in case of discovery. Bennigsen alone said: "We have engaged in the work and it must be executed". He went in and Paul was strangled. When

the conspirators went from the palace, they feared Pahlin at the head of the troops ready to take either side, with Paul if the plot had been discovered, or with them if it succeeded.

(1) Admiral Greig said the Emperor had gone in 45 hours from Petersburg to Moscow, distance 500 miles, in an open carriage with three horses.
Expense of travelling in Russia, about 7 roubles per mile.

Sunday, October 4, 1812. (1) Admiral Greig read me letters he had received from Admiral Chichagoff. He said he had orders from the Emperor to march to join Turmasow's corps, whose rendezvous was at Jitomir. Admiral Chichagoff was to have the chief command. His army, 50,000 Duke of Richelieu's corps, 20,000 added to Turmasow's, Admiral Greig thought would amount to 130,000.

Admiral Chichagoff in his letter says he hopes his expedition to the Mediterranean is only put off for the next season.

Admiral Greig had great hopes from Admiral Chichagoff. He was an honest and determined man and nothing would prevent him from going on. Took leave of Admiral Greig with regret, a most respectable, reasonable and sensible man.

Mr Mackenzie was to proceed according to his own suggestions contained in his letter of yesterday's date. I gave him a letter to Genl Oakes presenting him, saying he belonged to the mission: that I had no employment for him. He was therefore about to make a tour, half pleasure, half profit; thought our connection with the Barbary States might be improved; did not know how far he was correct. I had given him, in short, a roving commission.

Poli at Court(2) told me that the Hereditary Prince would not be ready with his answer to my papers before Friday. I represented to him strongly the inconvenience of the delay; that the whole Army was in a state of disorganization in consequence. He said the Hereditary Prince had consulted Fardella about some particulars. I told him it was not with Fardella but with me that he should communicate. I observed that there was nothing there that could not be at once decided. Why not send any particular point upon which he doubted to me direct for further explanation? I said it was with such details that the Prince lost all his time and that business did not proceed. I told Poli that he should cry "Confidence" to the Prince morning, noon and night.

Dolce brought me the motion he had made about thanks to the British Government. The motion was to be drawn up in a committee. He would show it me before being presented to the House.

(1) Admiral Greig with Mr Mackenzie sailed in Pilot, Capt. Nicholas, for Malta.
Dispatches arrived by messenger Fisher from Constantinople.

(2) Hereditary Prince's name day. Great gala at Court. San Francesco.

Monday, October 5, 1812. Nothing particular occurred. Addressed a letter to Prince Cassaro asking for answer from the Queen.

Tuesday, October 6, 1812. (1) Captain de Courcey landed. Said the General was so ill that he did not think he would have survived the passage. Was in the greatest despondency; doubted whether he should have left the army before being relieved. Most anxious to know my sentiments. Was doubtful whether he should not return and die under a gun. De Courcey said that he had seen him in command before, but never so affected; his heart was too good; his mind too anxious; his understanding was excellent.

I went alongside Genl Maitland's ship in the morning. Saw him only at a distance. De Courcey told me that my message of the night before had made him smile for the first time since leaving Alicante.

The General landed towards the evening. I never saw a man so dejected and so wasted. He said he was unequal to the situation. His mind was too anxious. He had never commanded an army. I consoled him and told him that his leaving the army did him, in my opinion, a great deal of credit. He said he had felt for the Catalans as also for the population of Alicante. He had been worn down. He did not think he could ever recover. At times, he said, he was pretty well, but at others his dejection was such that he knew not what was to become of him.(2)

(1) Warp-ship Mermaid, Capt. Dunn, in sight. Genl Maitland on board. Capt. de Courcey landed. Left Alicante 23rd of September. Capt. Dunn was 1st Lieut, to Capt. Hoste.

(2) Mermaid came to anchor. Ajax, Sir R. Laurie, anchored at night.

Wednesday, October 7, 1812. (1) Belmonte told me that the King had reserved also to himself the appointment of judges and bishops. He said that Frilli, the aide-de-camp of the Duke of Ascoli, had an office at Palermo where all these things were negotiated. Belmonte said that a man attached to him wanted some office and had promised a letter of recommendation to the King, from a very devout person (I supposed he meant Serrati). This man saw Frilli and asked him what they were doing. He answered that they passed their lives horribly; that the King was the gaoler of the Queen; that he often placed himself beside her door to listen [to] what was going on. Had ordered nobody to be admitted through the *Piano*. The Queen had done the same in order not to commit her friends. The King did not know that she had done so.

Frilli said that he had succeeded to the Duke of Ascoli's situation; that he had advised the King to dismiss all his spies, as the expense was great and useless. The King, liking the saving of money, consented. He had also advised him to live perfectly quiet and not to interfere in anything.

Genl Maitland rather better but in sad spirits. I endeavoured to argue him out of them. I observed to him that everything he had done had been strongly approved by Lord Wellington, that he could not have acted better. He had therefore nothing to accuse himself of. If from his cause any lives had been lost or the public service had suffered, he might have reason to reproach himself. When he found himself incapable he had, like an honest

man, left the army. I referred to his own expressed opinion of his unfitness. I said this was unlucky. He said he had an open ingenuous mind, and could not help it.

I told him he had nothing to feel but personal disappointment; his conscience was clear and this, with the aid of religion, should put him above the misfortunes of the world. He said his anxiety was also for his family; he had a very small income. I of course could say nothing of that, as I was not informed of his circumstances. He was much pleased that I approved his conduct.

(1) Dolce told me that the Commons had voted a part, or that everyone should subscribe the cost of his dinner for one day, for the purchase of grain.

Thursday, October 8, 1812. I called upon Prince Cassaro for the King's answer. He had just received it and read it to me. It was in pencil. It began "*Caro Cassaro, I am as much pleased with your letter as I am displeased with its enclosure (mine to Cassaro). I can add nothing to what I have already said to you on the 27th. Sono stufo delle indecenti insistenze di Bentinck. Ferdinando*".

I asked Cassaro what he advised me to do. He thought the King would not require her departure as long as she was with him. Her object was to compromise us and if possible to engage the King to some act of active resistance. He rather suggested that I should remain quiet. I said that was impossible. I could not retreat. He then recommended that I should write to the King to this effect: that I had heard that Her Majesty had intended to go to Castelvetrano, that Cassaro had confirmed that report; that I had in consequence suggested that place for her residence until the spring; that I was surprised to find that the King resisted at once all accommodation; that Prince Cassaro had so told me; that whatever confidence I had in his exactness, I begged, in a matter of such great delicacy, to ask from the King himself exact information. I told him I would do so.

He also said that the King had said to him that he wished her gone. He said he could never go to Palermo or resume the government while she stayed, as she would never be quiet and every intrigue would be laid to her.

I had spoken before with Belmonte and I had suggested that if the King gave an unfavourable answer, I would go myself, sending a detachment to the Piano, and would leave to the King the alternative either of resigning or abdicating.

Friday, October 9, 1812. I wrote to the King and sent Milner with the letter directing him to say he was desired to wait for an answer and to wait for it a certain time.

Belmonte brought me a form of abdication.

I waited upon the Prince with the papers. He gave me back very long papers of remarks upon what I had before given him. There was throughout an apparent desire to do justice.

Upon reading a passage in my paper "*et afin d'imposer au Parlement la nécessité de payer les dépenses*", he said: "*Cela est parfaitement juste*".

He returned me my own suggestions with his remarks on the margin. I sent Fardella to the Hereditary Prince to try to remove his difficulties and the delay occasioned by them. Fardella pleased with his promotion and the confidence reposed in him.

(1) Scirocco; warmish.

Saturday, October 10, 1812. (1) Milner returned at 12. Had delivered his letter the day before to St Clair to be given to the King. St Clair said an answer would be sent to Cassaro. Milner said he would wait for it. Milner not succeeding, he went to sleep at La Rossella. Returned to Ficuzza in the morning. The King's answer then was that he must first speak with the Hereditary Prince.

Belmonte brought me Philip III's abdication.

(1) Bad blowing weather.

Sunday, October 11, 1812. (1) Fagan brought me a letter from the Queen to him and to Maddalena (copies left). In one the Queen mentioned that the King had sent my letter unopened to the Hereditary Prince, notwithstanding all entreaties to the contrary.

Belmonte came soon after from the Duke of Orleans. The Duchess had received a letter to the same effect from the Queen. Belmonte observed what a great advantage it would give me if the Hereditary Prince could be persuaded to return my letter unopened to me. Belmonte said he would go to the Prince and endeavour to persuade him to do so. He went; I met [him] on his return.

He said the Hereditary Prince had received the letter the day before but had not yet opened it, and said he had not meant to have made any decision without speaking to him. Belmonte advised him not to open it. He said that from the moment he opened it, like Pandora's box, it was impossible to know what evils might arise from it. His responsibility began from that moment. He advised him to send it to me as it was and by so doing he would be doing me a pleasure, as it would enable me to withdraw and not to act if I thought proper. On the contrary, by opening it, it became impossible for me to recede. His alternative might be equally advantageous to his parents as to me. He recommended his writing a letter to me stating that he had received such a letter from the King; that he was unwilling to mix in an affair of such delicacy, and to conclude with a hope that I would show every possible kindness and respect to his parents.

Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince said that Cassaro had given him the contrary advice. "Yes", said Belmonte, "because from the moment Your Royal Highness engages in this affair, his responsibility ceases".

Cassaro had also received a letter from the King, in which he told him that he should take the Queen with him to his different chases, and that she would go away from the island in the spring.

The King had not said this in his letter to the Hereditary Prince. To the Hereditary Prince it might have been taken as a promise; to Cassaro it passed for nothing.

I saw the Duke of Orleans. In talking about the Queen's departure, he said the King was extremely *monté* by her. He said she wished violence to be used, as she had said to the Duchess, because either I would not do it from having no instructions, and then she should triumph over me; or I did mean to do it, and then she should make use of it as a handle against me, for the sake of her own cause.

He said the Duchess had wished to write to the Queen to advise her to go, but he had prevented her. I thought he had done right. I thought, throughout, that the children should not be concerned in the transaction.

I saw Belmonte again. I suggested to him whether the Hereditary Prince should not rather return my letter to the King than send it to me. It would not be of the same advantage to me as if sent to me. I should have to say that I could do no more than I had, but it might place the Hereditary Prince in the situation of committing his parents. He said that idea had appeared to have struck the Hereditary Prince. The Hereditary Prince had settled to see him and Cassaro next morning and to show them the draft of his letter to me.

(1) Arrived Termagant, Capt. Hamilton, with money from Alicante. Six transports from Alicante under Carlotta. Carlotta not arrived.

Monday, October 12, 1812. (1) Belmonte brought me a letter from the Hereditary Prince containing my letter to the King returned to me unopened. Belmonte said he had just come from the meeting with the Hereditary Prince and Cassaro. Cassaro had strongly advised the Hereditary Prince to open the letter. At last Belmonte overcame him by saying: "Will you then be responsible for all the evil that may arise if your advice is followed?" Cassaro said: "By no means". He then gave way, and the Hereditary Prince adopted [Belmonte's] advice. Belmonte said that the King in his letter had directed the Hereditary Prince to make use of force. Upon this Belmonte had said to the Hereditary Prince: "*Pour la force vous ne l'avez pas, et si vous l'aviez* and employed it, you would only seal the ruin of yourself and your dynasty". The Hereditary Prince had clearly said to him that as long as the Queen remained with the King there never would be tranquillity. She had nearly and would completely destroy the affection of the people towards the King.

After Cassaro was gone, the Hereditary Prince called in Belmonte and said to him: "*Je vois que vous connaissez votre monde. Cassaro n'aime pas la responsabilite*". "*Oui, Monseigneur, dans mon apothécairie j'ai des remèdes pour toutes les maladies*". "*Savez-vous ce que j'ai fait? J'ai écrit bien tout de suite au Roi après votre départ, afin que rien ne m'échappât de tout ce que vous m'aviez dit. Je lui ai écrit que je n'avais pas décacheté la lettre, et que je ne voudrai s pas le faire*". The Hereditary Prince desired him to speak to me and to engage me not to act horribly by his parents. Belmonte asked him what he could say with truth to persuade me not to do that of which the necessity was evident to all the world.

Di Aci would not be *Maresciallo*.

Tuesday, October 13, 1812. I wrote to Circello begging his interference with the King. Received his answer declining my request.

Belmonte gave me a draft of a letter for the King to sign, promising that the Queen shall reside at Castelvetro.

I am determined either to require this, or the abdication, or the removal of the Queen by force; if by force, the measure had better be effectual by her absolute removal from the island. The question and difficulty is how to get her through the capital without disturbance, or whether it would not be better to allow her to go either to the Colli or to Mezzo Monreale for a few days until the ship could be prepared. Belmonte was for taking her away straight, without delay. Lamb thinks the measure altogether too hazardous, and will not be approved.

Another question was whether previously to send a battalion and some cavalry to the Ficuzza by way of intimidation. This might perhaps frighten the King away. Another question was whether, as I have determined to go to the King, I should go alone or take some dragoons with me. I judge the last most advisable, the Queen having said that the King would go to Castrogiovanni and would endeavour to excite the people by proclamation. I have been also told that a printing press has been sent to the Ficuzza. A battalion is also in the neighbourhood, at Corleone, which by delay might be called and resistance made.

I saw the Hereditary Prince in the morning about military business. Still difficulties about the choice of officers, arising apparently from principles of justice, but in the meantime the inconvenience to the Army is very great.

He asked me if I had any objection to the Counsellors who had been excluded attending the Councils as formerly. I answered that he took me by surprise and without reflection I could not answer. He pressed me for an opinion, upon which I said that at first sight I thought it better not; that in England we found the inconvenience of large Councils; that here it was absolutely necessary that there should be the greatest union; that there was no other way of leading the Parliament. We understood this in England.

He said he hoped to unite all parties. I said it was impossible. There must be two parties: those who had the places, and those who had not and wanted them. I observed to him the inconvenient effects experienced at present from that disunion in his own Council. Belmonte fancied he could lead them, and did not see the necessity of collecting round him a strong party. The consequence was that the Parliament was under no guidance and were doing what they pleased. I said that I was convinced, had the Ministers been united, they, with the addition of my influence, might have had the Parliament completely at their command. The Hereditary Prince said what I said of Belmonte was right. With respect to the Parliament, we knew that better than they did. They would learn it hereafter.

I strongly advised him to unite all his Ministers in every Council.(1) One department was inseparably connected with the other. We talked of Villa Hermosa and of his unpopularity with the Parliament. He talked of the *annona*. I said the great error had been in endeavouring to please the people at the expense of truth and of the just principles of administration. I do not know whether the Hereditary Prince meant to take in Pantelleria etc., or only the last made Counsellors.

I showed him Di Aci's letter refusing to be a *maresciallo*. I told him in my opinion he wished to be it and to have at the same time the merit of refusing it. I told the Hereditary Prince that I began to know my compatriots the Sicilians and that vanity was the great defect of the country. I never had seen anything like it in any part of the world.

(1) I said I did not think Butera would attend Councils any more. He said "then he may be replaced with Cutò perhaps". Note: Cutò a man of no estimation.

Wednesday, October 14, 1812. Belmonte wrote for me a letter to the King and two drafts of an answer for the King, one upon the supposition that he confirmed my request at the bottom of my letter as he did to the Hereditary Prince, when he allowed him to sanction the 16 articles; the other in the form of an answer to my letter.

Lady William told me that Belmonte had said to her that he had done all in his power to dissuade me from using force,(1) and particularly had recommended ruse in preference. He said he had also advised me to send for Circello. I told Lady William that my impression was totally different, so much the contrary that when I to him (not he to me) had proposed Circello, I doubted very much whether he would approve the interference of Circello, whom he personally disliked, and whether he would not consider it as a mark of hesitation and weakness. He did however approve it and advise me to write to him instead of speaking, as my letter would exist, a record of my desire to adopt, previously to extremities, every conciliatory proceeding and every other public remedy.

(1) Belmonte said he had sent the Duke of Orleans to me to give me the same advice. I said I was not aware of it. The Duke had always said it was a dangerous measure and would be condemned by many. He, as Belmonte had done before, suggested money. I did not think, if even I had authority to give any, [it] would answer the purpose.

Thursday, October 15, 1812. (1) I set out at half past 10 on horseback with Major A'Court for the Ficuzza. On my way I was told the Queen was gone to Santa Margherita. I stopped at the Duke of Orleans' to ask if the Queen was gone. He said he knew nothing of it. Said the Queen's two last letters were very composed, but the two preceding ones were very violent. I left him at eleven and, changing horses at the *Piano*, arrived at the Ficuzza at two. We were received by St Clair. He said the King was asleep, not having long dined. He asked if I wished to have him awakened. I said no. I would of course wait, but I had not been in the house for ten minutes before Caccamo passed through our room, and I also saw the Queen passing from the passage into the King's room. Soon after Caccamo called me into his room and asked what I wanted.(2) I said, to see the King. And what to say? I said, to speak to him about the absence of the Queen. He said the Queen would go away in the spring, and in the meantime she would go in the first days of November to Santa Margherita, where the King would stay shooting for some time, and from thence she should return with him to the Ficuzza. He told me the King watched her very closely, like a

sentinel, to prevent her from seeing people; and that he would be well pleased if she went away. I said I knew that very well. I then told Caccamo I wished to see the King. He took in the message, and the answer brought was that the King was indisposed and could not see me upon business: it would make his bile rise. I might see him if I would promise not to talk to him upon any serious subject. I said I could not promise that. It was then the King refused. (For the better understanding Caccamo, who spoke a bad jargon, half Sicilian half Italian, I called A'Court in to interpret).

We talked of the Queen. I said I should be satisfied with her going and staying at Santa Margherita: I did not wish to drive her away at this season, but I must have the King's promise in writing to that effect.(3) Caccamo said he would not give it. I answered, if the King was really sincere, he could find no difficulty in promising what he really intended to perform. But I told him my orders were to be executed: the King knew them as well as I did; that my wish was to try every mode of conciliation before I proceeded to extremities; that certainly the reception the King had given to my letter was not encouraging, but I would not be deterred by this repulse. I then begged him to ask the King when he would see me. The answer was that he would let me know. I replied that the question must be decided, that I had been *burlato* for the last six months by the preparation of a frigate, by the Queen's continual declaration that she would go away, that I had always known she would not, and I told him now that until I came at the head of a British force, she never would.

I therefore begged him to say to the King that I should wait till ten o'clock on Saturday for his answer, as to the time he would see me, and if I did not hear from him before then, I should consider myself at liberty to do what I pleased.

He took this to the King. The answer of the King was that he could not receive such peremptory terms. I observed that I did not wish to dictate peremptorily, I only wished to know exactly how I stood, for my own guidance; that if the King wished for a longer term, I had no objection - and I said Sunday or Monday, and I fixed the last day.

The Père said that I might see the Queen. I answered that an interview would be painful to both of us, and could have no good result. I therefore begged to be excused.(4)

I said, in reference to the King's simple declaration, that it was not enough; that he had already deceived me: he had promised never to look at a paper and not to interfere with the Prince; he had, on the contrary, delayed and impeded public business by every means in his power.

I left the Ficuzza at 10 minutes past four and arrived in Palermo at 40 minutes past 7. I found Belmonte waiting for the result, which I communicated to him.

(1) Grey horse, bought of Rosenheim, died after my return; he was opened and parts of his inside said to be decayed.

(2) A'Court made a note of the interview, not perfectly correct.

(3) I believe this was said before A'Court came in (I am not sure).

(4) Caccamo said he was to come to town on Saturday.

Friday, October 16, 1812. I heard that Circello and Cassaro had been sent for by the King to the Ficuzza. I received a letter in the evening from the Hereditary Prince saying that they were returned and would call upon me in the morning.

Belmonte told me that the Queen had written to the Duchess to say she had done everything in her power to persuade the King to see me, but that he would not. She complained of my not seeing her, as not being creditable to my gallantry.

Saturday, October 17, 1812. Circello and Cassaro called upon me. They said that the King had said to them that he could not drive away the Queen, who had been his wife for 40 years; but if they could persuade her to go away and could induce her to do so without supposing it to be compulsion, it would be well. They had done so, and the Queen had consented to remain at Santa Margherita till the spring, when she would go to Vienna.

I asked if the Queen was to stay there and not to come to the Ficuzza. He said yes. The King had expressly said that he might come to the Ficuzza but that she should stay at Santa Margherita. They said they were authorized by the King to give me this assurance. I asked if they would have any objection to give me this in writing. They made some objections, but upon my saying that it was absolutely necessary that I should have such written assurance because I had already been deceived by the King's verbal assurances, that I had already required this under the King's hand, but that I should be satisfied with a declaration under their signatures that they were authorized by the King to make it to me, they then wrote down what they were authorized to say to me by the King.

It was to this purport: that the Queen would go to [Santa] Margherita the 4th of November, would stay there to the spring, when she would go to Vienna; and that they were authorized *informarmi* ed *assicurarmi* of this. Cassaro wrote this, and having read it I said I was satisfied. Circello had written another, which I also read, but having read the other first and given it my approbation, Circello said it was better to adopt the first; and they went away, saying they would immediately send it to the King.

Cassaro took the opportunity of begging me to authorize him to desire the Archbishop not to put the question about the entails. I told him I did not like to interfere, it was a popular question. I said I would consider it and let him know. I gave him no answer.

Sunday, October 18, 1812. The Duke of Orleans came with the French Bulletin, 18th, I had lent him. Did not think the French had gained any great advantage. He told me the King here was quite convinced that there would be repeated here all the horrors of the French Revolution, and that he should die by the hands of the executioner. The Duchess had received the night before a letter from the Queen, in which she spoke again of my going to the Ficuzza and that one of my motives was the procuring the King's abdication (never mentioned). She talked of Circello and Cassaro and called them *les deux trembleurs*.

Monday, October 19, 1812. (1) Di Aci(2) came in the morning. Told me that a friend of his has overheard at Cassaro's a conversation between Caccamo and Cassaro. Caccamo came to say to him that the King would not adhere to two points in the assurance he had authorized him and Circello to make to me. Upon this Cassaro fell in a passion and said that he would have nothing more to say to it, and everybody should be at liberty to do as they pleased. Upon this Caccamo, rather alarmed, said: "*Oh! questo no!*" Upon which Cassaro said: "Then I see this is not the King's ultimatum and you have other instructions"; upon which Caccamo acknowledged to him that the King had desired him, if he could, to get better terms, and if not, to consent to what I had desired.

Caccamo came before Cassaro and Circello.(3) He repeated to me the same propositions as at the Ficuzza, that the Queen should go away to the King and would return with him to the Ficuzza and go away in the spring. After talking in this way for some time, I said that this was no answer to the proposition made to the King at the last conference with Cassaro and Circello. He said the King could not consent to it. I told him I was sorry, but I could not make any alteration. He would write to the King.

We had a good deal of conversation. He repeated again the King's wish that she might go away, his putting a sentry over her and preventing any communication. I told him to ask the Hereditary Prince to show him a letter I had written to him and I begged him to read it to the King. I told him my anxiety for the King's happiness and that I should never be satisfied until I saw the King shooting at Colli as if nothing had happened. He began by saying that the King was sorry that I had taken the trouble of coming to the Ficuzza, that he could not see me as the Queen was with him. I told him the Queen pretended that she had done all in her power to persuade him to see me, but in vain. He seemed to laugh at the assertion. I told him in the course of our conversation that if the King did not agree to what I had proposed, he might be compelled to something worse. That fatal advice and influence by which he was directed had brought upon him all the misfortunes he had suffered and might possibly at last bring him to the scaffold.

Cassaro and Circello soon followed. As Caccamo had already spoken to me, they merely showed me the copy of a letter the King proposed they should write to me. It departed from the original verbal communication these gentlemen were authorized to make me by the King in two particulars: 1. The Queen was to return to the Ficuzza from [Santa] Margherita. 2. They were to inform me of Their Majesties' intentions, the word assurance being omitted.

I said I could not consent to a single word of the original paper as agreed by us all being altered. They went away, it being settled that they should return on Thursday, when Caccamo, who was to write to the King, would have received his answer. Circello in going away begged I would leave him in quiet.

Belmonte came. Told me that Circello and Cassaro had been with the Hereditary Prince; that the Hereditary Prince had told him that both, but particularly Circello, was much displeased with the conduct of the King in not adhering to what they had been commissioned to assure me. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince was much pleased with my long letter, of which he should give to Pèrè Caccamo a copy for the King.

He also said that the Queen had written a letter so impertinent to me that they would not deliver it. I sent St Laurent to the Père to ask for it. Whether he had one or not, I do not know, but he sent me a copy of one from the Queen addressed to Prince Cassaro.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He said the Duke of Berry had told Proval that there was no foundation for the report of the Duke of Angouleme going to Spain. He read me some of his last letters from Dumouriez: it appeared that he had been in constant correspondence with Lord Wellington; that he (Dumouriez) had advised Ministers in respect to the Catalonian expedition, but at the same time had advised that an expedition consisting entirely of Sicilian troops should land in Italy, and to be commanded by the Duke himself. The Duke observed how absurd this was, but he said it was part, of the character of Dumouriez never to give up his opinion. Lord Wellington had gained him over to his opinion about Catalonia and at the same time that Dumouriez gave in to this, he did not like to abandon his former recommendation of an expedition to Italy, and thus he was obliged to maintain by absurd reasons his old opinion. The Duke in talking of himself said that there were only three ways in which he could go: as commanding Sicilian troops, or some of the Italian Levy, or as a volunteer.

I mentioned to him an idea of La Tour's of transferring the Neapolitans entirely to us as a means of attaching them to us, by which their interests versus the Sicilians would be better secured, and they would participate more directly in the credit belonging to the British character. The Duke did not think it would answer: they had no military spirit and the Hereditary Prince would not consent, however much it might be for their interest.

(1) Richmond, Lt O'Shaughnessy, arrived in 5 days from Gibraltar. Had taken Clifford to Lisbon.

Sparrow, also from the Fleet.

(2) In mentioning to me the Hereditary Prince's wish to make a Neapolitan a Commissary, he said the Prince's heart was as black as that box (pointing to one laying on the coach) and that he was in reality worse than father or mother. At other times this inconsistent man has praised him as much.

(3) St Laurent interpreted.

Tuesday, October 20, 1812. (1) I saw the Hereditary Prince upon military business. Proposed to him the abolition of graduation for the future, which he approved. Regiments still not settled. It has now been going on for this last six weeks. This hesitation appears to arise from his love of justice. It may be a question how far Capt. Floris, his Secretary, impedes us. He gained very much in the former system. The Hereditary Prince's love of details and of the least *minutiae* is very evident, and makes him a very bad man of business. It originates in great measure in his unconquerable distrust.

(1) Packet arrived in the bay in 20 days from Falmouth.

Wednesday, October 21, 1812. Belmonte came. Told me that in talking with the Hereditary Prince about the final answer from the Ficuzza, he expressed his anxiety, upon which the Hereditary Prince smiled. Belmonte asking why upon so serious a subject he was merry, the Hereditary Prince answered: "*Il n'a qu'à montrer ses dents et ils feront tout ce qu'il veut*". Belmonte said he had been talking with the Hereditary Prince about the entails, and that the Hereditary Prince would not sanction the Act.

I saw Mr Faugh, the former consul lately come from Leghorn. He had been last year in France. People hate Bonaparte but prefer their present condition to a change which might involve them in greater misery. Politics never spoken of. Every man distrusts his neighbour; every servant a spy. No servant can be hired, under a heavy penalty, who has not a certificate from the police, which must be renewed every month. All attribute the continuation of the war to France and not to England. The English treated with the greatest <discontent>. People of Italy more discontented, but quite humbled, would not join any invader. Italy ruined. Provisions plentiful but money scarce. Viceroy popular. Knew nothing of Naples. French police very active: allow not the meeting of four people together in the streets. French authorities conduct themselves well.

Thursday, October 22, 1812. The Père Caccamo came at eleven. He had received no answer from the King. He said he might receive it in the course of the day. Otherwise he would write to the King to propose his going down there. He asked if the 4th of November would be time enough, when he was to go to receive the King's confession. I said no. I fixed the 28th, upon which day if I received no answer I should consider the question at an end. He wanted me to relax; I said I could not.

I said "now this thing is settled and I know the King will agree to what is asked, let us have some conversation together". I adverted to my having advised the King's abdication upon the Queen's own suggestion to me of such intention on the part of the King. Circello and Cassaro had opposed it, and I believe he had too. But I observed the great annoyance the King would have avoided by having taken that step. The Queen was the only evil. I was only afraid of her as influencing the King. The King abdicating, she could no longer do any harm and she might remain at Palermo or wherever else she pleased. He knew further that the King never would resume the reins of government. The abdicating therefore could never operate to his disadvantage or to the disappointment of any future wish. His former dislike to business and a reign of 54 years in other principles would prevent him from ever returning to public affairs.

I mentioned in the course of my conversation that, the Queen gone, he would make an excellent King. He had a good understanding and an honest heart. The Père told us that the Queen hated him and wished to have removed him from confessing the King. He also repeated the King's wishing the Queen gone, but would not drive her away (St Laurent present).

I begged him to urge the King to come back and shoot at the Colli. I said I would carry the King's gun for him. He asked what officers were doing about [Mount] Pellegrino. I told him

they were only surveying it. I told him of the positive orders I had given about the officers not shooting. I wished, I said, to show every respect to the King. He said the King knew it.

Friday, October 23, 1812. Called as usual upon the Hereditary Prince. Fardella present. I made all arrangements for the distribution of the officers in the Neapolitan and Sicilian regiments.

It was agreed that in the cavalry the officers should be mixed, but for the future that the cadets in the Sicilian regiment should be Sicilians. The Hereditary Prince seemed to have no partialities.

We talked of Di Aci's speech of 3 1/2 hours the night before. We rather laughed at it. The Hereditary Prince did not appear to join with us. It struck me, as it had done before, that the Hereditary Prince rather fancied Di Aci, and that he took a greater fancy for him in consequence of the division existing between him and me. His policy is probably that by our division he may gain.

Saturday, October 24, 1812. Belmonte came. He brought me a letter (a very clever one) written by the Duke of Orleans to Proval, open for my perusal. He combated the arguments of Dumouriez recommending a diversion with the Sicilian troops in Italy. The Duke also took occasion to observe that he thought we should weaken Sicily too much and put it out of our power hereafter to do anything in Italy. He also combated Dumouriez's idea of putting up the Kings of Naples and Sardinia. He said these Courts were immaniabiles, neither good for their subjects or their allies. Nothing could be more just than the picture he drew.

Belmonte talked of Di Aci and said he had given him a good dressing the day before, and I saw that he was very much annoyed, but I thought it had been with me. He said Di Aci was *dévoré d'ambition et qu'il était fou*. He had recommended to him to read his plan to the Committee and not send it to the House. He said he would, but he did the contrary. He did not think the Prince liked him so much. Di Aci often said before him that his government was weak and accused him to his face. He said the Hereditary Prince did not like this. Belmonte told the Hereditary Prince that he had been scolding Di Aci, as he would see by his countenance.

Sunday, October 25, 1812. The Père Caccamo came to me in the evening. He had just returned from the Ficuzza. He said the King consented to authorize Cassaro and Circello to sign the original paper arranged between us. He, Caccamo, was to give them that authority from the King. He said he had been fighting morning, noon and night against the Queen to induce the King to do it.

He said the Queen would come to Palermo on the 1st, if I had no objection, for three or four days. I said I had none. He also asked if I had any objection, when at the Margherita, to go to Castelvetro and the neighbourhood. I said none, but I expected to be informed of that

intention. He said the King would go to Santa Margherita on the 5th if the weather was fine. He, Caccamo, was to stay with him. I hoped if the Devil came he would drive him away.

He said: "Perhaps the Queen will not go away. What is the King to do?" I said it was sufficient that he would not prevent her. The Queen said that the next thing I should ask would be the King's abdication. I said if the agreement was observed, the King would never hear another word from me. The King would remain quiet. I offered to give him an assurance to that effect, and Caccamo asking for this, I told him, as he knew the King's mind better than I did, I begged him to write that which would satisfy the King, and that I would sign it.

He said the Queen wished me to put in writing that I had the orders of my Government to do what I was then doing. I begged to be excused. He said *cinque birbi* (rascals) had been down to the Ficuzza, and that the Queen had sent them away, for which the King had thanked her. I begged leave to add my own also.

He said he would come with Circello and Cassaro in the morning. I said it was unnecessary. It would be sufficient that the paper signed should be sent to me.

I told the Duke of Orleans of the arrangement. He said the Queen's last letter was furious. Lady William heard that she had written that she was in the tortures of rage and despair in consequence *des ordres que Bentinck avait vomis* .

Monday, October 26, 1812. Circello and Cassaro brought the original paper without any alteration signed by them both, and delivered it to me. Cassaro talked of the *fidecommessi*, or entails. Hoped I would not permit the nobility to be destroyed. The interview was very short.

Belmonte came. He showed me an extract of a letter written by the Queen to the Bishop of Catania. It held out all that was doing as so many acts of rebellion, and said the time would come when the rebels would be punished and the good regenerate again.

Tuesday, October 27, 1812. Prince Belmonte came. I told him that I was going to Spain and that Lamb was to be Minister. He regretted my going very much. He said as long as the Queen stayed, there would be always intrigue. The Hereditary Prince would always be weak. He was afraid of his mother. His fears arose from his always seeing Hell on one side and the reproach of posterity on the other. I said I thought the Queen was beat and could do no more harm if the agreement made was observed. He thought otherwise.

I said I thought there was much more to be apprehended from the weakness of the Government, the want of confidence on the part of the Prince (perhaps not equal to positive distrust) and the want of union (not disunion) among the Ministers. Every man drew his own way. I talked to him of his own department, of which [the Prince] did not permit him to open the papers or to write the answers. I said this could not go on. He said the Hereditary Prince wrote the answers himself, and copied them himself. Nobody knew what was written. I said this was a proof of his own hostility to the system. Belmonte said it was

necessary something should be done, and he proposed a conversation upon the subject between us and Lamb.

He talked of Circello. He said when a young man, he was in the Guards. The Queen took a fancy to him and Belmonte's grandfather, who had charge of Ferdinand IV, said to the then Minister that it was necessary Circello should be sent out of the way. He was in consequence sent as Minister to Denmark and afterwards to Lisbon. Circello had frequently said that he owed his elevation to his grandfather. Belmonte said that his grandfather was a man of no talents but highly honourable and decided, with a great deal of finesse and resource.

Belmonte said all those who had been about the King had administered to his pleasures. He had never. The King had frequently asked him if he knew such a woman. He always answered no. The King said "it is very odd". Belmonte answered that he always chose from the lowest class: an ounce gave him a woman at any time. He had therefore no knowledge of others.

Wednesday, October 28, 1812. The Duke of Orleans came. He said the Queen wrote in great anger. She did not, he believed, mean to come to Palermo. He supposed she would go to Parco, where Leopold had a house, if it should be ready for her reception. She had written that the Duchess should not go to the Ficuzza.

He talked of my going. He was also apprehensive of the Queen's intriguing in my absence. I told him I should give orders in writing with Lamb to execute to the letter everything agreed upon. I adverted to the Hereditary Prince not trusting Belmonte and I stated as another reason (exclusive of his not allowing him to open the dispatches of his department), that he had proposed to me to take Cutò and the other Counsellors into the Council, without ever mentioning the fact to Belmonte. The Duke said Belmonte was blinded with his own vanity. The business of the Government was conducted as if the King was still despot. They did not unite to lead the Parliament and fearing, as they all did, the crown, the Ministers had left to Parliament the onus of making the reforms, not foreseeing that if the Parliament were to do the bad they would like to do the good also, and now they had almost taken the government into their own hands.

Thursday, October 29, 1812. Padre Caccamo came by appointment merely by way of visit. We talked of the letter I was to write to the King. He suggested that it should mention my hope that all might be forgotten and an end be [put] to trouble, to mention my respect and veneration for the King, to propose to him to come again to the Favorita.

He said the Queen had wanted to remove him, but the King would not. He answered that, on the contrary, he wished he had been his confessor for a much longer time. He said the King would not interfere with his son; that the Queen had brought him a paper proposing to him to resume the reins of government, which the King had torn. She also, on St Ferdinand's day, had brought him a list of bad subjects, detained in prison at Palermo, which she had wished him to pardon upon the occasion of the day. He positively refused.

He repeated again the King's wish that she should go, but that he could not drive her away. He said the King put sentries to prevent people from coming to her. He said it was necessary he should be always there, or the Queen's influence would always increase. He said the King was well with his son. Said that the King had been particularly pleased with my answer to the requests of the Queen to be permitted to come to Palermo and to make excursions from [Santa] Margherita to Castelvetro. He then observed that he had told the King that if she wished to go elsewhere, I expected to be advised of it.

Belmonte came and told me (Lamb present) that he had been giving an account to the Hereditary Prince of a letter received from the Queen by the Duchess of Orleans, in which she said that after having deposed the King, the English would do the same with His Royal Highness. The Hereditary Prince smiled and said of Bentinck and the English, because I have a thousand troops, that had they wished it they would have done it long ago. He intimated that he was more afraid of the Sicilians, and Belmonte was convinced that he was sorry for my departure and that of the troops in consequence.

Friday, October 30, 1812. (1) Nothing new. Fisher, the messenger, returned to London.

(1) Capt. Napier, Thames, came in. Mr Brodie, Lt Daywell, Dr Swift, Cephalus, dined here. Regretted Clifford very much. Said Flynn was a wild Irishman, harassed the men to death. He himself was never off the deck.

Wrote to Caccamo and sent it to him.

Saturday, October 31, 1812. (1) Waited upon the Hereditary Prince with the military papers. Proposed to him: Zweyer's return to Milazzo, Statella as my adjutant, Reggio to the Guards, O'Ferris as inspector. He approved all this. Talked of Di Aci's refusal to be *maresciallo*, ended in nothing.

Of the *fidecommessi*, he was against it. Said he should wish me to be present when the articles were to come under consideration for sanction and rejection. He wished that we should go on *d'accord*. The article now under consideration was of no importance; he had not given me the trouble of coming.

We talked of the Queen's debts. He asked how they were to be paid. I said they had been submitted to Parliament and of course they had made no provision for them. He asked if he had not better do it. I said that it was a nice question; that the great object had been to prevent the Parliament from speaking of the Queen and of the past and they had not done so, would it be well now to do so? It was certainly better that they should do it at this late season than at first, because there was so little of the Parliament to run. But provision had been made for all other demands and I thought it would be better to wait till the next Parliament when things might have gone on well and past grievances forgot. (2) It was a point, however, I could not venture to give a decided opinion upon, and I thought His Royal Highness should consult his Council.

We talked of Caccamo. I told him of the letter I had written to him. He approved it. I asked his opinion of him. He said he believed him to be an honest man. Once he had not thought so. He asked me what regiments I meant to take. I answered Presidi and the Guards. He asked where. I told him Alicante, in the hopes of bringing all the troops back again.

The Hereditary Prince was taken with an expression of mine when, talking of the absurdities of a motion in the Commons to dismiss the foreigners in the Army, I said "until it is seen whether *it is possible* to make Sicilian soldiers". He entered heavily on this last opinion, partaking of the feeling of Fardella and others that Sicilians are good for nothing.

(1) Imperieuse, Capt. Duncan, came in from off Naples.

(2) I mentioned the King might pay the Queen's debts out of the Civil List, which was very handsome. He said: "Not so much". I said also that the King was rich; he made a face of assent. He said that the Queen wanted also to fit out her house at Vienna. I said the King could give the money for this purpose. Another face, strongly expressive of the opinion that the King would not give her a farthing. I said the public all supposed the King rich, but His Royal Highness not to have a farthing. "*Cela est vrai*", he answered.

Sunday, November 1, 1812. The Duke of Orleans came to tell me that he understood that the Barons and Ecclesiastics meant to agree to give 300,000 oz. as the Civil List and to grant the whole to the King, not acquiescing in the distribution made by the Commons. He told me it was an intrigue of Pantelleria in one House, and of the Archbishop in the other. He asked my interference. I said I would do what I could to prevent it.

I called upon Belmonte. He was out. I went from thence to the Duke of Orleans. He told me he had been with the Hereditary Prince. The Duke had told him that this was [an] intrigue of Pantelleria, who had been for three years in correspondence with the King and Queen and was a Frenchman in his heart, which the Hereditary Prince said he knew. He said to the Hereditary Prince that he might be sure that the object of the Queen was to keep them all in dependence. He told him that Bridon, the Queen's secretary, had been constantly with Brissac and Monroy also, and that the Archbishop was intriguing in the Ecclesiastics. I said the great object was to gain time and that I was sure I could obtain a majority against the increase and the sole grant of the Civil List to the Crown. He said the Duchess had written to the Hereditary Prince to desire he would send for the Archbishop. The Duke said the Queen wanted to revenge herself upon him, and to hold him out so punished as an example to others.

I saw Dolce, Ventimiglia and Salvo, and the Duke came about the same time in the evening. The former brought a vote they had made, by which, prior to sending the Civil List, they required to know whether the other Houses acknowledged the right established by the 14th of the 16 fundamental Articles, by which the other Houses could not originate any money bills or alter those sent from the lower House. The Commons had clearly no such right, the new Constitution not having yet taken effect. The Duke approved the motion.(1)

Belmonte also came. He complained of my not having interfered. I retorted upon him and said that the fault had been that the Ministers had not been united. They opposed each other in the House. I could only support them as an administration, it being their business to lead the House.

(1) The fear was, as this was the last day, that the other Houses would vote the Civil List without minding the Commons. If they did so, it was necessary that there should be the strongest grounds established upon which the Commons might found a protest and give to the next Parliament a right of overturning what had been done. I undertook to answer that the Hereditary Prince would grant a further prorogation.

Monday, November 2, 1812. I called upon Villa Hermosa to know the decision of the House of Lords the night before. I found they had been furious with the Commons for their message and had written a strong remonstrance to the King. He told me what we had not known the day before, that the Hereditary Prince meant to prorogue the Parliament for two days at any rate, for the purpose of some details which it was necessary for the House to prepare (Belmonte was not come to town). He also told me that the Hereditary Prince would not sanction the condition required to be imposed upon the crown in making peers, that they should have 6,000 ounces per annum. He had been advised by him and Belmonte strongly not to sanction the article declaring the inalienability of the property of the Church, but he could not be persuaded.

I went from him to Cassaro, to speak strongly against the increase and the exclusive grant to the King. He said he had promised to support 300,000 and was of opinion that a share should be allotted to the Hereditary Prince. He said he had given this sum to show his generosity, of the want of which he had been accused (absurd). He also did not wish to incur the King's displeasure. He said with pride, when the King wants an honest thing to be done, he sends for Cassaro; when an intrigue, he then sends for Pantelleria.(1) I could make no impression upon him.

I went from him to Belmonte. Belmonte advised my sending in an official Note observing that hitherto I had not interfered in the proceedings of Parliament, but that seeing in the intended excessive grant to the crown that the military establishment must be reduced in proportion, I thought it my duty to present my strongest remonstrances. He would propose to the Hereditary Prince that this Note should be communicated to Parliament.

I went from him to the Hereditary Prince and I told him of my intention that, before doing an act that in some respect was personal to the royal family, I had judged it respectful to explain to His Royal Highness my motives. The Hereditary Prince said that he did not think the grant by the Commons to the King sufficient, but he perfectly admitted that the Army should not be reduced to give to the crown, but he hoped both might be effected. He was very reasonable. We talked of the exclusive grant. He said he should certainly prefer a separate allowance to himself, but it was a matter of great delicacy for him to interfere.

I went to the Duke of Orleans. I told him that I thought there was an inclination to separate the Hereditary Prince from him, to give an allowance to one and not to the other. Cassaro

evidently wished to be well with the King and the Prince. The Duchess was very *montée*, was sure if left to the King and Queen they would get nothing. She mentioned the King's opinion of Parliament. Reminded the Duke that what I said of Cassaro had been always her opinion.

I saw Butera. He was for not increasing the Civil List and for its subdivision. He said the last was Pantelleria's intention also, but in this he must have been mistaken. I strongly impressed him with the propriety of both those opinions and of the extreme inconsistency of assigning such an extravagant sum to the King, who was the sworn enemy of the new system.

Lady William went to speak to the Princess Cassaro in favour of the Duchess of Orleans. Cassaro himself came in. He showed them the copy of the written agreement,(2) made between the King and the Duke of Orleans at his marriage, by which his portion was to be 120,000 silver ducats (a ducat 1/5th less than a dollar); that could not be paid in the present state of the finances till (as Lady William thinks, but is not sure) till Naples was reconquered. In the meantime he was to receive 5 per cent interest. Cassaro said he would not propose more, but would not oppose it. He was obliged to the King for not having sent to him. He said Leopold had written to him begging strongly to have a separate maintenance.

(1) The general opinion of Pantelleria is that he is a very clever, cool and bold man and that he has been bought by the King.

(2) Princess Cassaro said the Prince had received this from the Queen. Prince Cassaro, when he came in, said otherwise. I suppose he had it from Brissac.

Tuesday, November 3, 1812. (1) The Parliament sat all the last night and did not break up till 3 p.m. today. The Barons voted the Civil List as proposed by the Commons. Butera spoke first, making a long speech and proposing the separation to the different individuals upon the ground of their having families. He excepted Leopold; but not proposing any alteration, the question was carried. Pantelleria made some opposition. Belmonte took the vote to the Commons, and he was cheered by them.

There was a long debate about the Army. Aci proposed that no Sicilian, either of the Line or Militia, should leave the island. It passed in his House. Aci and Villafranca carried the vote to the other Houses. It was rejected in both. The Commons would vote nothing for the supernumerary officers. The Barons voted 4,000 ounces per month, the Ecclesiastics only --

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The Duke explained the paper shown by Cassaro to Lady William. He said it was a contract of mere form, drawn up by desire of the King to remain in the Secretary of State's office. He said the real agreement was in the hands of the Queen. He had asked the Queen at the time for those papers, who answered that what regarded the interests of her children could not be safer than in her hands. She refused him also a copy, wishing to keep him in dependence upon her. The Duke was very angry and proposed to give Obins in writing an explanation of the whole transaction.

The Duchess said that she had written to Leopold to advise him to shake off his shackles.

(1) The Duke and Duchess of Orleans, Mademoiselle, the Duke and Duchess Sangro, daughter, Lord Montgomerie, Genl Campbell, Sig. Airoldi, dined here. Lord and Lady Mahon arrived.

Wednesday, November 4, 1812. (1) Dolce told me that all the articles relative to the formation of the new Parliament had been sent back to the House. Some few were not sanction[ed]; to the rest *placet* was subscribed, with this addition to each: "provided that it is in conformity to the English Constitution".

Lord Mahon(2) asked me if I had any objection to his seeing the Queen. Mr Adamich had told him that the Queen was desirous of speaking to him upon the subject of her sons. I said I had none. I told him of the trick played me by Sir R. Wilson. I was sorry I had ever let him go there. Lord Mahon said his could only be private business as he could have nothing [to do] with public affairs. I told him that I knew the Queen's object to be that she might have a political conversation with him. She caught at a straw and deluded herself with everything.

(1) Belmonte told me that upon receiving my Note of the day before at dinner, he had not taken it immediately to Boccadifalco. The Hereditary Prince was not pleased that any mention should be made in it of the Civil List. Belmonte said he thought the Note perfectly reasonable. The Hereditary Prince desired a communication, not of the Note but founded upon it, requiring the House of Barons to provide amply for the military establishment, according to the alliance; and Belmonte said he would return and desire Villa Hermosa to dispatch it. Belmonte suggested it should be sent immediately, but the Hereditary Prince required that he should previously see it. It was sent out to the country and the Hereditary Prince softened it down to nothing. So much so that when presented to the House, Butera cried out: "What is meant by saying that this country should be defended? Who does not know that?"

(2) Lord and Lady Mahon dined here.

Thursday, November 5, 1812. The Duke of Orleans came. He said the Duchess had written a letter to the Queen informing her of the provision made for the Duke by Parliament and anticipating the satisfaction the Queen would derive from this continuation of the allowance that the King had been so good as to give them since their marriage. The Queen answered that it gave her satisfaction, but at the same time she could not conceal her disappointment and dissatisfaction at the state of penury in which the Parliament had left herself and the King and which would prevent her from going to Santa Margherita. She was sorry the Duke and Duchess had not addressed themselves sooner to her about their situation, and, alluding to a separate maintenance for Leopold, she said it might be wished to make him also a rebel against his parents, but that she could tell them that such attempts never would succeed. This letter had *monté* the Duchess very much. So far from not

speaking to the King about her situation, she had some months ago written a long letter to the King, and had received no answer. The Queen had also [written] in one of her letters upon this subject: "*Domandatelo*" (the allowance) "*a questi signori*", meaning the Parliament.

He said Leopold had written in despair as the King had entirely suspended his *borsilio* amounting to 4,000 ounces a year. The Duchess had made a plan, with Belmonte, for Leopold to adopt in order to get what had been voted by Parliament. It was to write a very respectful letter to the King asking for an allowance, that if he wished to keep the estates, to beg he would give him the sum allotted to him, and if not, to allow him to give them up and to receive from the nation the sum granted. They did not believe Leopold would have the courage to do either.

The Duke said he had called upon the Presidents of the three Chambers, to thank them for the provision made for him. Butera talked of the King. He said that once a letter to Madame Martinez had fallen into his hands, that it showed he had completely lost his head. Butera took it to the Queen without intending to give it her, but she asked for it, kept it but promised never to show it. The Duke of Ascoli saw it some time after. He said he wished the Queen separated from the King, sent to the greatest possible distance in the island from Palermo, but not removed wholly from it. He recapitulated to the Duke all the negotiation for the Queen with me, but said that the Queen would not keep her word. He talked of other attempts lately to disturb the peace, but without mentioning what. He said the Queen, when she last came to town, had written to him desiring to see him, but he had not answered her, because he knew the use to which she would turn any writing, and had sent her a respectful message declining to go.

The Duke went from thence to Lampedusa, the Praetor, who was very ill and whom he found dying, he and his family saying that the praetorship had hastened his end.

He then called upon the Archbishop, with whom he had a very curious conversation. The Archbishop said that he had desired to give 300,000 ounces to the King, but to have it divided among all the family. He knew the world, and it was his duty to prevent broils in families. Nothing was so likely to produce them as pecuniary arrangements. He expressed his regret that the King would not come among his subjects. He had long wished it, and knew the advantages that must arise from it. He said before the Parliament met, he thought there was danger, but after it met and subsequently, it was quite obvious that this apprehension was groundless. He was afraid of political fevers; much of that which had existed here was owing to the distrust of the court which the King's absence had tended to keep up.

He said that when the King came to see the Hereditary Prince in his illness, he had waited upon him. He excused himself for venturing to depart from the established etiquette, of only answering the questions proposed to him by His Majesty. He owed His Majesty everything he had; his duty as a priest, desirous of private and public peace, and gratitude to His Majesty, emboldened him to offer his opinion to His Majesty. He then began to give his opinion on public affairs and to advise him to return to Palermo, upon which the King put his hand upon the Archbishop's mouth and said: "*Taci Monsignor*, I know your good

disposition and loyalty. What I am doing is right and the day will come when you will be of the same opinion".

The Archbishop had always been very partial to the Duchess of Orleans. The Duke asking him if there was no mode of getting access to the King, the Archbishop said the misfortune was that nobody could speak to him. He conceived that the only person was the Duchess, but, the Archbishop said, the time is not yet come. There must be patience.

Friday, November 6, 1812. Nothing of any importance.

Saturday, November 7, 1812. Ditto.

Sunday, November 8, 1812. The Queen arrived at Palermo.

Monday, November 9, 1812. Lord Mahon met me. He told me he had considered of his interview with the Queen, and he suggested the possibility of her asking him if there was not ground of enquiry in Parliament, offered by all the proceedings that had taken place here, the deposition of the King, etc., etc., and asking him, as an Englishman, his opinion. He said that, to be frank, his opinion was that there were grounds, and his opinion had been that before we proceeded to interfere to the extent that we had in the internal affairs of Sicily, it would have been proper that we had published a declaration to the world of the motives by which the British Government was actuated. He said this without meaning to say that we were or were not justified in the extent of this interference.

I told him that I had charged the Queen with correspondence with the enemy, that I did not believe she meant to give Sicily to the French, but that it was from a passion for intrigue and urged by a love for Naples and hatred to us. She hated both us and the French, perhaps us most as we were the nearest and gave her the greatest present annoyance. She would be glad to exchange Sicily for any territory on the Continent. This had been proposed to us also. I remarked the never having given any aid during the threatened invasion, arising, as I had reason to suppose, from the policy of being ready to take either side which might be the strongest.

He said he would let me know the result of his conversation, and that he would take care to do no harm. I advised him to be silent with the Queen. It was not necessary to answer her questions: she jumped from one subject to another.

Fagan had been with the Queen for two hours (see written report of his conversation). She said she would unite with any nation who would relieve the King and her from their present distress. She said I was cruel and unfeeling. Persons having the sort of chin I had were always so: they were not sensible to the tender passions.

Tuesday, November 10, 1812. The Duke of Orleans came. He said the Queen said she never could leave Sicily in the state of mendicity to which she was reduced by Parliament. He said St Clair had been with him upon the pretext of talking about the Queen's future departure, but with the real object of pressing the Queen's wishes to see the Ministers - for what reason the Duke could not tell, but probably with the object of hazarding some intrigue or of softening them towards her. St Clair wished for the Duke's aid. The Duke said he could not give it. His advice would be that the King should send for them all together. St Clair said the King would not. The Duke answered that if the Queen chose it, he would. St Clair said he was mistaken; to which the Duke said that he (St Clair) knew that he was pretty well acquainted with the *intérieur* and that they both knew the Queen's influence. St Clair said that the Queen had been always advising the King to see the Ministers. "Yes" - says the Duke - "she calls them to the King revolutionists; says every abuse of them and then in the same breath asks the King to see them. But" - says the Duke - "if the Queen said to the King 'We thought these men dishonest, and we have been deceived; we thought the Parliament would deprive us of everything, but on the contrary they have given us more than we asked; we feared rebellion and there has been nothing but peace; these Ministers have been the first in resisting democracy'; do you think" - said the Duke - "that the King would any longer refuse to see them?" He said no, he did not think he would.

St Clair said it was a pity that the Queen had not some *homme d'esprit* who could lead her. The Duke said he knew how impossible the task was. St Clair said that the King and Queen always expected the power from England of hanging the Ministers, and nothing would quiet them so much as an intimation from Castalcicala that the Government would not suffer this.

The Duke said that the Queen had told the Duchess that the King was more *porté* to Di Aci than to any of them. He had formed him, their habits were the same. He said the Queen and Ascoli had removed him to put Ascoli in his place; that the King had not actually quarrelled with him and that he only sent him to Ustica pour *lui donner une leçon*.

The Duke said it was very important to consider who should be about the King when the Queen went. He was afraid it would be Pantelleria, to whom the King now always addressed himself. I said I thought anybody better than Di Aci, whose ambition was boundless and who would make use of him for his own views. The great object was that the King should be well; that he should abdicate if possible, but if not, that he should not interfere. A pure hunter would be his best favourite. He said Ascoli had been constantly writing to the King to advise him not to see the present Ministers.

Lady William was two hours with the Queen. Talking of the Hereditary Prince, she said ironically: "*Il a tant de talents*". Lady William said to the Queen: "You must allow me to forget that you are the Queen". She then told her, amongst other things, that she had committed two great faults, one in arresting the barons, the other in allowing me to go home. On the first, she said that there were twelve persons present in Council when it was done, among the rest some Sicilian barons. She said to them: "*Attendons*". With respect to my going home, she intimated that she was against it. She said: "*Je l'ai dit*". She acknowledged that she was wrong in both. She said: "*Je l'avoue, j'avais trop envie de maîtriser*".

I told Belmonte of the King's inclination to Di Aci and my opinion of his being the worst possible person to be about him. I said I had rather even that he remained Minister of War. Belmonte observed that he was very much changed from what he had been. Lamb said that we had been both well punished for having chosen him. He said again that the Hereditary Prince did not like him.

Wednesday, November 11, 1812. Lamb told me that the Duke of Orleans had seen St Clair again respecting the Queen's seeing the Ministers and her not going away. The Duke told him there were two ways, one by the King's abdication (this, the Queen said, the King would never consent to), the other as before described. He said the Queen was confident I had not instructions. The Duke combated the improbability of this. He said Castalcicala's letters were in direct contradiction to what was doing. The Duke said he had seen neither my instructions [n]or his correspondence, but I had now been here for a year following a fixed plan. In that time I had received frequent dispatches from home, which in no respect altered what I was doing, and knowing my character also, it was not reasonable to suppose that I would take upon myself so great responsibility, and if I had, that it would be approved.

Madame Montjoye told me that the Queen said she should return soon and bring with her the King.

Thursday, November 12, 1812. I attended the Hereditary Prince with the military papers. He told me that Minutolo, a major-general, had been so drunk upon the retreat that he was obliged to be put across a dragoon horse like a sack, and so continued the march.

Madame Montjoye told me that the Queen had sent for the Hereditary Prince, who had refused to go to her; that Poli had gone instead. She did not know any further particulars.

Friday, November 13, 1812. (1) I asked Belmonte how far the preceding fact was true. He said the Queen had seen the Hereditary Prince just before she went away. He did not know the substance of the conversation, but he supposed it to be unfavourable, as the Queen went away in very ill humour.

He told me what I had before known, that the Hereditary Prince sometime since had written to the Père Caccamo a letter in which, among other things, he said it was reported that I was not to return to Sicily. In another he had written to the same, begging the King to take from the furniture of the palace what suited him in order that he might have the remainder. The Père answered that the King was so irritable upon this subject that he could not venture at present to mention this particular point.

The Duke of Orleans told me that the Hereditary Prince had proposed to the King that he (the King) should give up 4,000 oz. per month and himself 2,000 to keep up the casa reale as it was. The King was willing but the Queen upset it.

Belmonte told us that Cassaro had told him what the Queen had said to him (Cassaro) of Lady William's conversation with her: that Lady William had asked an audience of her; that she had said all sorts of impertinences; that she had presumed even to give her advice; that she had told her that she had interested herself very much for the Duke of Orleans and very little for Leopold; that all that had happened to her was her own fault. The Queen added that all her prudence was required to stifle her passion.

Belmonte said that the Queen said of Lord Mahon that he seemed a good sort of man: *il avait de la sensibilité, mais peu d'esprit*.

Dolce told me that in consequence of the activity of the party opposed to the good Sicilian cause, and to the English, a few good friends had had a private meeting consisting of Airoidi, Settimo, Rosabia, Galeano. They had resolved that the English and Sicilian cause were the same; that each should, by his own friends, endeavour to impress these sentiments throughout the country; and that the existence of such committee and their acts should only be known to the British Minister for the time being.

(1) A'Court lost his English horse at the embarkation of the troops for Spain.

Joinville said that the variations in the barometer were: Russia 3 1/2 inches, England 2, Sicily 1, India 2/10.

Saturday, November 14, 1812. I called upon the Hereditary Prince about military business. Nothing particular occurred. I spoke to him of Balsamo as Villa Hermosa's subdirector; thanked him for Urso's appointment.

I went from him to the Duke of Orleans. He told me he had again seen St Clair upon the same subject of the Queen's not going. St Clair said the Queen did not think I had powers. The Duke said *he* thought I had, but if I had not, either that I had what I considered tantamount or that I should receive them. He must recollect that many months ago I had written to the Queen about her going. The Duke observed that St Clair must be convinced that I knew very well that the Queen would publicly state my having written such a letter. A proper time was given to her to make her arrangements: nothing was done by the Queen. Had I in consequence relented? Had I not pursued the subject? Why then suppose that I had no powers? He said Castelcicala had positively written that I had not such powers. St Clair said in answer to the Duke's reasoning: "*Cela peut bien être*".

He repeated what I had before heard from Lamb of this conversation, that if the Queen was sincere in wishing the King's return, she would use a very different language, adding to what was before stated by me, that the best thing for the King to be told was that his Ministers, whom he so disliked, were those who had defended him; that the Parliament who were to dethrone him had shown their decided attachment to his family; that instead of depriving him of everything, [they] had given him a greater Civil List than he had asked. The best advice to the King would have been to come to Palermo, to receive everybody, to give a great dinner, and to drink after dinner the Constitution. Would not the King have done so, if the Queen had not, instead of these sentiments, kept him in continual alarm with murders and the scaffold etc. etc.? St Clair said yes.

The Duke told me that the Duchess had just received a letter from the Queen, written under great depression and abusing excessively Santa Margherita. He believed the Queen had had no private audience with the Hereditary Prince. He knew that she had said that the King, and those in whom she most trusted, had advised her to have no particular conversations with anybody. Poli had been with her for three quarters of an hour. She had not made any impression upon the Hereditary Prince. He said the Hereditary Prince did not write to her about business. When he had occasion to write to the King, it was through the medium of Caccamo.

The Queen showed a long letter from the Hereditary Prince to Caccamo, of which a copy was sent her by the King. In this he mentioned that the acts of Parliament were very voluminous and that he should not send them. He should take upon himself, according to the King's instruction, to sanction or to refuse at once all such articles as were according to or against the English Constitution; all the rest he should send to the King for his decision. He went on to state about the expenses of the formation of his household of the palace, about the furniture, that he begged the King to take what he wanted, and to allow him to take the rest. He also said that I was certainly going away, and that it was said that I was not to return. He added: "*Questo merita la considerazione del caro Papà*". The Duke said that he conceives these last words were added to please and flatter the King, and for no other motive. Caccamo answered that the King was in such a passion he could not speak to him about the division of the household property.

Sunday, November 15, 1812. (1) I saw nobody. Lamb indiscreetly said, in defending me, that the Hereditary Prince had particular reasons for not employing Minutolo. It was repeated to her and she wished to have a Council of War upon him. Her and Paternò's object is probably, from their disappointment, to *brouiller* me with the Prince by showing that I have betrayed his private conversation.

(1) This morning the reinforcement sailed for Spain. First Mahon under convoy of Thames, Capt. Napier, 19 transports, Sicilian frigate Minerve, and three other vessels of war.

Troops: 1-27th, Col. Warren; Grenadier battalion, Lt Col. Blowart; Light Infantry, Major Steiger; 2 Italians, Lt Col. Grant; Royal Grenadiers battalion, Sicilian, Lt Col. Galluzzo; 1 brigade of guns, Sicilian, Sicilian horses, English guns; 1 brigade, English, 1 heavy 6-pounder, 2 heavy howitzers under command of Genl Campbell.

Wrote to Sir Edward, Genl Clinton, Lord Fred Bentinck.

Monday, November 16, 1812. (1) The Duke of Orleans told me that the Queen did not like Santa Margherita. The Duchess [said] there were two opinions: Leopold liked it much better, the Queen not. It was a better climate. The Duke told me that the Queen already began to complain of Leopold being seduced and his opinions were such as would make him.

The Duke gave me a paper about Spain and Italy, the advantage of acting in the latter in preference to the former. It is an excellent paper.

(1) Lady William gave a dance. Duke and Duchess of Orleans, Mademoiselle.
One ship of the expedition returned.

Tuesday, November 17, 1812. Prince Belmonte came, and soon after the Duke of Orleans. The Duke said that the letters of the Queen were written in the greatest despair. Leopold and the King, with St Clair, were all gone and there were only left with her Prince Cutò, Altavilla and two ladies, all stupid people not suited to her. Belmonte said of her *qu' elle avait de l'esprit, une imagination ardente*, and the society of such blockheads was sufficient to kill her.

He said of Leopold that he was *tombé into a corruption si profonde dont il serait impossible de le guérir*. He was satisfied with nothing and talked of establishments etc. She talked of Leopold as unprovided for and that all those who were faithful to her were left in misery, meaning by that remark to give a side blow at the Duchess, regarding the separate allowance given to the Duke by Parliament.

The Queen talked of going into a convent. She was dissatisfied with the King. She said before he went away, she could not obtain from him any fixed decision about her allowance. She said that he had threatened, if she talked to him about public affairs, to shut himself up in the convent of Santa Margherita del Bosco. She called me usually *Roi Guillaume*; that they had their William the Good and the Bad, but that I was *Guillaume le Pire*; they had hitherto their *Roi Guillaume*, but for the future it was to be *La Reine O ---* .

My last letter to Père Caccamo had been said to have invited the King to return and to resume the reins of government.(1) The Queen published this report with eagerness. The Queen said that those who had so exiled her would be sufficiently revenged for their exile by a Council of which she was only one.

We talked of the Hereditary Prince. It was agreed on all hands that he was glad I was going away. I said if he was honest and sincere, he ought to be sorry, as he ought to consider me his best support. Belmonte said he feared the Hereditary Prince meant, after my departure, to play them some *tour*. The Duke said he thought it very likely that he wished me gone to be left at liberty to do about the sanction just what he pleased. He thought it not unlikely that he might change the Ministers, making Cassaro the chief. He said that I thought I ought to leave directions with reference to such an event. This idea, he said, was confirmed by what St Clair had observed, that nothing would make the King so quiet as a declaration, through Castelcicala, from the British Government, that it would not suffer any other Ministers. The King had said that he would not, if he had the power, alter the Constitution; that he would never persecute the present Ministers, but that he would never see them.

It was observed that all this arose from the Prince's weakness, who was neither one thing nor the other. He would not decide for any side. It was mentioned by Belmonte that one of the dispatches from Castelcicala had said that their only plan was to be well with me; that I had great powers, and that the British Government would not hear of any proposal. The

Prince told Belmonte that this dispatch had put the King and Queen in despair, but for himself he said he was delighted *avec la certitude* that the British Government required this and that condition, Constitution, reforms, etc. etc., but that they had no thought whatever of taking to themselves the crown, which before he had imagined was their intention.

The Duke of Orleans in talking of the great advantage derived by England from having got rid of the prejudice of >welcoming< foreigners into their service, said Charles the V said that men were like trees, the better for being transplanted.

Belmonte talked to me of a *protégé* of his who had been turned out by Di Aci from the War Office. It was a matter of delicacy with him to speak about it. He said: "I think he owes me something. You may recollect whether I had not to say to his appointment, and whether *ce n'est pas le seul tort que je vous ai fait*". The Duke just come in, I only answered that I was quite sure there was no other.

(1) Dolce said that Santa Lucia had dined at Cassaro's who told him the same thing.

Thursday, November 19, 1812. Nothing particular. Not good news from Spain. Received 2 and 3 from Genl Clinton. Resolved in consequence of great want of cavalry to fill all the transports with horses instead of infantry.

Friday, November 20, 1812. (1)

Dined at Lord Montgomerie's with the Duke and Duchess of Orleans. At dinner the back of the Duke of Orleans' chair separated from the seat and he fell, without hurting himself. The Duchess, pregnant, was much agitated. She came afterwards to us.

(1) Carlotta arrived from Malta with letters from Sir Edward. Badger, Capt. Hole, in four days with transports from Mahon.

Saturday, November 21, 1812. (1) Called upon the Hereditary Prince to tell him the news. Also my intentions of embarking cavalry instead of infantry, to which he made no objection.

I had a meeting with Di Aci and Villa Hermosa relative to the pay of the War Department. Villa Hermosa very wrong-headed about a vote of the Commons assigning so much of the credits of the State first realized to the Army. He said there could be no credits until all the debts were paid. A contrary conduct would be the utmost immorality, and if it was executed he could not remain Minister of Finance. We in vain endeavoured to combat this idea by stating first that the Parliament made the vote, and it could not be altered.

(1) Carlotta sailed with dispatches to Sir E. Pellew.

Sunday, November 22, 1812. I sent for Balsamo to beg him to endeavour to reason Villa Hermosa out of his opinions.

Monday, November 23, 1812. (1) I waited upon the Hereditary Prince with the military papers. Nothing but the ordinary business was discussed.

Balsamo came, having been four hours with Villa Hermosa the night before, and having left him determined to give in his resignation, which he had actually written and signed. Balsamo had seen him again in the morning and had nearly dissuaded him from his purpose in this manner. Villa Hermosa had maintained with us that all the debts should be paid before any of the credits could be applied to other purposes. But Balsamo convinced him that in the plan of finance which he and Balsamo had made, Villa Hermosa had only proposed that there should be a sinking fund of 100,000 oz. per ann[um]. He did not at all purpose that the debts should be paid by the credits and that, according to his own plan, taking four months as the period when a new Parliament would be called, he was only entitled to ask for that proportion of 100,000 oz., which would amount to little more than 30,000. Villa Hermosa had nothing to say and I stated my willingness to agree to this; and all parties seemed to have their wishes settled.

The Duchess of Orleans told me that she imagined the King, after the hunting, would return to the Ficuzza. She did not think he would come to Palermo. I praised the Duke, the rectitude of his conduct, and gave as a strong proof of the blindness of the court the possessing such a treasure and making no use of it.

(1) Dined with the Duke of Orleans.

Tuesday, November 24, 1812. Nothing particular.

Wednesday, November 25, 1812. Saw the Hereditary Prince about military business.

Thursday, November 26, 1812. (1) Called upon the Hereditary Prince to beg he would excuse my calling upon him the next day, as I wished to go with the Duke of Orleans to Segestum. He spoke of Villa Hermosa. I told him of my having sent for Balsamo to speak to him and of his success. He said he was very obstinate *et avait des courtes vues*. I left him some papers.

(1) Lady William, Mademoiselle d'Orléans, Mme de Montjoye, Mr Howard, Joinville and Obins set off for Alcamo on their way to Segestum.

Friday, November 27, 1812. Set out with the Duke of Orleans at 1/2 past 3 a.m. in his carriage with six horses. We changed on the road and arrived at Partinico about 1/4 before 6. We set out on horseback to Alcamo and arrived at 1/2 past 8.

At the entrance to the town, the priest of the church had stopped in the middle of the benediction, and proposed to give it to us. The Duke went in. The priest offered him the holy water and then me. I, not knowing what to do, did not take it as I ought, and the Duke explained that we were English. We then went to the top of the church and kneeled before the altar upon two fine cushions laid for that purpose. When the priest showed the Host, the Duke bowed his head, which I ought to have done but did not do from ignorance. I perceived the spectators beating their breasts with their right hands and then crossing themselves. It was explained that at this act of beating their breasts, each said: "It is my fault, it is my fault". The Duke was much amused during the ceremony by my saying I had not the least idea what was going to happen to us.

We were lodged at the house of Baron Pastore.

We rode after breakfast to Segestum,⁽¹⁾ beautiful temple, bearing marks of very great antiquity. Earth formed round it to a great height. Amphitheatre at the top of the opposite hill. Country very beautiful. The weather very fine. We passed a hunting lodge of the King's and a large wood near it. People complained much of the damage done by the wild boars. We went to see the hot sulphureous baths on the way. A fine road making from Partinico to Alcamo, at the expense of the towns, about to be finished in four months.

(1) Majors Campbell and A'Court had gone and returned to Segestum in 18 hours the day before.

Saturday, November 28, 1812. We left Alcamo at 9. Rode to Partinico. Came from thence in our own carriage Duke and Mademoiselle d'Orléans, Lady William and I. We arrived about 3 o'clock.

The Duke in these two days told me a great deal about himself. He had escaped with Dumouriez. He told us of the escape; that a brigade of the Blue Coats had resolved to apprehend him. He was actually close to them when an officer not known to him, but of the same party, came and said: "Go off at once or you are lost". He went off and was pursued. They were three: the Duke, Dumouriez and a groom of the Duke's. They came to a ditch over which Dumouriez's horse could not leap. The groom and the Duke had got over. The groom jumped off and desired Dumouriez to take his horse. He did and got off, but the pursuers seized the groom. He, with the greatest presence of mind, took out of his pocket some bread and butter and began eating it very coolly. He asked what they wanted with him, that he had nothing to do with the General and that he was only returning from a farmhouse where he had been to get something to eat.

The Duke and Dumouriez went to the Austrian headquarters. They received information afterwards that the disposition of the French army was in their favour. Dumouriez returned and the Duke. The army was drawn up in line. They were well received by the first corps - some abused them - till at last they perceived that Dumouriez was riding upon Austrian

horses (from the imperial crown upon the housing). This created a cry that the General was in correspondence with the enemy and caught like wild fire. They were obliged to make off finally (I believe it was then and not on the first occasion that the groom saved Dumouriez's life).

Clairfait commanded that part of the Austrian army and received them coldly. They went from thence to the Archduke Charles' headquarters, who was particularly kind to them. He wanted the Duke to remain, but he did not choose it.

The Duke said Dumouriez never despairs under any circumstances. He was called by the French soldiers *le petit bonhomme* and was pleased with the appellation. He said the error committed by Dumouriez was not to have separated the White Coats from the Blue. The old troops were all with him. When Dumouriez was going to fight the battle of Jemmappes, one of his aides de camp in a great passion said: "*Comment croyez-vous pouvoir battre les Autrichiens avec cette canaille-là?*" It was an act of desperation.

The Duke then travelled unknown through Switzerland and gave lessons of mathematics for six months in one of the colleges. He had during that period forty sous a day and suffered great distress. He went afterwards to Copenhagen, where he asked permission to make the tour of Norway and Sweden, going round by the north of Norway into Sweden. They thought him mad: he went on foot, his baggage carried by their deer. He was accompanied by Mme de Montjoye's brother. He was very much distressed at one time for provisions. They were obliged to make off to the sea coast. They walked for 44 hours out of 48, only resting four. Although without food, he was still more sleepy and went immediately to sleep upon reaching a fisherman's hut. The Norwegians he found in very good circumstances, well educated and hospitable.

He travelled afterwards in America. The Americans were very uncivil, but he received also a great deal of kindness where he had no reason to expect [it]. He ascribed their incivility to egotism. An innkeeper would often say: "I can give you no lodging". "But", answered the Duke, "you have a sign up". "Yes", said the other, "but I only entertain when I like it". He passed afterwards 18 months at the Havana. He said the northern provinces were very different from the southern.

Palermo, Friday, December 11, 1812. The ratifications of the treaty were exchanged.(1) Belmonte told me a day or two before that the Hereditary Prince had written to the King to know if he would sign it, and was resolved, in case the King sent no answer, to sign it himself. The King however sent word that he would not sign it: "he who had made the treaty might sign it". He said no more. The Hereditary Prince was piqued with this answer. Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince had been frightened by an expression in my last Note respecting the necessity of refusing the sanction only where it was unavoidable. Belmonte said he was always asking if I was in good humour. The Hereditary Prince desired him to tell me that he would hold the first Council for the sanction on Saturday.

(1) £523 given to the Foreign Secretary[']s officer. The same in London.

Saturday, December 12, 1812. Nothing new.

Sunday, December 13, 1812. Belmonte came. He told me that the Hereditary Prince had suggested that it might not be necessary that I should be present in the Councils upon the sanction. Belmonte said that His Royal Highness had asked me to be present and had made me responsible for the consequences. Belmonte added that His Royal Highness had done this himself. Had he spoken to him and asked his advice whether he should have asked me or not, his opinion might have been different. But now he could not help himself, for what would he have to say if I said "I will not be responsible for that veto or the other"? The Hereditary Prince then proposed that I should only be consulted on those articles to which he proposed to affix the veto. Belmonte asked him why he was so afraid of me or why he disliked my company so much. He answered: "Not at all, I only am anxious not to annoy, *ennuyer*, him".

The Duke of Orleans came in the evening. He talked of the battle of Jemmappes. He said Dumouriez brought many 16-pounders into the field. The first battery were about to be charged by a regiment of hussars. Dumouriez, to discountenance, put himself with all his staff upon the top of the hill and made the drums beat as if it was the head of a column. The hussars were discountenanced and did not charge. The French infantry were repulsed in their first attack with the greatest ease. The Austrians advanced to a wood but hesitated; had they continued and brought up their cavalry, the French army would have been destroyed. He mentioned Dumouriez having been called to Russia by the Emperor Paul at the time of Suworow's going into Italy. When he came, he did not see him. Count >Rostopchin<, who burnt Moscow, was appointed to talk with the General. He was consulted about the practicability of attacking India by land. Dumouriez thought it not practicable.

The Duke said the Queen's letters for the last week had been quite *insignifiantes*. She said they had plays in the house acted by the country people. It was better that they should be amused in this way than think of politics; better for the Queen also, added the Duke. The Duke had seen the Hereditary Prince, civil but nothing else.

We talked of Di Aci. I had before told him that I had heard of Di Aci wishing to kiss the King's hand. He told me that he had heard the same thing from another quarter. He did not doubt it. He had mentioned it to Belmonte, who believed it. He said, of the Ministers, he was the only one who was *achetable*.

Monday, December 14, 1812. Nothing particular.

Tuesday, December 15, 1812. I called upon the Hereditary Prince with the papers. After the arrangement of the military business, I spoke to him about the finances and told him the mode fixed upon for supplying the wants of the Army till the month of March, when it would be indispensable to assemble the Parliament. He said it would not be possible to call it before the month of May. We talked of this and I represented the necessity of assembling it at the earliest possible period.

I said there was a condition of Villa Hermosa's staying, it was that of having Balsamo for his subdirector. "*J'avoue*" (he said) "*qu' il y aurait de très grandes difficultés*". I asked him why. He said he did not enjoy the public opinion. I said Villa Hermosa had great confidence in him. The Prince said: "*C'est tout naturel, parce qu'il vit toujours avec lui*". I said Villa Hermosa would not stay in without him; upon which he said it would be necessary to look out for a successor among the nobility. I said it would be a great pity to lose him; that a man of the same character for integrity and firmness was not to be found. I regretted in some respects his inflexibility. If I could remake him, I would alter him, but as he was he must be taken and he was the man, of all others, calculated to establish the public credit. I said that I had given the security of the British Government to the loan. I gave it solely upon my reliance in the word of Villermosa. I could not give it if he was removed. He said it would be necessary to reflect upon what had been said.

Di Aci came in soon afterwards. The Hereditary Prince desired me to stay, as Di Aci had something to say. It regarded the police of the town, the Captain of Justice complaining that he had not sufficient troops for his patrols.

I went afterwards to Belmonte and told him of my conversation with the Hereditary Prince. I asked him if there was anything really against Balsamo. He said no, he would answer for him. The public had received a prejudice against him in consequence of his friendship with Tomasi. Belmonte had cautioned him against it at the time, but Balsamo had not given him up. I told Belmonte of the necessity of his uniting with Villa Hermosa; that the Hereditary Prince was evidently not sincere. I said I had been deceived by him, by his kind and honest expressions, but that the facts were at variance with his assertions. Belmonte said that I might recollect what he had said of the Hereditary Prince in the outset. (Note: nobody so humbugged by the Hereditary Prince as Belmonte himself). I begged Belmonte to tell the Hereditary Prince that I should give no assistance if Villa Hermosa went out.

Wednesday, December 16, 1812. The Duke of Orleans came. I talked to him a great deal about the state of the Government. He said the Queen gave out everywhere that I was recalled and that this was one reason Lady William was going away. He said the British Government had not shown sufficient decision; that they had [not] taken a sufficiently leading part in the affairs of the country; that this had been the cause of the wavering of the good and of the activity of the bad.

I told him that it was very difficult to do more without assuming the government; that we appeared to have everything our own way and to have all the power in our own hands, while in fact we had nothing at all. We had our own Ministers, but they were not united together, did not know how to manage business, and had no power over the Prince. It was necessary either that we should have the Prince who would direct his Ministers, or the Ministers who should direct the Prince. Neither was the case. The Hereditary Prince had no confidence whatever in them. He remarked how much Belmonte had been coaxed and deceived by the Prince. It was long before he would allow it, but at last he was compelled to do so.

The Duke gave his opinion that things would never go on well until the hostile party at the Ficuzza might be completely defeated. He talked of the King and of his interview with him at the Colli, when the Duke told him if there was a contest between Sicily and England, that he (the Duke) should take part with England. The King answered: "*Avete ragione. Io sarei il primo di darvi questo consiglio*". The Duke said he was a just man at the bottom, but unfortunately extremely prejudiced. He mentioned a trait of him: he once said to the Duke that he made a boast of never reading or knowing foreign affairs except in the dispatches of his Ministers. "Then", said the Duke, "you will always be deceived". The King said that he had never read a gazette and should die without ever reading one. The Duke said that for a long time there had been no newspaper in Sicily; that the King had objected to it as Jacobinical.

In the course of his conversation the Duke told me that at Jemmappes one of Dumouriez's aides-de-camp, de Vaux, a natural son of the Prince de Ligne, had asked him how he could expect with that *canaille* to beat the Austrian battalions. "*C'est avec ce canaille*" - answered Dumouriez laughing - "*que je la perdrai ou je la gagnerai*".

The Duke said he would talk seriously with Belmonte upon the state of the country and of the Government. He said he had had delicacy in doing so and never mentioned politics without his first beginning, as he wished to avoid the appearance of at all saying anything against the Hereditary Prince or influencing in any respect.

Thursday, December 17, 1812. Belmonte told me that he had mentioned to the Prince my intention of giving no money if Villermosa went out, to which the Hereditary Prince answered that he did not wish it, that he should be very sorry if he did. It would be his own act, not his. "But" - Belmonte said - "it is Your Royal Highness that *chassait* him: you will not give him the assistance he wants". Belmonte said that I could only give it to him upon Villermosa's security. The Hereditary Prince answered, had I not always the security of a part of the subsidy which was withheld?

The Duke of Orleans came with Belmonte. The Duke said that he had talked over at length the subject of our conversation of the day before. He had discussed with Belmonte whether it was better or not for Belmonte to resign, and that they had felt convinced that his resignation would be considered as a great triumph of the opposite party.

The Duke said his conviction was that the enemy must be made to haul down his colours. The King must be made to come to the Colli to see the Ministers and myself. Once at the Colli, and things going on well, the King would be happy and the enemy's party would be destroyed. The King was at present as it were retired into his citadel from whence he was ready to make a sortie whenever he pleased, waiting for the turn of events and encouraging by his hostile position all those who were unfavourable to the Constitution.

He repeated a former story told him by the Archbishop, who had gone to the King when he came up to Palermo in consequence of the Prince's illness. The Archbishop said he hoped the King would excuse the liberty taken *par un vieux prêtre qui devait tout à la bonté de Sa Majesté*; he then begged him to come to Palermo. Upon which the King stopped him by putting his hand on his mouth, saying: "*Taci Monsignore*. I know your attachment and have no doubt of your good intentions. I have good reasons for what I do, and time will convince you that I am in the right".

The Duke then said that Belmonte had suggested a means of executing the Duke's suggestion. Belmonte proposed that I should write a letter to the King, in which I should state the great weakness of the Government arising from the attitude of hostility maintained by His Majesty towards the present order of things; that I should state all the different measures taken, the little effect produced by these principally caused by the irresolution of the Prince, the want of confidence in the Ministers, and the uncertainty of the public as to the intentions of the King; that I should press him either to resume the reins of government or to give a decided countenance to the administration of his son.

I approved this suggestion.(1) Belmonte also suggested that this letter should be sent to him as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he would take care to send it to the King. In talking upon this subject, it seemed to be Belmonte's and the Duke's opinion that this measure would be sufficient to remedy the evil; to Lamb and myself, that it might do good, that the King might do it as he had had long since a desire to abdicate, but that it was more probable that he would be silent; that a certain good effect would be alarming the Prince; that the real evil was the want of confidence of the Prince in his Ministers, his natural distrust and slowness and the disunion of the Ministers. This would remain as it was.

It was Lamb's opinion that Di Aci should be got rid of at all costs. I said if this affair came to a quarrel with the Prince and to extremities, this might be required, but otherwise it would be difficult.

(1) It was not executed, as Belmonte recommended we should wait for the next packet, when the act might seem to proceed from an order from home. It was afterwards put off altogether in consequence of the Queen's coming to the Ficuzza, contrary to the convention. January 18, 1813.

Friday, December 18, 1812. I saw the Prince for military business. After it was over I talked to him of the sanction. I told him I was very anxious to go to Spain: His Royal Highness' interest and mine were equally interested in it. Genl Campbell had the command at present: his object was to take advantage of my absence to gain for himself reputation, which could only be done by hazarding the army. I on the contrary wished to preserve the army for Italy, where I should be the first, instead of wasting it in vain efforts in Spain, where I was only second (no reason has so much effect with the Prince as one which can be traced to a direct personal interest). His Royal Highness immediately assented to the justice of these remarks, and agreed to my request that those articles respecting the sanction of which he had doubts should be read first. These disposed of, as they might [be], he said, in three Councils, I could go away.

I resumed the conversation about Villerosa and Balsamo. He said he should feel great difficulty in making Balsamo a Director. I asked his objections to Balsamo. He said he was a republican. I said I did not believe it. It mattered not what he was, as Prince Villerosa was responsible; <that> it was very disobliging to Prince Villerosa not to appoint the man in whom he placed his first confidence. The Prince was not to be turned, when I told him that Villerosa would resign. The Prince then said: "We must then look for another".

I talked of a successor. I said I thought the situation by preference should be filled by a commoner. He seemed to prefer *un homme de robe* and asked my opinion of the profession. I answered that they were but little esteemed and saw no advantage in appointing a lawyer. He said they understood business better. He asked if I knew any good ones. I said I knew Ferreri and Cardillo. He asked my opinion of them. I said I heard Cardillo was respected but *fou*; Ferreri, a very clever man, but not respected. He said he believed that he had been too much the *négociant*.

I talked to him of the weakness of the Government, which I ascribed very much to the hostile attitude of the King. I said that there should be no authority but his. The King should not receive applications as he had done those of the Barons about the *fidecommessi*. The Hereditary Prince said he had not; and upon asking Belmonte afterwards what answer the King had given, the King - he said - answered that he did not know whether the Prince would or would not decide the question himself, but if the Hereditary Prince sent the papers to him he would refuse his sanction to the article.

In the evening I sent Sir John Dalrymple to Di Aci to tell him that the Hereditary Prince had appointed Sunday for his Council about the finances, but that I saw no necessity for that Council, as I was resolved not to give the money if Villerosa was removed. Di Aci was angry. He said Villerosa was a bad financier. He would always say so. He had said so to the Hereditary Prince, *not as a Minister* but as a Sicilian. He said he was a republican. Dalrymple said I was determined to support Villerosa, and he asked Di Aci if the Sicilian Government could go on if opposed by the popular party of which Villerosa would be the head, by Belmonte (who would go out with his uncle), and by the British Government. He did not suppose that the British Government would sanction this opposition of their Minister.

Saturday, December 19, 1812. Belmonte saw the Hereditary Prince and advised him strongly to agree to what I had proposed. He said he was unable to contend against the power of the British Minister. The Hereditary Prince rather angrily asked if there was to be no end of concessions: was one thing after another to be extorted from him by force? Belmonte said no. He said there was in the present case nothing asked that was not reasonable. He said the Hereditary Prince would never lose his dignity by agreeing, but he would by refusing and being obliged afterwards to give up.

He then proposed a compromise to the Hereditary Prince: that Balsamo should not be Director for the present, that he should be merely at the head of the Secretary's office, and that hereafter, if the Prince was satisfied with him, he might be made Director. The Hereditary Prince rather liked this idea. But Belmonte begged him to consider it, provided he would not ask the opinion either of Cassaro or Di Aci; of the latter because he wanted to get rid of Villerosa to put in a creature of his own, through whom he might govern the finances and do what he pleased; of the former because he was prejudiced against Balsamo by the support he had given to the question of the *fidecommessi*.

The Hereditary Prince said he liked me very much and was very sorry to have any difference with me.

Sunday, December 20, 1812. I called upon Villerosa. I found him unwilling to agree to the proposal of Belmonte, saying that the Parliament had fixed that there should be a Director, and that he could make no deviation from the vote by appointing another officer; but he said that he and Balsamo had been considering how the point could be accomplished, and it had occurred to him that Balsamo should give up the chair in the University and his present *abbaye* which was a bad one; that he should receive a better from the Prince; that he should serve without any additional pay in the Secretary's office, and hereafter, if the Prince was pleased with him, he might be appointed Director.

I found that nothing had passed between him and Belmonte about the Camerari.

Monday, December 21, 1812. Some three or four days before I had received a letter signed "Clark Captain of the Ship" from Tunis, enclosing a letter from the Canonico Turrisi to Don Rinaldo Martinez, Neapolitan Consul at Tunis, which by an accident had fallen into his hands, of which he had sent a copy to the British Government. The letter was very traitorous.

I sent for Turrisi. He acknowledged his handwriting, but denied his correspondence with Martinez. He said afterwards he had answered hastily and that his signature had been forged. I begged Prince Cassaro to send an officer of his confidence to seize his papers. He was accompanied by Major Marshall, who with A'Court were in the room when I examined him.

I sent for Spaccaforo to know how he was to be confined, and begging discretion from Prince Cassaro upon the subject. He said I might send him to the castle and place him under a British guard, which was done accordingly. Nothing was found in his papers.

Tuesday, December 22, 1812. (1) I called upon the Hereditary Prince about military business. He talked of Turrisi. I gave him an account of my coming by the letter. He seemed to believe it and was well disposed to punish him

He talked of the Parliament and of several acts he was disposed not to sanction. One was the non-employment of foreigners in foreign missions. He thought for the future yes, but not for the past. I said that for most places it did not signify, but for London where the Sicilian interests were so much concerned, I should say as with Messina and Syracuse that there should be a Sicilian.

He spoke also of the Act of Succession and the separation of Sicily from Naples. I told him I thought it was good for Sicily and not bad for Naples. I thought, and he also, that the Sicilians never would belong again to Naples. Nor did I think the sanction would alter the question, for when the time came, the nation would very probably, if the King was popular, not object to the union. I thought also that both nations would be more powerful by being separated. I thought of the two that Sicily was much the most so. I thought in ten years she might be independent. He did not think so; he asked how. I asked what was to prevent their having 100,000 men under arms. Good roads might make the country less defensible, but it would increase their riches and their means, which would be a counterbalance. He said he thought the sanction of this act belonged to the King. He (the Hereditary Prince) could not give up the King's rights, and I agreed with him.(2)

I adverted, with reference to the question of the defence of the country, to the absurdity of having decreed that no Sicilian should be forced into the Army and Navy. Every man on the contrary ought to take arms. Switzerland had defended her independence by these means, and so alone could Sicily.

With respect to Naples, she should be made, if possible, able to defend herself. This might easily be managed if she was reconquered. And upon this subject, I would mention my satisfaction now that my terms with respect to the invasion of Italy had not been accepted. I did not believe it would have succeeded. The Army was ill organized. It would do better upon the next opportunity. But then and now it was always the wish of the British Government, as it was my own, to wish the reestablishment of the present family upon the throne of Naples. I hoped, whatever might have been His Royal Highness' idea at the time, he was now persuaded that there was no other person preferred by the British Government to his prejudice. He said he was satisfied by that. I told him that by not forcing himself upon the Neapolitans he would gain many friends. The issue would always be the same, because the British influence, if they made the conquest, could always direct with ease the will of the people. Our end was always the same, though the way to it might be somewhat different.

He hoped there would be no difficulty about the loan. He gave me to understand that the question about Balsamo was settled. He did not say it positively.

After my business was over, there was a Council held about finance. It was agreed that Belmonte should make me a Note asking for a loan of 150,000 oz. per month, when the money granted by Parliament was only 2,000. I said this might be obviated by my declaring

that the 7,000 oz. which I had a right to withhold should only be paid upon condition of its being given to these officers. Something was said about the credits, but the loan agreed upon prevented the necessity of the question being agitated. It was agreed that the Army should not be increased and that the Parliament should be called in March. Difficulties were started, but Prince Villermosa undertook that the Parliament could be assembled in time.

As Council was breaking up I begged the Prince to begin the one about the sanction. He said he would select the articles. Poli, he said, was ill, which was an inconvenience and impediment.

After the Council I begged Belmonte to ascertain from the Hereditary Prince whether Balsamo's business was finally concluded. I also begged him to say that the appointment of the Camerari must be also previously settled.

(1) Arrived Saracen from England, 17 November. 7 days from Gibraltar, 4 from Port Mahon. With accounts of Sir E. Paget being made prisoner.

(2) I told the Hereditary Prince of my application for the Russians, and begged him to tell it to no one. I also told him that Admiral Greig had said the Emperor would have no objection to the Russians being employed in Spain, and with respect to the politics of Italy, he left them to our direction. The Hereditary Prince gave a look of annoyance and surprise. Illustrating this decision of the Emperor, I said it was for his and all interests that the forces should be applied where it could be most useful, that neither Italy nor Spain could be kept if Bonaparte was not subdued, and that wherever it could be employed with most effect against the enemy, there it would be of the greatest utility to the common cause. He agreed.

Wednesday, December 23, 1812. I proposed to Balsamo that the Prince Villermosa should submit immediately to the Hereditary Prince the names of the Camerari and Vice-Camerari. I suggested the advantage of letting the list be previously seen by me and Belmonte in order, if possible, that the objections, if any, might be anticipated. Balsamo told me in confidence that Villermosa would not like to submit them to Belmonte. Belmonte had offended him upon the same subject before. He said he would have no objection to my seeing them, he was sure. He went back and brought me the list.(1)

He showed the list in the evening to the Hereditary Prince, who approved very much of the Camerari and of Gioeni, but said he must consider of the other two. I told Balsamo that I thought lawyers, as all the three Camerari were, were objectionable, but he said men of business were not to be found in any other class. I thought there ought to be at least one baron. He said it would be difficult to find one. I suggested Spaccaforo. He returned with Villermosa's answer that he should like him very much, having a very high opinion of him. I proposed it to Spaccaforo who was very unwilling, but said if another could not be found, great as the sacrifice would be, he would take it.

Belmonte came after the Council at night and said when he proposed to the Hereditary Prince that the Camerari must be settled as well as the affair of Balsamo, the Hereditary Prince was very angry and said: "Am I always to have *le couteau à la gorge?*" But Belmonte pacified him, saying that I had no other object but to preserve his friendship and

that I wish to avoid at once any future occasion of quarrel; that I had only the other object of preserving Villermosa in the Finances. Belmonte suggested to the Hereditary Prince to call in Villermosa, which he did, to hear who he proposed.

When the list was read, he seemed surprised that they were such respectable men and not republicans. Villermosa spoke very decidedly to him of his want of confidence. With regard to Balsamo, Villermosa said that the Hereditary Prince had now known him for eight months, and he at least might have known him so far as to be satisfied of his honesty. The Hereditary Prince made awkward excuses.

The Duke of Orleans told me that the King was to come to the Ficuzza on the 27th. Belmonte told me that a letter from the Queen to the Duchess had said the same, and that the King wanted afterwards to go to Palermo. What *les Souverains* or *le Souverain* would do with her she did not know. It seemed as if the King was quite tired of her, was determined to come to the Colli, but meant not to break his engagement.

(1) List of Camerari proposed by Villermosa: Averna, Rossi, del Buono. Vice-Camerari: Gioeni, Santa Lucia, Airoidi.

Thursday, December 24, 1812. Belmonte was to meet Di Aci by desire of the Hereditary Prince at my house at 11. Belmonte came, Di Aci did not. Villermosa came. It was agreed, as Balsamo was not actually appointed, that I should only give 25,000 instead of 50 to the War [Department]. I wrote a letter to Di Aci stating this and saying that the delay was not my fault, but I did attribute to myself the merit of having saved to the Government a man like Villermosa. He wrote me an answer. His opposition to me I forgive, but his attempt to get rid of Villermosa to put in his place a creature of his own I shall never pardon.

Belmonte mentioned the Hereditary Prince having, the night before, complained to Belmonte that Cassaro would never get rid of his old ideas. They had a long discussion about the Civil List. Cassaro contended that the money laid out by the King on the fiefs given to him for his life by the crown should be restored to him. Belmonte combated this. He said the estates did not belong to the King, but the Parliament had given them, and surely it was neither grateful nor liberal to talk of the repayment of the small sums that had been expended.

Belmonte talked to the Hereditary Prince afterwards of the immorality of the King in seizing the estates of the clergy. He was very eloquent: to rob the churches, to take away the holy vessels was a great sin, but the loss was easily repaired; but the sale of the property was the complete annihilation of the Church. The Hereditary Prince answered: "*Il mio confessore mi ha sempre detto che siete un buon teologo*". He said, now as upon many occasions before, that the bad government of his father and mother had debased the country, had selected the worst men for the administration, and had left His Royal Highness no choice of fit instruments to conduct his government.

Friday, December 25, 1812. Belmonte told me that he had just come from the Hereditary Prince to whom he had shown my letter. The Hereditary Prince was not pleased at first, but

Belmonte said that the case of Chiavetta, to whom a promise had been made for five years and which still remained unexecuted, bore me out. The Hereditary Prince was satisfied and said that he would send for Cappelli and arrange the thing without the intervention of Cassaro with Belmonte. The Hereditary Prince promised it. The Hereditary Prince [said] there had been a *dessous les cartes* in this business. Belmonte answered as if this observation was levelled at him. The Hereditary Prince stopped him and said it was not he whom he meant. I told Belmonte I would send immediately the remainder of the money.

I saw Poli. He said the Hereditary Prince was much obliged by my offer of the money, but that it would give rise to all sorts of remarks and that he could not take it. I proposed its being done through the Minister of Finance. I spoke to him of Villermosa. He said the Hereditary Prince had a good opinion of him.

Spaccaforo came by desire of Prince Cassaro to say that as I had been instrumental in placing him in his office, he thought it due to me to declare his intention of resigning. His plea, the badness of his health. I asked Spaccaforo the real cause, his health being perfectly good. Spaccaforo said he did not know. He said the Hereditary Prince had requested him frequently not to resign. He probably dislikes the idea of being made responsible to the Parliament.

Saturday, December 26, 1812. Belmonte told us at dinner(1) a story of the Père Caccamo. He owed a sum of money to a person in Palermo, and upon the day fixed for the payment of the debt he went and said that an angel had appeared to him in the night and said that the soul of the creditor's father would be released from Purgatory if he excused the debt. The man looked at him and said: "It is very odd that the angel did not tell me that, but if such is the angel's intention, it probably will be made known to me, and I give you notice that if this same notice is not made to me also in a dream tonight, tomorrow I will cite you before a tribunal". No dream took place and the poor Père was cited.(2)

(1) The Duke and Duchess of Orleans, Mademoiselle, Belmonte, Lord and Lady Montgomerie dined with us. French country dances in the evening.

(2) I mentioned the petition of the dead man at Malta to Genl Oakes. Obins reminded me of a petition at Madras in which a man said that he had dreamt that Lord Cornwallis had appeared to him and advised him to ask me to take care of his statue in Fort George.

Sunday, December 27, 1812. The Duke of Orleans came. I had told him of Cassaro's intention to resign and of my plan that Belmonte should take his office. Di Aci should be Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fitalia Minister of War. This passed the night before. The Duke told it to Belmonte on that evening. This morning the Duke said that he had a long conversation with Belmonte, who was very much annoyed at Cassaro's going out upon the idea of the bad effect that it would have upon the public opinion. Lamb and I showed the falseness of this opinion; that the Minister of Grace and Justice must have a great deal of power, that Cassaro would relinquish of course so much influence, and, Grace and Justice

with the Finances in the hands of Belmonte and Villerosa, the Administration would be really powerful.

We convinced the Duke of this. We convinced him also of the necessity of union among the Ministers, and that although Belmonte was always complaining of the backwardness and want of energy of the English, that the Ministers must be the principals and that the British Minister could only be an auxiliary. The Duke seemed convinced of this.

He told us that the Queen had employed Di Aci to cut Belmonte's throat with the King, and had employed Ascoli to play the same trick to Di Aci. It was the success of Ascoli that had made Di Aci a patriot. He said Belmonte was a good-natured man and had forgotten Di Aci's crimes, and only thought of his good qualities, of the part he had taken in support of the protest of the barons and against the acts of the crown.

The Duke said in confidence that although we must admire Belmonte for many things, yet business was not his *fort*: he would neither write nor read. His delight was in lounging and conversation and [he] would never apply himself seriously to any business. Which is true. He mentioned to me his having had a die made of his own signature, which he had given to Girardi - a strong instance of his idleness. He trusts his own signature to a man attached to the old regime.

I called upon Cassaro by appointment to endeavour to persuade him to stay. I found him very angry with the Prince for his want of confidence. He seemed particularly annoyed at his requiring from him a written opinion for the sole purpose of committing him with the King and of excusing his acts under the sanction of Cassaro's opinion. He said he saw the Prince winking to Belmonte when he asked for it. He said the Hereditary Prince had no talents, was very slow. He said he kept his papers for a month so that there were no more bags left in the office. At Naples he served under him. At that time he had too much *fermezza* and *durezza*. He was then obliged to moderate him. Now he was very timid and had no decision at all. He mentioned as a want of confidence his having sent for Gregorio, a subaltern in his office, and being closeted with him for an hour without his (Cassaro's) knowledge.

He complained very much of Villerosa. He was *duro* and would never agree to any *mezzo termine*. He was surrounded by bad subjects. He complained of the changes. He instanced the Tribunale del Patrimonio and the officers of it, who would now be left without places. He said the King had asked him to be his Minister, but he had refused it. He had always wished to be out of the Administration. He said he might be called to the Bar. He thought Sperlinga might cry out against him. He said he had communicated to the King his intention of resigning. He had received no answer. He should inform the Prince of it and beg him at his leisure to select a successor. I said if he went out I hoped he would remain in Council. He said if he was called, he should not be unwilling to go. I endeavoured to prevail upon him to remain in office upon the ground of the respect he enjoyed, the injury that his removal would do to the Government, and the pleasure it would give to the Queen's party.

He said the King was now as desirous of governing as he had been all his life averse to it.

I went from him to the Duke of Orleans with a message to the Duchess from Lady William. I found Belmonte there. The Duke had convinced him of the advantage of Cassaro's going

out. He objected to Fitalia being named to Grace and Justice. He said he was impracticable; he preferred Carini. I said he was acknowledged to be so weak that I thought his appointment would throw ridicule upon the Government.

Monday, December 28, 1812. The Hereditary Prince again put off his Council about the sanction. In the evening I received a note from Lt Col. Poli upon the subject.

Tuesday, December 29, 1812. I called upon the Hereditary Prince in the morning with the military business. We talked afterwards of Cassaro's resignation. He said Cassaro had written to him and he had answered him. He did not state the contents of either letter. I told him I had seen Cassaro and had endeavoured to persuade him to stay in. He asked me the reasons of his wishing to go. I said I believed one was his being unable to adapt himself to the new order of things. He liked the old system well administered. To the injustice that had taken place he was a great enemy. He was an honest man in his way, but he ought to see the necessity of bending to circumstances.

I told His Royal Highness in confidence that another reason was his supposing that he, the Hereditary Prince, made use of his (Cassaro's) opinion to protect himself against the displeasure of the King and thereby compromising him with the King. The Hereditary Prince said this was very erroneous, as since Cassaro's visit to the Ficuzza he had never written to the King about business, and all the correspondence on one side and the other related merely to health and subjects of indifference. The Hereditary Prince said he had asked Cassaro at any rate to stay in the Council. I said I had done the same.

I pressed him about the Council. He said Poli was preparing the subject and in three or four days he hoped to be ready. I urged him to begin sooner, and he said in two days he would be ready.

La Tour talked to me in the evening about the Archduke Charles. He said he had a *belle bravoure* in the field. He was all fire and energy. He had seen him ride in full gallop to a battalion in the heat of battle and cry out: "*Qui est le chef? Je vous vois, je suis derrière vous et je verrai si vous vous conduisez comme des soldats ou des dames*". He mentioned an instance of his riding up to a post which had been very well defended. He called for the chief, pulled at once his own cross from his breast and gave it to the officer commanding, and galloped off again without saying a word. In the order of the following day, he excused the irregularity and the cross was given to the officer unanimously.

He said the Archduke's nerves were not as strong as his constitution. He could not sit still or hear long application. He could not therefore attend to details and in consequence was much in the hands of those about him. He was naturally jealous and therefore preferred people of mediocrity who might not run away with his fame. La Tour said the Archduke had been very kind to him, *l'avait pris en affection*, and [had] shown him the book he was writing upon the art of war. The Archduke gave the ideas and General [], a very good writer, put them together. La Tour said that the objection to the work was that it was too

much *en règle* and did not calculate enough upon the battle which one or other had it in his power to give and by which plans were very much deranged.

He talked of Bellegarde and said he was the man that would have suited the Archduke, but the Archduke was jealous of him. Bellegarde was very clever, with great application, but was not very decided. La Tour said that he had proposed a plan by which the Army might have been kept together although the state was unable to pay them. He suggested the encampment of the whole Army on the great river, in large corps, by which their provisions could be brought at the least expense; that no officer or man should receive more than his rations - the former according to his rank. The Army then consisted of 350,000 and the militia of 150,000. In a year they would have been able to have asked and to have demanded of >France< the restitution of their lost provinces. He proposed it to the Archduke, who was not favourable to it from his timid policy, and because he thought that when things became at their worst, he must necessarily be placed at the head of affairs. Metternich also objected to it. He said it was unwise to disturb the sleeping lion Bonaparte to whom such a measure might give umbrage. Wallis entirely approved of it. The marriage at this time took place and Metternich and others hoped by this stroke of policy to avert further misfortune.

Of Metternich, La Tour said that he was a young and handsome man, devoting too much of his time to female intrigue. At Paris he had intrigued with the Queen of Naples.

La Tour said that the Emperor of Austria always talked of himself as the first magistrate, and, he thought, would not be at all unfavourable to the establishment of a constitution giving greater liberty to the people.

Wednesday, December 30, 1812. The Duke of Orleans told me that the Queen had written word that the King had gone to the Ficuzza on the 27th; that he was in the worst humour and would be kept there no longer; that, obedient to the King's wish and to the decrees of Providence, she should go to the Ficuzza on the 4th of January.

He told me of a species of fistula she had had at Vienna, for which she had undergone there an operation, but without being perfectly cured. It had always been kept under by particular plasters. The Queen was threatened with a return of it. The Duke said he believed there was no doubt of the fact.

In considering what measures should be adopted in case the Queen came to the Ficuzza, contrary to the King's written promise, it was a question whether any step should be taken to prevent her coming, or her coming waited for. The latter was agreed upon at all hands as the best plan, as she would then be committed and the little reliance to be placed upon the King's word clearly proved to the British Government.

Belmonte spoke to the Prince about her coming. He said he had received not a line upon the subject. He did not believe it. The Duke of Orleans thought she would; that she would first try her ground in coming to the Ficuzza, and if not there impeded, would come to Palermo. The town has been full of reports of the intention of her coming, for several days.

Thursday, December 31, 1812. Belmonte told me that he had spoken to the Hereditary Prince about Cassaro's resignation. He accused the Hereditary Prince of mystery upon the subject. The Hereditary Prince then told him what had passed; that Cassaro had written to him to say he must resign; that he had answered his letter begging him not to do so, and at any rate if he still persevered that he would allow him time to look out for a successor. The Hereditary Prince said that Cassaro had since called and that the visit was a cool one. The Hereditary Prince said he was attached to the old system and afraid of responsibility.(1)

A priest from Père Caccamo called in the morning and said the Père was come to town from the Ficuzza the night before, and sent me his compliments. He was unwell or would call. If I had anything to say, he was at my command. I said I was now much occupied, but in a few days I hoped to see him. I thought he was only feeling the ground and wished me to propose to see him.

The Duke of Orleans, Belmonte and Lamb were of opinion that the Queen would come at once to the Ficuzza and to Palermo without any communication with me. I was quite of a contrary opinion, and I was sure this advance from the confessor regarded that affair. This was just, for the same evening the same priest returned and said the Père had affairs *di somma premura* on the part of the King to talk to me about, but he was so unwell he could not call. I replied that I would call upon him at his convent the next day at 11.

I talked with Belmonte and Lamb. It was my opinion, in which they agreed, that I should stick to the treaty and leave it to the option of the King to abdicate if he wished the Queen to return to Palermo.

(1) It is clear that Cassaro is a very ambitious man and desirous of being at the head. In the last administration he could not bear Ascoli, now Belmonte. He is violent and cannot command his temper or discourse. He sees no chance of being Prime Minister.

Friday, January 1, 1813. (1) I called upon the Padre at eleven (with A'Court. See account of conversation drawn up by A'Court with addition by my directions, among my papers, Letter C (Caccamo)). The conversation was a reconnaissance on the part of the Père and nothing more.

Lady William heard from Mademoiselle that the Duchess had received a letter from the Queen saying that her health was very good notwithstanding what the physicians might say. The Duke told me that she was to come to Palermo on Monday next.

Belmonte told me the day before that Di Aci has sent a friend to him to regret the coolness existing between them, and making professions of the goodness of his intentions, of his devotion to the cause and of his attachment to himself. Belmonte told the friend it was well known what he had done for Di Aci. The ingratitude to him he would excuse, but his desire to drive out Villermosa he could hardly forget. He said he was misled by his ambition, which his friend denied.(2)

(1) On New Year's and Christmas days all people meet each other. I called upon the Duke of Orleans.

(2) Miss Reding, in talking of her brother's politics, said he was a fine straightforward fellow. He voted for every administration.

Saturday, January 2, 1813. Went to the palace to attend first Council about sanction. Di Aci and Cassaro ill. Prince did not hold it.

Went from thence to the Duke of Orleans. He said he and his sister had received letters of compliment from the Queen on the occasion of the New Year. I read them: civil and humble. There was an expression to the following purport: "*Il me ferait plaisir de vous exprimer ces sentiments de vive voix, mais...*" The Duke thought the Queen wished to see Rim. It gave him at least an opening to go there, and he had been to my house to ask if I thought any good might come of such a visit. I saw no objection. I thought they were beat and were desirous of making their peace.

He said he would propose to the Queen her absence or the King's abdication. He told me he had spoken with the Hereditary Prince about writing to the King to go there on his birthday. The Hereditary Prince said it was [] always uncertain how such letters would be received. The Hereditary Prince proposed they should write separately. The Duke showed me his letter: very proper. The Duchess thought it not as respectful as it might be. It did not strike me in that light.

The Hereditary Prince had said both to the Duke and Belmonte that the Queen never could be quiet. Belmonte observed how much his tone was changed. Formerly it was: the Queen is quiet, has no influence etc. The last time but one I saw the Hereditary Prince he spoke to me of the necessity of union among the Ministers to make the machine go on in Parliament. This was the best sentiment I ever heard from him, and holds forth the hope of his looking upon them as his own servants and of his placing his entire confidence in them.

Sunday, January 3, 1813. (1) Spaccaforno came and told me that his father was resolved to leave the Administration. His reasons, he said, were: 1st, that the majority of Council had not always governed the decision of measures. Frequently Villermosa's opinion had prevailed against such a majority. I said this must have been accident; that the Hereditary Prince had not made a rule of assembling his Council upon everything and of course there was not the same regularity as would be hereafter. 2nd, his other reason was that he thought there would be disorder and wished to be out before this took place.

(1) The Duke of Orleans went to the Queen.

Monday, January 4, 1813. (1) The Duke of Orleans returned in the evening from Santa Margherita. He said the Queen had not spoken to him a word about business. She had carefully avoided [it]. She appeared in perfect good health and in the best spirits. She was at first embarrassed. She asked if he came in consequence of any illness on the part of the Duchess. She answered herself by saying: "Oh! No, you would not have left her!" Had

anything happened? He said no. He had only come in consequence of the regret expressed by Her Majesty in her letter of not being able personally to assure him of her regard. He had seized the opportunity of paying her his respects.

They then talked of indifferent matters and of her own going to the Ficuzza. The Duke asked if such a step might not be productive of inconvenience to Her Majesty. The Queen looked down for some time and broke silence by asking him after the health of the Duchess' confessor, and did not permit him to say another word.

He told her that he had written to the King to propose visiting him on his birthday. The Hereditary Prince, he said, had done the same. The Queen answered that the King would not see him *mais pas pour vous*, meaning "not from any objection to you". She repeated this with an emphasis, upon the last words, insinuating that the King objected to see the Prince.

The Queen took great pains that he should not see Leopold alone. She made him remain with her as well as Cutò and others. But he saw Leopold for a few minutes by himself. Leopold said he was so glad to see him; he was the only person who gave him good advice; that others pitied his situation, but nobody pointed out to him how he could be relieved from it. He said he had asked the King for his *abbayes* or for some allowance. The King had sent the Controllore to him with an account showing the receipts to be 19,000 oz. and expenses 26,000. Leopold said he told the Controllore he did not believe him, and some days after he returned with another account showing the revenues to be 22,000, but that they had been anticipated till the month of August next, so that Leopold could not have more than 2,500 oz. Leopold was enraged and said he was a rogue and that he would turn him out of his office. He said he was determined not to stay there and to have his allowance. If the King did not soon arrange his allowance he should write to the Hereditary Prince claiming the allowance granted by Parliament, and they might settle the question among themselves as they pleased.

The Duke asked Leopold what the Queen meant to do. He said to go to the Ficuzza tomorrow and afterwards with the King to Palermo. The Duke asked if I might not object to that and referred to the agreement. Leopold said they did not consider that paper as binding, since the Parliament had only voted such a sum as was unequal to maintain a separate establishment for the Queen. He hoped to God affairs might be settled before the Parliament.(2)

The Duke told him he was going to Palermo from thence, to a ball at our house. Leopold exclaimed: "*Taisez-vous, vous me percez le coeur*". Another complaint was he wanted. "*Je ne peux plus tenir*". "There" - said the Duke "I cannot help you. You must get someone else to lead you there".

Leopold sent a book of dances to Lady William and sent her a message regretting very much he could not come to her ball.

A monk from Padre Caccamo came to beg I would send A'Court to him in the morning, as the Padre had received a message from the King.

(1) Ball. The Hereditary Prince and Princess were to have come, but the Princess was ill.

(2) The Duke asked Leopold about the Ministers: what would the King do with them if he returned? He said there would be no difficulty about them.

Tuesday, January 5, 1813. (1) I called upon the Hereditary Prince with the military business. After it I told him of my having sent A'Court to the Padre by his desire. I said I thought I saw from the Padre's conversation that the King wished to come to a reconciliation with everybody. I told the Hereditary Prince of the letter the Padre had proposed to me to write to the King, which I would do. The Hereditary Prince said it was very right. I told him the purport of the letter. He said it was very desirable the King should come and appear friendly to the Government. It would put an end to the party and to the doubt that existed.

I begged leave to ask him a question, which I requested His Royal Highness not to answer if he did not like it, and that was whether in the case of the King's abdication there would be any objection to Ascoli's return. He thought not. He would only in that case be like any other subject, and if he did wrong the Government could punish him like anyone else.

He said he was naturally very anxious to do by the King what was perfectly proper. I told him my intention was to act up to the letter of the agreement made by me with Cassaro and Circello. I said I had heard of the Queen's intention to go to the Ficuzza. I hoped it was not true. Then followed the preceding sentence. I said I was only contrary to the Queen's coming here because it was for the good of the King and of the family - and, he added, of herself also, for she would only commit herself.

He told me that he would hold a Council on the sanction tomorrow.

Soon after my return home A'Court returned from Padre Caccamo (see his report of his conversation, C 1813). It appeared that the King and Queen meant to come to Palermo and considered the paper signed by Cassaro and Circello as of no validity. I was very angry and went to the Padre's convent. Policy uniting with my disposition, I manifested very great anger to the Padre for the indecency and meanness of this attempt to declare nugatory a solemn assurance of the King, certified by persons of such respectability as Prince Cassaro and Marquis Circello. The Padre was very frightened and excused away what he had before asserted, and said he would do what I pleased. I said: "I wish for nothing else from the King but his adherence to his engagement". I did not wish to conceal from him that I was desirous of separating the King and the Queen. The Queen absent, the King would be happy and content.

It was agreed that he should write to the King stating what I had said; that I would wait till the day after tomorrow when, if the answer was not satisfactory, I should call upon Prince Cassaro and Circello for the reasons why our agreement had been broken (see A'Court's account of this conversation, C 1813 No. 2). As we were going, the Padre desired [us] to return at 23 o'clock. A'Court did return at that hour. The Padre showed him the letter he had written to the King (see A'Court's report of this conversation also, C 1813, No. 3).

On my way to the convent I called upon Cassaro. I saw Spaccaforno and told him shortly the interpretation given by the King to the agreement made with me by his father and Circello. I begged him to call at 4 in the evening, when I would tell him the result of what

had passed. He came. He told me that Cassaro had already written to the Queen some days ago, when he heard of her intention of coming to the Ficuzza, and advised her against it.(2)

(1) Major Dumont arrived from Vienna. Left it in September.

(2) Spaccaforno told me that Cassaro had heard from the King, who had begged him not to resign, but he was resolved to do so notwithstanding.

Wednesday, January 6, 1813. The Duke of Orleans told me that he had a long and most confidential and satisfactory conversation with the Hereditary Prince upon his giving him an account of his visit to Santa Margherita.

The Duke told the Hereditary Prince (what I had begged him to do the day before) that Caccamo had said that the King believed that I was not going on well with the Prince and complained of his slowness. The Duke told him that his best policy was to go on smoothly and satisfactorily with me. He said that the Hereditary Prince had seen that the British Government would have their way and would require that Sicily should be subservient to their views. They had clearly no desire to take Sicily, or they would have done so. It suited their objects better that it should be governed by a government of its own. It was therefore clearly his policy to become *l'homme des Anglais*.(1) It would be in vain for him to resist, even if he was so disposed. He could do nothing but irritate and annoy the British Government. The Duke observed that he was totally dependent upon the British. Others held a different language; but when a sovereign received from another £400,000 per annum and a large army for his protection, that sovereign was dependent.

The Hereditary Prince opened his eyes, but the Duke excused his frankness and the Hereditary Prince expressed no dissatisfaction. The Duke said: "People have filled your mind with distrust of me, have told you that I wanted to fill your place, etc. If I did, this is not the language I should hold to you. I should endeavour rather to excite quarrels between you and the English. I should know by that means that you would really be overturned and that such an opening might be made for me". The Duke told him that those that surrounded the King and Queen were French. Their object was to set the court and the English in hostility, that the French might come in and divide the spoils. (The Hereditary Prince was much struck with this conversation and his confidence and satisfaction were very evident).

The Hereditary Prince said: "I believe all that you say. I know they are French and I believe at this moment a correspondence with Naples exists". The Hereditary Prince told him that he believed Ascoli still governed the King through Frilli, his former aide-de-camp and now the King's. "You know" - he said - "that the Queen has never been able to treat directly with the King, that there was always an *intermédiaire*. Formerly it was Ascoli, and now it is Frilli." Frilli and Langelot (2) are the two persons who have the most influence over the King's mind. The Hereditary Prince(3) said Langelot was a very great rogue; that Caccamo had not much influence, the King rather influenced him; and that all he wanted was a pension and tranquillity.

The Hereditary Prince said he had known of what had been going on for above a fortnight and of the King's intention to resume the government. He knew that the Queen considered

the agreement with me as of no validity. The Hereditary Prince said that his intention was immediately to resign the government and to take no part in it, but to remain at the palace. The Duke strongly advised him to leave the palace. "I do not advise you to place yourself in hostility to the King, but in a state of separation from the government. Your separate allowance enables you to do so. Leave the King and his Ministers and his Parliament to settle their affairs as they please. Do not you meddle with them". The Hereditary Prince said he would follow his advice. The Hereditary Prince, talking of the Queen, said: "*Mon cher, nous n'aurons de repos* as long as she remains".

The Duke told me that the Queen had arrived at the Ficuzza, that she had written that she had been 11 and a half hours on the road; that she was very sorry to leave Santa Margherita, but submission *à la volonté de Dieu* and obedience to the orders of her husband left her no choice (all a lie) .

The Duke in the conversation said: "You see the fools that surround your father and mother. They have always chosen the greatest fools upon the foolish idea of being more easily led". He said: "You have Belmonte", and praised him, as he did also the Hereditary Prince.

The first Council on the sanction was held. The articles were . . . legislative power (see list and remarks). The Hereditary Prince made a great many difficulties all tending to the preservation of his prerogative. The Council lasted three hours. Very little was done. Belmonte and Cassaro talked a great deal and the latter very loud.

Cassaro came to me by appointment at nine in the evening. He was to go the next morning to the King and he was desirous of knowing what he should say to the King. He told me that the Queen had already written to him some days before to say that she was coming to the Ficuzza. He had advised her strongly not to come. She had made no answer to his letter, but in a letter to another person she had abused him extremely.

He said that the Hereditary Prince had desired him to say to the King that he was ready to give up the government, but that he was determined, if the King came back, to take no part whatever in affairs. Cassaro endeavoured to dissuade him from sending this determination. He said it was better not to *heurter* the King; to endeavour to humour him at first, and in the end he would be able to govern him entirely. But the Prince did not depart from his determination and ordered him to say to the King what he had directed.

He told me a story of his once having spoken strongly to the Queen, but with perfect respect. She told the King that Cassaro had insulted her. Cassaro saw the King's displeasure and spoke to him upon the subject. The conversation had related to some bad subjects that surrounded the King and Queen. The King flew in a great passion and said he would not hear ill of those people. Cassaro persisted in his assertion. The King told him in plain words that he lied. Cassaro told him he was the only man in his dominions that should say so to him. The King resumed his good humour and begged his pardon.

We then talked of the agreement made between us, which had been violated by the Queen's coming to the Ficuzza. He said that at the time the Queen wrote a violent letter to him saying she would not abide by it. He had not shown it to me. The King however directed them to sign it. He wanted to propose a *mezzo termine* and that the Queen should be allowed to reside at Partinico. I said it could not be; that she might go where she pleased,

provided that she did not reside at the Ficuzza or Palermo, or at any place nearer than the former. He said the King would not come to Palermo with the Queen, as he had often said that she would bring him into difficulty and that every misfortune would be attributed to her.

(1) The expression, *si vous voulez rester sur votre trône*. At the words *vous voulez*, the Hereditary Prince made a face and said: "*Je le veux bien*".

(2) A sort of controller and manager of the King's property.

(3) The Hereditary Prince asked the Duke very earnestly what I thought of him. He answered, either now or in another part of the conversation, that he must take care that they did not charge him with duplicity. He said that he believed I was very well disposed towards him, but that he must recollect that I was the British Minister and that I must see that my business was done.

Thursday, January 7, 1813. (1) Belmonte had a long conversation with the Hereditary Prince upon the same subject as the Duke of Orleans, and his advice was nearly the same. He recommended him to be separate from the King's government. The Hereditary Prince was anxious to know what I thought of him. Belmonte said he did not know; it was too delicate a question for him as a Minister to ask, but thinking for me he thought I could not be well pleased with the delay. The conversation was very interesting. The Hereditary Prince thought the King would not come to Palermo.

(1) Dined at the Duke of Orleans'.

Packet arrived from England in 28 days.

Friday, January 8, 1813. (1) The Padre Sannisi came from Caccamo, who had received a letter from the King saying that he had delivered over the affairs to Cassaro, from whom I should receive my answer.

Spaccaforo came afterwards to appoint eleven tomorrow for Cassaro's visit, when I should hear what had passed. He said the Queen was very obstinate and that the King said he could not force her away.

I transacted my military business with the Prince. He had not seen Cassaro. It had been agreed between them that if no result followed from his journey, that he should not go to the Hereditary Prince before the usual time. I read him a dispatch from Lord Bathurst directing me to send all the force I could spare to Spain.

This day the missing packet arrived in 45 days from England.

Saturday, January 9, 1813. Prince Cassaro, with Spaccaforo, came at eleven and stayed till one. He said that he found the King out, as had been agreed between them in order that

the Queen might not imagine there had been any concert between them. He was introduced to the Queen, who asked if he had met the King. She suspected the King's having gone out for that purpose. Upon Cassaro's saying that it was not so, then she said: "He is gone out that it might not appear that your opinions to me were directed by the King". Cassaro said she was *furba come una volpe*.

Cassaro then endeavoured to persuade her not to come to Palermo, but to allow the King to come and resume the reins of government. But she constantly refused. She said she would not separate from him, that her honour was concerned, that she had never consented to the treaty, and that I had no right to separate man and wife. Cassaro said he could not advise the King to go to Palermo if she accompanied him. She upon this got up in a great passion and said: "You have hated me and abused him".

Cassaro told what had passed to the King, who desired him to make another assault upon her and to say that he was determined never to go to Palermo if she accompanied him.(1) The Queen answered that she would go there whether the King went or not. Cassaro tried to propose some *mezzo termine*. He said: "If the King goes to Palermo, you can go to Partinico, where there was a fine garden etc.". She would not consent to this, and said the only places where she would consent to remain were Bagaria and Mezzo Monreale. Cassaro remonstrated against her conduct, that had she pleaded ill health, she might have had permission to come to Palermo for a few days, and something might have been arranged; but it was quite wrong, contrary to the King's promise, to take the step she had. Cassaro also proposed from the King that she should allow the King to come alone for some days to Palermo, where he might perhaps induce me to come to some favourable arrangement for her, but to this she would not listen. He said the King desired St Clair also to speak to her, which he did but with equal success.

The King had not spoken to Cassaro, but when they had broken up from table, he pulled him by the sleeve and took him unobserved by her into his room. Then passed the conversation. He desired Cassaro to say to me that he could not separate from his wife who had lived with him for 47 years, that his religion forbade it, and he desired to have from me in writing that my instructions from the British Government directed me to demand it; that in such case he should be compelled to give way to power. I answered I could not say this. On the contrary, the King might accompany the Queen where he pleased. I only required that the Queen should not accompany him to Palermo. I could only authorize him to say that the agreement entered into was in conformity with the spirit of my instructions. He wrote this down and I copied it from his reading of his own writing. He objected to giving me a copy (curious distinction).

He talked of various other things, that the King had objected very much to Balsamo's being employed: a person, he said, whom he had been obliged to turn out of his place as his librarian (for political opinions: he had joined with Belmonte in the Parliament of 1810, much to his honour). Cassaro said he could not consent to his having the *abbaye* promised by the Hereditary Prince. It would be simony. He might have a pension instead, upon the *abbadie*.

Cassaro said to the King that he hoped, if he resumed the reins of government, he did not mean to undo what had been done, adding there certainly were errors but which might be

corrected by the Parliament hereafter. The King answered no. He did not mean to change the Ministers, he would see them, but he could do no business with them. Their business could be referred to him by a Prime Minister or Chancellor, which situation he wished Cassaro to fill.

Cassaro also mentioned a proposal of St Clair's that the Queen should come back with the King; that they should both be reinstated, and, the Queen's honour thus reestablished, that she should go to the Bagaria, making promise never to meddle more in affairs. I observed I must be an owl indeed to consent to any such proposal.

I asked Cassaro if the King was not better disposed to Di Aci than any of the rest. He said he had not spoken of him, that formerly he had mentioned them and that then he was least inimical to Villermosa, saying he had never offended him. His principal hostility was to Belmonte.

Comparing the King and the Prince, he said the former was much firmer and not near so easily led as the Prince, and that in current business he was very *au fait*: not so in great points, matters of importance. The King could never be managed *di fronte* by a single person. Acton directed him by having all his creatures about him. By himself alone he was unable.

The Duke of Orleans and Belmonte followed. They came to know what had passed in order to regulate accordingly the advice to the Hereditary Prince. I gave Belmonte the copy of Cassaro's paper to be shown to the Hereditary Prince. It was agreed that Belmonte should advise him, if the King did not speak to him about business, to say nothing; but if he did, to say that he was ready to remain as his Vicar General, but that he must have all the power [or] none. If the King chose to return and to take any part in the government, he must beg leave to decline having any share in it whatever.

When Cassaro gave the Prince's message to the same effect, that the Hereditary Prince must refuse *aiutare nel governo*, the King answered angrily that he did not want an "adjutant". Belmonte and the Duke asked me if I would support him in this decision. I said I would. I thought it the best line of conduct he could pursue for himself and the country, for if new disorder arose under the King, as was most probable, to him the nation and the British Government could look with confidence.

The Duke and he were to go together tomorrow to the Ficuzza to kiss the King's hand on the occasion of his ensuing birthday. The Hereditary Prince begged the Duke to say that their going together was accidental. The Duke told me that Belmonte and he had both combated the Hereditary Prince's intention of remaining in the palace if the King returned. He said, with justice, to him that the Hereditary Prince knew that his (the Duke's) nerves were better than his (the Hereditary Prince's), and that still while he was in the palace, from being obliged to dine every day with the King and Queen, from their attendance in the evening, he always felt himself more or less in dependency. It was necessary for his safety that the public and England should feel he was really so.

Caccamo called in the evening. He said nothing new. He seemed very unwell. It is reported in the town and palace that he is mad.(2) I see no signs of it. Lamb was present. We talked very little. I lamented the want of firmness of the King respecting the Queen. He said:

"*Povero re, povero re*". Abused her. Pressed me very much to allow Gullotta's return from Lipari.

- (1) Prince Cassaro said that the King desired him to send from Palermo a person (not named by Prince Cassaro) in the confidence of the Queen, to persuade her to go back to Santa Margherita. If he does not persuade her, the Queen will quarrel with him for his advice, and at least, said the King, there will be one rascal less about her.
- (2) His illness said to arise from the death of one of the monks to whom he was very much attached, and supposed to be his natural son.

Sunday, January 10, 1813. Nothing of any consequence. Di Aci paid me a visit: accused the King of ingratitude to him. He had saved his life at Rome and slept by his bed for forty days together. Was earnest for the sanction of the articles, particularly for that of the liberty of the press.

Monday, January 11, 1813. Called upon the Hereditary Prince, supposing there was to be a Council for the sanction. I saw him. He said it must be put off till Wednesday, as he was occupied with his dispatches for England and Constantinople. He said his journey to the Ficuzza had gone off quietly.

I went from him to the Duke of Orleans, who gave me an account of their reception at the Ficuzza. The King appeared very cross, but it went off in ten minutes and did not again appear. The Queen was very low. The Duke said he knew at once that she would have a conversation with him. The Queen said only these words about business to the Hereditary Prince: "Do not forget that my honour is in your hands, and that you are my son". She said nothing more. This was at parting.

The Duke had tried short conversations with her. She made some remark in allusion to herself when the Duke asked her if she wanted to hear his opinion about her situation. She said she did. Upon which the Duke said: "You must now be convinced that the English will carry their point". She answered: "*J'en suis convaincue*". He was proceeding in the same strain and advising her to go away, when she grew angry and cried out: "*Mais mon honneur...*". Upon which he asked her if her honour would not be much more injured if the English Minister (I or another) forced her aboard a ship, which he certainly would do. England could not be counteracted. But, she said, she had not the means of going: she had no money, either for the payment of her debts or for her maintenance. He asked her if it would not be better, instead of making vain resistance and of writing to this and the other (meaning Austria and Russia), in this case to endeavour to make some arrangement with England upon this subject. I forget whether she replied.

In the beginning she said she was not come to the Ficuzza to go to Palermo. She execrated the Cassero and never wished to see it again. She came there on Leopold's account. She saw he was very much *ennuyé* and *ne pouvait plus tenir*. The Duke said there was to be a

masquerade the following week at our house. The Queen did not say a word about her coming.

The Duke said that Her Majesty would see that in the debates in Parliament the opposition find only fault that this was not done many years ago. The Queen said: "*Castelcicala en parle dans ses dépêches*".

The Duke told me that he had told the Hereditary Prince of the King's intention to make Cassaro Prime Minister. Cassaro had not told him.

Belmonte came. He asked the Hereditary Prince if the dispatches recently received gave any hopes of the changes expected by Her Majesty. He said, on the contrary, Castelcicala said that nothing could be done with the British Government, and that they had only to obey. The Queen called Castelcicala a rogue for this advice. Serracapriola wrote that Russia would not interfere at all with England.

The Hereditary Prince told him that Langelot had been with him and that he had pressed Langelot very much to induce the King to divide the property of the palace, that he might arrange his household. Langelot made some empty excuses when, the Hereditary Prince urging him very strongly, Langelot acknowledged that the King had no intention of making the division; that the King and Queen considered that everything would be immediately changed; that all the proceedings of the Parliament, whether sanctioned or not, were illegal and irregular and could not be carried into effect; that both would soon resume the reins of government, and that looking upon that event as certain, the King did not wish to have the displeasure of giving him what he should be soon obliged to take away again from the Hereditary Prince.

Belmonte, upon his saying this: "*Permettez-moi, Monseigneur, que je vous parle avec franchise, mais avec impertinence. Comment avez-vous pu, sachant cette intention du Roi, poursuivre un système aussi faux et erroné?*" It was your interest to have immediately and with all haste dispatched the sanction of the new Constitution". He adverted to the impolicy of the Prince of not having been satisfied with the full powers of *alter ego*, but to have required additional ones by which the King had tied his hands. In adverting to both their characters, he said they were differently formed from that of all other people. Talking of himself and of his own attachment to His Royal Highness, he could only *retenir* it as long as it should be a *lien* with the advantage of his country. He spoke with great eloquence, manliness and truth. He recommended him strongly to throw himself into the hands of England, and always to recollect that as we had put his father aside, so he might be treated in the same way. He said I was very much disappointed at further progress not being made with the sanction. The Hereditary Prince said I had been there and had shown no displeasure. Belmonte got out of this seeming contradiction by saying that I appeared most pleased when I was the most disposed to act. The night before I went to England I had given an entertainment. At that very moment he thought it very probable that there might be a Note in his house urging the sanction.

Tuesday, January 12, 1813. (1) Nothing particular. Prince Cassaro told me that he was to go to the Ficuzza in the morning by order of the King upon important business. This order was sent before my letters were received.

The Duke of Orleans told me at court that there were very angry letters from the Queen.

(1) The King's birthday. Received answers from Caccamo and Frilli.

Went to the gala in the evening and supped at Caltanissetta's. At the opera: Sir R. Laurie, Capt. Dundas, Prince and Princess Cutò, Duke and Duchess San Giovanni. No persons permitted to assume the masks of religious characters.

Wednesday, January 13, 1813. (1) I called upon the Duke of Orleans. I found Belmonte there. I showed them letters and answers to and from Caccamo and Frilli. They agreed with me that the letter of the latter was really written for the King and not for me.

The Duke told me of the Queen's letter of the day before, which he said was very nervous and no verbal explanation could do justice to it. It was written very angrily. The substance of it was that she was in the most miserable condition; that nobody felt for her as it was her duty to feel for herself; that the King was *abattu* and weak; that had he followed her advice, there would have been no surrender of the troops, no assembly of Parliament, no fine thing of a Constitution; that he would long since have resumed the reins of government. She abused the Hereditary Prince, and for the Duke of Orleans she said: "As your husband, *il me doit être intéressant*" (which Belmonte and the Duke pronounced to be old and bad French); that he had unfortunately *fouillé* himself in this affair, *malheureusement, malheureusement pour elle, malheureusement pour la Sicile*.(2)

The Duke and Belmonte both said that the Hereditary Prince told them that Castelcicala had written in his dispatches that they would not hear him at the offices, and that he was told everywhere that the Queen must go away.

The Duke told me an anecdote of the King's avarice, that the King would allow none of his silver plate to be used without an express order of himself, and the Duke said when he was living in the palace he was obliged to borrow a few plates of Belmonte to serve the ice about.(3)

He strongly urged a pecuniary arrangement by England in the Queen's favour. The being obliged to give her so much more in case of her absence would be also an inducement with the King not to allow her to go away. I told him the difficulty. They might give her a sum drawn out of the secret service, but an annual sum they could not give without going to Parliament, which they would not like. There were no grounds for such an application. It would be excellent policy no doubt.(4)

Spaccaforo came in the evening. He said his father was come back. The Queen was to go to Catania or Castelvetro. The Queen wished the former, the King the latter. The King was to come to Palermo. The Queen wished him to go immediately, but the King said he would not go there till the Queen was actually gone. He had disappointed her so often. While Cassaro was there the Queen made the King a long speech to which the King made

no answer, and the Queen said to Cassaro: "I have been talking to him for a year and he makes me no answer, and yet they say that I have influence over him".

The Duke of Orleans came in the evening. I told him what Spaccaforo had said, and of my inference from thence that the King meant to resume the reins of government. The Duke said we should have great difficulty with him. He would not govern as the Hereditary Prince had done. He would have his First Minister. In talking to the Hereditary Prince in going to the Ficuzza, the Duke had said it would be difficult for the King to find Ministers. The Hereditary Prince answered he would find them. The Duke thought he spoke as if he suspected that Belmonte might join the King.

The Duke said that I and Belmonte and Villermosa must agree about our future plan of operations. There was always a fear Belmonte's vanity might mislead him, and that flattery well applied by the King might gain him. The King was very expert at this. Di Aci would certainly join the King.

The Duke said that the Duchess had received a letter from the Queen in which she spoke of my letters to Caccamo and Frilli. She observed upon the indecency of sending such letters upon such a day, the King's birthday.

(1) Sir R. Laurie sailed for Malta. Said he should be back by the first week in February.

(2) The Duke, talking of the King's return and of the necessity of his showing his goodwill to the present Ministers and by giving some marks of distinction to each, proposed the key for Villermosa. He then asked Belmonte what he would like, and proposed the order of San Ferdinando. Belmonte affected unwillingness and modesty and said there was something else: the King might declare him Prime Minister. The Duke told him the objection, that from his talents and character he must be this. Belmonte assented and said he believed the Duke was right. It was a high scene. The Duke played him off and pleased him prodigiously.

(3) The Duke mentioned that 400 oz. given every month to the Duchess had not been paid. It had been stopped by the Queen. The Duchess said to the Duke: "Now let Lady William be persuaded of the difficulty there would have been if our allowance had depended upon the King".

(4) Belmonte spoke strongly the night before to the Hereditary Prince about the sanction.

Friday, January 15, 1813. Prince Cassaro came with Spaccaforo to give me an account of his journey to the Ficuzza. He would divide his conversation in two parts: one private, the other official.

He said he found the King very much *costernato* (meaning displeased and distressed). He said the Queen had come without his knowledge to the Ficuzza. He had taken away all the mules, but she had hired others in the neighbourhood. He said she was his torment. The King desired Cassaro to go to the Queen and desire her to return, and to advise her to go either to Catania or Castelvetro. The King said he would prefer the latter, where there was only a small population, as the Queen could never keep her mouth shut. She said she would not, she was the Queen. She would go to Palermo and be present in the palace, and

at the Te Deum celebrating the King's recovery. Whoever dared find fault should be answered in the same manner (or words to that effect). The Queen came in while Cassaro was speaking and made him a long and violent speech, to which the King answered her not a word. The King said that of an evening her discourse was incoherent and unconnected, and he said she was his torment.

Upon going to the Queen she said: "You see how the King was silent. I have been talking to him for the last year and have been answered in the same way, and yet the world say that I have influence over him". When Cassaro brought him the Queen's answer that she would go to Palermo, the King said: "Then tell her that I never will go there till she goes away". The Queen, consenting to this, said that if the King would go to Palermo, she would promise to go back to Castelvetro. The King replied that there was no depending upon her word, that she had frequently broken it, that twice he had paid her debts and as often she had promised never to contract others; that therefore he would not go to Palermo until she was actually gone to Castelvetro. Cassaro excused himself from giving this message, but the King required he should do it, which he did; and the Queen was very angry.

I asked Cassaro if he believed really that the King told the truth when he said that the Queen had come to the Ficuzza contrary to his inclination. He said yes, the King did not tell lies (which I do not believe). The Queen consented to this arrangement: Cassaro asked if I would allow her to remain eight or ten days at the Ficuzza to prepare for her future residence, to which I consented. Also, that she would come to Parco to see the Hereditary Prince and the Duke and Duchess of Orleans before she went away, although she had no reason to be much pleased with any of them. He told me that the King required that I should state in writing that I was acting according to the orders of my court. The Queen had said that she would be driven away. The King had answered that she should not have to say that he had driven her away. He would advise her to go, and having this document in his hands would state in writing all the reasons which made that measure necessary. The Queen said that she must have this paper in order that she might appeal to England and Europe against the act.

I asked Cassaro if the King would resume the reins of government. He said the King would not say, but he believed he would. He had persuaded him to see Belmonte and Villerosa. About Di Aci they did not speak. He had persuaded him to do so after much difficulty, by declaring that if the King did not see them he must leave the Ministry. To which the King consented. He had said to the King that there were many things in the Constitution which he did not approve, but might be corrected in time.

I asked Cassaro what the King said of the letters I had written to Caccamo and Frilli. He said he did not know, but [the King] was dissatisfied at an expression made use of to Caccamo that as his Captain General I might be charged by him with the commission of arresting the Queen. Cassaro said that the King had asked who the other *forestiere* was. Cassaro said he did not know, but that I had asked after Frilli and Langelot. He supposed it must be the latter. Cassaro said the King never was in confidence with his inferiors like Frilli. With the fisherman and his gamekeepers he would be more familiar, but any appearance of interference on business he immediately rejected.

The Duke of Orleans and Belmonte came afterwards. We had a long conversation about the conduct the Hereditary Prince should pursue. Belmonte related to us his conversation with the Hereditary Prince in which he started imitating the King, the exact conversations the King would hold with him (the Hereditary Prince), with himself and Villermosa. It was done admirably, the Hereditary Prince being much amused and at times opening his eyes in a sort of awe and fear as if he fancied the King to be actually present. The first part of the King's conversation would be to say that he wished to leave everything to the Prince, that he forgave all his enemies, that he was old and must be soon succeeded. He must reconcile himself to the will of God, an expression he would use every four or five sentences. He would say to the Ministers that he would always be glad to see them, but that he left everything to Francesco (the Hereditary Prince). This would be his first conversation. That afterwards he would begin to interfere in one thing or the other, to which the Hereditary Prince would be unable to resist. He told the Hereditary Prince this and asked if it was not the truth. He therefore strongly advised him not only to have nothing to do with the government, but to leave the palace and to go to his country house at Bocca di Falco or Sagana. The Hereditary Prince said he would do the former, but he could not persuade him to the latter.

We had a long conversation about the probable conduct of the King. I gave my opinion of his popularity, which both Belmonte and the Duke denied. I thought also that if he could make a tolerable administration, he would go and would have no difficulty in leading the Parliament. Belmonte thought not and said the Parliament was not *achetable*, and then got into a long display of his conduct in the Parliament in 1811 and his own wonderful efforts. Spaccaferno came. I asked him if the King meant to govern alone or by the Prince. He said he believed *alone*.

Saturday, January 16, 1813. Attended a Council about the sanction.

Called afterwards upon the Duke of Orleans. He did not know that the Queen was coming to Parco. He said the Duchess had received a letter from her, very violent. She made a comparison between the murder of a person by a gun, the report of which was heard, and others warned: but here, she said, the deed had been done by an air-gun without noise, and that it would be her duty to publish the whole transaction to set all other sovereigns upon their guard.

The Duke, in talking of the King, said that he was very unforgiving, that he always hit his mark sooner or later. The Queen laid all the murders at Naples to his charge. The Duke of Orleans told her: "But, Madam, you wind him up to these acts and leave him to follow his own passion. Did you take equal pains to prevent the effects?" She had nothing to say. Belmonte said that the Duchess of Orleans had fallen down upon her knees to the King to save the lives of one of the victims, but in vain.

The Duke said that the King had always a great kindness for him until the 1 per cent tax, when the Duke openly declared his disapprobation of the conduct of the court.(1) Ascoli then said: "*Grâce à Dieu nous avons vaincu la prédilection du Roi pour le Duc d'Orléans*". The Duke said he never should regain it.

I endeavoured to convince the Duke about his error on the popularity of the King. I said there were four points upon which there was a very general sentiment in the country:

1. Popularity of the King
2. Hatred to the Neapolitans
3. Hatred to the Queen
4. Dislike of the Barons.

He did not believe the first and last. I asked how it could be otherwise with the general oppression exercised by the latter and their refusal at all times to contribute to the public burthens. He was not convinced. He said it had always been the policy of the court to destroy the barons and their privileges, thinking by that means more easily to govern. This had been the object of Caracciolo's administration. He said Charles III had always respected the privileges of the barons. It was his policy to gain the affections of the Sicilians, hoping by that means to save the island. The present sovereign had not followed this example. The principle of the present court and of the present King had been to awe and terrify. He adverted to the times of the massacre of the Protestants and of Catherine of Medicis. The day before the massacre she treated them with the greatest kindness. She reproached Henry IV for too much gentleness. She said: "*Il faut toujours approcher la guêpière avec la masque*" (you must approach the beehive with a mask).

Belmonte wanted me to send away Frilli and to admonish Tomasi. He thought this would frighten the King. I objected. I said we had nothing against him, and it would look like persecution. I allowed it were good if it could be borne out.

(1) He refused to be Captain General.

Sunday, January 17, 1813. The Queen's birthday. We gave a masquerade which went off very well. The Hereditary Prince and Princess and Mademoiselle Caroline, masked. The Duke and Duchess of Orleans and Mademoiselle, beautifully dressed as in the time of the Ligue. Villafranca and Prince Carini, cosaques, very good. Trabia, Jupiter and French servant. Princess San Cataldo, Turk, very good; Prince San Cataldo, French ballet master. Spaccaforno, a Greek, handsomest mask in the room. Lady William, Spanish lady and a Tunisian. Lt Col. Ximenes, Scandal (eyes and ears covered) and watchman. Young Butera (illegitimate son) as John Bull, very good. Princess Butera, a Finland lady, very fair. The royal family went away at 4.

Tuesday, January 19, 1813. (1) Called with Lady William upon the Hereditary Prince and Princess. We were admitted. After, on Duke and Duchess of Orleans. They told us that the Hereditary Prince liked a masquerade.

(1) Busy with dispatches.

A Council appointed for next day. Cassaro ill.

Wednesday, January 20, 1813. (1) Spaccaferno came and told me the cause of Cassaro's being called for. The Queen pretended that my Note was not sufficiently explicit; that instead of saying the British Government, it should have specified the Prince Regent. The King showed Cassaro a letter he proposed to write to the Queen advising her to go away. He said he did not like to order. He proposed to Cassaro to send her privately a copy of it, and her answer would say whether she would be satisfied with it, and would in consequence go away. Cassaro asked how he was to come by the copy; he could not steal it. It was then agreed that the King should give him a copy, which he, Cassaro, should send to the Queen, and ask if she was content to go upon the advice given by the King. The Queen had made the King promise to be back at the Ficuzza on Thursday, or she would follow him to Partinico.

(1) Sent off packet.

Thursday, January 21, 1813. Belmonte told me that a letter from the Queen had been received by the Duchess, written in great violence against the Duke, saying it was not she who had advised the marriage, and speaking with fear and uncertainty of the consequences of the King's journey to Partinico. It was clear it was made contrary to her will.

Friday, January 22, 1813. (1) Called upon the Hereditary Prince about military business. Afterwards I spoke to him about Cassaro's visit to Partinico. He told me no more than Cassaro had before said to me, that the King had wanted Cassaro himself to write to the Queen, but he declined, saying that it was for His Majesty as head of the family to do so. I spoke to him about the sanction, and, as Cassaro was ill, to hold the Council without him, and every day. He said he would do the first if Cassaro did not soon recover, and he would do the latter. He said the delay gave rise to intrigues. Belmonte told me that he had shown my private note of the day before to the Prince, who promised to give the promotion to Balsamo and Benedetto. Spaccaferno told me that the Queen had sent an answer to Cassaro, and with it an official Note for the signatures of himself and Circello, but it was extravagant and Cassaro had sent it to the King.

(1) Saw a private letter from the Queen in which she said she wished to go to Catania but could not because of the badness of the roads; that she should go to Castelvetro. She had nothing now to consider but herself; everybody else had deserted her.

Saturday, January 23, 1813. (1) Received letters from Genls Campbell and Clinton. The former writes that he shall be delighted to give up his command to me. Fred had got a command in advance. Report that a corps was coming from Madrid towards Alicante.

(1) Arrived convoy under Scout, Capt. Crispin, from Mahon. Sailed 13th.

Sunday, January 24, 1813. (1) Belmonte called [upon] me and told me he had called upon Cassaro, whom he had found unwell. They talked of Cassaro's interview with the King, and Belmonte asked him why he had not advised the King to be firm and order her away. He said he had, but that the King expressed his fear that she would do some *sottise*. The King said that she was in her *radotage* and mad. Belmonte said that the King was an old fox and that he wanted either that I should take strong measures, in which case he would say "It is not I that do it", or he wished to come to some capitulation and to gain something else. Caccamo called upon me. He said what I had heard before, that the Queen had used such language to him, when last at the Ficuzza, that he declared he would not go there again, and, when there, he refused to dine in her company.

(1) Sent off the packet to Trapani.

Monday, January 25, 1813. Called upon Cassaro whom I found very unwell. The Duke of Orleans called upon me. The letters from the Queen had been *insignifiantes*. He showed me, some days before, his letters to the Duke of Kent: one about the Queen, in which he attributed much good effect to the strong language held by Lord Castlereagh to Castelcicala. He said the object of the British Government should be to make the court here imagine that I was always acting under [rather] than beyond my instructions. His other letter was to show the uselessness of the Alicante expedition.

Tuesday, January 26, 1813. La Tour told me that he had had a long conversation with Madame Zichy, in which he pointed out to her the absurdity of the Queen's quarrelling with me, through whose means she hoped to recover Naples. Madame Zichy was struck with the statement and said she would write it to the Queen. She did so. The Queen thanked her for the interest she took in her, but added that she had for ever given up all hope of returning there.

Wednesday, January 27, 1813. (1) Lt Col. Poli brought me a letter from the Hereditary Prince respecting the loan and preferment for Balsamo and Chiavetta, which he proposed should be compensated by the produce of the *abbaye* of Santa Maria dell'Arco. I found from Belmonte that neither Chiavetta nor Balsamo would take the money without the dignity.

Balsamo himself confirmed the same thing, talking to me of Di Aci. He explained to me why he was in opposition to the King. He had quarrelled with the King in consequence of the superior influence of Ascoli. In the Parliament of 1810 he had promised Belmonte and

Villermosa to vote with them. At the votation he voted against them, and Villermosa was so surprised that he cried out "Di Aci!". Di Aci excused himself afterwards by saying that they had, he said, a clear majority; that his vote was useless, and therefore he did not wish to offend the King. He hoped in fact to make up with the King, but this not succeeding, he then went into violent opposition and was banished in consequence.

Balsamo said the King was disgusted with him at last. He had an opportunity of seeing this when librarian. The King had many duplicate books, which Di Aci asked for and the King after much reluctance gave him, saying he was in love with them. Di Aci proposed to come and take them himself. The King did not allow anyone to go into his library. Balsamo asked the King's valet if Di Aci might come in. The King flew into a violent passion and called him *bestia* and all sorts of names.

(1) Confined by a bad cold.

Thursday, January 28, 1813. Lt Col. Poli called upon me by appointment. I spoke to him very strongly upon the Prince's conduct, upon his slowness, his distrust and his apparent bad faith. He had positively broken his promise regarding Balsamo. He had assured me on the 26 December that he would give the preferment. Upon this assurance I had advanced the money. To this day the Hereditary Prince had not performed his word. I said he was exactly pursuing the steps of his parents; that he was entirely sacrificing his opinion with the public; that he dissatisfied both the Sicilians and English, without pleasing the King and Queen, who were the first, as he knew, to blame his conduct. I told him I was sure that if the King came back he would be received with great joy, such general unfavourable impression had the Prince's conduct produced.

Poli did not deny the statement, but said his conduct was produced by fear of the King. He defended himself, said the public attributed much of the Prince's conduct to him. I said they did, and with justice, I believed; that it was his duty, as the Prince's preceptor and friend, to advise him. He said he did and was constantly exhorting him to hasten the sanction. I said I was unwilling to attribute to the Prince bad faith, but how could I account otherwise for his conduct? I begged him to state all these sentiments to the Prince.

Prince Di Aci came. He had entered the room while I was out. He found there MacFarlane, Fardella and O'Ferris. He said he came to represent to me the distressed state of the Army in consequence of my not advancing the money I had promised.

This complaining against me for consequences which his own intrigues had in great measure produced put me in a rage, and I declared I would not hear what he had to say. I told him he knew very well the cause; that the Hereditary Prince had not executed his promise, upon the faith of which I had already advanced 50,000 oz.; that I would not give a farthing more till that promise was fulfilled; that he might go and tell the Prince so. He said he would do no such thing and observed that private arrangements were not to interfere with public considerations. This made me more angry. I said there was nothing but intrigue and *malafede*, which ruined our affairs; that I would not submit to it; that I had taken my part and would not give a farthing until the Prince performed his promise. Prince Di Aci

continued to talk, but I took my hat and walked out of the room. I sent General MacFarlane to him soon after to say that I had no wish to continue the conversation upon the subject. Spaccaferno came. I had desired him to say to his father that as I had received no answer to my Note of the 15th, it was necessary that I should either write another, or that he should write to acquaint the King of my having such intention; and I wished to know which course he thought I had better take. Spaccaferno brought me for answer that the Queen required that I should write in the name of my court or Prince Regent, and not of the British Government. He proposed that I should write a new Note in lieu of the first, expressed in more explicit terms. I said I could not do this; that the first was gone and the copy sent to England, and that therefore I could only write a second asking why I had received no answer. Cassaro's opinion was that much time would be saved by a Note in preference to his writing.

Belmonte and the Duke of Orleans came. Their great object was to persuade me to more vigorous measures. They talked of the King's interference, the existence of which I denied. His influence I admitted, but this arose solely from the Prince's fear. The King himself was wholly passive.

Belmonte told a story of the Baron de Breteuil, who said he had always succeeded because he always set out by thinking that what he wished to do could and must be done. He told another story, of the Great Elector, who in a passion gave a box on the ear to Baron Zinzendorf, a foreign Minister. There was in the room only the Elector's Minister. The Baron immediately, without hesitation, paid the same compliment to the Minister and cried out: "*Passez-le*".

Belmonte said he had not been with the Hereditary Prince purposely for 7 or 8 days, to show he did not approve his conduct.

Friday, January 29, 1813. I went to the Hereditary Prince about military business. Afterwards he spoke to me about the sanction, and said that as soon as Cassaro was well he would shut himself up day and night till it was over.

He talked of Di Aci. He said he had written him a letter complaining of my conduct towards him and giving in his resignation. He asked me to tell him frankly what had passed, which I consented to do.

I then took up Di Aci's conduct from the beginning: his preposterous interpretation of his own powers, founded upon an article of "*Ministre de la Guerre*", taken from a French Encyclopaedia. I told His Royal Highness that his opinion was right when he objected to him. I acknowledged and was sorry for what had passed. I did not know him and had been astonished how Belmonte, who did know him, could have recommended him. But the fact was that Belmonte was a good-natured man and forgave him the injury that he himself had originally received from him, and only considered him as a partner of his misfortune. I complained of his ambition and of his wild and inconsistent conduct. I adverted to his having laid the treaty before the House. I complained of his violence and of his abuse of Fardella. The Hereditary Prince said Fardella *knew him* and abused him in consequence, which I condemned and said I had had Fardella spoken to in consequence. With respect to

his going out, I thought it would be well if the Hereditary Prince would appoint in his place some person *plus sage*, who would act with his colleagues and would preserve the union and harmony so necessary to the success of the Administration.

From this subject we passed to the present state of affairs. I expressed my regret at the conduct he was pursuing both to myself and to the country; that for myself I was most anxious for his honour and credit. The whole of the present embarrassments were due to himself. Why had he not performed his promise to me? It was a month since it had been made. Upon it I advanced the money he wanted. He hoped I did not think him capable of bad faith, *malafede*. I said I was very unwilling to believe it. He said: "I allow that I have been slow and doubtful and fearful, but of bad faith never". He pressed me upon this. I stated the great difficulty I had in explaining, either to my own satisfaction or to my Government, his delay. Three months had now elapsed and three Councils only upon the sanction had been held.

We talked of Balsamo and Chiavetta. He proposed to give the abbey of Santa Maria dell'Arco, and to give a promise of the next vacancy to Chiavetta.(1) I said this would not do. I did not know who would be the King when it might become vacant, nor what would be the value of it. He said there was only one vacancy, and therefore what could be done? He continued: there was the Archimandrite of Messina, but that was a cure of souls and his conscience forbade from giving that but to those who might be of the best character. He did not know Chiavetta. He did not know there was anything against him; said he had written to Cassaro for his opinion of him, and desired I would send to Spaccaforno to communicate with Cassaro upon the subject. I said to the Hereditary Prince that I knew the King did not like Chiavetta, fancying he was the writer of the Mission paper. But he was not so: the English controlled it. I proposed to the Hereditary Prince, in order to bring this question to a conclusion, that Prince Belmonte should be called in. He was fertile in expedients, was very conciliatory and was the friend of all parties. The Hereditary Prince consented to this. In the course of our conversation we talked of the relative situation of Captain General and Minister of War. I said I thought I had too much power, that it should be otherwise divided. He asked me to give him my opinion in writing upon this subject. I said I thought the King should be the generalissimo, his Captain General being the second in command; the Minister having only to do with the finance and political part of the system; that it should be a civilian. I had seen from the past *cifra'd* dispatches the inconvenience of vesting such extensive powers in a Minister of War.

When I was going away he reverted to Di Aci and said: "I think I will send no answer to his application". What did I think? I answered it was difficult, in a case where I was so personally interested, to decide. He said at going: "I hope we shall always separate more attached to each other".

I went to Villermosa to tell him what had passed. Belmonte came; and while there, the Hereditary Prince sent for Belmonte, who came to me afterwards. He said the Hereditary Prince accused him for not having been to him for several days. He said it was very true, he had kept away intentionally. He had nothing to say and his advice about the sanction and other things was not attended [to]. He preached in the wilderness. He spoke to him about

the difficulty of the abbeys for Balsamo and Chiavetta. He suggested an arrangement which pleased the Hereditary Prince very much, who ordered him to execute it.

Padre Sannisi came from Père Caccamo to say that he had received a letter from the King saying that he was *nell' inferno*; that the Queen would not go away; that he could not drive her away as he wished; that it was neither right nor proper for him to do that which I had proposed as an alternative. The monk said he did not know what that was. He however did (abdication). He invited me to send an officer to him to read the King's letter. I sent A'Court (see written account of it - C). The Padre Caccamo, when A'Court arrived, pretended that he had not authorized his messenger to propose to me to send anyone to read the King's letter.(2)

In conversation with Belmonte I suggested that it would be a good thing to send someone to Di Aci to endeavour to make him persist in his resignation. I thought of Settimo, but he said Dalrymple would do it better. I in consequence desired him to go to Di Aci and say from me that the Hereditary Prince had told me of his having given in his resignation, that I was glad of it, that he could not agree either with me or his colleagues, that it was indispensable the Government should be united, and that I had long foreseen it must come to this sooner or later; and that I was glad it had originated with him rather than with myself; that I was very sorry we had not agreed. I had been the cause of his nomination; I respected the part he had taken for the good of his country formerly; that I wished not to have any personal quarrel with him. On the contrary, if I could forward his wishes in anything I should be happy.

(1) I said Chiavetta had been promised for several years. He said not "promised". I answered that I understood it otherwise. He said the answers given were vague and not committing the Government to anything, like "*si conservi*" on military papers. But he proposed now to give a specific promise in writing of the next vacant *abbaye*.

(2) Sent second Note to Cassaro and Circello.

Saturday, January 30, 1813. Sir J. Dalrymple told me that he had seen Di Aci; that he was very high and seemed to fancy that he was sent by me to make peace with him. He was in a great rage when he heard the substance of the communication. Di Aci said that upon giving in his resignation he had asked the Hereditary Prince's leave to write to the King. Sir John asked why write to the King, he had not made him Minister. No, but he wished to show his respect to the King. He was always King and had not abdicated. When Sir John said that I was glad his dismissal had not originated with me, he said his country was not to be governed by the British Minister. He only wished for the independence of his country. He talked with great anger of Villermosa; said the Parliament would not support him, that he was surrounded by Frenchmen and spies.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. I found Belmonte there. The Duke said the Queen's letter of today was written in bad spirits. She said she hoped she might be happy with her children. Said she was always in tears and only came out of her room for messe and dinner.

In another letter she said: "*L'honnête homme de votre père est allé à la chasse. L'honnête homme son fils l'accompagne. Honnête jusqu'ici, mais honnête jusqu' où?*"

Sunday, January 31, 1813. Belmonte came from the Hereditary Prince to say that all was arranged about the abbeys. The Hereditary Prince asked if I would not advance the money. Belmonte answered he was sure I would as soon as the dispatches were out. He said he was also charged to speak to me about Di Aci, who had told the Hereditary Prince what I had said about my intention of removing him if he had not given in his resignation. The Hereditary Prince wished me not to give in such a Note and wished that the thing should be accommodated. Belmonte said as the Hereditary Prince wished it, he would do it. It was agreed that he should say to the Hereditary Prince that he had found me irresistible.

MacFarlane received a letter from Di Aci begging him as the common friend to require from me an explanation of the charge I had made against him of engaging in intrigues. MacFarlane sent me his answer, which I approved.

Caccamo came and said he was to go to the King the next day to confess him. He confessed twelve times a year, every month.

Belmonte told us that Caccamo had told Monti and Chiavetta, speaking of the hatred of the Queen to him, that he never tasted a dish at the King's table of which he had not seen eat either the King or the Queen; that he recollected the case of the Padre Strassoldi, who had been his predecessor as the King's confessor. The King had spoken to him about the 1 per cent tax and expressed to him the uneasiness of his own conscience. The Padre desired him to be tranquillized, and put into his hands a book which he, the Père, had written upon the subject of the power of kings in Sicily 12 years before. The Padre said that opinions written so long ago could have received no bias from present circumstances. The King read in the book his own condemnation. He was furious with the Queen for the measure she had advised him to take. She in turn was most enraged with the Padre and, sending for the Principal of the Jesuits to whose order Strassoldi belonged, abused him for having such a *coquin* belonging to him. In 24 hours after he was dead.

In Sicily ...

Monday, February 1, 1813. (1) Attended Council upon the sanction at the palace. We made a good deal of progress. The Prince authorized the publication of the Town Council Bill, and so much of the Legislative Power articles as were necessary to the convocation of the Parliament.

When we first sat down, Di Aci laid before the Council a printed paper containing an order from Villermosa that no advances should be made by the country treasuries to the military. Di Aci complained of the ill judgment of publishing this order at this moment when the Army were starving. Villermosa showed that it was published in December and not now, and this in execution of the orders of Government; all the Council were against him. Di Aci also alluded to the assertion by me that he was an intriguer. I made no answer. Belmonte told me after the Council that the Prince attacked Di Aci very strongly about some order he

had given interfering in some question of the civil courts and ordering the judge into confinement. Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince had spoken to him about Di Aci and was very well disposed to get rid of him, if I had spoken to him very decidedly.

(1) Dined with the Duke of Orleans. A large party of English.

Tuesday, February 2, 1813. Belmonte came before the Council to speak to me about the estate of Caccamo, which had been once referred to one of the tribunals. It had been spoken of in Council and the Hereditary Prince had proposed to refer it to another tribunal. He desired Villermosa to make the dispatch, who refused upon the ground of the personal interest he had in the affair. Cassaro also refused, unwilling, as Belmonte supposed, to incur the responsibility. Belmonte refused for the same reason as his uncle Villermosa. The Hereditary Prince desired Di Aci to make the dispatch, who undertook it, but his opinion was contrary to the Hereditary Prince's resolution. Belmonte suspected some bad faith on the part of the Hereditary Prince. He begged me to speak to the Hereditary Prince upon the subject, which I promised to do. He also spoke to me about Di Aci, saying that if I spoke decidedly to the Hereditary Prince about him, he would turn him out.

I went to the Hereditary Prince and, having transacted my military business, I spoke to him first about Di Aci. I told him that Belmonte had spoken to me about an accommodation with Di Aci, with whom I should have been most happy to have gone on well, but it was quite evident that he could go on well with nobody.(1) The Hereditary Prince said he was a friend to conciliation and therefore had desired Belmonte to speak to me to see if the matter could be accommodated. I observed that he must see what sort of man he was, and of the injury he would do to the public service. The Hereditary Prince entirely agreed in this. I said he was always courting popularity, and I advised him most strongly to give him the dismissal which he had asked and to do it directly.

He asked whom I recommended to succeed him. I said D. Ruggiero Settimo. I knew he was an *homme sage avec beaucoup de courage*;(2) that Di Aci would probably put himself in opposition, and that it would be necessary to have someone who could face him. The Hereditary Prince said he did not know Settimo. He knew his brother Fitalia and respected him very much. I said I was doubtful whether he had sufficient ability to support himself in the House. If he had, it would be better, I thought, to make him Minister of War and his brother sub-director. He asked me to enquire into Fitalia's capability. I said it would be better for His Royal Highness to do this.(3)

I then spoke to him of the estate of Caccamo, and told him that as the law had actually passed, that the question did not in any way regard the crown, as there would be a Civil List in whatever way the question of right was disposed of; that acting in opposition to the law, upon the plea of the law being incomplete in consequence of the non-publication to the magistrates, although it had been published to the Parliament, would be productive of *méfiance*. The Hereditary Prince appeared to agree perfectly in what I had said and even anticipated some of my own opinions. He said it should be spoken of in the Council, which however he did not do.

There was then Council, which lasted from past eleven till past two. The article discussed was the liberty of the press. Cassaro began by saying that he thought the provisions good and that it should be sanctioned, with the addition that it should not be executed till men's minds were more composed. This was opposed by all the rest and by the Prince himself.

The Prince's principal objection, and which occupied the greater part of the morning, was his fear of irreligious sentiments being introduced into books upon other subjects. Works professedly upon religion were by the law to be submitted to a previous revisal by the bishop, other works not. He proposed that all books should be submitted to such previous examination. It was answered to him that the punishment awarded by the law would be sufficient; that the examination he wished would be a great obstacle, if it could be executed, to the liberty of the press. Who was to be the revisor? Where was the appeal against him? He at last gave it up, making more particular and extensive the description of religious publications subject to revisal.

The members to compose the committee for the preparation of the civil and criminal code were also named.

After the Council Belmonte came to me. He said that as soon as I had left the Council the Hereditary Prince called him and Cassaro into the room. He asked Cassaro's opinion about Fitalia. Cassaro said he was perfectly unfit, for want of capacity, to succeed Di Aci.(4) He then asked him about Settimo, and Cassaro said that he was an excellent man, possessed of great good sense and talent.(5) The Hereditary Prince desired Belmonte to say to me that he wished to have a letter from me advising his acceptance of Di Aci's resignation. He wanted this to show to the King.

(1) I said also that an united administration was always desirable, but in a system like this and with such a people, an united and energetic administration was indispensable. In which he entirely acquiesced.

(2) I said there were two men I thought better of than any others, Settimo and Spaccaforo. The Hereditary Prince said he liked Spaccaforo very much; that he had often complained to Cassaro that he would not allow him to come forward. How, he said, was he to develop himself?

(3) Belmonte said that he had proposed to the Hereditary Prince to put Di Aci in Butera's place as director of the Militia. But the Hereditary Prince said he would put everything in confusion.

(4) Belmonte said that Cassaro abused Di Aci to the Prince more than either I or he (Belmonte). He said he was doing always some outrageous thing or other. He mentioned various instances of the irregular dispatches and interference proceeding from his department.

(5) Cassaro said the only inconvenience about Settimo was his youth, upon Belmonte saying that he was 25 or 26. The Hereditary Prince said that the objection did not much signify.

Wednesday, February 3, 1813. Went to Council for the sanction. The article discussed was the succession to the crown.

Several questions were referred to me to ascertain the relative practice in England:

1. Marriage of the King and family with or without the consent of Parliament.
2. His absence with or without the consent of Parliament, and who appoints regency.
3. In case of the King's dying and leaving his son [a] minor, who appoints the regency.

The Hereditary Prince thought he ought, others that the Parliament should. Cassaro proposed that a part should be appointed by the King, part by the Parliament. It was suspended till I could report the practice in England.

The Hereditary Prince wished, in case the King was the last of his family, that his successor should be elected in his life by the Parliament with his consent. It being stated that he had no interest in it and the nation every interest, he left it with the Parliament.

The great question was the separation of Naples and Sicily under different crowns. The Hereditary Prince said he would leave this to the King. The Hereditary Prince urged this point very much. He said Sicily must always be dependent. Its natural dependency was upon Naples. All his Counsellors strongly maintained, with the exception of Cassaro whose opinion I did not exactly learn, that there would be no liberty for Sicily if it was to continue a province of Naples. I gave as my opinion that Sicily could be independent of all powers; that I thought the sanction belonged to the crown, but that I certainly would strongly advise the King to sanction the article. But, as it was to be sent to him, I would suggest that it should be transmitted with the opinions of all the Counsellors. Cassaro objected to sending his.

Cassaro told me that an answer had been sent by the King to his and Circello's note, but addressed to him alone. The King was angry, said that his honour was falsely attacked; that the paper in question was not a treaty but a mere declaration of the Queen's intentions. He desired to send a draft of an answer (I could not understand more which he added).

Thursday, February 4, 1813. (1) I attended Council for the sanction. The questions discussed were the rights of the citizen.

Cassaro told me more particularly what he had received from the King. Besides a letter from himself and Circello to the King, he had written strongly both to the King and Queen. The King's answer was addressed to himself only. In which the King said that I had attacked his honour; that the paper signed was no treaty but a simple declaration of the Queen's intentions; and desired him to write the draft of an energetic answer to be sent to the Ficuzza. Cassaro answered the King by saying that nothing energetic could be answered until the Queen went away, and that as His Majesty was coming to town in three or four days, it would be better to defer till then the answer.

Belmonte came after Council and told me that the Hereditary Prince had given way to Cassaro's objection to the youth of Settimo and had resolved to appoint his brother Fitalia. I expressed my regret at this. Belmonte advised my speaking to Poli. Belmonte also told me that the letters from the Queen to the Duchess of Orleans were in good spirits. She hoped God would assist >the King< in acting with firmness.

I spoke to Spaccaforo in the evening and begged him to say to his father that I understood he had objected to Settimo's youth. I wished him to observe that it would have done very well under the old system, but under the new one it was necessary to have a person who had firmness and ability, and to ask him whether he did not think that much inconvenience might arise from it.

(1) The King was to come to Palermo, but prevented by the great snow. Such severe weather unknown in Sicily for 50 years.

Friday, February 5, 1813. (1) Spaccaforo brought me his father's answer - that his opinion was that it might give dissatisfaction to appoint so young a person as Settimo, it being contrary to usage. But he did not wish to meddle in the matter. Talking of his father, he said he was timid and that he believed there were some persons about him who gave him bad advice.

The Duke of Orleans told me that the Queen's letter today was nothing remarkable. It talked of the King's coming, and it concluded with praying God to fortify him to govern himself with firmness - *qu'il le fortifiera de se régir* - in support of his rights and dignity.

Belmonte interpreted the Queen's tranquillity upon the departure of the King to the assurances received by her from the King that he would follow her advice, assurances he at the time never intended to keep.

Padre Sannisi came from Caccamo twice. He brought the Padre's compliments and said that the Padre had heard from the King, who wrote in great spirits that everything was arranged to his satisfaction with the Queen, who was quiet and contented, and who had consented in a few days, when the snow would allow her, to go to Castelvetro; that the King would be in Palermo as soon as the weather would allow him. (Note: if this is true, the King has probably promised the Queen to resume the reins of government, and it is this which has composed her).

(1) Redwing, Sir John Sinclair, sailed for the Fleet.

My grandfather, the Duke of Gordon, my uncles Huntly and the Duke of Richmond.

King prevented from coming to Palermo by the snow.

Saturday, February 6, 1813. The King arrived about 5 in the evening. Was met by a great number of carriages. Philippstadt received him at the bottom of the stairs of the palace and said: "Your Majesty sees that the people of Palermo are not indifferent about your coming". The King made no answer. He slept that night at the Favorita.

Sunday, February 7, 1813. Belmonte and Villermosa came. The former said that the Padre Sannisi had been with him and said that the Padre Caccamo wished to speak to him. He said he would call upon him. He went and found the Padre at dinner with the dirtiest

tablecloth, surrounded by five as dirty monks, and himself covered with a large greatcoat which made him look like an old bear. He sat with him till dinner was over. But while there, Moliterno came in like a knight crusader, and kissed the Padre's hand three times.

Belmonte and Caccamo then retired, and after some hesitation on the part of the Padre, Belmonte interrupted him and said: "Permit me to tell you what you have so much difficulty to begin upon. You want to manage an interview between the King and his Ministers". The Padre said: "You are right, but you know the King cannot make the first advance". Belmonte answered: "Very well, but I will make a proposition and you yourself shall be the judge of its reasonableness". Belmonte said: "When we first became Ministers we wrote to the *Prieur* Jannucci to propose to pay to the King our respects. He answered that he would not give us that trouble. We cannot therefore offer ourselves without his permission. The best way to save the King's dignity, the Prince's and our own would be that the King should desire the Hereditary Prince to send us, or to intimate to him his wish to see us".

Belmonte added that he wished the King to understand fully his sentiments; he wished him to know that he had *éclairé* the Hereditary Prince as to his real interests, that he had advised him that it was indispensable for his own and the country's welfare that either the King should have all the power himself or that he should delegate the whole to him, the Hereditary Prince - a divided power could never answer. If the King chose to resume, well and good. If he did, it was his interest to put himself on good terms with his Ministers, with the nation, and above all with the British Minister. Belmonte said he had no wish but for his country's good. It was necessary that the King should agree to sanction the Constitution. Till then it was necessary he should keep his Ministers. This over, he might change them as soon as he pleased. It did not then signify, when the machine was once in play, who was the Minister; and he and his colleagues would be glad for peace and retirement.

Upon talking of the injustice done him by the King, the Padre said "it is not the King". Belmonte answered: "The King gave his consent, he permitted it and his is the guilt before God and man". He talked to him of the extreme forbearance of England and Sicily towards the King, who had insulted them both; that the King still persisted in his conduct; the Queen misled him; had lost for him Naples and would have lost him Sicily also but for the generosity of the English.

He asked me if I approved his resolution, which I said I did entirely. I also proposed to write a letter to Cassaro, saying that I could not call upon the King till he had performed his engagements. Of this they approved. Lamb was present.

Belmonte went to the Hereditary Prince, who was very anxious to know the result of his conversation with Caccamo. Upon Belmonte's telling him that he had said to Caccamo that he (Belmonte) had advised the Hereditary Prince what to do, the Hereditary Prince embraced him. He said: "I owe you more than I can ever repay you. It would have been very difficult for me to have told my father that I could not act under him. You have taken this odious task upon yourself and I am very obliged to you for it".(1) Belmonte said nothing could exceed the kindness of the Hereditary Prince. He spoke in the most sensible and handsome manner. Belmonte said he would, that day, have done anything for him.

I saw the Duke of Orleans afterwards. He said he had been at the palace waiting with the Hereditary Prince three hours for the King. The Hereditary Prince was very nervous but decided. The Hereditary Prince said to him he would be *tout ou rien*. He said he had a good story of a woodcock for the King which he kept in reserve. Speaking of some of the persons by whom he was surrounded, he said "*il aimait mieux avoir à faire avec un Jacobin franc qu'avec un royaliste double*". The Duke said: "You do not mean Belmonte?" The Hereditary Prince said: "Oh, no!", but evidently he did. Despotism will probably never be rooted out of his breast.

The King received the Hereditary Prince very well. He did not speak to the Duke at his arrival, nor afterwards when all the family, as is the etiquette, goes into the King's room. The King then came out into the aisle and the Duke went up and spoke to him. The King drew up at first, but afterwards his coldness went off and he spoke the same as usual. The Duke had been there this morning and was well received by the King. The King had not said a word about business to the Hereditary Prince; but the Hereditary Prince said it would all do very well. The King was in great spirits.

Belmonte showed me a note from Di Aci to Monti, in which he said that, understanding the King had said he would be glad to receive everybody, it was his intention to call upon him; and he thought it right to inform Belmonte and Villermosa of it. This was written after he had been there. He was an hour and a half with the King.

Belmonte wrote me a note in the evening to say that Cassaro had sent a messenger to say that the King had said that he had seen all his gentlemen of his bedchamber except Belmonte. Belmonte said he would not go.

Villermosa came and told me that the King objected to the abbey being given to Balsamo, and that it should not go on.

It was said in the town that the King would hold a great Council, but it was Belmonte's opinion that he was only come to feel his ground and, if the Hereditary Prince would let him, to govern through him.

The Duke of Orleans told me that the letters from the Queen were written in the greatest despair. She talked of herself as abandoned by the King; that she was going to Castelvetro. Her letters were so violent against the Duke of Orleans that the Duchess would not show them. The Queen in her letters to the Duchess said she hoped that the cloud or fog which covered her (the Duchess') eyes respecting the Duke would never be removed.

(1) The Hereditary Prince said that Belmonte had *éventé*, blown up, the King's plan.

Monday, February 8, 1813. (1) The Padre Sannisi came from the Père Caccamo. His object was to induce me to go and see the King. He said I had nothing to do but to send a servant to know if the King would receive me, or if I wanted a person to introduce me, the Padre would take me himself.

Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince had sent for him to tell him what had passed between himself and Di Aci. Di Aci had not dispatched the papers relative to the loan which had been agreed upon at Council, and pretended to have forgotten. As he was going

away, he said to the Hereditary Prince, as if by accident, that he had been to wait upon the King, upon which the Hereditary Prince answered: "*Me ne consolo assai assai*". He then said that he had spoken to the King about his resignation and that the King had urged him not to - hoped he would not - leave the Ministry. Upon this the Hereditary Prince said: "You know the King has made me Vicar General. You know very well how unpleasant is the situation of affairs. Nobody more sensible of this than yourself, who have so frequently offered your resignation. I shall be most happy if the King resumes the government, when I may be quiet and retired. But as long as it pleases His Majesty to leave me the power, recollect that it is to me you are to address yourself, that you are my Minister". The Hereditary Prince said it was necessary he should go out immediately.

The Duke of Orleans told me that the letter from the Queen was very violent today; that she feared the King himself was going to yield, through the influence of Cassaro and Caccamo, what had been so often asked of the Prince.

Spaccaferno told me that the Queen had sent a very violent answer, which she proposed to be sent by Cassaro and Circello to me. The King said it was extravagant. He said that when he first came his father had found the King more inclined to see the Ministers than he had been on that day and the day before. He said that I would receive an answer in two days; that the King had desired them to write an answer, the object of which would be to excuse the King for the Queen's conduct.

(1) The Duke and Duchess of Orleans dined here.

Tuesday, February 9, 1813. Went to the Hereditary Prince with my military business. After this was done, he talked to me about the King. I said I had been invited by the Père Caccamo to go and see the King. He hoped I meant to go. I said, after I had received an answer. The Hereditary Prince said he could not understand it all. Time would *démêler* it.

He then talked of Di Aci. I said he was a *misérable*, dirty fellow. I supposed His Royal Highness was still determined to remove him. He said he was. I then talked of his successor. He proposed Fitalia, with Settimo as sub-director, that Settimo should have all the duty and responsibility. I said I doubted whether this could be, as the Parliament had placed all the responsibility upon the Secretary of State. I did not see what objection there could be to Settimo. He said it would appear odd that he should become Secretary of State at once. I said this was unavoidable. Hitherto there had been no stepping stone. I instanced Gargallo, who had been made at once and was of no family. He said that it was true, *il avait tombé des nues*. He said he would reflect upon the difficulty.

In the antechamber Cassaro repeated to me, in a tone which I could scarcely hear and understand, what had passed between him and the King. He said that Pantelleria had entirely lost the King's favour. The King said he was a *cattivo soggetto*. (I could not make out why the King had changed). Cassaro said when he took the Queen's answer to the King he remarked that if His Majesty chose that answer to be sent, he must be prepared to send passports at the same time. The King said it was *immoderato*. Cassaro was to go to him tomorrow to arrange the answer.

The King was averse to seeing the Ministers, that is, Belmonte and Villermosa. He hoped in a few days to conquer it. The King said - but how applied I could not understand - that I acted like a schoolmaster (*maestro di scuola*) to the Hereditary Prince and he should not like to be treated in the same manner. Cassaro said that the reason was that the Prince required to be spinto, be urged on, whereas His Majesty did not delay business. There was afterwards Council upon the sanction. I proposed an alteration respecting the chase. Nothing particular happened.

Wednesday, February 10, 1813. I called upon the Duke of Orleans and found there Belmonte. He said that after the Council the preceding day the Hereditary Prince had detained him. Belmonte spoke to him about the patents for the abbeys given to Balsamo and Chiavetta. He said it was necessary the Hereditary Prince should show his loyalty and dispatch the business immediately. He proposed himself to sign them: he as Minister for Foreign Affairs being authorized to enter into every department. Belmonte pressed him a good deal and at last said laughingly to him that he would not leave his room till he had ordered him to do them. The Prince then said: "*Faites-les*".

Belmonte then talked to him of the Minister of War and the necessity of giving Di Aci his resignation and nominating his successor immediately. It was necessary that the Hereditary Prince should show decision in order to discountenance the opposite party, who were endeavouring to discredit his Government. The condemnation of Di Aci would have a great effect. The conduct of the Hereditary Prince at present discouraged the good and his own and his country's friends, and encouraged the bad. Belmonte added: "When they see these acts of energy, the whole party will turn cassock and join us". Another advantage of Settimo was that he had not been near the King. "What objection is there to Settimo except his youth? There can only be energy with youth, and must a Minister be necessarily 90 years old?". Belmonte said, as in the former case, that he could not go till His Royal Highness ordered him to make out the dispatches. The Hereditary Prince, laughing, said: "*Voi siete un diavolo*", and said "*Faites-les*".

Belmonte then told us that he had asked Cassaro before the Hereditary Prince if the King had talked to him of Di Aci. He said he had; that the King had mentioned Di Aci's having been with him for an hour and a half, in which he talked the most extravagant nonsense; that his head was the hottest he had ever met with, and that there was no doing anything with him.

Belmonte said that the extraordinary fact about the King was that he had not noticed those who had most taken his side in politics; that Pantelleria he would not speak [to] and Militello he would not look at. It was so marked that Trabia said of the King: "*Non c'è che fare con questo vilissimo uomo*".

The Hereditary Prince was very anxious that Belmonte should see the King. Belmonte had said that he could not go without Villermosa. Caccamo has seen the King and had sent for Monti to say that the King would see them both. Cassaro and Circello met also Monti on the road, stopped him to say the same thing. I received two messages today from Caccamo:

the first to urge me to go to the King; the second to beg me to urge Belmonte to wait upon the King.

Belmonte said that Cassaro had told the Hereditary Prince in his presence that nothing could speak more decidedly to the King than Circello about his failure of his word. He fell into a passion with the King, interrupted and contradicted to him, saying he was now old; he considered nothing but his honour (the King's) and his own. His Majesty was bound by every sentiment to execute his promise.

Spaccaferno came from Cassaro to say that the King had approved the note proposed by his father and Circello and I should receive it next morning.

The Duke of Orleans said that the letter from the Queen was written in great despair. She said she was lost and abandoned. She was going to Castelvetro and nothing should keep her in Sicily after the spring.

Belmonte asked Cassaro about the King's future intentions. Cassaro said that he spoke of it with uncertainty. "If I resume the government I may do so and so; if I do not then so and so".

Tuesday, February 11, 1813. (1) Went to the Council about the sanction. We went through the first chapter of the Executive Power.

Before the Council I told Cassaro that I was not at all pleased with his note, just received. He said it mentioned that the Queen was to go away. He said that the draft sent by the Queen was of the most extraordinary kind. He mentioned that the Queen had promised the King never to return to Palermo. This passed in a whisper in public.

At Council, while speaking of the crime of plotting against the Constitution, which seemed unprovided for, Cassaro said it was one of the most serious kind and should be severely punished; and, he said, it was a very possible one. Who, he said, can be certain that the Queen will not send someone to make plots and disturbances in Palermo? And would not that be an offence against the state?

I was very urgent that no alteration should be made in the 17th article about the >Executive<; but the Hereditary Prince strongly maintained that the people would not be satisfied unless the government assisted them in obtaining redress. I said I thought this very objectionable - that the government should interfere in the administration of justice. I could not succeed. I was much amused with the Hereditary Prince's anxiety that it should be already understood that not the King but his Ministers were responsible.

After Council I went with Belmonte to call upon the Duke of Orleans. Belmonte told me on the way that he had again urged the Hereditary Prince to give out the dispatch about Di Aci, saying he could not look me in the face if he did not. It was agreed that it should be issued immediately. Belmonte had made a draft, not inserting in it any compliments to Di Aci. Both the Hereditary Prince and Cassaro thought that he should be complimented.

Belmonte said that Cassaro thought the King would resume. Cassaro told me in the morning that the King had desired him to inform him of the nature of the Constitution; that it was all new to him and that on retaking the government he did not wish to commit *bestialità*.

I showed Belmonte and the Duke of Orleans the note received from Cassaro and Circello. The Duke thought it offered a fine opportunity of giving a strong answer; that the note had been written for publication in Russia and Germany, where my answer would also be sent. The Duke said the Queen had written that my correspondence, when published abroad, would do an injury to the British character that all the good of England could not efface. Belmonte was of the same opinion.

It appears to me that it would have been better had the King acknowledged himself in the wrong, and that the thing could have been settled quietly. A strong answer may throw him again into the Queen's arms. The Duke said no, he never would go back to her; that the King spoke to him with horror of the 14 months he had passed. He said that he was now in a *paradiso*.

The Padre Sannisi came to me. I told him that I had received a note from Cassaro and Circello, very unworthy of the King. I was very sorry for it. I desired him to say so to Padre Caccamo.

(1) Received note from Circello and Cassaro in answer to mine of the 15th and 29th of the last month.

Sent off orders for expedition to Ponza.

Friday, February 12, 1813. (1) Padre Sannisi returned from the Père Caccamo. He said the Padre begged the King not to ask him to interfere in anything. I said this was an affair of conscience and thought it came entirely within his relation to the King. He desired I would send A'Court to him, which I did, with the note of Cassaro and Circello, and desired him to say that the answer to that note could only be unpleasant to the King; that I wished for reconciliation and harmony; that I advised therefore the note being withdrawn and another substituted stating the Queen to have come to the Ficuzza without the King's knowledge and that she would go away as soon as the roads were good. He went and the Père said he would speak to the King.

I called twice upon Cassaro with the same object, without being able to see him.

I waited upon the Hereditary Prince with the military papers. I told him of a letter from Queen Murat to the Empress Bonaparte, intercepted by the Russians and sent by Prince Kutusoff to Mr Liston and from Mr Liston to me, in which she stated in June the defenceless state of her kingdom. I suggested to him writing to the Prince Regent, strongly inviting such an expedition. He thanked me very much for the advice.

We spoke about the King and I mentioned the note from Cassaro and Circello. I stated the absurdity of it; that it was like all Circello's notes, which instead of protecting the King's dignity always exposed it to insult. He always put the King more in the wrong. I offered to show him the note, which he declined, saying he wished to be able to say that he knew nothing of it. It was an affair, as it regarded the King, in which he was anxious to have no concern.

He talked of the King's intention and said that according to his view there were only three things for him: 1. to resume the government; 2. to abstain from all concern and interference

whatever with affairs; 3. or to leave the Prince as Vicar General and to give his countenance and protection to the Government. But, said the Hereditary Prince very justly, he does none of these things.

He said his duty and course was plain: to keep on steadily on his path without going to the right or to the left. I agreed on the wisdom of this sentiment.

(1) Don Ruggero Settimo's appointment as Minister of War came out.

Saturday, February 13, 1813. I went to the Council at 10. Belmonte told us that the day before he had been at the palace where he found Di Aci and Settimo in the antechamber, the one to take leave, the other to thank the King for his appointment. The Prince came out, when Di Aci thanked him but said that it was not his intention to have resigned entirely. The Hereditary Prince said he must recollect that he had asked very often for his dismissal, and at last he had granted his request. Di Aci said that he had served His Royal Highness with the greatest devotion. The Hereditary Prince answered: "*Tutti gli altri fanno lo stesso*". Di Aci added that His Royal Highness might be assured of his attachment and support to his Government. The Hereditary Prince answered: "*Non ne dubito*". Belmonte said he answered very well, with great apparent stupidity but licking Di Aci at every word.

He then spoke to Settimo and said he was a sailor and probably had an inclination towards the Marine (his nose turned towards Italian expedition); that for the present it was necessary to be as economical as possible, to pay and clothe the men, and not throw away the money as Di Aci had done in the repair of ships etc. When the Parliament met and voted more money, then they might begin and think about repairing more ships.

We then went to Council, which lasted three hours. We went through 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th chapters of the Executive Power. Di Aci did not attend either of the last Councils.

Cassaro came to me at half past 5. I proposed to him to withdraw the note sent to me by himself and Circello. I said I thought he had not written it. He assured me he had, every word of it. We had a great deal of discussion about it. I maintained that the King had broken his word, which he said he had not. I said I could not let him off his promise, and that it was better for us all that the Queen should go away upon the strength of that promise than be sent away by force. He said the Queen had come without his knowledge. I said I doubted it, but if she had, why not say so rather than make the assertion he had, which after all the difficulty of making the former arrangement, to which the King only consented to avert a greater evil, was indecent and impertinent?

He said the King was highly offended at being told he had not kept his word. I was aware this charge was strong, but it was the truth and I would prove it. He made difficulties about recalling the letter. I said I should be obliged, if he did not, to send a still more displeasing answer to it. I said I must be always prepared for my defence; that I was liable to be attacked in England; that I was threatened with the publication of everything in Russia and Germany, and therefore I could let nothing pass without its refutation.

Cassaro then proposed, if his note was withdrawn, that the objectionable expressions respecting the Queen should be withdrawn also. I said they should. He afterwards proposed

that both my notes should be withdrawn, which I said I would consider; that one or both had gone home. I was to give him an answer the next morning.

He said the King was displeased at the Hereditary Prince having appointed Settimo without his knowledge. He adverted much upon the Hereditary Prince's weakness, upon the popularity of the King, that all classes wished him to resume the government. He talked of his resuming and asked if I had any objections. I said none. It was necessary previously that the King and I should be agreed; that I had entered into engagements with the Hereditary Prince which must be executed. Those were: the establishment of the Constitution, the appointment of Ministers agreeable to the Sicilian nation. Cassaro said the King would sanction everything that was consonant to the English Constitution and proposed to have the Constitution sent to England to have it there examined and determined what was or was not according to that of Great Britain. I asked if it was to be delayed till that time. He said no, and gave no satisfactory account of the King's intentions in that respect. With respect to the Ministers, it was his intention not to change them.

Cassaro said he should give up his situation and asked me who I thought should succeed him. I said I did not know. He said there was no nobleman who could; there was not one among the class fit for it. It must be a lawyer. He mentioned four persons: Ferreri, Artale, Del Bono and Averna. He leaned to the first. I said against him I had heard great objections. It was sufficient that he was president of the Tribunal of Patrimony. Against the second, I had heard him accused of harshness. The third was generally esteemed, but he was slow. He said he believed he was. I said it was decidedly my opinion that his successor should be a nobleman and a firm man; that his business now would be principally with the police. Cassaro proposed Villermosa. I said the same arrangement had occurred to me, but I thought him necessary to his present office. Cassaro begged I would not mention the names proposed to me to Belmonte and Villermosa, as they would object to them; but if I would say which I preferred, he would propose him to the King.

He talked of himself, that the King wanted him to be first Minister; that he had refused it; and insinuated that I was against his being so. I did not notice this insinuation. He also asked if the King would be compelled always to keep the present Ministers. I said no. He must keep them till things were established, and then he might change them if he pleased. He mentioned 7 or 8 months. He said he might possibly take in another, not exactly of the same opinions with Belmonte and Villermosa. He said he would go to the King directly, and call upon him again in the morning. The King never gave way the first time.

He talked of the separation of the two kingdoms, and said he had seen a letter from Castelcicala saying that the British Government did not wish the separation. I said I did not care a pin about the article, but my opinion was that the King had better sanction it.

Sunday, February 14, 1813. (1) Spaccaforno came from his father to say that he had seen the King the night before, but he was in company and could say nothing to him, and that the King could not see him on this day because he was going a-shooting.

Belmonte came. He said he had seen the Hereditary Prince. He said to the Hereditary Prince he merely came to feel His Royal Highness's pulse. I forget the remainder.

The Duke of Orleans came. He said the Duchess had resented to the Queen her not permitting Leopold to call upon her although he passed her house. He changed horses at the Porta Nuova instead of going to the palace.

I told Lamb what had passed the night before. We were both of opinion that no difficulties could be made openly to the King's return to the government; that on the contrary every facility should be given to it.

(1) Suggested why the Queen's departure should not be made a condition of the King's return.

Belmonte thought the King would not resume.

The Duke of Orleans said the Duchess was of the same opinion.

Monday, February 15, 1813. Belmonte came and told me that the Duke of Orleans had been with Leopold and the royal family at the masked ball the night before; that the Duke had given Leopold some severe cuts about his dependence, which the Hereditary Prince overheard and was not displeased at. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince had, in speaking to him about his future situation, said that if the King resumed, he was determined to see nobody and no Minister but in public. If the King sent Cassaro or any other to him, he would only speak to him in the presence of others. The Duke told the Hereditary Prince that this was the most critical moment of his life; that he was observed most closely by me; that all his past conduct, he might be assured, was present in my mind; that I should in consequence examine with distrust, and that his ruin or salvation depended upon himself.

Tuesday, February 16, 1813. Attended Council on the sanction, which lasted for three hours. Went through the whole article of feudal rights. I strongly urged the entire removal of all restrictions on the part of the crown on woods, planting and cutting etc., and I in great part carried my object.

We also went through the whole article of the *fidecommessi*. Cassaro was very strong against it, saying that it would democratize Sicily. Belmonte, as had been previously agreed, suggested a modification according to the English Constitution, by which the possessor and the living heirs at full age might cut off the entail. Cassaro wished that the younger sons should also agree, and so the amendment was written; but it was altered upon my representing the difficulty of an agreement where so many were interested, and I suggested that it would be sufficient that the interests of the younger brothers should not be injured by such a transaction, that is, if he had 100 oz. per ann[um], that he should not have less.

Villermosa strongly represented the necessity of calling the Parliament and of fixing the day. It might be prorogued again if necessary. But the Hereditary Prince was averse to it and wished to put it off. I could not make out why. Cassaro was also against it.

Cassaro and Spaccaforo came in the evening by appointment, having seen the King. It was agreed that my last note and the note of Cassaro and Circello should be withdrawn, and

they were to come for the purpose of cancelling them. I hoped the answer that they would have now to write to my first note would be an admission of the promise. Cassaro made some fight, that it was not a treaty. I asked if it did not contain, whatever its designation, the royal promise. Cassaro admitted this. I said that if this was admitted in the answer and that the King excused himself by saying that the Queen had come without his knowledge, I would apologize in my answer for having charged the King with a violation of his promise. He told me the Queen had written eight pages to Caccamo; that the King would not return to the Ficuzza and that the Queen would go away to Castelvetrano on the 4th March.

I then asked him if the King meant to resume. He said, speaking not officially, that he did. He said he meant to ratify the sanction of the Constitution; that he had been persuaded by him to give up the idea of sending it to England. I said the ratification was unnecessary, as the Hereditary Prince had received his full powers. To add any unnecessary form might bring in question hereafter the validity of the same powers, if granted.

I said I did not think it would ever suit the King to resume the authority. He had been a despot all his life, had never attended to business, and could never give up his old habits and prejudices. I said when I knew that he was to resume I should write him a letter, directly or through him, that it was necessary I should be assured of the present order of things, and that such precautions should be taken by me as would secure their safe establishment. I had not made up my mind to what exactly might be necessary to require. I had only as yet required the absence of the Duke of Ascoli, but it might be essential to remove others. I could not possibly hurt the King. He had shown no goodwill to the Constitution. He expressed a willingness to sanction it now, not because he liked it, but because he now wanted to resume the authority and could not do so without assenting to this condition.

Cassaro said he would keep the present Ministers. He thought there would be no difficulty in being King under the present Constitution; that before the King did everything, now it was the Ministers. I begged his pardon: much depended upon the King, in regulating, in preserving union etc.

Cassaro evidently wants to be Prime Minister and is urging the King to return, because he sees he cannot have the full confidence of the Hereditary Prince.

Wednesday, February 17, 1813. The Duke of Orleans called in the evening. He and the Duchess had been to the Colli, met Cassaro coming away. Found the King agitated; nothing dropped from him while there. While there he recovered, but not entirely, his usual serenity. The Duchess was always of the same opinion that he would not resume.

He told me his conversation with the Prince at the opera, which Belmonte had before told me. Much the same. There was this to be added: that the Hereditary Prince would be firm in his resolution to take no part in the government, and that it could not be easily conceived how much he had been *travaillé* to consent to some arrangement. The Duke said he had mentioned to the Hereditary Prince my having spoken to him on the subject, and [that I] had asked his opinion whether the Hereditary Prince would be firm or *faiblirait*. Belmonte, who was present, the Duke stated to have given his opinion that he would be firm.

The Hereditary Prince talked to him of the Queen of Naples's letter, and the Duke drew a comparison between the conduct of the French and of us. The French required everything from the Neapolitans. We gave everything to the Sicilians. The Duke also reproached him for the fine opportunity he had lost by not placing his confidence in me when I offered to undertake the expedition to Naples.

The Duke said that he collected, from what Leopold had said, that there was evidently a question whether . . . the Civil List. Leopold said so with reference to his own allowance. Leopold said that the King had given him the commanderies, but he only received from them 6,000 oz. per ann[um]. The Duke reminded him that he had been told by the Controller . . . that they produced 24,000. The Duke said if they only produced 6,000 it would be better to take at once what was given by the Parliament, and then Leopold expressed his doubts as to the execution of the intentions of the Parliament.

Thursday, February 18, 1813. (1) I went to Council about the sanction; gave the Hereditary Prince a translation of Hall's account of the action. Also three papers upon three articles of the Constitution submitted to me. Told him of the Ponza expedition. He promised secrecy.

Council then took place and we went through 27 paragraphs of the Potere Giudiziario. The principal question was whether the new tribunals could take place immediately or before the establishment of the new code.

Villermosa pressed the Hereditary Prince again about the assembly of the Parliament. The Hereditary Prince showed his unwillingness, although he agreed upon the necessity of it. To gain time, as it struck me, he desired Villermosa to put his opinion in writing.

An addition was made to the alteration of the *fidecommessi* article, by which when there was no direct heir as a son, the next living heir was empowered to break off the entail. Belmonte proposed this and no objection was made. Cassaro wanted to put off the meeting of the Parliament.

(1) Received accounts of the taking of the convoy off Pietrasera by the flotilla with 4 companies of the 75 under Major Stewart, 75, who was killed.

Friday, February 19, 1813. I went to the Hereditary Prince about my military business. He talked to me of Ponza and said he wished to talk to me about the occupation of it. It was the territory of the King of Naples and we had to speak about the garrison. I said I thought it better there should not be a Neapolitan garrison: being so near the Continent, they might run away. He said it would be necessary to consider about the commandant and desired I would propose him one. I said I would, and generally that I had not considered the subject as the island was not yet taken.

Saturday, February 20, 1813. I went to a Council about the sanction. Villermosa presented his written opinion upon the necessity of calling the Parliament: where the Hereditary Prince and Cassaro were against, I, Belmonte and Villermosa for it. In the course of the discussion the property of the crown came into question, and for the first time the Hereditary Prince fell into a passion and said it would be contrary to his conscience to sanction the article and he never would do it. It was recommended to him to refer it quickly to the King, and I advised him to have nothing to do with the article: let the King have all the odium, and then in case of unpleasant consequences he would be clear of them. The Hereditary Prince abused the Parliament when he was so angry with them.

I gave among other reasons for calling the Parliament the necessity of having confirmed by Parliament all the alterations, in some respects total changes, made by the Prince. Belmonte and Cassaro were against this. Villermosa was with me.

We went through from the 28th paragraph, chapter 1, of the *Potere Giudiziario* through to the 2nd and 3rd capitoli of the same and to the 3rd paragraph of the *Piano generale per l'organizzazione delle magistrature*. There were two great questions. The first was whether the new tribunals could be erected before the code was ready, and the second was the number of the courts. Villermosa was for their immediate establishment, saying they might administer the old law [till] the new one came out. Cassaro and the Hereditary Prince very much against it, and Belmonte was with them. It seemed at last established that the new code must first be prepared. As to the number of magistrates, Cassaro said six would be sufficient. Upon this there was for the present no decision.

In the course of the articles there was one putting an end to torture. I advised the Hereditary Prince to sanction it, with an addition that it should take effect immediately. I argued upon the good effect this would have in the eyes of Europe respecting the Prince's character. Belmonte and Cassaro argued against it. The Hereditary Prince said he abhorred torture, but he thought with the others that nobody would be convicted without it under the present laws. I doubted it, but what did it signify? Nobody was punished as it was. Murders without end, nobody hanged for them. Villermosa said nothing. I could not succeed. I also observed upon the absurdity of making the sheriff answerable for all the thefts; but they said it was the custom.

In the evening Cassaro and Circello came. They brought a new note, which I read. I said it was very vague; that had it been written in the first instance it would have done very well; but I should not object to it. My second note and their first note were withdrawn.

Sunday, February 21, 1813. Belmonte came. He said he had been well received the night before by the King, who did not say anything to him, but in coming forwards, immediately when he saw him, distinguished him.

He told me that the Duchess of Orleans had received a letter from the Queen which spoke a great deal of the King, and the Queen observed that she could understand nothing of his conduct; that at a moment when he was in the greatest *avilissement, dans la boue*, he was delighted and said to all around him that he was in Paradise. Belmonte said that a physician *lié* with St Clair had told the Duke of Orleans that he had seen two letters, one written to

Leopold and another to someone else, which were so extravagant that any medical man would pronounce her to be insane and would at once order her to be bled.

I showed him the note of Cassaro and Circello of the night before. I told him that I did not propose to go to the King till the Queen had left the Ficuzza according to the terms of the King's promise.

I then submitted to him the question whether it would be better to write to Cassaro respecting the King's return now, or when I was more certain that it was his intention to resume. The letter was to relate to certain previous arrangements to be made between the King and myself. Belmonte thought it better to write immediately, as he was sure the King would say in return that he did not mean to resume. I thought otherwise, and that, as he was timid and wavering, the letter would act rather as an invitation to him. It would be going before the King. To take a step would be difficult for him, but I should not be taking it for him. Besides, I knew that he would make no difficulty about the terms.

Monday, February 22, 1813. (1) Attended a Council about the sanction. Before it began the Prince called me in. He read me a letter he had written to the Prince of Wales soliciting him to order me to attack Naples.

He read me also a letter(2) he had written to the King, sending him the articles which he had considered himself restricted from sanctioning as not being analogous to the English Constitution. He says in the letter that he will refrain altogether from offering any opinion of his own, from being anxious not to bias his (the King's) opinion, and lest he might be suspected of being actuated by any motive of private interest. When he had read this paragraph he said: "You conceive very well that I could not give the reason which you gave in the Council of the 20th".

He asked me then if I knew what the King meant to do. I said I did not, and observed that Cassaro, who had just preceded >me<, could probably have told him. He said that Cassaro assured him the King had not told him his intentions. He had spoken vaguely upon the subject, but nothing more. The Hereditary Prince did not seem to believe what Cassaro said.

The Council then took place. We went through from the 3rd paragraph, 3rd cap. *Piano delle magistrature*, to the end of the 5th cap. We met with the comical article that judges should be chosen from among those who can write and read. It seemed admitted by all that the system proposed by the Parliament was a bad one; that the courts were much too numerous and complicated. I suggested that I thought it would be much better to do away all the judges allotted to certain portions of the population; to have the 23 district courts, whose jurisdiction should be limited, and whose [judges] should be removable at the pleasure of the crown; to have courts of appeal where causes beyond the amount fixed on the district courts could be tried, and criminal offences that might be capital; and to have a supreme court of appeal at Palermo. The Hereditary Prince very much approved this idea.

I called afterwards with Belmonte upon the Duke of Orleans, who told us that the last letter from the Queen was written in the greatest despair; that the letters were all of different length, and that the words at the end were so confused that the sense could not be made out.

She said that she would not come to the Parco, where she only should have an interview that would be painful to herself and her children; that she gave up all hopes of ever seeing her again, and that she was determined finally to relinquish the island. The Duke talked of another letter wherein she said, of her coming to the Ficuzza, that she had come there by the King's order; that his intention was to send her to Palermo for the purpose of sounding the feeling of the public towards the King; that in the meantime I interfered and Cassaro went to the King. When the Queen came to the Ficuzza all was changed, and to avoid the Queen's violence it was supposed that the King had gone to Partinico.

The Duke said he had that morning seen the King and that he was in excellent humour. Said he was there in *paradiso*. The Duke said St Clair was quite *abimé*. He supposed the arrangement about the notes with Cassaro and Circello had produced this effect upon the Queen and St Clair. He said it was believed that the King and Queen had decidedly quarrelled. The Hereditary Prince told the Duke he also believed so.

I asked the Duke's opinion whether it would be better to write to Cassaro to state to the King that I wished to speak to him before he resumed, or, as the King knew from Cassaro that I must have such conversation, to leave the King to propose it. The Duke preferred the latter. The Duke said he had spoken to the Hereditary Prince at the opera, who said he thought he would not resume. "For, talking of the difficulties" - he said - "how will he get on with Villermosa's coldness and stiffness? Even I am excessively annoyed by it, although I flatter myself to have some patience. And then with Bentinck? Perhaps" - said the Hereditary Prince - "you have never seen him in a passion". The Duke said he had only seen the *queue* of one and he could judge from that.

I in consequence sent for Spaccaforo and desired him to tell his father that I proposed to send such a note, and wished to know if he felt any objection.

(1) Packet arrived in England in 42 days, 30 from Gibraltar. Strombolo came in with convoy from Mahon in 13 days.

(2) In this letter it was also said that I was present at the Councils and that my advice upon many occasions had been of use.

Tuesday, February 23, 1813. Spaccaforo returned and said that his father had no objection to the note, but suggested that it should contain exactly the assurances I wished to receive from the King. I said that [it] was unnecessary in the first letter to ask more than if the King intended to resume. The rest would follow in due course.

Belmonte told us that after the Council of the preceding day the Hereditary Prince said that there must be a Council the following day and that they must get through the sanction as fast as possible. Cassaro said he must go to the King the next morning. The Hereditary Prince said: "You can go as well in the evening, and the public business will not be retarded". (*Quantum mutatus ab illo*). The Prince the advocate of dispatch!!

Wednesday, February 24, 1813. (1) I received at night an answer from Cassaro in which he said the King would see me the next day at 4 p. m. I consulted Belmonte what I should do, and it was resolved that I should persist in my former declaration that I could not go to the King till the Queen went away from the Ficuzza.

(1) Ajax sailed. Our excellent friend Obins left us. He was very much affected and we deeply regret his loss. Finer, purer principles, greater goodness and virtue adorn few men.

Thursday, February 25, 1813. I went to Cassaro and gave him my answer. He asked me if I meant to say that the King should not resume. I said I did not say that, nor did I mean to say what I would do. It would be the time to declare my future intentions when I received the answer to the note I gave him. He asked what I wanted to have done. I said: "Let the King put off his resumption of the government for a week, when the Queen will be gone, and thus all parties will be satisfied". He said that two or three days could make no difference to me. I had expressed myself satisfied with the arrangement, and yet notwithstanding I now made objections. I told him I was satisfied with the arrangement about the Queen, but this had nothing to do with the King's resuming, of which I then knew nothing about the time. Of his intention only I was informed. He said: "But if the King does not resume, the Queen will not leave the Ficuzza, the King having made her the promise which he must execute".

I went from him to the palace and made Cassaro's excuses for not coming to Council, he going immediately to the King. I told the Prince what passed. He said he always supposed a convention to have subsisted between the King and Queen. He did not know of the King's resuming. When I mentioned it, he said he was of course glad that the King should resume. He could amuse himself perfectly well with his family and farm. With public business he would not interfere; he would always be a *fiis respectueux*. He hoped I approved his conduct and that he should enjoy my good opinion. I said I thought his conduct perfect.

I went to the Duke of Orleans. I told him what had passed. We agreed that the resumption was very unlucky. He said the Queen's last letters were *tout miel*. She wrote as if she had carried her point.

Belmonte came in afterwards. He said he had seen the Hereditary Prince afterwards, who said: "I see you are attached really to me, and although Villermosa has given me disquietude, yet I believe him to be a very upright man". The Hereditary Prince evidently talked of Cassaro.

Belmonte told the Duke some curious anecdotes of the Queen. She said to him: "*Vous voyez ce lit*" (it was her bed and the King's). "*Je ne l'ai jamais profané, quoique j'aie fait quelques faux pas*". She appeared to flatter herself that the place and not the act put her morality in safety. She boasted also with considerable pride that all her children were the King's. The Duke explained how this had been contrived.

Friday, February 26, 1813. In the morning I received a letter from Cassaro saying that the King would see me at 4 today, but if I did not choose to come, he intimated that he should resume immediately.

It was necessary that I should not be compelled to retreat a step. I therefore determined that the departure of the Queen should be the counteract on my part. Belmonte came soon after the letter, and I told him my idea, which he very much approved. I said in such crises as these I had always gained more than I had asked, and it was desirable now to try if we could not by a coup prevent the King from resuming at all. Might we not then leave the King to resume, and then as a consequence carry off the Queen? Belmonte was for the latter, but for doing it immediately, before the King resumed as a consequence of the intimation. There were objections to doing this by force, without a previous communication of my intention to the King, viz. that as we had but little force, much less than the Neapolitans, there might be bloodshed. At any rate I must take all the force with me, and the town would be left exposed, even if the Queen's *enlèvement* should be quietly effected.

I sent for Lamb and talked to him about it. I thought it best, after much consideration, to state it plainly; to protest against the King's resuming till the Queen went away, and to state the other conditions or assurances which I should require. I thought it better also to send it through Belmonte than Cassaro.

Belmonte and the Duke of Orleans came to me in the course of the day. I told the Duke what I had determined and he was of my opinion. I asked Belmonte if he would have any objection to deliver the letter. I told him it might compromise him with the King. It was suggested that I might write to Cassaro and say that as Minister of the King I should send a formal Note to Belmonte as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Belmonte saw no objection.

Lamb rather thought that I ought to go to the King and take with me the conditions in writing; to endeavour to obtain his promise in writing to them, and if not, to leave the paper with him. But I objected to this that I had said I would not go and that I could not depart from my word.

Fearing that my note to Cassaro might not prevent the King from resuming the next day, I went to him and told him that if the King resumed I was determined to *enlever* the Queen. I was angry with him. I saw her influence in everything. I begged him to tell the King of my intention. He said he could not charge himself with such a message. I said he had been the *intermédiaire* and that I made him responsible for the communication. He wanted to persuade me to go to the King. I answered that I had said I would not and that I would keep my word. I was as obstinate as Villermosa. I said the King was ill advised, it was as usual: his dignity was always compromised. A delay of a week would have saved [him]. Why in such a hurry? He said there were those who *trafficano* (are endeavouring, intriguing) to prevent it (I imagine the hurry is caused by the supposition that the troops coming from Milazzo have been sent for the purpose of preventing him from resuming by force).

Belmonte told me that the Hereditary Prince had told him that Cassaro had said he was sure the King would be unwilling that he should leave the Council. The Hereditary Prince stopped him and said: "My dear Prince, the King thinks me capable or incapable of being Vicar General. If the first, he would have continued me in it; if the second, I am not fit now to remain in the Council. I wish ever to be his *fiils respectueux*. I will pay him every respect.

I will tie or untie the strings of his shoes if he pleases; but to read a paper I never will. I never will see a Minister or any person in private. *Ma volonté il ne peut pas commander*". The Duke of Orleans, who was present, said laughing that this was a new doctrine in the family. The pitch to which filial obedience was carried could not be conceived. They were all afraid of being damned (his expression).

Cassaro told him that if he had wished it, he was sure such an arrangement could be made. Belmonte said the Hereditary Prince was very firm and he (Belmonte) told the Hereditary Prince that if he changed he would proclaim everywhere that he was weak and had broken his promise.

Saturday, February 27, 1813. (1) Belmonte went with my Note in the morning to the King. He presented it to him, saying: "*C' est avec une pénible surprise que j'ai à présenter a Votre Majesté une note du ministre d'Angleterre, une note qui regarde directement Votre Majesté*". He said the King received it embarrassed and frightened, but very generously as about himself. Belmonte asked if His Majesty wished him to stay, to come at some other time, or to wait his commands at home. The King answered: "*Je ferai mes réflexions et je vous ferai savoir*", and went away directly. Belmonte flattered himself that his own firm manner had frightened the King. He said so when I asked him if he thought the Note would alarm him.

It was mentioned as a proof of Cassaro's influence over the King that he had advised Carini and Fitalia to go and see the King, and had said exactly what the King did say to them.

(1) Sent my Note to the King through Belmonte.

Sunday, February 28, 1813. (1) Belmonte came and showed me a note he had received from the King, desiring him to be at the Colli at 4 p. m. It was rather Belmonte's opinion that Cassaro would have advised the King to be well with Belmonte. He said his intention was, in case the King gave him a written paper as the answer to the Note, to ask the King if he would allow him to make his reflections upon it, and if not, and that he found the paper very objectionable, not to present it.

After the breakfast I went to the Duke of Orleans. He had been with the Duchess to call upon the King, whom they found in excellent humour. He and Leopold had just killed 70 hares, of which he had killed 36 or 37. The Duke said he had also seen the Hereditary Prince, who had, with an openness he had never before seen the same, communicated his intentions and opinions before the Hereditary Princess and Mademoiselle d'Orléans.

He told them that the King had come with his plan ready made; that he had promised the Queen to resume; that after his coming to Palermo he wrote to the Queen that he would not resume,(2) and the Queen's answer was rage. The Hereditary Prince [said] the present plan, as he believes made by Di Aci, was to resume and to endeavour to upset the Constitution by Parliamentary numbers. The Hereditary Prince expressed great dissatisfaction with Cassaro. He took him off and said: "You know, after every Council he goes home and,

surrounded by numbers of people, he tells everything that has passed and makes *le grand*". Talking of himself, he said three times the King had given him the power, but he never could understand his situation. He saw it as through a cloud. There was the Queen on one side and the King on the other. Persons coming from one and from the other with opposite opinions and messages; he never knew what he was about. He was determined not to place himself in that situation again. By the Constitution the King was king. There could be but one and he was inviolable. His Ministers were responsible. There was no mention of an Hereditary Prince. He was the eldest son, and no place assigned to him in the government. It must be one or the other, but it could not be both.

The Duke said the Queen had written that she doubted whether she would come to Parco, as she did not know in my rage what I might not do to her.

In talking of the King, the Duke said he had been once quite English. Soon after his coming to the island, Acton and he had gone to Messina, where he wished to establish his government in the English headquarters. He proposed Carlentini for his residence, where he might have good duck shooting in a great lake there, like some shooting he had near Naples. He was upon the point of making an arrangement, by the advice of Acton, with Sir J. Stuart, by which he was to put the whole of the territory from Milazzo to Cape Passero under Sir J. Stuart's orders. Trabia wrote to the Queen and she prevented him. Di Aci joined Trabia in this, in the hopes of supplanting Acton, but he was again put out by Ascoli. The Duke said the King was not now English. They had persuaded him that they abetted revolutionary principles to take Sicily. The Duke had seen expressed in his own hand his conviction that he would die on the scaffold.

The Duke said when the Duchess heard the King had sent for Belmonte [she] cried out: "Then he is the King's Minister".

The Hereditary Prince said he could not be pleased with Cassaro for allying himself with Circello as he had done. The Hereditary Prince said he liked Circello.

The Duke asked me what I thought the King would do. I answered that I thought the Note was so decided that he would not resist it; that I thought the King determined to resume; that both Cassaro and Circello would advise him to do so, and both to make themselves well with Belmonte: Cassaro from a confidence in his own influence over the King being always greater than Belmonte's and therefore not fearing him and thinking this the only way to a reconciliation, and putting the King upon the throne again that he might be his Prime Minister; Circello from a conscientious belief that the English alliance was the best, from his hatred to France and Buonaparte. His opinion was free from all private interest.

Soon after, Belmonte came to the Duke's on his return from the King. He said the King had received him even with tenderness. He said he had known his grandfather and was very much attached to him; that the same attachment he wished to feel for his grandson, and that his grandson should feel the same for him. He knew his wit, his talents, his penetration, and that whatever he wished he succeeded in. The King said he knew him. Belmonte said he had believed that the King had not known him. The King interrupted him and said: "I will hear nothing of the past - let all that be forgotten".

The King then gave him notes in his own handwriting in pencil, that he called *capi versi*, upon which he was to make the draft of the answer to me. Belmonte asked if he should

offer any reflections that might occur to him. The King said it was unnecessary. He asked if he should bring the draft himself. He said no, he might send it. Here there are in the beginning great professions of respect and regard, but no confidence. He gives him notes prepared by Circello and Cassaro, and his answer to be submitted to the same revisal.

- (1) Went to a public breakfast given by Belmonte to the English at Acqua Santa.
- (2) The Hereditary Prince in answer to the Duke said he knew that for a fact.

Monday, March 1, 1813. (1) Genl Nugent had left England at the beginning of December. Had been with Lord Wellington at Cadiz; had talked to him a great deal about Italy, but Lord Wellington would not hear of the application of the force elsewhere. He said the presence of our expedition on the eastern coast had produced great good. He approved entirely of Maitland's conduct: he had done exactly what he wished and had ordered. He had been sorry to read Lord Wellesley's speech, who knew nothing about the matter. Nugent told me that Lord Wellington's idea in case of great success was to enter France by the Pyrenees, and Lord Liverpool, he said, agreed with this. Lord Wellington was satisfied with Ministry. He would have about 50,000 English troops and 25,000 Portuguese. Lord Wellington was satisfied with the arrangements he had made at Cadiz. He was to have the chief command; to have all the departments with him, and measures taken for the appropriation of the revenues to military purposes.

- (1) Arrived Hyacinth. Genl Nugent last from Alicante, had been at Cadiz.

Tuesday, March 2, 1813. (1) I called upon the Hereditary Prince about military business. He was in a hurry and going to wait upon the King. I spoke to him of Cassaro and of the bad part I thought he was playing. He made no answer to me. I observed that I thought no honest man could advise the King, with his habits and prejudices, to resume the government. The Hereditary Prince said something of his own determination not to be chancellor if the King did return.

I told the Hereditary Prince about the capture of Ponza, and he talked of a Sicilian governor and of the hoisting of the King's flag. I begged to remind him of my former opinion that it would be injurious to the object of reconquering Naples to put forward the royal family. I had stated this opinion to my Government and had received no answer to it. His Royal Highness was assured of the desire of the British Government to replace his family upon the throne. He, I hoped, was equally satisfied of my own anxiety for the same end (he shook my hand) and therefore in the opinion I gave I was sincere and was only pointing out the way I thought the most sure. I was convinced if we succeeded, our own influence would carry the point, and much opposition would be overcome by leaving the question to the free will of the people.

I called upon Belmonte. He told me he had had a long conversation with the Hereditary Prince about the separation of Naples and Sicily, and fancied he had made [an] impression upon him. But I doubt it.

I saw the Duke of Orleans. I told him my idea of asking for Cassaro's removal. He thought it would have the greatest effect. He told me he had seen Leopold, that Leopold talked as if the Queen was not going away and said he would not and had not packed up any of his things.

I begged Villermosa to come, that I might speak to him of Cassaro's removal, and he very much approved of it.

In talking to Lamb about the state of the country, we agreed upon the little dependence that was to be placed upon the people; that they were all afraid and would do nothing; that they were run already to kiss the King's feet; that in the endeavour to prevent him from resuming, it was more than probable that there would be a strong address to him to return to the government, while on the side of the nation and of liberty not a man would stir. We were now completely the principals. It became therefore necessary that we should show more decision and manifest a determination to maintain what had been done; that the delicacy and caution we had observed had been our ruin. Lamb observed there would be great difficulty with such a people for the future and if the King had at all lent himself to our views, we could have gone on much more easily with the government as it was; and it is true. There can be no doubt now of the treachery of the King and of his view being to upset what has been done.

(1) Furieuse, Capt. Shaunley, came with the report that Ponza had been taken without the loss of a man.

Wednesday, March 3, 1813. (1) Belmonte came. I showed him my Note to the King. To that part, unknown to him before, asking for Cassaro's dismissal, he said that he feared Cassaro would always be Prime Minister and equally consulted whether in or out. I satisfied him of the impossibility of this happening. I believe Belmonte wished that I should have mentioned it to him sooner, though I did not do so from delicacy.

The Duke of Orleans came. He again approved very much of Cassaro's going, as it would disconcert the party. The Duchess had always said he was double. He had thought it right to tell the Duchess that I had required the Queen's departure to be fixed. She burst out crying at hearing this. Talking of the nation and the barons, I said they were all afraid of the King. He said he did not think Belmonte had recovered the effects of his banishment. He was not now the same man he had been before. I said that I had observed that Belmonte never liked to come in contact either with the King or the Queen. This opinion from the Duke came out accidentally, as an agreement with a supposed opinion from me which was however otherwise meant.

Belmonte told me that the intelligence of the taking of Ponza had not pleased the King. He rather drew up when it was told him. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince had desired him to prepare a Note claiming the right of hoisting the Neapolitan flag. Belmonte said he

could not do it because he, Belmonte, was the Minister of the Vicar General of Sicily only. The King had said nothing of Naples. The Hereditary Prince however desired him to write the Note that it might be showed to the King.

(1) Sent Note in answer to the King's last note to Belmonte.

Thursday, March 4, 1813. Belmonte came. He said he had presented my Note to the King the evening before and had remained with the King for three quarters of an hour. The King read the Note before him. When he came to the part relating to the Queen, he said: "*ma parti!*". Belmonte said that he believed it was a question of her leaving the island. The King observed: "*Ma questo e troppo!*". Belmonte said he was unacquainted with the previous papers; that my Note adverted to this as a promise. As to Cassaro, he said I had no right to enter into those details. Belmonte said he seemed to feel much more about his prerogative than about Cassaro. Belmonte's impression was that he meant to resume at any rate and would give up everything.

Belmonte said he had received a note from the King desiring him to write an answer to my Note. Belmonte read me his answer to the King, saying that until he could hear from His Majesty what he meant he should write, he could not obey his commands. Until, he said, he knew what had previously taken place, what sacrifices the King was prepared to make, he could not form the draft. In answering the first note he had asked His Majesty if he should give him his ideas, and that His Majesty had answered no; that he had given him the notes in his own handwriting, which he most punctually executed. He begged now that His Majesty would either give him the same instructions in writing or verbally, that he might obey his commands.

Belmonte supposes that the King meant to take him in.

Friday, March 5, 1813. The King wrote a note to Belmonte to desire him to come and receive his orders as to the answer to be given upon this *disgustosissimo affare*. Belmonte went and stayed one hour and a quarter with him.

Belmonte began by saying that he must excuse himself for sending the answer he had done yesterday; that His Majesty could alone be the *arbitre* of the questions at issue, and that it was impossible for him to write a Note as the King yesterday had directed him without knowing His Majesty's sentiments upon any one point. As Belmonte said in his reply to the King yesterday that he only knew from report what had passed, the King brought out copies of all the papers. The King said one demand came after the other, there was no end to them. He had begun with receiving them; then he gave them up the places; and now they wanted to drive him away. They wanted to get Sicily: that was the object of all their measures. Belmonte said that had they wished this, they would have done it before. Belmonte said the conversation was very confused, passing quickly from one thing to the other. Belmonte asked him frequently what he should say in answer. The King said he could not agree to

any proposal about the Queen. As a king it was inconsistent with his dignity, as a husband he could not drive away his wife, as a man he could not submit to be insulted.

Upon the King's asking in the beginning what he thought of the present position of affairs, he said there was one thing to which little states must always submit who had to do with large ones, and that was superior force they could not resist. Belmonte said loyalty should always be on the side of the weakest; it was the only arm and defence they had. With the powerful, loyalty did not signify: they carried their point and represented it as they pleased. The King made a long exordium in praise of his own honesty and sincerity. Belmonte frequently asked what the King would do. He said he would not submit. "Then", said Belmonte, "you have a force". The King said: "I will put myself at the head of you". The King intimated also that, before the troops went, he was obliged to be quiet, but now, that he had the means. He also said (in answer to a remark of Belmonte upon his idea of not submitting, that as he had no force of his own he must trust to some other, and of course must be in some other alliance, meaning with the enemy): "and then", he said, "the English would be justified" in what they had said of the Queen. And Belmonte said: "I have heard a great deal that has been said of the Queen here and in England; of correspondence by the Queen with the enemy; that Her Majesty had committed *des légèretés*, that she may have written and done imprudent things, I am perfectly convinced; but that she should have gone to such lengths I cannot believe". To a similar remark having the same bearing, the King did not deny the fact, but said what the Queen had done was only to serve him.

Belmonte said that he would write the answer as the King pleased, but it was his duty to state to him the inconveniences; that it was necessary the King should state whether he would agree (agree, answered the King, he never could), refuse, or propose a modification. The King said he was *un uomo onesto, un uomo di sistema* (this amused Belmonte very much), *e che aveva molto talento*.(1) The King said he was sure I had not instructions: Castelcicala wrote him so. How - Belmonte said - could His Majesty think so? Belmonte said he knew what British Ministers were, that they were very cautious; that they were responsible to their country. They were not like an Alquier (a former French Minister at Naples). Belmonte said that he was personally acquainted with me. The King said: "*Lo conosco meglio di voi*", and gave Belmonte a description of my visit to him at the Ficuzza. The King said I had spoken to him with much *duret *, and imitated an expression of my voice and of my head which I made in answer to some of his remarks. Belmonte said: "But let that be as it may, it cannot be supposed that Lord William, who has no personal enmity to Your Majesty, should take upon himself to do all these things". But Castelcicala must have represented these things and some order must have been given. I could not be supposed to act without instructions. "*Ma cos  fanno sempre gli inglesi. Lascian fare al loro ministro. Se riesce and does right, they take all the merit!*" If he fails, *gli rompono il collo*".

When, after recurring frequently to the same question as to what the answer should be to the first article about the Queen, the King desired him to elude it (*eluderlo*), but Belmonte said I should return to the charge; the King answered: "But this advantage will be obtained: we shall gain time".

With respect to the Parliament he said: "*Continuino i consigli*". He had never desired the Hereditary Prince to discontinue them. With regard to Cassaro, he said I seemed to interfere in everything. He said it was possible next that his, Belmonte's, dismissal might be required: what would he then say to that, *che direste?* Belmonte answered that his advice would be to the King to ask him, Belmonte, to give in his dismissal. The King said Cassaro had given in his dismissal on the 1st February last. The King desired him to say in answer that he could not give up his old servants.

The King talked of Ponza and approved the Note. The King, talking of Naples, said we had in a cowardly manner abandoned that country. Belmonte begged his pardon, the English certainly could not be accused of want of bravery. The loss of the Kingdom of Naples was decided at the battle of Austerlitz. The King said: "I should like to see what they will do. Do they mean to take Naples from me as well as Sicily?". Belmonte told the King that the English had not guaranteed Naples. How could they? They had it not, and if they had they could not keep it. Sicily they had guaranteed because they could always keep it and could always take it.

The King said, in answer to some remark of Belmonte that the King seemed now to consider the English as his enemies, the King said: "I detest them". He flattered and threatened Belmonte: if so and so, well; if otherwise, then blood must be shed. Belmonte said that he had no ambition to die *à son aise entre ses matelas*. It was indifferent to him whether it was by a ball or a stiletto. He was not afraid. "No" - answered the King - "*voi avete il coraggio del diavolo*".

During the conversation the Duke and Duchess of Orleans were announced. The King was very angry and desired them to wait. After the conversation the King would not let Belmonte pass through the door by which they entered. The King stopped him as he was going out and said: "They will see you. Go out by this door". Belmonte could not imagine why he was not to be seen.

Nugent told Lamb that it was very comical to remark the conduct of Ministers in England about Sicily. They were very anxious for accounts in order to see what had been done next and who was to get the better, as if the Business was entirely left, as far as regarded them, to itself.

(1) Belmonte said that others had taken *les roses* and left him *les épines*; and to me, added the King, they have left the bone to gnaw.

Saturday, March 6, 1813. Belmonte called. He added some things of the King's conversation he had forgotten the day before.

The King mentioned the finances and said that nobody paid, and the plan was that nobody should pay in order that they might come to Bentinck for money, and thus enable him to ask what terms he pleased. Castelnuovo put himself *d'accord* with Bentinck in this. Belmonte begged the King's pardon and said this was not true. Why, he said, had the former Government had recourse to sales of the public property, to the 1 per cent tax, and to other extraordinary modes of raising money, if there had been no distress for money?

Another reason was that the Deputati del Regno would not pay. Castelnuovo had done all in his power to make them do their duty, the Hereditary Prince the same; but they had given in their dismission. The loan from me had been decided in Council, at which Prince Cassaro was also present and consented.

The King told him that I had had the impertinence to say to Cassaro that I would take away the Queen, but that Cassaro had answered me well and *da furbo*. He had said he would not give such a message, that I must write it.

The King said he would sanction what was according to the English Constitution; but that it must be allowed that much differed from it. Belmonte denied it. He complained loudly of the Hereditary Prince. Belmonte said it was unjust to accuse that *malheureux* Prince. It was right, to him and the other Counsellors, that complaint should be made. Belmonte repeated this to the Hereditary Prince, who heard it with tears in his eyes. Belmonte said: "Your Majesty has known for many years, and you know I never said ill of anybody". "*E' vero. Siete un onesto uomo*".

Belmonte told the Hereditary Prince what he had said to the King about Ponza. The Hereditary Prince said the King would *gâter* the affair. The Hereditary Prince said his sentiments were altered about Naples, and that he now thought he should be more safe in Sicily than at Naples; that at any rate he thought it better to rely upon me; that I was *bon et doux* by *caractère* ; that it would be easy *de me tromper* ; that it was better to trust to my generosity and goodness, and that he was sure I should do all in my power, and therefore in the answer he would recommend that everything I proposed to do should be approved. The King, he feared, would spoil all.

The Hereditary Prince asked Belmonte what he thought the King would do. He said he might make an appearance of force. The Hereditary Prince said "no, here he will not do that"; at the Ficuzza, at that distance, he might. He knew his father well.

Belmonte stated that his conversation with the King began by his saying with great solemnity that he had confessed and communicated; Belmonte with great seriousness, that His Majesty had done well in praying for assistance (*lumi*) in the difficult situation in which he was placed.

Sunday, March 7, 1813. Lamb, I and Belmonte had a consultation about the answer to be given to the King's Note. The draft was made by Lamb accordingly.

Belmonte told us that we were to have Council the next day. It was a question whether Cassaro would attend. Belmonte thought not. The Hereditary Prince said he would. He thought Cassaro too anxious to remain in the Council.

Monday, March 8, 1813. (1) I was late for the Council, having revised Lamb's draft of the Note. We went through the greater part of the judicial system, from . . .

Cassaro attended. Just as usual. The Hereditary Prince remarked to Belmonte afterwards that Cassaro was *adouci*, but I did not perceive it. The Council lasted for 4 hours.

The Duke of Orleans told me that he had been at the Ficuzza the day before; that the Queen received him very ill and was marked in her conduct to him. She did not speak to him about business. She cried very often when talking to the little boy. In her letter of this day to the Duchess she had excused herself, saying her nature was to be sincere. She had been aware that she had not been civil to him, she regretted she could not help it. She said she was driven away and was afraid the same misfortune would happen to the King.

Villermosa said the Hereditary Prince had sent for him the night before, had thanked him for his attachment to him, and openly expressed his dissatisfaction with Cassaro's conduct. Villermosa said that he was told that Cassaro had said that he would not go out now, as it was attempted to force him.

(1) The Duke and Duchess of Orleans dined with us.

Tuesday, March 9, 1813. I went to the Hereditary Prince about military business. He talked of the King and asked if I had heard anything more of him. I said no. I thought it odd the King had never spoken to him. The Hereditary Prince said: "It is clear what I am to do, that is not to interfere". He asked, did I not think so? I said yes, and [he] asked again the question whether I thought otherwise, and I fear from this that he is afraid, and that his fears may get the better of his resolution. I said I entirely approved his resolution.

We had a long Council about the sanction, from . . .

The Hereditary Prince mentioned his wish that as much as had been already sanctioned should be immediately published,(1) it being stated that the articles suspended were reserved for the King's consideration. Villermosa was very much against this, for two reasons: first, that the whole should be published at once, and secondly, that it would not be right to omit the two most important ones - the independence of Sicily of Naples, and the Civil List. He considered these as cardinal articles. He could not make the dispatch if these were omitted. A long discussion took place, in which we all endeavoured to convince him of his first objection. But he persevered, and Belmonte said he would make the dispatch, and, as I thought, showed too much readiness to do it.

Cassaro proposed a *mezzo termine* about the property of the crown - that the King should give up his rights upon condition of receiving his Civil List for his life, of which two-fifths are annual grants. I thought this a good idea. Belmonte and Villermosa were against it. I said the Hereditary Prince should make the most objections, as he was chiefly interested. The Hereditary Prince said he had none. The Hereditary Prince said it was for the King to decide it. Belmonte said if it was [for] His Royal Highness to sanction this article, he should advise him in the strongest manner to do it. I said I was sure if the King sanctioned generally, they would give him the List for life. The Hereditary Prince said the King would not trust them, and he seemed to be of the same opinion.

To my great surprise I heard in the evening that the King was to arrive at 6 o'clock. I went between 8 and 9 to Belmonte's. He said the King had sent for him to be there at 6. He said to all the Ministers assembled together: "*Figli miei*, my health by the blessing of God has been restored, and I intend to resume the reins of government". He desired Belmonte to

issue the dispatches immediately. He said there should be Councils held as usual, but he would not attend. There should be *Consigli di campagna*, where the subject should be written on one column and another left open for his decision.

Villermosa said his business could not be carried on, as the state of the finances were such as to make it necessary for him to see His Majesty at all moments. The King said the finances might have been in a better state. Villermosa answered in his cold way: "Your Majesty will correct me".

Settimo said it had been formerly the custom for the Minister of War to give out the dispatches to the governors of towns, but by a new arrangement it was now the duty of the Captain General. He shrugged up his shoulders and said "very well". Belmonte said it had been also usual for the Captain General (me) to do the duty directly with the Hereditary Prince. Would His Majesty wish the same thing? The King: "*Ciò che è fatto è fatto. Pazienza*".

The King talked of the Constitution, and said he wished it to be at once understood that what was analogous to the English Constitution he would sanction, and nothing else. Belmonte called Cassaro to witness of the pains taken by the Prince to adhere to the English Constitution. The King said no, he knew that much of the present Constitution was different from it.

He said to them all that he should be at home always from 8 till 12.

Belmonte delivered to him my Note of the morning. The translation had just come from Caracciolo and Belmonte gave it to the King unopened. The King said he would not read it till the morning: "*Chi sa che guai avrò*". Belmonte asked if he should give out the orders before the King should read the Note. The King answered: "Give them out immediately".

(1) He said, as a reason for the publication, that people might not say that the delay of the articles in question was his fault.

Wednesday, March 10, 1813. Belmonte called upon the King to receive his orders respecting the answer to be given to the Note. The King told him that before he left the Ficuzza his plan was made. Belmonte might see that from being resolved not to open the Note and not to be influenced in his resolution by it.

Belmonte advised him of all the consequences of his conduct. They might take away the Queen. The King said they were the masters. The British arms might be taken down and the British might be in hostility. "Very well", said the King, "Europe will be the judges between us". He was determined not to give way. He would not be at my feet, as had been his son Francesco. He had governed for fifty years and had more experience of these things. He would not allow me to be his *maestro di scuola* as I had been that of Francesco. The King said I was a *révolutionnaire*, it was not the first revolution I had been engaged in. I belonged to a revolutionary family. The King said he consigned himself to the hands of God. Belmonte made him various observations to show that God left the actions of men in this world to their own guidance. He instanced the successes of Robespierre and Buonaparte. It was in the next that God punished and rewarded the conduct of men. It was

not just, therefore, that we flattered ourselves that God directs our conduct. He desired Belmonte to write me a very civil Note, but to decline doing what I had desired.

The King told Belmonte that the Queen had a fit at Corleone, that the people wished to bring her back to the Ficuzza, but that she had, in obedience to his orders, gone on to Santa Margherita. The King made some pious ejaculations.

The Duke of Orleans said he had dined with the King and that he was in the best spirits. He was particularly attentive to him. The Duke said he never saw him more false. When he was announced he overheard the King say to the servant: "Let him in, *ma lascia aperta la porta*". The Queen's letter was violent. The Duke said while they were at dinner a carriage came into the yard. The King grew pale and said "Who is this? Who is this?", evidently supposing it to be me.

Thursday, March 11, 1813. I determined to go personally to the King and see if I could not frighten him. I accordingly went at half past 9 and was immediately received.

He came into the room where I was and said he was glad to see me and hoped we should be well together. He talked of the alliance, that he had been always the firm friend of Great Britain as he always would be. I asked if His Majesty would permit me to speak of affairs. He said yes. I then said that for the last year and a half it had been my misfortune to have many unpleasant discussions with the Sicilian Government (and his misfortune too, he noted. He added: "We shall go on better than we have done for the last year"); that various measures had been carried into execution; that I had always deemed it my duty to forewarn the Government of the consequences. When I went to England I foretold exactly what had happened. When I returned, I did the same, but my voice was not listened to. It was [my] duty now to warn him of the consequences that might ensue from his persisting in his present refusal. "What consequences? What consequences?" he answered, "nothing can ensue". The King of England was loyal and he would not injure him.(1)

I said that the object of the King of England was to secure the Constitution. The King made some remark upon this. I answered [that] the King could never permit that it should be destroyed. The King took fire at the word "permit": "Permit, permit", he repeated, "England has no right to interfere". I repeated that England would never permit it. I said it was very disagreeable to make such observations, but His Majesty must permit me to return to an unpleasant circumstance and to put him in mind that the alliance had been actually broken by the correspondence which had been carried on by his Government with the enemy. The King said quickly: "I never failed". I answered that "I did not say that Your Majesty had failed". He replied: "Neither I nor my Government". He said he could not listen to such language: "Write it, write it", and went out of the room.

I called upon Belmonte. He talked of strong measures. I accused him that the Sicilians would do nothing for themselves; that they left me as the principal while I ought to be only their aid. I was supporting the nation and there appeared no party for it. He told me that the King had been very much applauded the day before; that a great deal of money had been spent among the people to obtain partisans for the King and to purchase cries of "God save

the King". There were many cries in the church, which was very unusual. Belmonte wanted me to prevent it by force, which I said was impossible.

I sent for Caltanissetta and told him that I understood the King was going to another church tonight to sing Te Deum; that I heard there was to be a great mob, and that means had been taken to put the people in a ferment; that the effect of such measures could not be foreseen, and that I thought it better to prevent disorder by having the troops under arms and bringing them into the town. He thought the precautions unnecessary, but I said I was responsible with himself, and should prepare the troops. I desired him to inform the King of the measures intended.(2)

He came back to say that the King was ill and would not go; that this was a pretext, and that he would not go to prevent any possible difference between the English and Sicilians. *Anglice*: he was afraid of the troops.

Before this resolution was known the troops had already been in motion, and the passage of some cannon through the town made a very good effect, greater, said someone, than all my Notes for the last year.

(1) I said: "*Je suis un homme simple*". He answered: "*Je suis plus simple que vous et plus honnête que vous*". I made a bow and he recollected himself: "*Je suis honnête, vous pouvez l'être aussi*".

(2) I found afterwards that Caltanissetta, when he first received my letter, went to the King to know if he should come to me.

Friday, March 12, 1813. I called upon Villermosa, where I met Settimo by appointment. I went to say that it was my intention to carry by force the points I demanded, even to the setting aside of the King; that my idea was to take the government under my protection, appointing a Council to manage the affairs until the Parliament could be assembled to provide for the government. I thought that they should previously resign their situations upon the plea that they could not be responsible to the nation for the conduct which the King was pursuing. Villermosa thought that the usual plea of ill health would be better, as it would not compromise them; but I showed the necessity of their giving the real reason. In this Settimo concurred.

I stated how advantageous some manifestation of the public opinion would be to the good cause. We saw the King received with favour by the people. One side said it was bought, the other not; but there was no countermark of disapprobation. They both said that nobody would dare to sign their names to anything, such was the general fear and the recollection of the executions that had taken place at Naples.

Belmonte came in. He had been with the King. He had talked to him a great deal of his situation. He repeated to him the same reasoning, that the whole world was governed by force; that Bonaparte so ruled, and would descend from his throne when he should be weak. His Majesty had lost Naples by weakness, and would have lost Sicily also, if the English had not defended it; that as he was not able, alone, to defend himself, he must be dependent either upon the French or the English. As an island, it must be upon the latter. Those who

protected him must and would be obeyed. It was only required that such obedience should be exacted with proper respect and consideration.

The King said I had called out the troops and prevented his going to San Francesco. What harm was there in the people crying out "God save the King"? The King said if I consulted my own honour, I should be the first to raise the cry. Belmonte said that I was responsible for the public tranquillity, and he supposed that I had been actuated by no other motive.

Belmonte talked to the King about the Councils. The Constitution required that the King should hear the opinions of his Council before he gave his veto. How could this be, if he was not present? And then he must recollect that the Hereditary Prince would not open the Parliament unless I had given my promise that I would protect him from all consequences that might arise from the putting the veto to any of the acts of Parliament. Belmonte said what he had said before, that this was not his advice. The King said: "Would you have me sit with this brutal man in Council"? Belmonte begged him to appeal to the Hereditary Prince and Cassaro as to what my conduct had been in Council, whether it had not been perfectly respectable, *pleine de douceur*. The King said: "Yes, it is true, and often he showed a great spirit of conciliation".

After beating the ground over and over again, Belmonte said: "Why not make some proposition to Lord William?", and Belmonte mentioned the Queen. After other difficulties he said: "But the Queen has debts, her jewels are pledged. She wants an assignment, and I have not a farthing of money". Belmonte proposed to speak to me about it. The King desired he would, and return to him again. With respect to Cassaro, he had asked for his dismissal, and it might be given him; but it could not be done immediately, either for his honour or that of Cassaro. He was to tell me that.

(It was agreed that Belmonte should say in return that with respect to the Queen, I should be glad to attend to his wishes about the payment of the Queen's debts, but that I could not appropriate the public money in a manner not warranted by my instructions; that were I at liberty ever to depart from them, which I never did, it would be in a case like this. With respect to Cassaro I was immovable. He was also to say that he found me at Villermosa's; that I had come out to say to him privately that I was resolved to put myself in hostility if my demands were not granted; that afterwards he had remained with Villermosa.)

"I always liked and distinguished the English above all others. And the Ministers, what *brava gente* they were. But the English of these days are totally different; they are not the same people. This Bentinck è *così duro e brutale*. Anche Fremantle (the Admiral) [*se*] *ne è andato disperato*". Belmonte denied this, but the King said that he knew it for a fact upon the best authority. Lord Mahon, he said, was the only honourable man amongst them. Talking of his perseverance and his end, he said: under the cross of Jesus Christ was Jesus Nazarenus Rex Judaeorum; on his tomb would be written Ferdinandus Rex *delle due Sicilie*.

When Belmonte told him I could not yield, he got up and, making many gestures of religious grimace, he said: "*Sia fatta la volontà di Dio*". There never was such an old hypocrite.

Marquess Spaccaforo returned from his father. He said that his father had no ill will to me; that he would have been glad to have called upon me, but he thought it might be

displeasing to the King as well as to myself. He was an honest man and he thought that his exertions were entitled to merit and praise. It had been the intention of the King to return with the Queen and to make great changes. He had succeeded in dissuading the King from the one and the other. He had letters from the Queen upbraiding him bitterly for his conduct. The King had determined to send the Constitution to England. This he had also persuaded him not to do. He could give me his word of honour that the King meant to sanction the Constitution, to make no changes. He had wanted the King to change him. The King wished to put a lawyer in his place, but he had, in consequence of my having objected to a lawyer, advised the King to put in, not a person attached to him, like San Marco, etc., but one of no party, and recommended to him the Duke of Feria.

He thought I had done wrong in preventing the King from going to San Francesco, because the people would say that the English had interfered with the religious duties of the King. I said I had not prevented it. I had only taken a precaution against the possibility of tumult. Later Aceto and the young Duke of Feria called to say they were ready to do anything I desired. They represented others. I advised their union and their rallying round the Constitution.

Saturday, March 13, 1813. (1) Belmonte came. He had been with the King, who was anxious to know if I had sent in my Note. The King, in answer to what he said, said: "*Sia fatta la volontà di Dio*". He said the King was very kind to him; that his mother, who was *liée* with the palace, had told him that the King had said to a friend of hers that he was very much content with Belmonte; that he was what he had always known him, *audacieux*, saying the strongest things to him but always with respect. He said he had been more embarrassed with Belmonte's arguments than with the threats of that demon Bentinck. Belmonte pleased himself very much with a very strong thing he had said the day before to the King. The King had said if there was to be a war, he would be the first victim. He said this angrily. Belmonte answered he was ready to die, but he begged His Majesty to recollect that his sentence had come out of his mouth. The King said: "I meant nothing". The King, when he adverted to his heading them all, said: "*Il faut que nous crevassions ensemble*".

(1) Sent my Note to Belmonte declaring the alliance to be at an end if my terms were not complied with.

Sunday, March 14, 1813. Belmonte took the translation of my Note to the King. (1) He said it was a *triste devoir* for him to be obliged to present to His Majesty the last Note, perhaps, he would ever receive from me. He beseeched His Majesty to reflect and he begged him to allow his own unbiassed judgment to decide and not the bad councils of his supposed friends. He asked whether he should read the Note to him or await his commands in another room till he had read it. The King said no. He would reflect upon it quietly by himself, and would let him know when he wanted him. Belmonte said he looked nervous and agitated.

Settimo said that he called upon him on military business, which the King transacted very well, but with evident violence to himself. Settimo concluded by saying that he thought it his duty to confirm himself his intention of resigning, as expressed by Prince Belmonte the day before. The King: "*Non ci sarà niente, sarà niente*". This resignation would not be necessary. Settimo took leave, but he stayed for some moments waiting for the King's permission, who had turned his back and supposed him out of the room. Settimo saw him making several gestures to himself of annoyance and distress. While he was with him he perceived his lip quivering.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He had dined with the King and never saw him in worse humour or spirits. The Hereditary Prince desired him to thank me for a very kind letter he had received from me. The Duke told him he must see now that he had done wrong in remaining in the palace. He advised him not to keep himself so secluded, but to see people and express his opinion. The Hereditary Prince was most anxious to know what I said of him. The Duchess of Orleans wanted the Duke to send her children on board the Edinburgh, from the effects of tumult and the King's rage.

(1) Belmonte called the Note a *chef d'oeuvre*.

Monday, March 15, 1813. (1) Belmonte came from the King, with whom he remained for an hour and a quarter. The King said he had proposed an answer for my Note. Belmonte said he must begin by saying that if it was contrary to his opinion, he must decline reading it. The King: "*Sentitelo*". He then read it and Belmonte said at the end of each sentence, "*Très bien*". Belmonte then said that he could not send it. "How", said the King, "when you did not seem to disapprove of it". "Yes", said Belmonte, "six months ago this Note would have been unobjectionable and I could have had no difficulty in signing it"; but at this time, when the British Minister declares that he will consider any delay or evasion as an hostility, it would be inconsistent with his honour to advise such an answer. The King said he would send it himself. The King grew angry and was beginning to talk loud at one moment, but Belmonte stopped him by saying "*Non vorrei turbare la tranquillità di Vostra Maestà*". It was dear to him as it was to His Majesty's own dignity.

Belmonte told him that he had often had at the tip of his tongue an opinion which he would now state, that the great object of the Queen had always been to involve him in her own ruin. This opinion the Duke confirmed by saying that the Queen had often said that her great wish was to take the King with her to Germany.

Belmonte beat him out of his position that I had no instructions, and made him say that in that case all he had said of me was applicable to my Government. He said he was convinced the King would not yield. He asked Belmonte if he thought I would lay my hands upon him. He said no. But what would I do? Belmonte answered he could not possibly say. Belmonte showed me his letter giving in his dismissal, which he immediately sent, as did also Villerosa and Settimo.

In the evening I saw the answer of the King to Belmonte and Villerosa, asking why they had given them in, *per qual motive*: the reasons they gave did not exist, as he knew his own

conduct and the loyalty of England. They answered not as decidedly as they ought to have done. They answered, if the reasons existed no longer they should be happy to continue to serve the King. They said no more, so that their resignations at night remained suspended. The King had asked very often for the dispatch convoking the Parliament. Villermosa, upon pretext of illness and of necessary explanation, had not sent it. He sent it today with his second answer, as did also Belmonte with his second letter a Note of mine explaining why the troops had been called out.

The King said in this conversation to Belmonte that I would not allow him to go to the church, or allow the people to cry out "*Viva il Re*". Belmonte said it was not so. He was master to do what he pleased, all I wanted to prevent was tumult and disorder. The King said he would die in the house until I would not allow him to go to the church. But, Belmonte said, had he not a very good church in the palace? If he wanted to say his prayers or if a sermon was necessary to his salvation, could he not have it at home? But the sermons of these days did not come out of the mouths of a Bourdaloue or a Massillon, but from the most ignorant of animals.

We held a council in the evening, Belmonte, Villermosa, Settimo, Lamb and I, to determine what should be done in case of extremities. It was a great question what should be done with the King. It was wished he should be sent to Malta. I proposed keeping him at the palace until he promised to be quiet, when he might remain at the Colli. This was very much opposed.

It was a great question whether the Hereditary Prince should be appointed by me at once, or rather invited to take the government. They were all of opinion that he ought to take it. My opinion was contrary. It was right that we should offer it to him, but right for him to refuse it. The public would say he was an usurper. The principle of the arrangement was to be that we took possession of the country and gave up the right to the nation. The Parliament must nominate to the vacant throne.

(1) I told Dundas state of affairs. Thought I could not retreat.

Tuesday, March 16, 1813. The Duke of Orleans came. Had been two hours with the King, who wrote to him to say he wished to see him on business interesting to himself and to all the family.

The King began by saying that he, and all the family, was placed in great embarrassment and, the Duke added, in imminent danger. He said he wanted the Duke's assistance. The Duke said he had not seen my last Note. He did not know the march of this business. The King brought out all the Notes, which he made the Duke read out aloud. He showed him the Note of the 3rd March but not that of the 6th, which he said was merely a repetition of that of the 3rd. When he came to the last, the Duke observed on that point (leaving the island to the defence of the English at the time of the invasion) that he must be allowed that this was perfectly true, and hurt the Government more than anything in the eyes of England and Europe.(1) The King said it was very wrong. The formation of a large foreign army without the means of paying them was equally so. The inspiring them with sentiments of

hostility to England: the King said "*Questo non è vero*". The Duke begged his pardon, the Queen openly professed her hostility and people made their court to her by professing the same sentiments. Those who would not say the same thing, amongst whom he was, incurred her displeasure. The King said: "This must be so, but it was not my intention". And he reminded the King that he had advised a council of general officers being called, and the question being put to them whether the English could not starve the force kept here if they chose it. He said it was true.

The King said to him: "I have written the answer, and you must charge yourself with it". He said Belmonte refused to sign it. The Duke said if his Minister had refused to send it upon the ground of the danger and hostility in which it might place the royal family, it became infinitely more delicate for him, his son-in-law, to be a party to such a measure. "But", said the King, "you should read it", and he read it. There was annexed a piece of paper on which was written, in the King's hand, that this was the Note he intended to send.

In talking of the four points, he said: "I mean and wish the Queen to go away. Nobody knows, God bless her, the pain and trouble she has cost me, and how much I wish her to go, and you must manage it. But how is she to go? There are debts, and no money to pay them. Note this [to] Lord William and ask him what other arrangements are to be adopted about her". He said the Queen came to the Ficuzza without his knowledge. "You know the Queen", he said, "and it is a person not to be resisted. But you must manage her departure". The Duke said he could not possibly interfere in this. All he could do was to tell me what His Majesty desired. The King said the Queen would not go away unless he promised to resume the reins of government. "And you see", said the Duke, "that your own defence justifies Lord William in asking her departure". The Duke said it was a great error in allowing her return. The King said it was.

The King said: "There then is the point of the Queen settled. The debts to the British Government arranged with the exception of the Civil List. Understand I cannot do without my Civil List". "Nor I either", said the Duke. The King also, with very great feeling, said: "And they say I have 200,000 oz., *bêtises* which are not true. Can they wish to take them?" "Oh, no!", said the Duke. "The Parliament I have called. I have often asked for the dispatch from Villermosa, but he excused himself on account of illness, whether real or feigned I don't know". He said the Ministers had given in their dismissions and there was ridicule in it, for Settimo's resignation was dated with a different pen from that with which the letter was written. It was evidently concerted. The Duke said such was the custom in England.

The Duke said he could not present the Note the King proposed he should deliver. The King asked him what he advised him to do. He said: "Either see Lord William(2) and hear from himself what he wants, or write him a Note saying that you wish to be on the best terms with England and are ready to do what he wants". The Duke said the great error had been always to deceive His Majesty with the idea of his power. The King said he could not do either of the things recommended. The King said: "But all the four points are settled". "But if so", said the Duke, "there are other things which Lord William asks at the end of his Note" (he read him that part). "There is only one thing that I cannot consent, and that is to abdicate,(3) *cessare di regnare*". In the Note to be sent to me it was said if the British Government required him *cessare di governare*, he was ready.

The Duke said he had been ill advised in keeping up his hostility to the Vicariate. Why not come to Palermo? Why refuse to see the Ministers? Why see everybody else that was the most hostile to them? He said he could not come to Palermo while his son was Vicar General. It would be said that he was incapable of governing. The Duke said the mode in which he had resumed was very objectionable. This was said in answer to the King making a merit of coming secretly to Palermo, and not wishing to have the acclamation of the people. The Duke said the King should not have come in the middle of a negotiation with me. He should have waited till he had received a Note from me saying that I had no objection to his coming. His entry should then have been public, amidst the acclamations of the people and through a line of the British troops who would have assisted in the ceremony. "*E' vero*", said the King, "*ho fatto una bestialità*".

He talked of the Queen's going, but where to? The Duke said to Malta or Cagliari, until passports could be received from Germany. The King objected to Malta. "At Cagliari", he said, "will the English be quiet with the Queen there?" The Duke said: "But will the Queen be quiet?" The King answered: "I understand you, that is the question".

He said the King must open his eyes to his relation to England. He was not independent. He must obey the orders of England. He was the canal through which the wishes of England with respect to Sicily were to issue.(4) This was better than being a persecuted king begging his bread in England or the Continent, a *métier* which he had exercised and seen exercised by others for a long time past, and that he could assure him was not very pleasant. "*Lo credo anch'io*". He said to the King that he never should have allowed me to go to England. The King said: "I always said so, *non l'ho mai voluto*".

Belmonte was present at this conversation, and Lamb at the latter end of it. Belmonte showed us a letter from the King desiring Belmonte to issue a dispatch signed by him, giving Prince Cassaro his dismissal and appointing him Maggiordomo. The dispatch was expressed in the most flattering terms. Belmonte said that having given in his own resignation and finding from a Note just received from me and enclosed to the King that the reasons *sempre sussistevano* (the King's words, when he said there were no points of dissension between him and me), he hoped he might be allowed to decline doing any further act as a Minister. The King, in this complimentary manner of dismissing Cassaro, evidently intended to do me an impertinence.(5)

Upon considering what answer I should give, the Duke was of opinion that if I asked for the King's abdication, he was ready to give it. I said I had no authority to ask for his abdication or even for the reappointment of the Vicariate. Belmonte pressed me very much to ask for the abdication, and was displeased when I said it was impossible.

It was agreed at last that the Duke would say to the King(6) that upon the four points, as to the first, the Queen, I required her immediate absence. I could give no money, having asked for authority to do so and having received no answer. Second and third, Parliament, I was satisfied. Fourth, Cassaro: I was very much displeased with the manner of his dismissal, which gave but little satisfactory prospect of the confidence and conciliation so desirable to be established. He was to say that he found [me] very silent and ill humoured; that it was very difficult to *déboutonner* me; that I had said that I was very unwilling to give any opinion, that whatever I said was always misconstrued; that the King must know perfectly

well what was necessary to the solidity of the alliance and the public tranquillity. With respect to the abdication, that I had not asked it but that I had always advised it, and thought it most advantageous for the King and all parties concerned.

The Duke returned to the King at 3 o'clock. The King was very anxious to know my answer, but before he began to speak to him, he said speaking quickly and repeating his sentences two or three times over, and interlarding every other sentence with a prayer: "But do you know that I have got a Note just now from Bentinck? He is not going to give me a cannonade immediately? Not coming directly with his cannon loaded with grape to fire into my room?". He was very much frightened. The Duke then told him that he had found me very much displeased at certain reports I had heard of his intending resistance. The King said to each: "*Falso, falsissimo*. How can they tell Bentinck such lies? They want to ruin me. I intend to make no resistance", and said a prayer.

The Duke then told him my answer about the Queen, that I had no money to give him, and as to Cassaro, he told him my feelings about his appointment as Majordomo. The King said: "But will he be satisfied if Cassaro goes and endeavours to persuade the Queen to go away?" The King authorized the Duke also to say to me that he was ready to resign the power to his son and to give an assurance that he would not interfere with him or resume again the power; that he had come to Palermo to resume because he thought to hear that it was *la volontà di Dio*, but now he saw that it was the will of God that he should not resume, and he was content: "*Sia fatta la volontà di Dio*".

He told the King, and the King was firmly persuaded, that the British Government would carry their point; that he must execute their wishes. Such was the necessity of the case. The British had protected him and would have their will. He said it was better to do that than to expose himself to a possible *chiasso* (a contest or confusion) that might end in his own ruin. The King deprecated resistance or disorders. Nobody knew better than he did the fatal consequences that might ensue.

Lamb was present. The Duke said he was in the mood I wished. He thought he would ...

(1) The Duke said he gave to the King a written note upon the subject. The King said: "*Me ne ricordo, avete ragione*".

(2) He said he had a great repugnance to see me. He wished the Duke could have been behind the door to have overheard our last conversation, and to see the ways in which I treated him. The Duke said the King had an excessive fear of >me<.

(3) He added that I had advised him not to abdicate. I said this was a mistake. I said I had advised it, but never asked it.

(4) The Duke told him that whatever a British Minister asked or the British Government desired was never retreated from. They went very slowly but surely to their end.

(5) The King said he had no objection to the absence of all the bad subjects from the island. He should make no difficulty upon this head.

The King said all the Queen's spies were French also. He hated all that *canaille*.

(6) That he found me very much displeased at reports I had heard of resistance on the part of the King, that the colonels of the military regiments had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness, that the Consuls had been sent for.

We were all of opinion that I had better not have the Note sent home. The Duke said he could bring it me if I pleased. It was very long and submissive and it asked for the proofs.

Wednesday, March 17, 1813. The Duke of Orleans returned from the King, to whom he had gone in consequence of a message the night before. He told the King that I had been very happy to hear that all the stories told me about resistance were false. It gave me great pleasure. The King desired him to say that he had not the smallest intention of putting himself in hostility to me. The Duke told him that he had said to me that the King was willing to adapt himself to the empire of circumstances.

The King asked if I would be satisfied with his resignation of the government to his son, and with his giving a written assurance that he would not resume it without the permission (*annuenza*) of the British Government and the British Minister; and he added: "If ever I return after that, I give him leave to come with his troops and his cannon and *di farmi pezzi pezzi* (cut me into little pieces)". He said he was willing to sign any assurance that might be written for him that he would not interfere with his son. The King said that he should also require a counter-assurance from me that if he did resign, the British Government would not oblige him to resume again if he did not like it.

He said he was prepared also to abdicate if the British Minister would put in writing that he required it and that force was used for that purpose. This he would show to all Europe.(1)

The Duke said I talked of money, that I knew the Government could ask nothing from Parliament for the Queen, because she was so detested by the nation, but that I had said that perhaps it might be tacked on to the subsidy and given to him. The Duke said his eyes and face for the first time assumed a smile of great satisfaction. The King said that would be much the best way, that he would answer for the Queen's departure. His word would be *sacrosanta* and could not be departed from - and, said the King from himself, "but that annual Civil List is a sad thing. If some guarantee for its permanency could be obtained..." The Duke said I had only mentioned the first point in the course of conversation, and had seemed to regret that I had let it out and had not authorized him to mention it; but that I had given him to understand clearly that it was only in the case of abdication that I should feel myself authorized to give any money. The Duke satisfied himself with launching the idea of the money, to which however the King frequently returned during the conversation. He remarked once with his great cunning: "But you do not think I would sell the abdication?"

He asked if I was satisfied with Cassaro's going to the Queen to try to persuade her to go, and whether I thought he was sincere or going for some other object. The Duke said that I had answered that I should judge by his success.

His first question was whether I had consented to the prolongation of time given for his answer. The Duke said that I very unwillingly extended it beyond 12 o'clock today, when the *éclat* was to be made - "Oh Gesù Maria" (answered the King) "*questo soffro per i miei peccati*" - but that I had in consequence of present appearances agreed to give the whole day for His Majesty's decision.

The Duke reminded the King that he had as yet said nothing about the Queen's going. The King said he would endeavour to persuade her, but could not use force: *come marito e Re* it was impossible.

The King said: "God knows how much I wish to be quiet". He said three days more of such a life would kill him. He felt himself dying. He had a pain in his breast and in his side: "*Me*

ne vado - I am dying - Oh how I wish to be quiet at the Colli where I may prepare my soul for God".

The Duke asked him for a written approbation of his conduct in this affair, as he had been pleased to express it verbally. He said he had many enemies. The King answered that it was not necessary, but he would give it him later if he wished it. The King said that he had desired Leopold to place himself under the Virgin and pray for him.

It was agreed that the Duke should return to the King and say that, as the King would not perform that part of his agreement about the Queen, I would not listen to the remainder, and that the Duke would beg to be relieved from the commission. It was a question whether the Duke should advise him to see me, but I would rather not see him and should prefer the mediation of a third person, because if he abdicated in consequence of my personal visit, he would immediately say that I forced him. I thought it better that the Duke should recommend the employment of Belmonte. The Duke said the King would send me his Note, which I was always desirous not to receive.(2)

I asked the Duke, as he was placed in a most delicate situation in this business, and as I should have to represent it home, that he would have the goodness either to write my dispatch himself or to give me a written statement of his interviews with the King and me, in order that there might be no misrepresentation. He said he would put the whole in French.

The Duke returned to the King at one. The King said: "Well, well, well, *dove siamo?*" The Duke said he had made no progress; that I had paid little or no attention to his resignation, but that I had asked about the Queen. "*Che, che, Gesù Maria*, does he want me to drive her away immediately?" "Oh no", said the Duke, "Lord William only wishes an arrangement. He has sufficient sagacity to see at once upon what he may depend". He asked what answer I had brought upon the proposal of Cassaro's going to the Queen. The Duke said I had made no answer to it. He had not asked it as a question, he did not know that he was ordered to do so. He had stated my former opinion upon it. The King said that Cassaro was entirely ruined with me and that he could not go without my sanction, or he might compromise himself. The King asked the Duke what he thought of my intentions. He said he did not know, but it appeared to him as if I had so bad an opinion of his good faith that I should prefer coming to extremities to conclude effectually the business. "*Ma io non voglio l'ostilità*", cried the King, "I will take good care that it shall not come to this. *Non [lo] lasciar venire qui, Gesù Maria*".

The Duke then begged to be relieved from this negotiation. He had done all he could: it was very unpleasant to him. It would be said, in respect to the King, that he wanted to make him abdicate; to the Queen, that he wanted to drive her away. He had many enemies. The King said he had done very well and praised him, but would give him no written assurance of his satisfaction.

The King asked him if he had said to me that if I required his abdication he would appeal to the chiefs of the nation. He said he had, but that I paid no attention to the remark.

The Duke said he then went to the Hereditary Prince, but after leaving him, while he was in the next room to the King, waiting for something, he heard the King give a loud cry out, like a great parrot.

He told the Hereditary Prince all that had passed, and the fruitless and disagreeable negotiation in which he had been involved. The Hereditary Prince said he knew them well: he had been involved in the same for the last thirty years.

The Duke said the King would probably send for him and desire him to resume again the Vicariate. "If he does, I would advise you to say that you have been placed in great embarrassment by the British Minister" - as he (the King) had also been; that he would not again be placed in the same; that often Bentinck had required him to do that which the insufficiency of his powers did not allow him to do. He therefore would not receive the appointment until they had been examined by Bentinck and pronounced by him to be sufficient. "By so doing you support each other". The Hereditary Prince thanked him very much for his advice and said he would follow it to the letter. But, the Hereditary Prince said, the King would be off in the night leaving him a letter. The Duke said: "At whatever hour it comes, send for Lord William immediately".

The Hereditary Prince then told the Duke a story of his patent as Vicar General. The Queen, before it was made out, asked to see his patent as Vicar at Naples. The Hereditary Prince said it would not answer. Medici and Tommasi drew out another, which was shown him by the Queen, and the Hereditary Prince approved very much. It was written out upon fine paper. Some time after, Medici came back with the same all torn, saying the Queen did not at all approve it, and then the present insufficient one was made out. The Duke advised him not to be satisfied but with the fullest powers. "Ah", said the Hereditary Prince, "ribbons, keys and abbeys".(3)

It was then debated what should be done (Belmonte was present, not Lamb). Belmonte thought the King going away was the best thing that could happen, but I thought otherwise. I never should catch him again, and he might involve us in a civil war. I thought it necessary to stop him. Belmonte proposed guards round the town to prevent egress, but I thought it better to send Lamb or MacFarlane, or both, to the King at 9 this evening to make some arrangement with the King and to make him promise not to go away in the night. They thought MacFarlane the best, but I did not know whether he would see the thing in the right point of view.

I resolved to send Lamb first and MacFarlane afterwards, to declare, if Lamb failed, that we were in a state of war. I thought it probable I should previously receive another *ambassade*; if not, Lamb was to go away at eight o'clock.

Just as Lamb was going away, the Duke of Sangro arrived from the King with the Note written in Prince Belmonte's name but signed by the King. I said I could not receive it; the Duke said he was desired by the King only to say that it was written on the 13th. But I received it to clear the Duke from embarrassment, and gave the Note to Lamb. The King would not see Lamb, but desired the Hereditary Prince to speak to him (see his account of the conversation). It was agreed that I was to call upon the Hereditary Prince the next morning to settle the details of the assignment.

(1) The King said the Queen did not adapt herself to circumstances as well as he did, and did not bear with the same Christian resignation the persecution they were doomed to suffer.

(2) The King said often: "*Bisogna finire questo affare. Questo Bentinck è così straordinario* that he is capable any moment of bringing a cannon loaded with grape close to my window and blowing me and my room up altogether".

(3) The King said to the Duke he would then send the Note. The Duke advised him to not to do so. It was only sending a paper which was to bring the negotiation to an unfavourable conclusion.

Thursday, March 18, 1913. Belmonte came here early to consult about what I should require from the Hereditary Prince. Lamb present. At 11 I was to be at the palace to settle the details of the proposal made the preceding evening by His Royal Highness on the part of the King with Mr Lamb. The conversation principally turned upon the persons of the King's party to be punished, both Neapolitans and Sicilians, Belmonte wanting many and I thinking four or five examples sufficient. He also wanted that I should require the sanction of the reserved articles, particularly those relating to the Civil List and the separation of the two kingdoms. (1) I said I had certainly advised both, but I could not require them. I thought it probable that to the separation in particular the British Government would probably be adverse. They were obliged to act upon fixed principles. The King had rights and it would be a question with them how far anyone had the right to say no to them. The British Government did not adapt their principles to their interest but vice versa. I would again strongly advise it.

I went to the Hereditary Prince and he showed me a letter from the King in which he said that he thought his health restored, but since his return it had been becoming di *male in peggio*: it was necessary he should go to the country to take the remedies he required and the exercise indispensable to his health. He therefore desired him to resume again the government which he had hitherto conducted with *tanta plausibilità*.

He asked if I had any objection. He also added that he had told the King that he must put himself *d'accord* with me. I said I wished the King had abdicated, that I thought he would have been a much happier man; that now there would always be intrigues round him. His former powers were insufficient. Of the embarrassment that had been in consequence occasioned all were aware. I showed him the paper drawn up beforehand. He thought them ample. He wished to have added the power of making treaties or, in other words, the foreign correspondence. The Hereditary Prince said there would be some difficulty in introducing these new powers into the *cedola* or patent; but it appearing from the former patent that it conveyed full powers and that the restrictions were secret, it seemed to me that the proposed explanatory paper might also be private. But I asked his leave to ask the opinion of the Council, three of whom happened to be in the next room. They were of the same opinion, and the Hereditary Prince thought this arrangement would be satisfactory to the King.

We talked of the Queen. He told me Sangro and Cassaro were to go to the Queen to advise her to go, and that if they could not persuade [her] and <that> we chose to force her to go, he would not interfere. I said the measures threatened should be suspended. It was agreed that I should send these proposals to the King through Belmonte.

He talked of many things. He said a Minister of Grace and Justice was wanting and that if I wished to know whom he would like, it was D'Averna. I said there was great objections to a lawyer, and I told him what had passed between me and Cassaro, and that he said the King would appoint the Duke of Ferla. The Hereditary Prince said he could make no objection to him. I said I had heard objections to the Duke's integrity. I then mentioned the report that Carini had been named by the King. He said he had heard it and added I should like him. I said very well, and this was agreed. I said Counsellors would be wanting, and mentioned Fitalia and Cattolica. I said the latter had behaved well and I should be glad to see him restored. I mentioned also Villafranca as a person deserving notice. He was powerful and active. The Hereditary Prince agreed with me and said he had a party, but no place was mentioned for him.

I strongly urged him to remove Castelcicala, and he as strongly resisted it. He said I had no instructions to ask it. I said I had not. The reasons I gave him were: the objection to Sicily being represented by a Neapolitan, and the certainty of the remonstrance of the Parliament. (Time enough, he said, when that arrived). The certainty that both his mother and father, in whom I could have no confidence as I had seen him to be so weak and to be acting one day in positive contradiction to his resolution of the preceding day, would be intriguing at the court of London. A Sicilian Minister would not support such representations but would rather plead the cause of himself and the nation. Nobody knew better than I did what Castelcicala said and did at my own court. The Hereditary Prince said he was an honest man, and gave honest advice. I said I believed he did, but he was the King of Naples' Minister and not of Sicily, and cared nothing about the Constitution or interests of Sicily.

He then went off to the successor that might be named to him, and mentioned Ruffo. I said he was suspected as an agent of the Queen. He proposed Scaletta. I said Scaletta was, I understood, a weak man. He asked who I would propose. I said Don Cesare Airoidi. He said he had great prejudices against him. He did not say why. I answered that he was a very sensible, well informed man and would represent the court much better than anybody I knew. It ended, 1st with saying he could not do it, and 2ndly that he would reflect upon the matter.

He talked of the Civil List and of the property of the crown, and wished the *mezzo termine* could be adopted as proposed by Cassaro, to give the property for ever, upon condition of having the Civil List made permanent. I said I was sure this could be done if he did the thing handsomely on his part. He said I could secure it to him by speaking to some of the members. I said I could only answer for what depended upon myself, but I would speak to some of the leading members of Parliament and would let him know if I thought it would be carried.

Next, upon the separation of Sicily. He acknowledged his belief that every man in Sicily wished it, but, to confess sincerely his own objections, they were that in case of the loss of Naples and Sicily in possession of another, he should be left without anything; that if he [was] exposed to such alternative he would take the least that was certain instead of the greatest that was precarious. I said perhaps some *mezzo termine* could be suggested. He begged me to think of it. He said if the article was not to be sanctioned, he thought it better

for the King to take it upon himself. If a satisfactory arrangement could be made, then he might sanction it himself.

I told him I thought it much better to leave the odium with the King. I told him the Sicilians could make good their own case by refusing to pay any of the Neapolitans and to expend a sixpence in an expedition to Naples. He said: "You have no orders to require the separation". I said, none. England did not care about it. For England, I said, it was perhaps better that they should be united, as by her direct influence, by means of her maritime superiority over Sicily, she might influence Naples also.

I called upon Sangro. He said he was not going to the Queen. The King had asked him but he had positively declined. He could do no good, and as a Neapolitan he would not commit himself with the Sicilians.

(1) Belmonte dictated the powers that he thought the Vicar ought to possess.

Friday, March 19, 1813. I called upon the Hereditary Prince with notes: 1. of persons to be noticed in consequence of preceding transactions; 2. also calling upon the Government to enquire into the conduct of those who had disturbed the public peace; 3. with a *mezzo termine* for the separation of Naples and Sicily.

In looking over the names in the first, he asked if Cassaro might not be excused. He had left his office; the charge was one he had about the King. I said it was necessary to mark those who had conducted themselves in order to discourage others. He pretended not to know that Parisi and Tommasi had been of the King's council: for both he has an inclination, but particularly the latter. He thought it would hurt the King very much to require the absence of Frilli. The Duke of Orleans said the King had mentioned Frilli: that he never listened to him, and that his advice would be, he was sure, contrary to that which he had followed.

I showed him the *mezzo termine*. I found I had not rightly understood him the day before. The Hereditary Prince meant to hold out to the Parliament a hope that at some future time he would consent to the separation. I said that would not do. The nation would not be satisfied with an evasive proposal. I thought he could not avoid sanctioning it. By the proposal I had made, his rights and those of the King were safe. I thought the King would not object to it, as it appeared he cared only for himself. The Hereditary Prince himself said, in reading the paper, that the descendants were out of the question. I took the paper away. He said Cassaro, as well as Sangro, had refused to go to the Queen.

I found Belmonte with the Hereditary Prince. The King had refused to open two of my minutes, one containing the Note of the King sent the night before, the other relative to the Vicar's powers and sent to him by Belmonte. It was a question how the powers of the Vicariate should be arranged. I proposed to the Hereditary Prince to go himself, but he said he would send for Caccamo, to whom he would give a *mémoire raisonné* upon the subject, or otherwise he would not say all he might desire him. I advised him to mention to Caccamo the promissory arrangement I had suggested in case of abdication. He said he would. He told me the King had written a very strong letter to him.

The Duke of Orleans came. He told me that he had seen the King. He looked embarrassed, was in bad spirits and humble. He made no allusion to the past. Belmonte said that the King had written to the Queen about her departure and said: "As a friend I advise it, as a husband I beg it, and as King I order it".

I showed him the *mezzo termine* about Naples and he thought it fair for all parties. He said he found the Hereditary Prince much more *mou*, much less hearty and more indifferent the last time (yesterday or today) he saw him than before.

He said he had had a very gracious letter from the Queen of Sardinia. He could not understand it, but upon going to the Duchess he found she had also received one stating she was very glad the Queen was required to go to Castelvetro, as she could not avoid meddling with affairs. He said that court hated us more than this. I said I believed the cause of offence was that we did not give them as large a subsidy as to Sicily. He said the Queen was clever, but without judgment. So was this. This Queen had not read, but that of Sardinia was well informed.

Saturday, March 20, 1813. Caccamo was ill and did not go to the Hereditary Prince yesterday. He came today and went to the King in the evening, and did not return on that day to the Hereditary Prince.

Sunday, March 21, 1813. Belmonte came from the Hereditary Prince to desire I would go to him. Caccamo had returned from the King, who would not open the packet before sent him by Belmonte, and would not sign any other *cedola* than that already given. The Hereditary Prince had prepared a very strong letter to the King, observing to him that I had said that hostilities were only suspended and making the King responsible for all the consequences of his conduct. The Hereditary Prince had put into his letter that he had proposed to me to content myself with the former *cedola* and a general assurance that he would not interfere. I dissuaded him from being satisfied, but advised his sending my former Notes to the King containing the powers to be granted to the Vicar General, as specified in the public and private paper.

I said it was necessary this question should be terminated. I should consider it so at six in the evening. The Hereditary Prince asked till 8 or 9, but I told him that as no time was required for a decision, I could not consent to delay more, particularly as I wished the thing to be settled before dark, as I was afraid of the King decamping in the night.

I said I would go from thence to Caccamo in the hope of frightening him. I went there immediately. Belmonte interpreted. He said what had passed between me and the Hereditary Prince, the necessity of a decision, and the limitation in point of time fixed for 6 o'clock. We told him that a letter was gone from the Hereditary Prince to the King and we begged him to go immediately, which he consented to do.

He returned at half past 5 directly to me, bringing the King's answer to the Hereditary Prince unopened for my perusal (*vide copy*), saying the Hereditary Prince was to be Vicar without any restriction *come fossi io stesso*, according to the powers granted under the

English Constitution. I told the monk this would not do, as the English Constitution acknowledged no such office as a Regent. After much conversation, during which Lamb told him he deserved to be made a cardinal, with which he seemed much pleased, it was agreed that I should write him a letter specifying the exact form of the paper which he ought to sign, which he would carry to the King.

I took the copy of the King's letter to the Hereditary Prince to Belmonte. He was to get the *cedola*, and I said I would call again at 8 p. m. In the meantime I received a note from the Hereditary Prince desiring I would call upon him again. I went first to Belmonte's, where I met Lamb. It was agreed that the public *cedola* should merely express what was stated in the King's letter of today to the Hereditary Prince, and that the other paper to be signed by the King should be private.

I then went to the Hereditary Prince. I told him what I proposed to do. I asked him if he thought his powers would be sufficient as proposed without the private paper. He said he wished [me] to be satisfied. I said I would have no other object than to prevent the embarrassments that had already occurred, and that he must be the best judge of what might be sufficient. I was acting for him and the state. I asked him again if he thought that he was safe from interference. He said there might be *chicanes*, but he must get rid of them as well as he could. I said this was not enough, and that therefore the private paper was necessary as well as the public *cedola*.

Belmonte had told me that Langelot had been ordered in a hurry to the Ficuzza, as well as the Cacciatori Reali. I asked the Hereditary Prince if it was not so. He said it might be. I could not ask him the question directly, but Belmonte as well as myself and Lamb were firmly convinced that the King would be off in the night. If he did, there would be no catching him again. Everything would remain unsettled and perhaps he might excite a civil war in the country. I therefore determined to prevent the King's departure, and I ordered Captain Goerres at 12 night to post 70 dragoons on the Colli road with orders not to let any carriages pass. The King did not go by.

Monday, March 22, 1813. I went to Padre Caccamo's convent at 8 a. m. with my letter to him containing the two papers. I mentioned to him that I did not enclose the third paper, namely the King's proposal not to resume without the sanction of the British Government, as I knew the King had already written it. As I wished for a conclusion to this business, I proposed to go also to the Favorita. I promised not to go to the King if he did not like it; if he did, to say nothing disagreeable to him, and to wait in the garden to be ready to answer any doubts that might occur, and thus to conclude the business at once. The Padre desired he might go before to prepare the King and have the gates opened.

I sent A'Court to withdraw the dragoons. We followed in twenty minutes, were admitted, and went into the garden. After remaining there quarter of an hour, the Duke of Sangro and Caccamo came out and asked me to come in (A'Court present. See his report). The Duke of Sangro spoke. He said he was desired by the King to say that he would not sign the papers sent to him; that it would amount to his abdication. I combated this, but he persevered and said the King was resolved to sign no other than the former *cedola*. The Duke said he

thought the King was right. He said everybody was against him, his son was against him, and he was going to say that if he signed this paper he would >have< signed an abdication which he could not revoke. I corrected the Duke when he said the son was against the King. It was not true. No son had ever acted with more affection to a father. His weakness in this respect had been his greatest crime. I should not have carried it to the same extent.

The Duke said the King was ready to go either to Malta or England. He put it as if I wished it. He said he could not stay in Sicily. I asked why he wanted to go. He gave no reason. I said he was the master to go where he pleased. The Duke asked if I would promise him the means. I said I would. He proposed also that I should give him a pecuniary assignment. I said that I could not do this. This did not belong to me. I was not asking the King to go. It was his own free choice. His assignment could only be given by the Parliament and the nation. I desired Sangro to go and say this to the King, and to ask when he wished to embark.

While the Duke was absent, the Padre said that the King was afraid of being tried by the Parliament, and asked if I would give him a guarantee for his personal safety in writing. I said I had no difficulty.

The Duke came back and said the King was ready to go immediately tonight if I pleased. I told the Duke what the Padre had said. The Duke got angry and said it was a lie, that the Padre understood nothing of the matter, and that he was directed to speak to one point only by the King, and he would not digress from it. The Padre, he had said to the King, pretended to speak from the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, which he did not. All those that surrounded the King were beasts. Circello had not common sense. He said of the King that he was an honest, good man, but so timid that no honest man could serve him. I said it [was] better that Caccamo should mention this point to the King. He did, but returned declaring that the King had nothing more to say. After a long pause, I said I must require the King's promise that he would not remove from the Colli. He went to the King, and brought back the King's promise to that effect.

After walking about the room some time with Sangro - I was apprehensive that my requiring the signature to the papers I had sent should appear as the cause of the King's departure - I said that [as] (and as the Duke of Sangro had frequently repeated) the King had declared he would not interfere with the Vicar, I should be satisfied if the King would give me that promise in his, the Duke's, presence and mine. The Duke went to the King and proposed this, to which the King immediately assented. The King came down and said: "I confirm all Sangro has said, I promise not to interfere with the government of my son. I promise also not to move from here, and if you like it, you may place sentries at my gate". He said he was loyal and honest. He was determined to throw himself into the hands of the English. They should see then what he was.

I said I was not that *méchant homme* that I had been represented to him. He took me by the hand. He said he felt sure of me, but he would not say that of others. He hoped I would guarantee his personal security. I gave my word that I would. I did not think he was consulting his *bonheur* in going to Malta. He said it was his *piacere* to go there. He said Sangro was to communicate with me. I said he was an honest man.

I returned home and Belmonte and Lamb came. Lamb had information that the King had a communication with Di Aci the preceding evening. Belmonte said it was all a ruse on the part of the King to avoid committing himself to paper. He recommended that a letter should be written to the King to put it out of his power to say that he had been forced away, and that my opinion and advice had been against it. I thought it well done.

I went with Belmonte to the Hereditary Prince. I went in alone. When I told the Hereditary Prince of the King's intention of going to Malta, he crossed himself. I said I was sorry for it. I thought it would have a bad appearance before the public. I told the Hereditary Prince that I thought Di Aci had advised it. It was like one of his extravagant measures. I asked the Hereditary Prince if he thought the King would execute. He said "yes, certainly, within two or three days, but he will be back in four months". I said he talked of going to England. The Hereditary Prince said he would not go there. He believed there was no Ficuzza in England. He told me, as another reason for the King's going, that he did not like being here when measures were taking against the Queen. I asked the Hereditary Prince if he thought the powers sufficient. He said, with the letter written by the King to him and with the King's promise to me, that they were sufficient.

I saw the Duke of Orleans, who was told by Lamb that something extraordinary had occurred, and, upon being asked to guess, said the King was going away. It appeared that the Duchess had heard that the King was to go away with the Queen. The Duke said the King had beat me by this measure. He was satisfied the King would have abdicated if he could have been properly pressed. He thought I ought still to make him sign the paper. He did this to be able to come back again whenever he pleased, without any restrictions upon himself. He did not submit by this means, and kept his party alive. It was evidently good policy for him. He appeared also to be throwing himself into the arms of England.

Belmonte came in the evening with the *cedola* prepared and proposed to me to get it signed by the King. I said I would keep it till the morning and consider what I would do with it.

Tuesday, March 23, 1813. (1) I took the *cedola* to be signed.

I wrote a memorandum of what had passed the day before, and, to prevent mistakes, I addressed it to Sangro to be read to the King. I sent A'Court with it to the Colli. Sangro was not there, and >he< returned. Sangro came to me and I read him the memorandum. He said I had mistaken one part wherein I said the King would not oppose. He said the King had said he could not oppose. I altered it before him and he took it away.

(1) Genl MacFarlane set off for Castelvetro. Our intelligence informed us that a plan of resistance was organized in the country about Castelvetro. The 75th, 3rd and 8th German Legion, 50 dragoons, and 4 pieces of cannon marched for Corleone under Genl Humber to hold themselves at Genl MacFarlane's orders.

Wednesday, March 24, 1813. (1) I received Sangro's answer, very evasive and unsatisfactory. Being occupied all day with the packet, I made no reply to it.

Belmonte showed it to the Hereditary Prince, who struck his forehead with his hand and was ashamed of it. Belmonte showed it also to the Duke and Duchess of Orleans. The latter felt it equally.

I sent a Note to Belmonte asking if the Hereditary Prince thought the *cedola* proposed by the King contained full powers etc.

(1) Packet dispatched to Trapani. Wrote to Lord Castlereagh that I should send Lamb home.

Thursday, March 25, 1813. Belmonte recommended to the Hereditary Prince to write to the King enclosing a copy of my Note, and advised him to show it to me previously in order to be agreed with me in everything, and that he might hereafter have no reproach to make to him.

He sent for me in the evening and read me his note to the King. It put the whole upon my Note, and asked what he was to say in answer so that he might be *d'accord* with Bentinck. He was always anxious to obey his commands. It gave no opinion. It was a very harmless, weak letter. I made no objection to it.

Friday, March 26, 1813. I prepared a Note in answer to the Duke of Sangro's last. I had asked the Duke of Orleans if he had any objection to my calling upon him to certify the truth of what I had said to have been communicated to me by him on the part of the King. He said he would certify it if I wished it, but he would rather not be called upon. I in consequence in the Note begged the King to call upon him, and I read him what I had said, of which he approved.

Sangro called upon me and showed me the King's answer to the Prince. It was in the shape of a conversation between the King and Sangro, wherein the King gives Sangro orders as to the communication to be made to the Hereditary Prince. Sangro had written it from the King's dictation. The directions were express and the powers very limited. I asked Sangro some questions, which he could not answer, respecting them. I sent him my Note in the evening.

Fagan came. He said Budon, secretary to the Queen, had called upon him with a proposal to me to place the King upon the throne again, in consideration of which I was to be made Great Chancellor in perpetuity. I said I could receive no communication that was not made to me by the Duke of Sangro. I wrote to Fagan and desired him to write down what had been proposed to him, which he did.

The Duke of Orleans said that the letters from the Queen after MacFarlane's visit were very tranquil and indifferent. She talked of a *prêcheur* whom she had heard at church. The Duke told me that preparations were actually making for her departure.

Saturday, March 27, 1813. The Hereditary Prince desired me to call upon him at ten. When I went there I found Poli in the antechamber. He said the King's letter was precise. Something had been added to the Prince's powers. I told him that I thought it was much better for the King to resume [than] that the Hereditary Prince should have insufficient powers. He agreed with me and pressed me to allow the King to resume. I said this would be a very great evil.

I then went to the Hereditary Prince, who had prepared a copy of the King's instructions. He read them. He observed, in answer to my asking what was meant that his treaties with England should maintain the honour of the crown, that it seemed to arise from want of confidence. Also, upon the power given to him to name to his own court, he said he had no court; he laughed at it. He entirely agreed with me in the opinion that it was much better for the King to resume than for himself to govern with powers so limited as these. He wished me not to prevent it. He wished to be the mediator between me and the King.

I said it was one question what he should do, another what I may. I thought His Royal Highness quite right in his decision. There was no other course for him to take with propriety. Respecting his mediation, I said if the arrangement could be easily made, no mediation could be more proper; but if otherwise, and it was difficult to suppose that there should not be some unpleasant terms or discussion, it was much better that he should not be mixed up with them. I must reflect upon what I should do. He begged me to let my own heart make the decision. I said the great misfortune was the distrust which had been inspired into the King's mind. He supposed we were his enemies, that His Royal Highness was leagued with us to dethrone him, and hence arose all the conduct he had pursued. The Hereditary Prince said this was perfectly just.

I read to the Hereditary Prince a part of Fagan's letter wherein it was proposed to make me Vice-Chancellor. I said it was exactly like an intrigue of the Queen. He knew Budon. He put his hand to his forehead and said it was perfect extravagance.

I also showed him the papers relative to a sum of money possessed unjustly by a Neapolitan who wished to refund it to the King. He had seen Ascoli and Circello. The sum was to be paid to Herries and Farquhar. These papers were to be a passport to a French spy. I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He told me the exact purport of the Queen's conversation as contained in MacFarlane's first letter, which I only received in the evening of this day. I showed him the paper just given me by the Hereditary Prince. I begged him to show it to the Duchess who, he said, gave a deep sigh and exclaimed: "Always appearances and professions but no reality". The Duke said such had always been the conduct of the court to everybody, to himself, to Stuart, to myself when made Captain General, to every other, Minister, general or Power, promising everything but doing nothing. This was the true Italian cunning and policy.

I told him what I proposed to do, to write to the King, i. e. to Sangro, to say that he must either resume with the conditions imposed in my Note of the 13th, or give sufficient powers to the Vicar, or I would tomorrow take the government in trust till Parliament could be called. He thought the first would be viewed as a defeat. I said if there was such a ministry formed as would be entirely in our interests, it ought not to be so considered and would not be so in any other part of Europe. I was aware of the effects it would have here, where

cowardice was carried to such an extraordinary pitch. I said they never looked forward in this country. They only considered the present danger, but I adverted to the greatest possible evil, which they never contemplated at all, and that was the possible disavowal by the British Government of my acts. He agreed with me.

I had begged the Counsellors to come to my house, and there were present Belmonte, Villermosa, Settimo, and Lamb. They were for the most part against the King's resuming, but upon my observing that I must be consequent with my own Notes and that I thought if he resumed it should only be with the condition that he should be bound hand and foot, their objections ceased. I stated what I further proposed, as said to the Duke of Orleans. To this they agreed. We prepared the conditions. One, proposed by Belmonte, was that the King should always preside in his Council; and if he did not, the decree of the Council should be decisive without the consent of the King. A strange idea.

A corresponding Note was sent to Sangro between 6 and 7 p. m. He came to me about ten p. m. with the Hereditary Prince's letter. He then told me that the idea about the Great Chancellor was his and that he thought it was a way of settling all difficulties. I told him it was altogether impossible, that I was a foreigner to begin with, and that Sicily, besides, must be governed by a Sicilian administration. He said I should be able to do whatever I pleased with the King. He would be entirely in my hands. I said all this was very fine, but that I had seen the King from the first to the last moment always the same man, always hostile, always showing bad faith. He had seen in our last conversations how words and facts were misstated and falsified. How could he, who was an honest man, suppose that the King with his habits of pleasure and disuse to business do the duties of the king under the new Constitution, where a continual attention to affairs would be necessary? He said the King was able to work from morning till night. I complained of the King's bad faith. I asked why he had not given full powers to the Hereditary Prince as he said he would. He said: "May I speak in confidence?". I said yes. He said the reason was that he was afraid of the punishment that would be given to individuals (this could not be true). But, to show him how unfounded this idea was, I read him the note of the persons whose conduct was to be noticed and the manner of doing it.

He excused the King. He said it was not his doing. To induce him to do what he had, he had been goaded like an ox. He gave me his honour that I might guide him. He said he had always been led. I said I was uncertain of that. I could not tell what influence would lead him. When the Queen was gone, his mind would be disengaged. I said all this might be true. I could only judge after the facts and not after words. He urged the King's return and he came to beg me to dictate the law and the conditions. I said I could not do so.

He asked me what I thought was best. I repeated what I had often before said: give full powers to the Hereditary Prince. As for the King and Queen, there was no argument but force that had any weight with them. Show it and they were down to the ground; withdraw it and the next moment they were on their high horse. The sword must be constantly kept hanging over their heads. I said the King and Queen were always surrounded with rogues. He hoped I did not include him. I said no. He had told me that he did not advise the King, that he merely wrote what he was desired. He said he was sorry he could not bend me. I told him I was decided and he might take me at my word. As I was fully prepared to have

made the King a prisoner if he had not yielded before, so I was resolved to do tomorrow what I had said I would. He hoped he would give him the whole day to prepare the King. He should not have time before 12. I said, after some hesitation on my part and much insisting on his, that I would.

Sunday, March 28, 1813. (1) Belmonte came. He told me the Hereditary Prince had gone to the Colli.

I received, while he was with me, a note from Sangro informing me that the King had given full powers to the Hereditary Prince. Soon after I also received a note from the Hereditary Prince desiring me to go to him. I went and found Belmonte with him. He showed me the paper of full powers written by the King himself in pencil. There were seven articles to which he required my pledge. I only could make objection to two of them. One was an assignment to the Queen. I said I had written for authority and had not received it. I therefore could not pledge myself to it, but I would do so upon condition of the approbation of my Government. The other was the non-removal of any of those in the King's service. The Hereditary Prince thought this regarded Frilli principally. I said for him I had no difficulty. I thought Cassaro and Cutò should be removed. The Hereditary Prince wished not. The Hereditary Prince proposed a *mezzo termine*, that I should not ask for the removal of any of them as long as they gave no cause for complaint.

I asked the Hereditary Prince if the King gave the paper with contentment. He said he did. I observed that from this moment his happiness would begin. The Hereditary Prince said the King had made the same remark. Belmonte came home and assisted me in putting in Italian the Note conveying the assurance required by the King. In the Note I said I would make no objection to Frilli, to whom I conceived the King alluded. My own opinion was not to ask the removal of any of these persons, but Belmonte strongly opposed me and I gave way. I thought after we had got everything, it would appear in England like vengeance and harsh treatment towards an old sovereign who had not the means of defending himself.

I went to Belmonte in the evening and showed him Castelcicala's dispatch to the King, of which Lord Castlereagh had sent me a copy.

(1) Arrived Gleaner ketch, Lt Knight, with dispatches for me from England. Sailed 23rd February.

Monday, March 29, 1813. The Hereditary Prince sent for me. Belmonte was there and remained during the whole of the conversation, [which] was very long. It turned upon a variety of subjects.

The Hereditary Prince read my Note of the day before upon the two articles which I had refused to give an assurance upon. The first for the money. I said I could not do more. I had no authority, but I was sure my Government would do it. He asked me to write him a Note to that effect for the King's satisfaction, which I did accordingly. We talked of the assignment of the Queen. I said I would be ready to assist, but I could not talk of it till after

the Queen's departure. The Hereditary Prince asked what sum I would give. I said I did not know. He said I had before proposed 20,000 ounces. I said I had, but that was for the abdication. He said it was the same thing. The King could not resume without the leave of England. I answered, not quite so. I thought that 12,000 would be sufficient. I said if the King gave her three or four thousand she would live in great splendour at Vienna, where all articles of life were half their price here.

He repeatedly, over and over again, expressed his wish that Cassaro and Cutò should not go out. I stated that I thought it necessary. It was essential the disposition of His Royal Highness and of the Government should be unequivocally manifested. Hitherto it had seemed uncertain. It was also necessary that the bad should be discouraged and the good encouraged; that they should be turned out and a man whose principles were well established should be appointed. I said it was what I should have done if unfortunately I had assumed the government, as had been possible. He asked who I would have put in his place. I said Paternò. He and the Princess together had a great deal of influence. The Hereditary Prince said he was an imbecile. I said that did not signify, and Belmonte made these distinctions: for *places de cour* great noblemen, *places de cabinet* the ablest and most honest men, military places the bravest, etc. It was agreed at last he should have it.

He talked of Grace and Justice. I said I was sure Carini was not fit for it. He wished much for >Averna<, but both I and Belmonte opposed a lawyer being appointed to that situation. Others were talked of: Ferla; I mentioned Airoidi and said I knew he had a prejudice to him, but did not know what it was. He said he had heard that he was not sage and, he had heard, had no religion. The Minister for Grace and Justice should be a man of high character. I said I was sure he would like him hereafter. I stated that formerly I could not persuade him to be Minister. I was sure he would like him hereafter. He said he might, but at present he did not know him. It was agreed that he should be Director and that Cutò's place should be left open for Carini, who might hereafter succeed to it and Airoidi to his. These arrangements the Hereditary Prince wrote down and desired me to sign that they were settled with my advice.

We talked of Castelcicala and the necessity of his removal. Belmonte thought all should be removed who were not Sicilian, and he adverted to his own responsibility upon this subject. The Hereditary Prince defended Castelcicala. Said he had always given good advice. I proposed as a *mezzo termine* that Castelcicala might remain as the King's Minister for Naples and another appointed the Sicilian Minister. The Hereditary Prince asked Belmonte whom he would recommend. He said Villafranca (the Hereditary Prince approved), but not to go till after the Parliament, where he would be very useful. The Hereditary Prince approved this.

The Hereditary Prince was particularly kind and affectionate to Belmonte. Belmonte said he had written him a letter in which he said: "*Per la vita sono il vostro affezionato...*".

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He told me the Queen's plan was to take the King away with her if she could.

The Hereditary Prince mentioned the dispatch received the night before. He recapitulated it and said laughing: "And they complain of me also". He said the King was much more calm.

The King thanked God for what he had done. The Prince went to the King in the evening and the *cedola* was signed.

Tuesday, March 30, 1813. Belmonte came in the morning from the Hereditary Prince. He was to try to persuade me not to insist upon Cassaro's and Cutò's going out. He wrote me a Note asking it and helped me to write the refusal of it. Neither the King or Prince expected to succeed, but the King said: "*Proviamo*, let us try".

The Hereditary Prince afterwards sent for me. He told me that the King disliked very much the appointment of Paternò. He asked if it was necessary, as well also as the removal of the others. I said I thought it was, but I said if Paternò was not agreeable to the King, let the office remain vacant for the present. The Hereditary Prince added that hereafter, when the King was in better humour, when he had received his money and amused himself with fishing and shooting, he thought he would not object to it. I asked the Hereditary Prince to let me know when it might be right to call upon the King. The Hereditary Prince said he would ask the King, adding: "You only want to pay your respects, not to speak about business".

I showed him the intelligence from Calabria from which it appeared that Tschudi and others had been placed. He said he thought the former would always be placed.

He mentioned the Queen's wish not to go before the end of the month, that is before the end of Lent, that she might finish her devotions. I said the ships, in consequence of the Edinburgh going to Ponza, could not be there before the middle of the month; but I had written to MacFarlane to say they would go in a week.

I gave Belmonte Lord Castlereagh's letter to him, with which he was very pleased.

I talked to the Hereditary Prince about the sanction of the article of the separation. I repeated again my *mezzo termine*. He said he would do what sometimes I said I must, and that is reflect upon it. It costs him dear.

Wednesday, March 31, 1813. Belmonte came. He told me that the King was not quite satisfied with the form of the assurance. He wished it to be more decidedly expressed that it was given in the name of the British Government. We read over what had been written, to see what was inexplicit. It appeared that I had expressed myself speaking as Minister Plenipotentiary, and that more could not be said. Belmonte took the message back. Belmonte said he had shown Lord Castlereagh's letter to the Hereditary Prince, who had asked for a copy of it.

Belmonte told us that the Hereditary Prince had told him that the King said he would only send to the Queen such parts of the dispatch as regarded her. He said: "You know what a devil of a head your mother has".

Thursday, April 1, 1813. (1) I went to the Hereditary Prince about military business. He told me that the King wished to make Sangro inspector instead of St Clair and asked if I

had any difficulty. I said no. It would be a great disappointment to the Duchess, who wished for his return to Naples.

He told me that although the King would see nobody, yet whenever I chose to go he would receive me. I asked if I should go in their uniform or my own. He said in theirs. He said the King was very quiet.

The Duke of Orleans told me that the Duchess had received a letter from the Empress of Germany, in which she said she did not write to the Queen because she thought her already gone from Sicily, and adding that she should be received with every kindness and consideration.

(1) In the morning Dundas, Edinburgh, sailed for Ponza; Thames, Capt. Napier, for Mahon.

Friday, April 2, 1813. I went to the King at eleven and remained half an hour. He received me graciously. He looked ill and *abattu*. He talked to me of shooting and fishing, his cows and calves, his mares and foals. He said Naples was the best country for sport, particularly in birds of passage, in the world. The island of Capri both woodcocks and quails first came to. They take them in nets. They were the revenue of the bishop. Forty thousand quails have been taken in a season, and a thousand woodcocks in a day. He and a party on a 3rd of May had killed above a thousand quails. For eating he preferred the *turdo (grive)* to every other bird. He had lost about 70 mares and foals this year by the bad weather.

He told a curious anecdote of the tunny fish. They always have their noses pointed towards the west. The net is open to the east but they do not go out. This only continues till the 15th May, after which they will go to the east, and go out of any opening. They are very much afraid of the shark. A large shark drives them before him and they break the nets. Last year they had excellent sport. The preparation cost 12,000 ounces. Last year they cleared 5,000. The small *thons* are beginning now to arrive. About the 10th of May the great body arrive. They killed an immense shark last year, in whom they found part of a human body. He luckily came when the fishing was nearly over. He did not believe that the *pesce spada* attacked the *thons*, but they did the sharks.

He talked of four capital English horses promised for him by the old Lord Pembroke.

When I came home the Duke of Orleans and Belmonte called upon me. The Duke told me that in the letter of the Queen today she appeared more humble than ever he had seen her. It was the best sign. She talked of going to Germany. They proposed I should talk to the Prince about honours and keys, and proposed as *pentarques, dames de cour*: Principesse Villafranca, Castelnuovo; Villafranca, Lardereria, Villermosa. From Catania ... ; From Messina ...

Saturday, April 3, 1813. Lt-Col. Poli called upon me. He said the Hereditary Prince wished I would write an official Note about Milano. He also spoke about money for the Queen. He told me that the King of Sardinia would not receive the Queen at Cagliari. I said I would give a year's assignment in advance, which would carry her to Vienna. I would put

this sum on board the English man-of-war. I also proposed to make up to the King so much of his Civil List as would be taken from him as a consequence of its having been overdrawn, but the request must come from the King. I said I would send him a paper as to the mode in which this should be done.

Sunday, April 4, 1813. Occupied all day in writing dispatches.

Monday, April 5, 1813. (1) The Duke of Orleans came in the evening to talk to me about Italy. He proposed to write to the Duke of Kent upon the subject. He showed me a letter from Dumouriez wherein it was stated that his opinion respecting Spain was changed, and that it would be well to dedicate a part of the force to Italy.

(1) Leopard, Capt. Dillon, arrived with Genl Campbell.

Tuesday, April 6, 1813. Engaged with the dispatches for England.

Wednesday, April 7, 1813. I presented Mr Lamb to the Hereditary Prince as Minister Plenipotentiary in my absence. After this I remained with the Hereditary Prince and gave him a letter from Sangro.

I then talked to him about Naples, and I said the great object of Lamb's going to England was to press the expedition to Italy. I began the conversation by saying that I had as yet given no answer to the Note about Ponza written to me by the King. I reminded him of what had then passed, of my opinion that it would be better to leave to the Neapolitans the choice of their own government and chief. I told him that I had said to my Government that upon my own responsibility I could not undertake the expedition if these terms and principles were not adopted. I said, as Lamb was going home, it was important that he might be able to communicate his precise sentiments to the British Government.

Lamb came in. I then recapitulated what I had said to the Hereditary Prince with regard to Naples, and the advice I had given that, by leaving the Neapolitans to choose their own chief and government, it removed all opposition from that party who might object to the King, and that there could be no doubt that our influence, if successful, would reestablish himself at least, although not the King. We both desired the same thing. Of the wish of the British Government to replace him and his family, I believed he did not doubt. We only differed about the manner of doing it. I asked him if his opinion was changed upon the subject. He said he could not renounce his rights; he trusted the English, but he did not feel sure that the King's party would not be made unfriendly by such a declaration, because they might oppose us from fancying that we meant to bring in a stranger in opposition to the King. I combated this and said this could not be. I said also there could be no doubt that the English influence was superior to any other, and that we should act as the mediators

between him and the people. The King's friends must be most anxious to get rid of the French. I thought the party against the King was more numerous than for him, and that it was principally important to get over these. I doubted the King's party being very numerous. He thought otherwise, and that they would be glad to see the King. I doubted it and referred to the executions at Naples, in which unfortunately Lord Nelson had his share. Lamb supported the same opinions.

After talking to him for a long time, I told him that there were two ways of making out a first proclamation. The first according to my idea as before stated, which I thought the best. The second, to promise delivery from the French yoke and a free constitution, and to say nothing of the family or of the chief. He liked neither. I had before advised him to come to this decision and say to us: "I will not renounce my right. I trust your goodwill and leave you to manage it, as you are to execute it, in that way you may think most likely to succeed". He did not assent to this but evaded. When I proposed to talk about government and to mention it generally in the proclamation, he wanted it to be understood that it should be a monarchy and not a republic. I said this must be managed afterwards. Of course we could not consent to a government like that of Spain or America. After pressing him a great deal, he said a free constitution might be promised, and, with respect to the mention of the family, it might be left to me to decide as the circumstances of the moment might point out to be best. This he said, but I did not believe he was sincere or that he will allow it hereafter.

When he made difficulties about assenting to my recommendation, I asked him this question, whether he would prefer an attack being first made upon Naples, according to the manner proposed by me, or that we should go to the north of Italy. If we succeeded in the north, Naples would manage her own revolution and would appoint her government and her chief without the interference of our influence. This made him very much hesitate. He said it was true they might not choose any of his family, but they might, and perhaps leave him unshackled by a constitution. I said if we landed anywhere else but in Naples we must leave the people at liberty to do what they pleased.

I talked to him about the separation. He said he wanted to hold out the hope of its being done without really committing himself. He knew everybody in Sicily wanted it. I said he would be safe under the *mezzo termine* I had proposed. He said yes, but there were his children. This difficulty he had never had before. I told him the public never would believe him if he held out the promise. It was better of the two to put the veto on than to do it in a way that would only confirm their distrust. I said they were full of distrust. He said he knew it and it arose from the past conduct of the government.

Thursday, April 8, 1813. Belmonte showed us letter he had written to Lord Castlereagh in answer to a very complimentary letter from him.

Friday, April 9, 1813. (1) I called upon the Hereditary Prince with military papers. He talked to me about Leopold. He said what I had said about him, of the importance of his

showing that he belonged to Sicily and of the use he might be to his (the Hereditary Prince's) family in case of any accident happening to him (Hereditary Prince). He had been working upon this subject and had endeavoured to arrange that he should have limited leave. I said the part Leopold had acted was not a good one. His respect to his mother I approved: he ought to go with her, but he should [not] appear as a child. He should assert his own opinions and independence and obtain the goodwill of the nation.

I told him what was reported of his having applied to the King for money, and its having been said in answer by the King that he (Leopold) wanted to drive him to his grave. The Hereditary Prince said it was not so, but that to the application the King had answered that he could manage the estates better than him (Leopold). The Hereditary Prince spoke of Leopold with great affection. He was quite at his (the Hereditary Prince's) disposition. He was quite sure of him. His heart was excellent. It had no *fiel* in it. The Hereditary Prince said he wished for a more close union between Leopold and his own family, meaning, I conclude, that he should marry his eldest daughter. He said nothing as to the probable result.

I told him I believed Moliterno wished that the Queen should go by Constantinople and not by Trieste, because he was afraid of the French. I said I believed him a rogue. He said he believed so too. I said I thought well of St Clair, to which [he] agreed, adding he was quite another sort of man.

I spoke about Cassaro and Cutò, and I asked what had been done about their going out. He said, nothing. He would speak to Belmonte. I spoke about the Councils. He said he wished to dispatch the sanction and asked about the Counsellors, Settimo, Cattolica, and Fitalia. I said I saw no objection to taking them in. He said it should begin on Monday.

(1) Lamb sailed again. Bad weather.

Saturday, April 10, 1813.(1) The Duke of Orleans called to explain his whole conduct to his mother. This was offered in consequence of what had been said by Campbell to Lady William as well as by Sir E. Pellew. The Duke said he would support her if she would come to Sicily without Faulmon, but he never would maintain her at Mahon: 1st, because it prevented her from receiving a pension from the British Government; 2nd, because he would not pay for the maintenance of a *bureau* of abuse of himself. His mother received originally an allowance from the French Government. Faulmon wished the continuance of this, as he had estates in France, and he put up a *commerce* with it. The British Government had offered her a pension and every facility if she chose to save herself from the French Government. I saw my father's letter to this effect. The same with the Duke and Mademoiselle. The latter had a pension upon condition of living at Malta. She left Malta and it was withdrawn. She returned to Sicily and it was repaid with the arrears. Faulmon had been with the Duchess for 19 years. He has robbed his mother. He takes every farthing from her. Brissac, his friend, says he has 40,000 ounces in gold. He ill treats the Duchess. Before the Duke and Belmonte he called her to her face a *sotte* and desired her to hold her tongue. He is a blackguard.

The Duke said that the Queen's letters now made no mention of time. He said St Clair had told him that the King meant to give the Queen 5,000 ounces per ann[um] and the *Commanderies* to Leopold.

(1) Mr Smith arrived in Pylades, Capt. Wemyss.

Sunday, April 11, 1813. (1) MacFarlane, to whom I had shown a letter of Fagan saying that the Queen meant to plead ill health as an excuse for not going and also to come to Palermo, had spoken to St Clair, who assured him that the Queen had no thoughts of coming to Palermo, and as for health, it was as good now as it had been for a considerable time past. That Leopold was coming to Palermo.

Belmonte told me that, as to the *Commanderies*, the King had desired Leopold, as he did not like Langelot, to choose another superintendent, but he doubted his intention of giving them up to Leopold.

(1) Capt. Romney, Furieuse, came from Ponza. No news.

Monday, April 12, 1813. (1) I went to a Council upon the sanction. Before it the Hereditary Prince desired me to go in for a moment. He said he intended to sanction the act relative to the employment of foreign ministers with the condition that those now employed should be provided for. I told him I thought this just.

The sanction was given from the beginning of the Finances to Par. 6.

There was a paragraph respecting the right of search of English vessels to prevent the contraband trade. I said my private opinion was that it was quite just, but that as British Minister it was a point to which I could not speak, as I did not know the usage of other nations. They said it was general. They also spoke of the advantage of some arrangement respecting the *franchigie* to British troops. I said Burgmann was going and Mr Granet was a more manageable person.

(1) The Duchess of Orleans was brought to bed at 3 a. m. of a daughter.

Tuesday, April 13, 1813. We went to court to be present at the baptising of the Duchess of Orleans' child. We were there for about two hours. The Hereditary Prince particularly gracious.

Went afterwards riding with Mr Dashwood. (1) Poli came to me at night to talk to me about the money I would give to the Queen's journey and assignment. I said I would give the 12,000 ounces in advance, i. e. one year's assignment. With respect to her debts, I recommended the King's giving up a part of the 5,000 proposed for her, and I suggested that we should have a meeting of himself, the Duke of Sangro, Marquess St Clair, and MacFarlane upon the subject.

(1) Mr Dashwood told me that Lord Yarborough's mausoleum in memory of his wife cost £30,000. His daughters married: 1. Dudley North; 2. Mr Elweys; 3. Mr Tennant; 4. Mr Bateman Dashwood. One unmarried.

Wednesday, April 14, 1813. Attended a Council for the sanction. Went from Par. 7 to Par. 9.

A long digression took place upon the expenses of the King and Queen, of which Prince Villerosa produced an account. The Civil List was to begin on the 1st September. The King had received in that period 40,033 ounces more than his due. How was this to be repaid? The Hereditary Prince said he must be the loser, unless I would repay it. He said he had written to the King the day before to say that there was such a balance against him, and to ask his permission to treat with me upon it, as it was not right that he should suffer the loss.

I said I thought it would have been better if His Royal Highness had done otherwise, if he had claimed from the Minister of Finances his due, if he had let the Minister stop from the King, according to the official course of such proceeding, the amount overdrawn from the subsequent payments. The Hereditary Prince then might have come in as a mediator, and the King would have been glad to have come to some arrangement. The Hereditary Prince said "Oh no. Let us be too content", he said, "with what has already happened, and be satisfied with the sacrifice". He said the King would never have paid back a farthing of the money he has received. I said he ought at least to be satisfied with the half. He hoped I would pay it. I said I would consider it, it was a very large sum.

The Hereditary Prince made a decision upon the different branches of the Casa Reale to be managed by him and by the King. There were pictures and statues belonging to the King as King of Naples, with which Sicily had nothing to do. Some member proposed that they should be bought by the nation.

It seemed that the King had not yet settled what he would do as to Leopold's claim for the *Commanderies* or for his 2,000 ounces per month.

There was a good deal of conversation about the effects belonging to Spaniards. It appeared that Ferrandina's property had been sequestered because he was a Neapolitan; that against Fuentes there were doubts of his right of succession, exclusive of the question whether he had not been implicated with the French.

It was agreed that Belmonte should write to Aguilar that Ferrandina's property should be given up in September at the meeting of Parliament. I pressed the injustice of not giving it up immediately. But the Parliament, they said, had considered it as a rent, and it could not now be given up till otherwise substituted.

In talking, the day before, of the Queen's assignment, I asked what it had been when she was before at Vienna. They said, unlimited. Acton, Belmonte said, was very glad to buy her absence at any rate. Belmonte said when she returned she was very ill received by the King. The Hereditary Prince said that he should never forget as long as he lived, for his

astonishment was excessive when he saw her reception after having heard so much of the joy and of the preparations made to celebrate her return.

Thursday, April 15, 1813. Cattolica, Settimo, MacFarlane, and I met to talk over the plan for the militia and regulars for the ensuing year. It was agreed that I should propose a plan according to the ideas we had fixed.

In the evening St Clair, Sangro, Poli, MacFarlane, and I met to consider the pecuniary arrangements for the Queen: her debts here, her journey and future assignment. St Clair said the King would give her half of what he had. St Clair said it was more than he would have given her under any other circumstances.

I said, with respect to her debts, that I would do all in my power to persuade the Parliament to pay them, but I was sure they would not unless the King would make some arrangement for their gradual liquidation, in which case I dared say the Parliament might take them upon themselves. I proposed that the King should give 2,000 ounces per month towards this object. St Clair said the Queen's money debts were about 60,000 ounces. Her jewels were in pawn for 55,000 ounces, and there were besides some presents that she had been in the habit of making to her children, which from want of money had been suspended but must be considered as debts of affection. St Clair objected to giving up 2,000 ounces, saying that the first year there would be great expenses in fitting out a house in Vienna. I adverted to the probability of the Emperor's fitting out a house for her. After some conversation, it was proposed that the first year 1,000 ounces should be only given up and the second year 2,000.

St Clair said the Queen meant to go by Constantinople, and from thence by land. I said I could answer for the impossibility of that route. There were no roads and no accommodation. I recommended Trieste or Leghorn. Passports could be easily obtained from Buonaparte by the Emperor Francis. St Clair said after what had happened, it would be objectionable for the Queen to ask to go through the French. I said I thought it did not signify. I merely mentioned my idea. The Queen was at liberty to go the way she best liked. I said that for her journey by land I would give an anticipation of a whole year of the 1,000 ounces per month I proposed to add on the part of England to her assignment.

We talked a good deal of the amount overdrawn by the King on account of his Civil List. I mentioned this to be 40,033 ounces. Sangro denied it and showed me a paper stating it to be 14,000 only. I begged Poli to show him Villermosa's account, that he might compare it. I asked who was to pay this deficit. Sangro endeavoured to take the King's part. He said he might not have known of the amount of the Civil List; that a generous Parliament would give up the past; that having maintained all the royal family, he was entitled to the whole sum voted by Parliament for the whole Civil List. I said the Parliament would not be much disposed to pay it, as they would answer "You knew what you were to have, why did you take more?"

This ended in mere conversation. Sangro said the Hereditary Prince's confectioner's bill amounted to 800 ounces a month. St Clair and all said that the extravagance in the palace was very great. St Clair said the King meant to give the *Commanderies* to Leopold.

Friday, April 16, 1813. We had a meeting with Settimo and Cattolica about the militia. A plan proposed which Cattolica was to draw up.

Settimo told me that the King had applied to several noblemen to preserve their woods for him. Some had agreed but others had not, among whom his brother, in consequence of the Act of Parliament requiring that such woods should be surrounded by a wall, which would be very expensive. Some farmers also had refused to preserve the game. The King's manager had spoken to them in vain, but the King thought they would not refuse his personal request or threat, and they were desired to meet the King at Mondello at a certain time. The King went but not one of them came. This so irritated the King that he could not eat his dinner two days >after< when it happened.

St Clair came to know exactly what had been fixed the day before. He wanted me to give the 12,000 ounces and 1,000 ounces per month instead of a yearly anticipation of the latter monthly payments. I said I would speak to Belmonte and Villermosa. I did to the latter, who said he doubted very much whether the Parliament would do anything.

Saturday, April 17, 1813. St Clair came to me again to know the result of my conversations with Belmonte and Villermosa. I said I had only seen the latter, that he could answer for nothing. St Clair said it was hard not to make a better provision for a Queen who was going (driven) away. I said it was all her own fault: if she could have remained quiet, nobody would have asked her absence. I could give her no more than I had done. My authority went no further.

Belmonte and the Duke of Orleans came in the evening in consequence of having seen St Clair, who was in despair in having been able to obtain nothing towards the liquidation of the Queen's debts. He said they might be reduced to 50,000 oz. The Duke told him it was necessary he should obtain the Queen's consent to their being placed, with the funds for their liquidation, in the hands of commissioners who should duly examine them.

Belmonte asked St Clair if he did not retain his former influence. St Clair was rather embarrassed with this question. Said he did when he was actually with the Queen. Belmonte recalled to the Duke's recollection what St Clair had said formerly to him (Belmonte) when he wished his influence to be established over the Queen. He said: "You must be there every day and all day long, for the Queen is entirely different on the day you have been with her and the day you have not". The fact is that the Queen was always the most inconsequent person in the world.

I had told the Duke that my Government had desired me to interest myself with the Parliament of Sicily for the payment of the Queen's debts. St Clair said Castalcicala had written that it was to the Government and not to the Parliament of Sicily. St Clair was right. I read that part of the dispatch to the Duke. They wanted me to write a Note to this effect. I said I was ready to do so, but what good would it do? I remarked to the Duke that he would see that I was not authorized by the dispatch to give anything, because the authority was only given upon the condition that the employment of force might thereby be prevented;

but force had been used, so the ground upon which the authority was given no longer existed.

The Duke said the King had given the *Commanderies* to Leopold and allowed him to name his manager, but under his (the King's) inspection. Belmonte said he was sure the King would not continue to give the 5,000 ounces per month to the Queen hereafter. He would find some excuse for getting off. The Duke thought otherwise and so did I. I told them I was certain that the Queen meant to return to Sicily and had chosen Constantinople as a route impossible for her to perform. They were both against her going by Trieste. Bonaparte was capable of seizing her and sending her to Paris. I thought not and if he did, I did not think it much signified.

The Duke showed me a letter from the Queen of Sardinia about a Baron Popolwich, a Hungarian who had brought letters from the Emperor to the Archduke Francis and the Queen of Sicily. The Duke asked what he came for. He said he came upon no commission and was going back immediately. It was evident that he was come upon some errand. The Duke was quite sure that it was to recall the Archduke. The Queen of Sardinia had written to the Duchess that Popolwich was one of us, meaning of the old emigrant clique and against the innovations that had been carrying on here. The Duke said the King and Queen [of] Sardinia were convinced that there was a society established for the introduction everywhere of constitutions, a society which they regarded with horror.

Butera's birthday, 61. Went to dine with him.

Sunday, April 18, 1813. (1) I saw the Duke of Orleans, who had been at the Colli. The King was in his highest spirits. The Duke announced to him that he had passed two tunny fish on the road, which filled the King with the highest delight. He called Don Vincenzino, his old servant, and said the Duke had passed on the road "*due magnifici tonni: oh che bella cosa*". Don Vincenzino came in soon afterwards and announced the arrival of four instead of two fish: "*Sono quattro*". The King threw his cards upon the table and went to see them. He said he would go directly to Solanto.

St Clair told the Duke that he had said to the King that Leopold wished to come and take leave of him, but the King wished him not to come. He had given him his blessing and did not wish to see him any more. St Clair represented the odd appearance that his going away without seeing the King would have, upon which the King consented. But the King ordered that the Queen might not write to him about debts: "*affatto affatto*", he would not read a word from her upon that subject.

Baron Popolwich was not to go to Castelvetro on account of his wound, as he said. He told the Duke that Trieste and the Illyrian Provinces were certain to be ceded to Austria. The Duke said he was sure that Popolwich's mission regarded solely the Archduke Francis, who, he said, had French passports to pass by Trieste.

(1) Took Sacrament.

Monday, April 19, 1813.(1) Went to Council about the sanction. We had in Council a great deal of conversation about the money to be given to the Prince of his Civil List already voted by Parliament and spent by the King, the sanction not being yet given. I mentioned the difficulties: that I had no authority; the authority to give the Queen money, by which even her departure might have been obtained, was refused; that the difficulty was in preventing such a demand to Parliament. I repeated again that he had managed in such a manner with the King that he would neither be obliged to him or me. The King knew he (the Hereditary Prince) did not dare to demand his due, by which the King would be obliged to refund; and I doubted very much whether he would sign any letter or make any request to get a farthing for him, the Prince. I could have wished that he (the King) had really felt the want of the money [and] the inconvenience, and then he would have been obliged both to His Royal Highness and myself for anything he would have received from us. I wanted first to please the King, and secondly a justification to my Government for advancing so much money. The Hereditary Prince seemed to be of opinion that the King might be unwilling to do much. It was agreed that he should endeavour to persuade the King to ask me for money. I proposed that he should send Sangro to me.

Then came a question about the sum. The Hereditary Prince wanted the whole 40,000. I said it was impossible. He laughingly said 30,000. I in the same way said about 15. At last I said I would give 20,000. For the rest that must be wanted, there must be a separate application from himself, and I might advance it to him by way of loan. He said the King would require to know that there was no condition annexed. All was settled in very good humour.

The question of the King's chase and woods occupied a great deal of time. The King had spoken to the Hereditary Prince about it. The Hereditary Prince proposed an addition to the former decision upon this article. The words were added: "whatever the King possessed under whatever title".

The further consideration was put off till the following day. We went through a part of the finances. There were two articles of importance relative to the employment of foreign ministers not Sicilian. It was settled without difficulty.

(1) The America, Capt. Rowley, arrived from Mahon.

Tuesday, April 20, 1813. Went to another Council about the sanction. The discussion of the King's forests was resumed. The Hereditary Prince was very anxious that the King should be gratified. As the King's own forests had been excepted from the wall required to surround the chases of individuals, the Hereditary Prince was desirous that all woods belonging to individuals and hired by the King should have the same indulgence. The injustice and hardship upon the people that would arise from this - this was admitted by all and by the Hereditary Prince as much as by the others. He was only actuated by consideration for his father's pleasures, to restrict which after so many years of devotion to these sports amounted to destroying him.

Villermosa observed that the King ought to be very much gratified by the homage that had been paid him in exempting his woods. The Hereditary Prince said on the contrary the King considers this as nothing, *niente, niente*. The Hereditary Prince wished that these words should be introduced, but it was stated to him that the public would cry out against it. He was then to tell the King that he might make agreements with the neighbours of the forests he wished to preserve, so that the game might be preserved.

It was also a question from me in what manner individuals might be able to preserve the game, and whether there was any law to prevent trespass upon the land of others. It appeared that there had been a former law by which a very curious punishment had been awarded to those of the common people who trespassed with damage to the land. It was the punishment of the pulley: a man's arms were tied behind him, he was pulled up on high by a rope, which being suddenly loosed, the body dropped with rapidity, and being as suddenly checked, the shoulder bones were dislocated. Different punishments were assigned to different ranks of life, increasing in mildness in proportion to the increase of rank. It was added that the law was to be revived with such modifications as the new code might determine.

Another question related to certain Church lands which had been sold under the late Government, when Tomasi was Minister, for much less than their value. The lands were put into such large lots that there could be no bidders, and they were knocked down to a person (Baron Greca or some such name) with whom Tomasi was said to have participated. One question was whether the crown could sell the lands. Another whether these sales ought not to be broken. The Hereditary Prince was rather against the latter position, as, the faith being given and the transaction passed, it would be unjust to break it. I said it depended upon the honesty of the transaction, and that the first step should be to ascertain if there had been any unfair dealing. The Hereditary Prince agreed in this opinion, and it was sanctioned with this sort of reserve. Continued with the finances.

Belmonte told the Hereditary Prince that Circello was going to Naples, that he said he was old, had nothing, supposed the Parliament would give him nothing and the King could not, and therefore he proposed to retire to his family, some of whom were rich. The Hereditary Prince expressed his astonishment at this. He never thought he would have done this. He always thought him honest, but with *très courtes vues*. Sometimes he did not see beyond his nose. Belmonte mentioned Troisi. The Hereditary Prince said he had been always French in body and blood. Belmonte mentioned Ambrosio. "*Pour celui-là*", said the Hereditary Prince, "he is a *coquin*". He said he had contrived the escape of his brother the Colonel from Malta, where he was upon his parole of honour. They all said this Ambrosio had done a great deal of harm. He had been the great instrument in corrupting the Guards and spreading hostility to us. The Hereditary Prince said he never liked him.

Belmonte had been with me before the Council by desire of the Hereditary Prince, to agree about the draft of the letter to be written by the King to the Hereditary Prince, which the latter was to send to me. Belmonte wrote it in the King's style. The Hereditary Prince talked to me of it in Belmonte's presence before the Council. He said it was exactly what the King would say. The Hereditary Prince said of Belmonte to me: "*Il est le vieux rat du magasin*",

meaning that Belmonte knew all the King's ways. The Hereditary Prince was to go to the King that day and get him to sign the letter if he could.

Prince Trabia called upon me in the evening to explain his conduct. I said I was surprised that any Sicilian should be in opposition to us who wanted only to establish the independence and happiness of Sicily. He said he was attached to the King and desired a constitutional government; that in the details he disapproved of very much that had been done. He liked Belmonte and disliked Villermosa; very much obliged by my opposition to the *fidecommessi* not being sanctioned. He hoped if ever I heard anything against him I would send for him.

Wednesday, April 21, 1813. (1) Heard that the King had gone by sea to Solanto lest the acclamations of his people might expose them to the rage of the English.

(1) Sent off packet to Trapani.

Thursday, April 22, 1813. Went to a Council about the sanction. Told the Hereditary Prince of the letter Fagan had received from the Queen wherein she wishes for a million sterling and other extravagances. The Hereditary Prince said he had also received a letter, which was very kind. The Duke of Orleans told me afterwards that the Duchess had also received a letter in which the Queen said that she was the *unique*, underlining the word, whom she would leave with regret; that the physicians said she could not make the voyage, but that she was determined to go at any rate. She would not stay in Sicily.

The sanction to the finances terminated, and nothing remains now but the reserved articles. The Hereditary Prince said not a word to me about the letter he was to propose to the King to write to me. In Council the conversation turned upon the Queen. Belmonte said she had an ardent imagination without a grain of judgment. Belmonte said formerly he used to pass an hour or more every day with her, and when he left her he felt as if he was drunk, his head was so confused by the multitude of topics she introduced and the confusion and variety of her ideas.

Belmonte mentioned an anecdote about the road to the Ficuzza, respecting the repair of which there was a question. Nobody would undertake it, it was so expensive. Belmonte said he had proposed another route to the King by Marineo. At the moment he was removed from the superintendence and Priolo replaced him, who recommended the present route. The King preferred this because, the other passing through his own estates, he would have had to pay a portion of the repairs. Belmonte said upon some future occasion to the King that he had recommended the other route because he thought it the best. "But", says he, "virtue meets with its reward. Priolo proposed the other in opposition to my opinion and by so doing has carried it through my own property, to which before there was no access but on horseback".

Friday, April 23, 1813. I went to the Hereditary Prince about military business. I asked him if the King had given any answer to his proposal about the letter. He said no, but he had written again yesterday, and he believed he should receive an answer, as those *qui guidèrent le Roi* had changed their minds upon this subject. He insinuated that he (the Hereditary Prince) had spoken firmly.

He spoke to me about the sanction of the article of the separation, and read the memorandum I had given to him. He asked me what I meant by *le eventualità della guerra*. I explained. He wished me very much to recommend that he should not sanction it. I said I wished it could be avoided, because it was not for the advantage of England. "Because", interrupting me he said, "you preserve an influence over Naples by that you will have on Sicily". He asked if England might not be displeased at his sanctioning it. I said I did not think they cared about the matter. He again asked if I did not think it might be avoided by holding it up in prospect as a thing to be done hereafter. I said no, that the public would immediately ascribe to him intended bad faith; that I thought the veto upon the broad ground of his right would be preferable, but in this case I was sure the Parliament would return every year to the charge, and that he would be obliged after a great deal of trouble and loss of popularity to concede with a bad grace what now would be considered as a favour. He hesitated. He said he knew the Sicilians wished it. I said the hatred of the Neapolitans was a common feeling. He said this was owing to the government, who had put them forward and had always protected the Neapolitans to the prejudice of the Sicilians. If a Neapolitan injured a Sicilian in the street he was sure of receiving protection. He spoke with the greatest reasonableness. He talked to me of the Councils, proposing, when the sanction was over, to call in Butera, Cattolica, and Fitalia, and at the ordinary Councils the three Ministers.

He then called in Belmonte and he talked over the Queen's debts. He read them to us. Among the rest was a debt of 1,000 ounces to the King, which he told us the King had very often written for. He said it would not be possible to present this to Parliament. Both Belmonte and I agreed in this. He read other items, which the Hereditary Prince declared to be equally objectionable. The tradesmen's debts (*dettes criables*) amounted to 12,000 oz. The Hereditary Prince read us a letter from the Queen upon this subject. It became a question how the payment of these debts was to be brought about. The King had declared he would have nothing to do with them, and had prohibited the Queen from even writing to him upon the subject. The Hereditary Prince told us that the King had declared to him that those who drove her away might pay her debts and find the means of her going. He would not. After much consideration, about 2 hours, it was agreed that the *dettes criables* should be presented to Parliament as an amount which they would be likely to grant without any condition; that the rest should be paid by a yearly instalment of 24,000 from the Queen's assignment, assured to them by the King.

The Hereditary Prince said the King might object to this, in as much as it would pledge him to an alienation of a portion of his Civil List for several years, when otherwise in the event of the Queen's death the whole would return to him. However, so it stood. It was then settled that if the Hereditary Prince could obtain the letter from the King he had asked for, he would send me that which would explain both the King's and the Queen's wants; if not,

he would send me the Queen's letter, certified by himself, upon which I could give the 12,000 ounces I had agreed to. I begged him to make it strong. He said he would paint it red and yellow if I pleased.

There was then held a Council for the sanction, which determined upon some indifferent articles.

Saturday, April 24, 1813. (1) I met Mr Graham, son of Sir J. Graham, at dinner at Lord Montgomerie's. He had been long at Cadiz. He told me the factions were divided into three - the *liberali*, the *antiliberali*, and the Americans. The first were for the liberty of the press and of the subject and against the Inquisition. The second was composed of the clergy and *noblesse* and were for the old order of things. The third were complete republicans. Sir Henry Wellesley united principally with the first. He said there was great jealousy of the English. Infantado had this feeling: a zealous Spaniard, a furious enemy of the French, but jealous of the English. He said that two of the persons who had now come into the Regency had been removed by our means from one of the former governments. They would not agree to Lord Wellington's proposition, as being contrary to the Constitution. He asked an audience, which they rejected. He then said he would confine himself to the defence of Portugal if they did not listen to him, which brought them to their senses. It was then settled that one tenth of the revenues should go to the Government, nine tenths to the Army. The revenues were paid direct to the Captains General.

He gave instances of the great injury sustained by the public service from the want of money, particularly from the unwillingness of the people to give their carts and their bullocks. He saw the retreat from Salamanca. Many carts with kits were left because the people ran away with their bullocks. They would even kill one to save the other. They were only paid in Treasury notes payable 6 and 9 months after date, bearing 6 per cent, universally said to be bought up by our commissaries. He said Lord Wellington used to embargo the wagons of the whole country. His great difficulty was to feed his cavalry. He had made a great deal of hay - the experiment never before tried in the valley of the Mondego.

He said it was shameful in what favourable manner rank cowards were received at Cadiz. He mentioned that at the time when the French had retaken Madrid and were near the Sierra Morena again, the Cortes had been occupied for 20 days in debates upon the Inquisition. The Cortes were to die next year. The new elections had been already made, and for one clergyman before there were now two, and the greatest bigotry in consequence.

Received a letter from Fagan written by Maddalena, expressing the Queen's wish to go away immediately.

(1) Espoir, Lt ..., arrived from Malta with notice of Genl Oakes's intention of going to England.

Sunday, April 25, 1813. (1) I called upon the Duke of Orleans. I found St Clair with him. The Duke said he had been ill received by the Queen, who had asked him if he had read her letters. He answered yes, and that he had thought it better to forget them. The Duke told him he had read the letter written to Fagan and said to him: "You see, it is always so. While she employs you to negotiate on one side, she is employing on another some different channel".

They were now endeavouring to persuade the King to give the security for the regular payment of the sums to be allotted for the payment of the Queen's debts. The Duke told me that the Hereditary Prince had threatened the King to demand the money that was due to him if the King did not write the letter that was required. The Duke said he had urged him very strongly before the Duchess to do so. I repeated that the Hereditary Prince never would be well with his father until he showed him that he did not care for him.(2)

It was settled with Capt. Rowley, Dundas not returning, that Unite, Capt. Chamberlaine, should take the Queen. I desired MacFarlane to give notice of this intention to St Clair, which he did verbally and afterwards in writing at St Clair's request. He was to send it off to the Queen. MacFarlane said St Clair seemed impressed with the communication.

(1) Wrote to Sir E. Pellew by Termagant, Capt. Rowley.

(2) The Duke told me that the Queen had had a fit, that the reports were that the Queen was not to go and Leopold had countermanded the sale of his horses and carriages.

Lucchesi told me that Trabia was to be Leopold's administrator.

Monday, April 26, 1813. MacFarlane and Capt. Chamberlaine waited upon St Clair. The latter said that all the effects would be embarked by Saturday. It was agreed that the ships should immediately go round, and Wednesday was fixed as the day when everything would be ready for the Queen's embarkation at Mazzara. MacFarlane showed me a letter from St Clair saying that the Queen's pecuniary affairs were still to be settled.

Belmonte came to me from the Prince with the drafts of the two letters proposed to be written to me by the Hereditary Prince. One related to the sum overdrawn by the King, which he begged to be reimbursed to him, or otherwise he would be the loser, and he stated the great embarrassment of his finances. He enclosed extracts of the correspondence between the King and himself, in which the King says that he will pay back nothing, that he must have his regular Civil List from the 1st May paid without any deduction; that he never intended that the Civil List should begin but from the sanction; that, having maintained the whole family, he was entitled to the whole receipts during the preceding period; and that at any rate if any account was taken the balance would be trifling. I told Belmonte I could not possibly give the money upon this letter.

Another letter from the Prince related to money required by the Queen. To this I had no objection. Belmonte therefore wrote to the Hereditary Prince to say that I would speak to him next morning about the first letter. He said the King would not hear of the Queen's debts and would make no arrangement about them.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. I told him of the drafts brought me by Belmonte. I said I could not give what was wanted without a direct justification coming from the King himself, that he would not give it, and that I would not otherwise give the money. I had told the Hereditary Prince the King would do nothing that should give him a farthing; for himself he would condescend to any meanness. The Duke then told me of the division he had made of the effects of the palace. He had only left to the Hereditary Prince 100 napkins, 100 knives and forks, a very small proportion of the plate. The King had taken 20 carriages, almost all the furniture, all the property brought from Naples. But he had left him all the palace servants to pay.

I said the Hereditary Prince should make the King come to an arrangement. He should claim his Civil List, and let Villermosa and the King settle it between them. The former would not yield. The Hereditary Prince might then, as a matter of favour, make that arrangement with the King which he thought proper. The Duke said he was exactly in the same situation. He had not received any money. The Duke also said that the King said he would make up the amount, if the Hereditary Prince insisted upon it, of all that had been furnished to him, and the balance would be made out against him. The Duke said he had received candles etc. from the Queen, but he knew the exact amount. The Hereditary Prince did not, and therefore was at the mercy of the King's comptroller.

Tuesday, April 27, 1813. I attended a Council about the sanction.

The Hereditary Prince began by telling Villermosa that he should send him an order demanding a portion of the arrears to which he was entitled on his Civil List. Belmonte, the Hereditary Prince, and myself had had a conversation upon this subject before the other members came in. I expressed a doubt whether the Hereditary Prince was really entitled to all that he alleged his right to, viz. 40,000 ounces. There was only this balance when the amount he had actually received in money was deducted from whole sum of the Civil List due in the 8 months. But there was still to be deducted the maintenance of his family, which the King had performed at his own expense. The Hereditary Prince then brought us out an account he had made out upon principles the most fair and equitable, wherein, taking the whole expense of the Casa Reale, he allotted to the King and himself what separately belonged to each, and the common expense he distributed to each according to the proportion of their respective Civil List, the King pay[ing] 10, the Hereditary Prince 7, Leopold 2. There were outstanding debts not included. The balance in his favour was 19,000 ounces.

I observed to the Hereditary Prince that his weakness towards the King had been the great cause of all the embarrassment all of us had suffered. Had he been firm and at the same time respectful as was his duty, the King would never have done what he had. He presumed upon his submission, and abused it accordingly. The King would do nothing for the son, but if he should be compelled to refund himself, he would, I am sure, write any letter that was required to obtain even 500 ounces.

The conversation was resumed in Council. The Hereditary Prince said the King had *buttato sul capo* all the expense of the palace. The Duke of Orleans told me also that the King had

retained for himself all the best apartments, his own and the Queen's. The Hereditary Prince said to us that the King declared he would take from the Queen whatever he might be obliged to refund.

In the Council the liberty of the press was revised, upon my remark that the punishments had been referred to the new code, so that the liberty of the press would be established without any penalty to the abuse of it.

After Council the Hereditary Prince told me that he proposed to sanction the separation and succession articles, as I had recommended it. He wished to know whether I wished him to say that I had given him the suggestion. I said he was at liberty to do as he pleased.

Wednesday, April 28, 1813. Attended another Council upon the sanction: separation and succession (articles reserved).

Par. 12. Belmonte contended that the article should stand as it was, but Villermosa read the practice under the English Constitution which was also analogous to an opinion given by me to the Hereditary Prince, which he read, and the Hereditary Prince sanctioned it with this modification.

Par. 15. This article *vetat*, but always understood that the regency to be appointed shall have the consent of Parliament. The Hereditary Prince was very fair upon this. He offered this himself and said such a condition was quite just and reasonable.

Par. 16. *Placet.* This, he said, was quite reasonable. I laughingly said that England could no longer buy Sicily. He said he understood me.

Par. 17. There was a long discussion in which the Hereditary Prince did not pretend to evade it or put it off. He proposed the idea which I had suggested and which Belmonte and Villermosa both opposed as leaving to Sicily always a precarious government. The Hereditary Prince asked my opinion. I answered that I thought, provided Sicily obtained her independence, they had no right to interfere with the rights of the royal family, who ought to be left at liberty to arrange them as they pleased. They combated this opinion. The Hereditary Prince proposed to sanction the independence and to leave all other arrangements of family to a general peace, which they all approved. It was a question, however, in the event of his choosing Naples, whether his son or Leopold should be King of Sicily. The Hereditary Prince said he thought it should be Leopold, but we all said that Leopold had no manner of right, that the right belonged clearly to his eldest son.

I could not but observe that <under> this arrangement left the government as precarious as was objected to my own proposition, with this difference, that the possessor, if the son of the King of Naples, and his son after him, would always have a less interest for Sicily than for 85 Naples, and would make use of his influence to promote the annexation of the two crowns.

Par. 23. The Hereditary Prince wished the regency should be mixed. Belmonte saw no objection to this, but I strongly opposed it. I said the nation was much more interested than the father in this question. I supposed the case of improper persons being selected by the king. They could not be changed by the nation; their names beforehand could not be declared because of the power and influence they would assume [over] the nation. There

would therefore not even be the security for a good government as was established by Par. 15 for only the temporary absence of the king. I said the king might very likely appoint an improper person. I instanced the present King, who certainly, had he been in such predicament, would have appointed the Duke of Ascoli. Belmonte said, and the Hereditary Prince laughed and assented, that the King had already done this when the Hereditary Prince was not only not a minor, but had a wife and 2 children. Or persons supposed good might become bad afterwards, and then there was to be a motley government. There was also the danger that these irremovable counsellors would, upon the strength of their security, endeavour by every means of flattery to obtain the young king's favour. If chosen by Parliament, they would place their whole reputation upon educating the young king as was most proper, as their removal might immediately take place. Villermosa supported these opinions. I said that I thought the most could be granted would be the king's recommendation. If he was a good king, it would certainly be adopted, not otherwise. And the Hereditary Prince sanctioned the article.

It was mentioned by the Hereditary Prince that the King had never read the Constitution, not even the Civil List, for he talked still of the *borsiglio* and *spilleria* of the King and Queen. Villermosa said he had announced the intention of stopping the arrears from the King to the comptroller, who said he could not mention it to the King. He said he must present a less sum.

The Hereditary Prince gave me a Note asking a loan from me of 20,000 ounces, to be paid by instalments of 500 ounces per month. Belmonte came afterwards to know my determination. I desired him to say that I could make none until the King had resolved either to write or to refuse the letter to me. But he might count at any rate upon 20,000 ounces.

Thursday, April 29, 1813. (1) Belmonte told me that St Clair was not at all satisfied with my letter of yesterday to the Hereditary Prince, wherein I stated that 12,000 ounces should be given to the Queen when she should have actually disembarked. Had not seen the Hereditary Prince, was employed in writing to Vienna. Belmonte said besides the official cypher, he had a private one of his own.

(1) Arrived Leyden, Capt. Davie, and Mermaid, Capt. Dunn, with Grenadier Battalion from Alicante.

Friday, April 30, 1813. I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He told me that St Clair was very much dissatisfied with the King, that he could bring him to no arrangement about the Queen's pecuniary affairs; that in answer to all representations he obtained nothing but pious ejaculations, "God's will be done", "Commit ourselves to Heaven", but not a farthing of money. The Hereditary Prince had offered to enter into a written obligation to give 1,000 oz. per month after the King's death towards the payment of the Queen's debts, if the King would do the same. But the King declined putting his hand to any paper, saying his word

was sufficient. He said the King would not write to me because he thought there was some latent object, or I never should have given such a boon without some equivalent. The King refused to give the Queen 1,000 ounces which had been asked in advance.

The Duke told me that the Comptroller Ruffo, who had said that he could not communicate to the King the message from Villermosa that 2,000 ounces were to be stopped from his Civil List, took post horses and went down immediately to Solanto. He returned bringing an account to the Hereditary Prince that the expense of his maintenance for the 8 months had amounted to 36,000 ounces. The Hereditary Prince said he should have the account minutely examined. The Comptroller objected strongly to this, saying that he was a man of honour, that there was no example of such examinations. The Hereditary Prince said that might be, but he had a right to do so, and he would assure him that the investigation should be a most strict one, and he threatened him with the consequences of any misapplication of the money entrusted to him; that he would be liable to prosecution before the Parliament.

St Clair insinuated that the Hereditary Prince should pay 32,000 ounces, as he had offered the King in the first instance to allow him 4,000 ounces a month for his part of the expenses, which the King then refused. The Duke said that it was agreed between him and the Hereditary Prince that the Duke should receive 500 of the 2,000 towards the liquidation of his arrears.

Saturday, May 1, 1813. (1) I heard from the Duke that the Queen's letters were very violent. He told me Sangro was not to go with the Queen. Poli said the same, and asked me from the Hereditary Prince whether I had any objection to Cutò's going. I took the opportunity of saying that I had not, and referred to the Hereditary Prince's delay in all things, to his not yet having turned out Cassaro and Cutò. Poli said he did not like to displease the King. I answered that it must be clear that submission to the King was useless, and that he could only be well with the King by showing his independence. I said there were other things for the Hereditary Prince to do, other persons to reward. It was his policy to reward his party, as he wished for an unanimous Parliament. I had refrained from making these proposals in expectation of the Queen's departure.

(1) Packet arrived from England. 43 days on her passage. Papers to the 13th March.

Sunday, May 2, 1813. It was agreed with Capt. Rowley that he would return and take me to the Fleet. I expressed my opinion that Sir Edward Pellew's instructions relative to Tunis would answer the purpose.

America sailed for Tunis. Mermaid to Ponza with answers to Coffin.

Monday, May 3, 1813. (1) I spoke to Mr Smith and told him the arrangement I should wish to make respecting the mission to be left with Lord Montgomerie in preference to him. I stated the real reasons. He was very reasonable, agreed in my sentiments, and said he would serve wherever I thought him most useful. He only wished that it might not appear that, having been sent for, he had not been appointed because he had been found unfit. We talked of the plan I had of obtaining the King of Sardinia's consent to the station of a certain force in Sardinia. He said the King would not consent to it, that he suspected and hated us; that he was mad; that he fancied himself the most powerful prince in Europe; that he wanted no assistance for the defence of Sardinia; that he talked of being able to take 70,000 men from Sardinia to Piedmont. He called the Sardinians his Cossacks. That the Queen governed him; that she hated us, was clever but had no judgment at all, fancied with the King that we meant to repeat the same scenes there as here. Smith said they hated him particularly; that Mr Hill was a wavering man; that he allowed them to say things to him which he was persuaded by Smith afterwards to revoke by a Note; that this they ascribed to him (Smith); that they equally thought that Magnan, the Consul, a very intelligent man, influenced him (Smith); that the King was sure of returning to Piedmont and was occupied all day long with the most minute details of the future governments; that his policy towards England had been by counteracting us in everything to induce us to give him a subsidy, as we have done to Sicily. He said the Sardinians hated the Piedmontese as the Sicilians did the Neapolitans. There were [some] who wished for a constitution, but these were principally lawyers and townspeople.

(1) America still in sight.

Tuesday, May 4, 1813. (1) There was a Council for the sanction. Before I transacted military business with the Hereditary Prince. I proposed to him the incorporation of the Grenadier battalion into the Line as well as the Guards. I suggested this as an idea. The Hereditary Prince did not express any particular opinion upon it. The Hereditary Prince told me that Sangro had behaved very well about the letter to be written by the King. He was gone down to the Ficuzza to speak to him. He hoped also to persuade him to let Leopold come. The Council assembled. I produced the subject of the Neapolitans. I proposed that some of the confiscated estates should be sold to pay the arrears due to the emigrants, and that an address should be sent to Parliament from the Hereditary Prince recommending a provision for the remainder. There was a very long discussion. Belmonte said that Monteleone's property could not be sold without his being tried and confiscation judicially announced, and that the property could not be sold without the consent of Parliament. I answered that, as to the first, it would depend whether the King had confiscated the estates or not; that, if he had, I conceived he was an authority competent to it. The 2nd question was clear.

(1) Packet arrived in 25 days from England.

The Duke of Orleans told me that the stopping the King's 2,000 ounces had had the best effects; that he pretended now not to have understood the subject; that he thought the writing the letter was meant to make him blame himself, and that he began to see the question in a totally different point of view.

Wednesday, May 5, 1813. We held another Council for the sanction. Before it, Villerosa read a circular letter he proposed to address to all civic councils requiring that they should keep strictly to the law. It was a threat more than an admonition, and I recommended its being altered, which was done accordingly, and made more gentle. It was a question whether the civic councils could appoint their own officers, and it was shown that they could not; also whether they could assemble more than once in a month. It was doubtful. I said the paragraph evidently bore a doubtful construction. The paragraph required that they should assemble once every month, but it did not prevent them from meeting oftener. I asked what those who wrote it intended. Villerosa and Belmonte said they intended expressly to limit the meetings to one day only, except when the civic council chose to assemble them.

Thursday, May 6, 1813. The Duke of Sangro called upon me from the King, who, he said, wished to treat directly with me himself. He said the Hereditary Prince had told the King falsehoods and he would have nothing to do with him. I read the paper. The Duke said it was taken from the King's own dictating and his notes. I said I would consider it. He told me there was an outstanding balance of 14,000 ounces against the Civil List. This had been the general amount of balance for the last 7 years. He added to it the 2,000 ounces deducted by the Hereditary Prince.

There was a Council for the sanction. There was a very warm and long discussion between Belmonte and Villerosa about the *fidecommessi*, the latter wishing to repropose the question and to express the sanction in terms different from the first proposal. Belmonte expressed himself with too little respect, too much flippancy towards Villerosa. The latter was evidently much displeased. It was all a difference about words. Villerosa's opinion was that the principle should be established without detailing it. This principle was the analogy with the British Constitution. He said as there would be assuredly much discussion, and perhaps Parliament would not agree to the conditions presented by the Hereditary Prince, he asked if it was not better that the Hereditary Prince should reject the proposition of the Parliament than that the Parliament should reject that of the Hereditary Prince. Belmonte said that the reproposing it would give life to the opposite faction. He said the public was very much pleased with the first decision. It was a question whether the country really wished the entails to be cut off or not, or whether the noise made about it arose merely from the interests of a few *ladrunculi*. After a long discussion, in which I sided with Villerosa, with Settimo on our side, against Belmonte, our sittings concluded without a decision.

I spoke to the Hereditary Prince afterwards about the paper I had received from the King, which I showed to the Hereditary Prince. I asked him about the Russian vessels. He would obtain all the information in his power for me. I told him I was to see Sangro next morning. He said he should be very glad if I could settle the matter in dispute between him and his father.

Trabia came to me in the evening and said he had heard that it was desired by Villermosa to repropose the question of the *fidecommessi* and to carry it. I told him his mistake, that it was a mere question about words and not about the substance of the question.

Friday, May 7, 1813. (1) Sangro called upon me. He said the King was willing to exchange some young horses with my mare. He would also give me the Partinico wine I had asked for. He then entered into particulars of the paper of the preceding day. He said the King's debt amounted to 16,000 ounces, that calculating the Hereditary Prince's expenses at 3,000 ounces per month, the King would have to refund to him 16,000 ounces. There were also due to the Duke of Orleans 5,000 ounces. I said I would consider the subject and give him an answer before 4 today. With respect to the Russian frigate and vessels, I must have them surveyed before I could obtain an answer.

I went to the Hereditary Prince, begging Belmonte to meet me there. Belmonte was not there. I told the Hereditary Prince the expense claimed by the King for the maintenance of the Hereditary Prince's part of the family. The Hereditary Prince said it was too much. He said he should only have to receive 16,000 ounces, which would straiten him very much. After some discussion, I asked if he would be satisfied with 16,000 the balance. I told him I had not before calculated upon the outstanding balance against the Civil List, and that I did not know how I could undertake to pay so large a sum. He hoped I would assist him with an additional sum. I asked what he wanted in all; he said 20 or 22,000 ounces. The excess beyond the 16,000 might be given by way of loan. I said I would think of it. He gave me a note of the credits of this Government with Russia. I told him that I must consider how to present this subject to my Government. I said it must be done by way of loan.

Settimo was called in about the Russian ships. It was a question whether they belonged first to individuals or the Government. There were those who claimed them as private property. The Hereditary Prince said they were not private property. Another question was whether they belonged to Naples or Sicily. They were taken in Sicily. This question was got rid of by its being shown that they were never considered as a good capture, and that credit had been given to the Emperor of Russia for their value and set off against the debt from Russia. This account, of which the Hereditary Prince gave me the copy, had been sent to Russia, but till now no answer had been received from Russia.

I met Belmonte on my return. I proposed to him that I should advance this money, for which I was to obtain as securities the Russian credits or repayment from the 7,000 ounces, the balance of the subsidy, whichever might first be due. He agreed to this. I had proposed to the Hereditary Prince that this question should be discussed in Council.

He then talked to me about the entail question and hoped I would not give way upon it. He was very warm upon it. He told me that Trabia had said to him that I had declared to him

that Villermosa was the only man in Sicily, adding that had I said this of him (Belmonte) I should have said justly. I denied the assertion, and I shall make Trabia deny it too. Belmonte said the Hereditary Prince had talked to him after Council and had been of his opinion relative to the article. Belmonte said that the Hereditary Prince had observed that after having sanctioned it one way, and that being known, the giving way at all would raise the other party.

(1) Brig Buzzard, Capt. Smith, came from Mahon with duplicate of Lord Bathurst's dispatches. He brought me other letters. There seems to have been some mistake.

Saturday, May 8, 1813. (1) Saw Settimo. He told me, in reference to the entail question, that the public said that Belmonte was interested in the question, that he might not lose the property that would devolve to him from Villermosa and his mother. I said I supposed Villermosa really wanted no more than he said; that when he mentioned the English Constitution as his rule he was sincere in his opinion. I said I always believed Villermosa to the very letter of what he said. I proposed that all the Council should be called upon this question.

I heard that Cutò was not to go with the Queen. The question of the Queen's diamonds was to stop him.

(1) Pilot, Capt. Nicholas, came from Alicante with 6th German battalion. Brought letters of the 24th.

Lady William told me that Airoidi had confessed to her that he preferred a republican government, but he did not think it now applicable to Sicily.

Sunday, May 9, 1813. (1) Received accounts of the dissatisfaction of the Sicilian officers in Spain in consequence of the insufficiency of their pay. The question was considered in conjunction with MacFarlane, Fardella, Sir J. Dalrymple and La Tour. It was doubtful whether to give them the English ration or a double ration. The latter had been formerly the custom of the service. If the English ration had been given to the officers it might have been claimed by the men. It was agreed to give a second ration, commuted into money. They all thought this ample. The pay was agreed by all to be sufficient. Fardella went to the Hereditary Prince to obtain his consent to it, and the order was dispatched to Spain by the Buzzard.

I received a letter from the Hereditary Prince requiring two assurances from me for the Queen's satisfaction. The first, that she should receive no *molestia* during the voyage, meaning from us. Second, that she would be safe from the Barbaresques. I returned an immediate answer giving the required assurances.

(1) Buzzard sailed in the night for Mahon and Alicante. Wrote to Admiral Hallowell, Sir J. Murray, Genl Clinton, Sir E. Pellew.

Monday, May 10, 1813. The Duke of Sangro came and brought me the draft of a letter to be written to me by the King, which I was to alter as I pleased. It asked me for a loan of 70,000 ounces to pay his debts and the arrears due to the Neapolitans (32,000). I said I could not possibly pay the latter sum. Sangro said the King would do anything to obtain that money, he would pledge his jewels, give the frigate, etc. I told him the frigate was worth only £1,200 or 1,500, the other vessels about 500. He said the King had desired him to see if he could borrow the money of the merchants. I said I would do the same on my part.

I went to a Council about the sanction. The Hereditary Prince saw me before it, and merely said that the letter I had written him about the Queen was perfectly satisfactory. I showed him the letter proposed by Sangro and the accounts of the household. He made some remarks upon the unfairness with which they were drawn up, charging him with the whole of sums of which he ought only to have paid his proportion. I left them with him.

There was afterwards Council upon some of the articles that had been passed over. There were the superintendence of the executive over the public works, etc. Carini attended for the first time. The discussion turned upon the administration, whether with the civic councils or the government, of those works of royal foundation. The article was sanctioned without any addition. Another was what court should enforce the payment of the public revenue till the new tribunals were erected. It was decided that it should be Tribunal of Patrimonio until the new magistrature was appointed.

The Duke of Orleans called upon me. He told me that he had had a conversation of 4 hours with Belmonte upon the subject of his disunion between him and Villerosa. Belmonte said that if Villerosa went out he should go out also. He said he knew he could not carry on the Government without Villerosa. The Duke said: "Then you would leave the Government to ruin". The Duke told him it was his vanity that misled him. The Duke said Belmonte was very much attached to his place.

The Duke said they were agreed that it was only a question about words, for that in the principle, that the English Constitution should be the guide, they were agreed. Belmonte said Villerosa should have stated his difficulty to be insurmountable at the time, that now, after having allowed the manner in which that article had been sanctioned to become public, it was difficult for the Council to revoke what had been done merely upon Villerosa's fiat. The Duke said to me that in his opinion he agreed with Belmonte, but on the other side Villerosa had told him that on the same evening that this sanction had been given he had gone to the Hereditary Prince and said he must resign if this article as sanctioned was to pass.

The Duke said, after this long conversation, in appearance he had gained nothing, but after being beat from pillar to post it seemed to him that Belmonte would be too happy to give way if he could find out the mode with safety to his *amour-propre*.

Tuesday, May 11, 1813. Duke of Sangro came to me. I gave him back the draft and proposed some trifling alterations. I said it would be impossible for me to give him all the money the King wanted. He must borrow from the merchants what was wanted for the emigrants, and I suggested, besides giving his jewels in pawn, that the King should pay 1,000 ounces per month. I thought it likely that the Hereditary Prince might pay his proportion. He said he would go to the King.

Sangro told me that he had proposed to Leopold at the Ficuzza to bring him to Palermo.

I went to the Hereditary Prince about military business. He desired me to send back his former letter to me asking for a loan of 20,000, in order that it might be made out afresh for 6,000. He talked to me about the entail question. I told him my idea as to the manner of its being sanctioned: "*Veto unicamente perchè non è analogo alla costituzione inglese*". I said this suggestion was neither according to Belmonte >nor< Villerosa. I said I thought Villerosa's argument that the crown should not expose its dignity by making its decision the subject of discussion was unanswerable. The Hereditary Prince entirely agreed in this. I said we had to fear democracy in the next Parliament, and that it was essential he should cling fast to the British Constitution and not allow its limits to be passed. He said he was quite sure of that. It was for this reason that I recommended the veto to this article, as carrying with it more decision. He agreed. I saw that he did not like Villerosa nearly as well as Belmonte.

There was then a Council about the sanction. One of the questions was respecting the crimes to be prosecuted by the crown. One of these was those of *lèse majesté*, of offences against the lives of the King and Queen. The Hereditary Prince wished to be inserted the word "insult" among the offences against the King. Villerosa objected to the vagueness of this word. Was a man to be punished because accidentally he did not take off his hat? Belmonte was of the same opinion. I said it was better to say nothing about it; that he would be sure of receiving respect. Belmonte said there was no country where the people were so respectful. The tradesmen were addressed by >their< shopmen and the shoemaker by his journeymen with the title *Vossia*, short for *Vostra Signoria*. The Hereditary Prince did not think so. He said things were not the same here as in England. Here they were now released from fear, and it was unknown to what excess they might go. He could not trust them. It was got rid of by its being agreed to regulate the article by the English Constitution. The Hereditary Prince was to examine this.

The Hereditary Prince was also very desirous to introduce certain old courts as have existed in England and which are mentioned in Blackstone. This was resisted by all the Council, and it passed off.

Wednesday, May 12, 1813. (1) I called upon Belmonte and had a conversation with him regarding the difference of opinion or rather the disunion between him and Villerosa. He went at length into the subject. I told him that he should consider himself as Prime Minister and Villerosa as one of his instruments, whom, on account of his utility, it was necessary he should court as a fine lady. He said he had neither time nor health for this operation, which would occupy a man's whole life. I said that I knew Villerosa was a very

impracticable man, but I believed him to have no ambition, and that I thought he was easily to be managed. I had seen nothing in him inconsistent with the most straightforward conduct. Belmonte admitted that he could not exist without him, that if Villermosa left the Government, he should also, and precede him if possible. I said to him that I did not think he had always treated Villermosa with proper respect; that upon former occasions, when he had refused to write an opinion in which he differed, Belmonte had taken the pen with a degree of ... ; that in the Council the last day he had treated Villermosa's opinion with great levity. Why did he refuse to him that great conciliation which he showed to everyone else? He said it was all Villermosa's fault, and he enumerated his complaints against him, that this was all an intrigue of his to upset the *fidecommessi* altogether. I told him their disunion would ruin everything. Belmonte said he knew it, but he said if they did not quarrel now they would do so afterwards; that the Budget he kept concealed from him who was to support it. I said he was mistaken in this, that it was Villermosa's great object to consult him upon it; that he had frequently pressed me to give him the military expenses that the plan might be debated in full Council. After a very long conversation he promised me that he would conduct himself towards Villermosa with every possible conciliation.

I then endeavoured to come to some arrangement about the *fidecommesso*. I told Belmonte I preferred the veto, giving as the reason that it was not analogous with the English Constitution. I showed him some of the old sanctions which I thought applicable. He made objections. After a good deal of conversation he himself suggested the form of a sanction upon condition that I gave my promise that I would not mention its having come from him. I suppose he did not wish it to be known that he had lent himself to any arrangement different from that which he had hitherto supported. I promised him.

I went from him to Villermosa. I saw him in conjunction with Settimo. I endeavoured to persuade him to adopt the veto, but they were both against it, upon the ground of the dissatisfaction that it would give. I said it was the same as the *placet*, but they asserted that the word *placet* would please and hold out certain encouragement. Villermosa then wrote down a form of a sanction, *placet* for the reform of the entails, and adding that the Prince would never consent to any project of a law that was not in everything analogous to the English Constitution. Villermosa said we had now to fear democracy. I said it was in consequence necessary that the Ministers should be united, and that the British Constitution should be constantly held forth as the barrier which the Hereditary Prince would never permit to be thrown down.

I saw the Duke of Orleans, who told me that the Queen wrote now that she was anxious for the arrival of the frigates, that her present suspense might be terminated.

(1) Marquis Cassaro brought me a letter from the King.

Thursday, May 13, 1813. (1) Belmonte came and asked me what I had done with Villermosa. I showed him their proposal. He did not like it, but did not object. I told him that I had found him at Carini's. "Ah!" said he, "endeavouring, I suppose, to obtain his

opinion", adding that he (Belmonte) never took such means. I said that neither he nor I knew what passed between them. Distrust!

Sangro came in the morning to ask me about the loan for the Neapolitans. I told him I could not give it. He said the King would give 500 ounces per month and the Russian ships and credits. I said the ships were good for nothing, and that there was even a question as to the right of the King to dispose of them. As for the credits, nobody would take them, and that for the loan nobody would lend money for more than a year. I said the King should give the amount out of his own property. I was sure he had money in England. Sangro said he did not know it.

Poli came at the same time and brought me a letter from the Prince asking for a loan of 6,000 ounces. He also showed me a letter from the Queen to the Prince respecting her debts and jewels. She said that of her income she would assign one fifth from the 1st September to 1 May and after that one quarter. I said I had understood it to be more, and I asked Sangro, who said the King had settled that it should be one third. Always an endeavour to get as much money as possible.

I saw the Duke of Orleans, who told me that the Queen's letters were very tranquil.

(1) Arrived Speculator lugger in 19 days from Falmouth. Sailed 25 April.
Sent letter to the King.

Friday, May 14, 1813. I went to the Hereditary Prince about military business. I gave him the resignations of several Neapolitan officers, and I told him of the general disgust existing among the officers, and of my fear that the greater part would resign.

I related to him a conversation I had had with O'Farris, but without mentioning his name, in which O'Farris, in terms of much bitterness and annoyance, had stated the cruel usage which they had received from the Sicilians, that they had been called *Esteri*, which they were not; and that they had no mind to be considered as Watteville and Meuron's, alluding to foreign regiments in our service. O'Farris spoke with great asperity of the Hereditary Prince, saying that he had no firmness; that his intentions might be good, but that he said yes to everybody, intimating that he had given them (the Neapolitans) up, that he was fit only to be a monk or Capuchin. He said this was the talk of the town, that everybody said so, and that he was sorry to entertain this opinion of a man of whom, as I knew, he had spoken favourably. I told of that I heard: there were recruiters here from Murat. O'Farris said this was not the cause; that it was the conduct of the Government to the Neapolitans; that he and all the others had been long resisting their inclinations and endeavouring to support the bad usage they had met with, but that it could not be borne any longer. He said the Sicilians had declared they were *Esteri*, and that very soon, when they had an army of their own, they would discharge them all as they had already done the civilians. He said both the King and the Prince, if they had any feeling or just notions of policy, would have gone barefoot and have lived upon a cook rather than leave so many persons who had followed them from attachment to suffer such misery and be reduced to starvation.

I of course did not report all this to the Hereditary Prince, but I told him the general effect. I said to him that Fardella himself was discontented. The Hereditary Prince told me it was very wrong in him (Fardella); that it was his business rather to calm the minds of the officers, instead of which he told them they were quite in the right to go away. He had also told several officers, upon the occasion of the general plan, that it was not his fault but his (the Prince's) who had made the decision. The Hereditary Prince said: "You know I like Fardella and I do not wish him injured, or to know what has passed"; but he begged me to speak to him. The Hereditary Prince asked what he could do to prevent it. I said, nothing. I proposed to write a letter which I hoped might have some good effect. I showed him the proposed mode of sanctioning the *fidecommesso*. He thought the veto would be better. I told him I had been of the same opinion, but that Villermosa and Settimo thought otherwise. I was sure Carini was of the same opinion. Nothing was settled.

There was then Council. The articles >respecting< the crimes of *lesa maestà* were settled. The Hereditary Prince added "*e tutti gli altri delitti contro il re e la famiglia reale a tenore della costituzione inglese*". Nothing of any other importance passed.

I read the Queen's letter to Council respecting the debts.

I called upon Sangro. I told him without the King made the loan, it would be impossible. He said the King was not satisfied with my answer, that he had found [him] in the most melancholy state regarding the emigrants. I said this is all very fine, but they none of them will make any sacrifices. I asked what the King would pay. He said 1,000 ounces per month. I said with the 5 I was to give, his 12 would make 17. I would try what I could get from the Hereditary Prince.

I went directly. I asked him, telling him he was more interested than his father, the one ending, the other beginning his reign. He asked what he should give. I said it depended upon him. He said 3, 4, 5 hundred ounces. I said 5 would be the best, as the loan could only be made for a year. But I said there would still remain the sum of 7,000 to be made good. I asked if this could not be given from the 22,000 he was to receive. He said he should be very much pressed. I said a little debt was all the fashion, but I suggested that I would try and obtain the loan for a year and a half, which would render the further 7,000 ounces superfluous. I saw Gibbs in the evening, as did also the Duke of Sangro in my presence. Gibbs was to give an answer on Monday morning.

Saturday, May 15, 1813. (1) Attended Council upon the sanction. The whole time engaged with the plan of magistrature, which with the exception of some few parts was decided to be referred back to the consideration of Parliament. Villermosa strongly contended for the appointment of some magistrate at the *capoluogo* of each district. Belmonte opposed this and thought there would be too many and no means of paying them.

(1) Received advices from Genl Oakes that the plague had appeared at Malta.

Sunday, May 16, 1813. I called with La Tour upon Marshal Rosenheim. He mentioned the universal discontent of the Neapolitan officers. It was arrived at that pitch that he could not require those under him to do their duty. The officers saw themselves detested and abandoned. They had no *appui*. There was no Government, and every officer, he believed, was desirous of leaving the service. He said the Army had been very much dissatisfied under the old system, but that the hope of returning to Naples engaged them to submit to all the inconveniences which they had suffered. He said we must not allow the good officers to go away. He strongly recommended an expedition upon Italy. He said he believed that persons had been here from Murat to invite the officers to go over.

Monday, May 17, 1813. Marshal Menechini came by appointment. I spoke to him of the discontent of the troops. He made the same report as Rosenheim. He said that he believed the real cause was the offer from Murat of equal rank in their own service. He mentioned the hatred of the Sicilians, and the conduct of the Government to the *superanti* and *ritirati* officers, as the cause.

There was Council about the sanction. Before it the Hereditary Prince told me that the Queen was really ill of a fever, but said that she hoped to be ready to embark by the day after tomorrow.

There was Council for the sanction. It was endeavoured to rectify a mistake in the sanction of the articles already published, by which all the *secondarii* officers in the civil departments of government were to be excluded from Parliament. This also excluded the Camerari or Lords of the Treasury. Villermosa suggested an exception being introduced in favour of the latter, which was done, but I doubt the Parliament agreeing to it. Villermosa represented that one of the Senate had been with him, requiring for them certain powers and honours enjoyed by the preceding Senate. Villermosa answered that with respect to the powers, Parliament only

Tuesday, May 18, 1813. Attended Council upon the sanction, which was this day finally concluded. The only remaining question was the *fidecommesso*. The Hereditary Prince had asked me before the Council, as he had done the day before, whether I did not think the veto might be put upon it. I said no, that from all I had heard the *placet* would do better. It occupied for a long time the consideration of the Council. The Hereditary Prince repropounded the veto, which was strongly objected to by Villermosa. Carini had first given his opinion upon the general question, which, not having been before present at any part of the discussion, he had had no opportunity of doing. He was for the *placet*, adding "provided that it was made analogous to the English Constitution". Settimo joined in Villermosa's opinion. The Hereditary Prince asked mine, which agreed with those of the two last. I thought it necessary that the sanction should be given without giving up the point, [and] be made in the manner the most conciliatory possible. As there would be much discussion, it was desirable that His Royal Highness should keep clear of it. He then talked of the agitation of the same question in 1810, when it >was< proposed that all those existing

should have no interest in the decision and that the law should only take effect for the future generation. The Hereditary Prince proposed the same law to be made now, and that the *fidecommesso* should be abolished 50 years hence.

After much discussion, this was also rejected, when the Hereditary Prince took out of his pocket the paper I had given him some days before, containing the project arranged between the three members of Council. He brought it out as by accident. Belmonte proposed that there should be added to it "and provided that there is nothing contradictory to that of the fundamental articles relative to the order of succession of families", which was negatived.

A note I had presented to Council relative to the *superanti* was read in Council. Villermosa made some objection, which was perfectly well founded, to a deviation of part of the subsidy already appropriated to the Army, and said it would increase the amount of the loan. The Hereditary Prince was very angry with Villermosa. Villermosa said he was called cruel. The Hereditary Prince said that he was indeed, and expressed himself harshly. Villermosa replied defending himself, saying it was better to be cruel towards persons who had no right than to rob the just creditor.

After Council I showed the Hereditary Prince a private letter from Genl Montresor, in which he suggested the present time as favourable to an overture to Murat. I asked the Hereditary Prince what he thought of it. He quite agreed on it and wished it to be done. I told him the proposed negotiator, Col. Roche, was at Malta and could not in consequence of the plague come away. I asked him upon what terms he thought it should be opened. He said: "You must understand, I never can give up the crown of Naples". I said if Murat was likely to lose all he might consent to give it up; if not, it was not likely he would yield that which he possessed. I proposed that we should reflect upon the subject for two or three days.

Wednesday, May 19, 1813. I called upon the Hereditary Prince with a proposition founded upon the conversation of the preceding day. I took it to him in English and read it to him (*vide papers*). It was simply to this purpose, that Murat and we should attack Bonaparte with all our force; that Murat should yield Naples to the King of Sicily and should have a compensation, but should keep Naples until he obtained it. He at once stated this to be reasonable. He said he could not suppose Murat would give up what he had. He said he could not give up his rights. I repeated what I had said the day before, that there were only two ways of doing this business, either by the compensation being given to Murat or to him. He said he could never give up his right to Naples. I proposed to go myself immediately to Ponza and to return. I took down before him in French his answer and translated into French my English propositions. I gave him a copy of this paper, which I took in his presence.

I said to the Hereditary Prince that the King must not know this business. He said no, or everybody would know it. Much less the Queen, who would never go away if she did. I asked him if the Queen now desired to go. He said he believed not.

Upon my return home I found there were reasons which would prevent my going, and I wrote a letter to Coffin desiring him to let Murat know that I should be next week at Ponza, and proposing to him to send an accredited agent to treat with me.

Capt. Rowley of the *America* consented to stay for me till the beginning of the next week. I wrote to the Hereditary Prince and told him I could not go till the next week, and that I had directed Coffin to propose to Murat either to send an agent to me or that I should send one to him.

Thursday, May 20, 1813. Attended a Council about the *superanti*. After much consideration of the question, I suggested that a committee should be appointed to suggest the most equitable mode of making a reform.

The Hereditary Prince, in reference to the negotiation with Murat, said care must be taken that he did not cheat us, *nous faire des fourberies*. I said I did not think much would come of it, nor he either.

Friday, May 21, 1813. (1) The Duke of Orleans called upon me. He told me that all the Queen's party had returned from Castelvetro and spread reports that they were not to go at all. He said the Duchess was very anxious to go and he did not know how to gain time. The journey and the scene altogether would hurt her very much. He pressed again the expedition to Orbetello.

(1) Dispatched lugger the *Speculator* to call at Mahon and Alicante.

Saturday, May 22, 1813. (1) I called upon the Duke of Orleans and showed him the paper from the other side with the news of the battle. Said we must wait to see the accounts. I also showed it to the Hereditary Prince. He spoke of it with regret and asked if I meant to go still to Ponza. I said yes. Hoped I would write to him.

Showed me an addition, proposed by Villermosa and approved by Belmonte, to the sanction of the independence of the two crowns. The words added, "who was to reign in Sicily". I said I thought it was well added to prevent discussion. He asked with anxiety: "But you always think the independence necessary?" I said I certainly did.

I called upon Settimo and Villermosa and offered them 20,000 oz. for the pay of the Army. Settimo asked for 30,000. I said if I could be promised repayment in a certain time.

(1) Arrived accounts of battle in the North, 2d at Leutzen. 7[th,] telegraphic dispatch from Paris published 12th at Monteleone.

Hereditary Princess brought to bed of a son.

Sunday, May 23, 1813. We went to the baptism and gala afterwards of the newborn infant of the Hereditary Princess. Leopoldo name: 1. Ferdinando 2. Carlo 3. Leopoldo. The Hereditary Prince was very attentive and expressed his regrets at my absence.

Monday, May 24, 1813. I went to call upon the King by appointment at Solanto. He received me very graciously and took me into his bedroom, where we sat down. He brought out a paper of memoranda and read it to me. The first article regarded the full payment of his assignment. He said he could believe nobody but me; that the Hereditary Prince deceived him, he could not depend upon him. He promised but never performed. He required that the order which had withheld 2,000 ounces from him per month should be revoked. I said I understood it had. He said it had not, he could assure me. I promised him that no reduction should be made from his Civil List.

He then talked about his creditors and the debt from the Casa Reale. He said that he must pay them. They came crying to him and it was not for his honour to refuse them. He said Ferdinando had never owed a carlo in his life, had always been just, had always appeared with a clean face. I said the Parliament would pay it. He answered that he would not ask it of Parliament, he had rather sell his own plate and property. I said this was not necessary and that I myself would not advise him to ask it of Parliament. He took me by the hand and approved much of what I said. I said it was but reasonable that the nation should, when they took his property and gave him a Civil List, put him clear of the world. I thought the debt extraordinarily small, and it must be recollected that he might always have paid it if he had pleased.

He talked of Cassaro and the Cacciatori and Pionieri Reali. He complained that they were not paid and had not their clothing; that he was formerly allowed to choose a man from the cavalry when there was a vacancy. This was now forbid. I made some excuses, but he said: "You know that they do not choose to give out the order. That is the fact". I assured him this would be settled to his satisfaction.

He then said he wished an order should be given to the captain of the five-pounder battleship always to receive him on board if he should wish it. He said we were living in a nation of *cannibali*, of cannibals as I understood him. He abused the Sicilians very much. He said he knew them very well and that this business, meaning the Constitution and changes, could not end well. I said I knew them also, that they made a great outcry, that they barked very loud and had no teeth. They did not dare bite. He was afraid that they would take his effects upon the pretext that they belonged to the nation. He hoped I would assure him a safe conveyance for his property and for his person. He was evidently afraid of revolution and of their cutting off his head. He spoke very bitterly of the Hereditary Prince. He said he loved him and forgave him and prayed God every morning *illuminarlo*.

I urged upon him as strongly [as] I could the case of the Neapolitan emigrants and contrasted their wants, who were dying with hunger, with those of his creditors who could always wait. He lamented their situation very much. I said I could not forgive the Sicilians for such cruel treatment to their fellow subjects. I asked if His Majesty had not been disposed to give so much per month to the payment of the loan to be made for them. He

said it was impossible for him. He already gave 800 ounces in charity. How could he give more? He asked me to dinner. He also begged me to recommend him strongly to my successor.

Tuesday, May 25, 1813. I attend at the palace. I transacted military business with the Hereditary Prince.

He said Belmonte had observed to him that it would be well to grant some honours. I said I was quite of that opinion. He mentioned Villermosa being Gentleman of the Chamber. I said I was sure he would not like it and would prefer being Consigliere di Stato. I also said Belmonte would be glad to have the other order (S. Ferdinando). He said it was a military order, that it had certainly been given for other services but he did not approve of it. I said Belmonte deserved reward; that he had suffered much; that he was an honest man and, as he saw, was no democrat. No, he said, if they had managed well, he would have been completely *royaliste* (meaning a zealous supporter of the former regime). He also observed that with the least prudence nothing would have happened that has. He was not disposed to give it him at once, but to say that if he governed (guided) the next Parliament well he should have it. I said I hoped there would be *remous*.

I spoke of Villermosa; that he had more followers than Belmonte; he had no ambition. I said he was a most valuable man, that he was impracticable, *entêté* and sometimes wrongheaded, but that in general his opinions were full of wisdom. I said if there was so much difficulty in getting money from the Parliament with him, what would there be with another? The Hereditary Prince said he regretted very much my absence, but hoped I should come back soon, though not exactly here.

There was then a Council about the *superanti* and a *dispaccio* agreed upon, made upon my suggestion. Cattolica, Fitalia assisted for the first time.

They talked of the tumultuary conduct of the people of Catania and Messina. I said with respect to the former, I would send 5 companies to that place; and to the latter, I mentioned the bad character of the Marquis De Gregorio at Messina. I said he was detested. They defended him, but I added there could be no doubt of his having made away with the public money.

I saw the Duke of Orleans. He repeated to me what I had heard the day before, that the Queen had no idea of going away; that she had won over Dr Calvert, and was only waiting for my departure. I told him of the orders given to MacFarlane.

I told Belmonte what had passed with the Hereditary Prince about him. He came to me from the Hereditary Prince to ask for the money I was to pay him from the King. I said when was Cassaro and Cutò to be turned out? He said he would write to the Hereditary Prince and tell him the money would not be paid till it was.

Caccamo called upon me. He brought me the same memorandum the King had given >me<. He begged me to write my answers to it. He evidently had lost the King's favour. He said the King had not spoken to him about business long before. He seemed delighted with this return of the King's confidence and wished me to write the answer that he might show

his influence. He said they had done all in their power to remove him from the situation of confessor.

Wednesday, May 26, 1813. (1) The Duke of Orleans told me that Airoidi had proposed that I should be addressed by the Sicilians to stay. The Duke told him it must first be ascertained whether this would be pleasing to me. I answered that it would only embarrass me, as I was resolved to go. It was the only hope I had of recovering my Alicante troops.

I called upon Cassaro. He expressed fears of the coming Parliament.

The Duke of Orleans called upon me. He read me a paper he had prepared relative to his mother and offering propositions to her which he authorized Sir E. Pellew to show her.

He told me that Belmonte had proposed to him that the Hereditary Prince should direct an official Note to be sent to me begging me to stay in Sicily, and Belmonte proposed that he (the Duke) should manage this with the Hereditary Prince. The Duke said he would willingly undertake it if I had no objection. I told him I had; that having been ordered to stay in Sicily, my departure in disobedience to such an order was always a hazard, but that my responsibility would be very much increased if I should receive a formal application to the same effect from the Sicilian Government. I suggested that a letter from Belmonte, as Prime Minister, would do as well, and that such a letter I could either show or not as I pleased. It would not tell against me, and I might make it useful in respect to Lord Wellington. The Duke entered into these reasons, and the letter was accordingly written.

He told me that the Queen talked of going on the 10th June. Had ordered the ships to be revictualled.

In the morning we had a session with Settimo, MacFarlane, and Fardella to arrange the powers and authority of the commander of the forces and Minister of War. There was a very long discussion. It turned very much upon the manner in which the orders should be communicated to the Minister relative to the making out of the patents for officers' commissions. Settimo said it should be from the King and not, as at present, in consequence of a communication from the Captain General. I said the object was to exclude the Minister from all military details; that if he entered at all into it, his responsibility would be involved, and upon this plea he would interfere in all the promotions. Hitherto the Minister had been commander in chief and everything. This was not according to the practice in England, and very disadvantageous for the welfare of the Army.

(1) Lady William obtained another day from Capt. Rowley.

Thursday, May 27, 1813. I presented Lord Montgomerie and Mr Smith to the Hereditary Prince, who received them very graciously. Belmonte was present. I also presented Genl MacFarlane.

Afterwards I remained with the Hereditary Prince. I told him the orders I had given to MacFarlane relative to the Queen. I asked him first whether he would wish to hear them or not. He made no remark upon them.

He asked me about the money he was to receive. I asked if three months would be time sufficient. He said yes and asked me an assurance to this effect, which I promised to send him.

I then talked to him of Cassaro and Cutò, and begged him to call in Belmonte, who was in the next room. I observed to him that till this moment they had not been turned out. I represented the disadvantages. The impossibility of going on if the good were not recompensed and the bad discouraged. The retention of these persons in their offices after its being known that they were to go out would show clearly to the world that he was afraid of his father, and would give to these persons an authority derived from this protection. I was confident that the party would always have in view the return of the King to the power. He said the King would never return. I said I was not at all sure of this; that I perceived the King had never given way; that he was the same man he had always been. The Hereditary Prince said that it would be like punishment to remove these persons, and by the new Constitution nobody could be punished without trial. Both Belmonte and I showed the absurdity of this opinion. He said I pressed him very much. He said: "But understand that I will not be understood to have sold this for money". He adverted to Belmonte's note, wherein he said that I could not give him the money unless Cassaro and Cutò were turned out. I said that this was not the meaning of the letter; that His Royal Highness had contracted an engagement towards me which I had communicated to my own Government, and that I was confident that I should be blamed before I executed my own engagement to him if I had not put him in mind of his engagement to me. This explanation seemed to satisfy him.

In the course of conversation I attacked Cassaro. I said he had acted like a traitor to him; that his conduct had been abominable in all respects. The Hereditary Prince said Cutò was a good man. Belmonte said "to the contrary" and related two anecdotes, one of his having endeavoured to take in a watchmaker; another I forget. He also referred to his having paid persons for having applauded the King.

The Hereditary Prince mentioned to us his idea of making promotions, and read a list of persons who should have different descriptions, the order of St Gennaro, the key etc. One name was Partanna, which Belmonte objected to. The persons to have St Gennaro were: Principe di Ruoti, Minutolo's brother, the Bishop of Catania, and ... Ventimiglia, Belmonte's brother, was proposed for something. Belmonte rather praised him but would give no opinion. He said he was now in the right direction. After Belmonte went, the Hereditary Prince asked me about him. I said he was a bad character; that he had been angry because Villermosa had not made him sub-director.

After Belmonte went out, Settimo came in in order to settle about the powers of the officer commanding the troops. The question turned upon the point whether the recommendations should go through the Minister of War from the commander in chief, or direct from the commander in chief to the King. The Hereditary Prince was rather in favour of the first plan, but after a long discussion, in which Settimo behaved fairly enough but contended for

his office, it was [at] last agreed that no change should take place, and that the question should remain as it was.

MacFarlane was then called in to consider the expediency of issuing an order giving leave to all officers who chose it to give in their resignation in the course of 7 days, at the outstations 10 days, and in Spain after the campaign. The Hereditary Prince approved very much the idea, but MacFarlane thought that it would be better to wait a day or two longer until he could collect further information. It was so settled.

I took leave of the Hereditary Prince, promising to write to him from Ponza.

I took leave of Paternò, Villermosa, Carini, Damas, Belmonte. We embarked between 12 and one in the morning on board the *America*, Captain Josias Rowley.

Monday, October 4, 1813. I landed at 3 and went directly to the Hereditary Prince with Lord Montgomerie. He expressed great joy at my return and had written a letter to that effect in the morning. I called afterwards at the Duke of Orleans'. Saw the Duchess and Mademoiselle. Went afterwards to Santa Croce to dine with Lord Montgomerie, and returned to sleep at my own house.

Tuesday, October 5, 1813. I went with Lord Montgomerie to the Hereditary Prince at twelve, by his appointment, to meet the Council, which consisted of the Marquess Ferreri, 77; Duke Lucchesi, 50 or thereabouts; Duke of Gualtieri Averna, ..., a good honest man; Naselli, Minister of War.

The Hereditary Prince began by proposing that the speech should be read with which the Parliament was to be opened tomorrow. I stated my opinion that it would be better to prorogue the Parliament for another week; that I had come here in consequence of the proceedings of the Parliament, of the confusion and danger which threatened the country. The cause of my coming was notorious. I was therefore resolved to set things right and to bring those gentlemen to reason. Great Britain had no other objects than the support of the throne, the happiness, greatness, and independence of Sicily. It was thought that these could not be obtained without the liberty of the people. But if Sicily was not true to herself; if, instead of pursuing with wisdom her own good and the final establishment of the Constitution, her representatives chose to be governed by their own passions, to be indulging alone their private vengeance, and that the result of all this was anarchy and revolution, to such consequences despotism itself was preferable; and as I had been the first to give it, so I should be the first to take it away, if I found it to be incompatible with the happiness of the nation. I wished to give advice and due notice myself to the members of Parliament, as I had advised Her Majesty the Queen of the certain effects that would await her conduct (the Prince interrupted me by saying that I had), so I would do the same to them in order that no charge might attach to me for not having given due warning. But, in order to do this, it was necessary that I should have some time to become acquainted with the state of affairs.

Two of the Ministers, Ferreri and Averna, opposed any further prorogation, alleging the disgust that it would produce. They added also that the Parliament was ready to vote the Budget. I said this was very well, but there were other points equally necessary with the Budget. There was the Sicilian Army and the magistrature. There could be no liberty or security without an army, and no tranquillity or order without magistrates. As for the disgust, that could only arise upon the supposition that the House would not again meet, but when it met, that would cease. When so much time had been lost in nonsense, surely another week could not signify much. The Hereditary Prince overruled their objections, and the thing was agreed to.

It was then a question whether the further prorogation should be made by proclamation, and also whether any reasons should be given in the speech. Proclamation was not specified in the act, and therefore this mode could not be adopted. With respect to the reasons, I strongly recommended that none should be given. It was the prerogative of the Hereditary Prince. The reasons were obvious, and I begged all the Ministers to publish the sentiments I had expressed. The Council broke up. The Hereditary Prince told me that when there was anything particular to be done, he would beg me to attend. Great demonstrations of regard for Lord Montgomerie.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans in the course of the day. He talked a great deal about his allowance being cut off. He told me that the Hereditary Prince had said to him that the Parliament was to give him 12,000 ounces more, and that out of that sum he would see what could be done. He told this to the Duchess. The Duke was in a great passion. He told the Hereditary Prince that he would receive nothing short of his allowance; that if the Parliament did not give him the whole, he would receive his allowance from England alone, by whom it had been guaranteed to him. The Hereditary Prince made a distinction between him and the Duchess, putting her forward as the person to be provided for. This also made him angry. He said he could not consent to be considered as a foreigner; that he belonged to the Bourbon family and the same as himself, and that he was in the succession to the crown. We agreed that the Hereditary Prince had sold himself, and had given up his claim and all other points for the 12,000 ounces. Lord Montgomerie told me that the Hereditary Prince was not the least displeased with this vote of the House. We agreed very much about all the causes of the ruin of Belmonte's party, his vanity, the bad subjects with which he was surrounded, and his jealousy of Villermosa. He said that he believed he had no wish to come in again at present. I said that I knew him so well, that what he would like would be that I should, with the British force, arrest his enemies and establish him again in power, like the vizir of a sultan. Belmonte was present at the latter part, and said that these people were only to be kept in order by fear. Always recommending acts of arbitrary power that never could be justified.

Wednesday, October 6, 1813. (1) I went by appointment to the King at Solanto, seemed in very good health and spirits. He talked of fish, of the sport he had had, of his gains at the tunny fishery. Seemed full of hopes of returning to Italy. Nothing particular passed. I came

to Santa Croce in the evening, where I had slept for the last days. I called upon Butera on my return.

(1) Packet sailed for England. Sent No. 18 to Lady William.

Thursday, October 7, 1813. Dined with Belmonte and all the old Ministers.

Friday, October 8, 1813. Dined with Carini. Met there the same party. I gave after dinner *les véritables amis de la Constitution*, which was drank with great satisfaction.

I had seen Settimo the day before, and had had a long conversation with him upon the state of politics. He recommended that Belmonte and Villermosa should be put in the Council. I told him the objections to it: that Belmonte was very unpopular; that he and Villermosa could not go on with the rest. I was convinced that the wisest thing to do would be, if any of them was to go in, that it should be Villermosa, and that Belmonte should stay out; that Ferreri should be the Chancellor, Airoidi Chancellor of the Exchequer, himself Minister of War; Averna to remain in. He did not think Belmonte would like this, nor I either. If this could not be, I thought it better than the present party should remain out, should attend in their places in Parliament and do their duty, the peers protesting, the commoners speaking out and dividing the House upon all occasions. It was necessary that there should be a standard round which the good might rally.

In the evening after dinner, Belmonte, Villermosa, Settimo and I met at Belmonte's. Belmonte said, as we were met, he would say for them all that they were ready to do whatever I desired of them. I then told them what I thought it best for them to do: to attend in their places and to speak and vote; that I thought it better both for them and me to remain independent of the Government. If the Ministers were entirely to my mind, I should be glad then to identify myself with them, but I did not now wish it. We went over different points which I should require to be carried, finance, Army, magistrature. After some conversation, this was satisfactorily arranged.

Saturday, October 9, 1813. (1) Nothing particular.

(1) Packet came from England in 25 days. Newspapers down to 27 September. Dined with Genl MacFarlane.

Sunday, October 10, 1813. Mr Vaccaro, the President of the Commons, asked for an interview. I appointed him the next day. I showed Lord Montgomerie dispatch from England about Naples and Murat. Time gone by. Lord Montgomerie talked of going to Vienna for his health.

Monday, October 11, 1813. (1) Mr Vaccaro came and remained with me near two hours. He spoke extremely good French with the greatest fluency. He said he had been taken from his retirement to be placed in public situations. He did not like it. He should be glad to give up his situation, which he only accepted for the good of his country. He attempted to justify the Board of Health. I told him the principal facts of partiality against the English. He endeavoured to explain them away, and said he would show me the papers. He talked of the House of Commons. He begged my influence to establish order in the House. He said he cried and rung his bell, but he was not obeyed. I said the House should support him. The disorder which prevailed was a disgrace to the House. There was nothing like it either in Spain, England, or America.

He said he had been called a Frenchman and a Jacobin. He had been first brought up to the law, and had taken pleasure in the beginning of the French Revolution. He was entirely English; thankful to them for the liberty they had received and for the protection they had obtained. He talked of the taxes, particularly of the *macina*, which he said was very oppressive upon the people, but necessary for the moment. He talked of the extreme poverty of the country. He spoke very lightly of the barons, of their want of education, of their extravagance; said there were not above five whose *maisons* were *rangées*. He mentioned them (Belmonte, Villermosa, Pantelleria, Trabia, San Marco). He said the *fidecommesso* was a great misfortune for the country. It prevented a more general distribution of the lands and a better state of cultivation. There was a good deal of the modern philosophy in his discourse, but he was evidently an able man and seemed respectable. His language was very insinuating and there was, in appearance or reality, a great deal of modesty.

I said I wished to see some of the chiefs of the party, five or six, and to talk to them at length upon the present state of politics. I told him my anxiety for the welfare of Sicily proceeded from two causes: 1st, for the sake of Sicily itself and that it might cease to be a dead weight about the neck of England; 2ndly, that the liberty of Sicily might serve as a model for the rest of Europe.

I went from thence to the Hereditary Prince with the military papers. He referred to a conversation I had had with Cattolica and repeated by him to the Hereditary Prince, that I was not content with his having so soon forgot his old Ministers. To this the Hereditary Prince observed that he had invited them to come to him, but that they had never come and he could not well do more; that he should always have great pleasure in hearing their opinion upon all points. He begged me to state to him directly any cause of dissatisfaction I might have with him.

There was then a Council. There was first a question as to the means of raising the finances. Ferreri said he meant to lay the old Budget before the House and leave them to select what they pleased of the taxes. I said I thought this bad; that it would be referred to a committee, and that there would be no end to the discussion. I was of opinion that this should be settled previously with the party of Rossi by Averna, and I would do the same with the others. This was approved by the Hereditary Prince. The Army to be the same as before voted. I suggested only that the local militia should be formed but not called out. Averna said that

they were agreed about the formation of the code by persons to be selected by the Hereditary Prince. The Council was very long. It was agreed that after they had seen and had agreed with the party, they should all come to me.

I saw afterwards Belmonte. He talked to me about the Duke of Orleans's allowance. He said I ought to exact it from the Parliament. I said I could not do that, and I observed to him that I was not quite sure whether he had broken the Duke of Orleans's neck or the Duke his. He said it was neither one nor the other, and that his unpopularity had arisen from his determination not to abandon his uncle. He said that since I had left Sicily, Di Aci had been with him in secret and had told him that the King had a great regard for him; that there was an idea of his return, and that there would be no objection to his remaining in office with Carini and Settimo, but that Villermosa must go out. Belmonte said that he scouted the propositions.

(1) Carlotta came from Tarragona with letters from Lord Wellington and England.

Tuesday, October 12, 1813. I received a deputation from the House of Commons consisting of Vaccaro, Rossi, Manzone, Ardizzone, and others of the most violent. I asked Settimo and Airoldi to be present, as we had no secrets to treat.

We had a long conversation. I told them the impression their conduct had made upon me was very unfavourable, and that I could not understand it. I had seen a reunion of the old court party with the democratic part of the House of Commons for the purpose of turning out the Ministry. They then attacked the British influence, making use of the plague as the pretext. I said of that Ministry that I had recommended them to the Hereditary Prince as being the persons whose uniform perseverance in the cause of liberty pointed them out as the safest guardians of those liberties; that to begin with Prince Belmonte, his opposition had been long and lasting. He had been one of the foremost to resist the 1 per cent tax. He had been banished for it. He returned, and nobody knew better than I did how much Sicily was obliged to him for the completion of the work. As for Prince Villermosa, his inflexibility and integrity made him an honour to his country. Of Settimo, as he was present, I would say nothing. They had not given these Ministers their confidence, and others had been chosen. These should receive my support as long as they were true to the Constitution and their country. I only knew *la Patrie*. But at the same time I must be permitted to feel the same public confidence, the same private regard for the old Ministers that I had always done.

Vaccaro was the spokesman. He defended the House of Commons about the decision against the British generals. He vindicated also the Board of Health. I said I did not think I could be mistaken. The British authorities here were men of honour. I added also that it was the spirit, the *allure* of the *chose*, which was so evident. I acknowledged that England alone had given them the Constitution, and Rossi observed that it was unlucky England had not continued them in their slavery for one night longer and given them the Constitution ready made, quite complete. I said I was determined to stand by the Constitution as long as possible; that it was given to Sicily under the idea that it would contribute to the happiness

of the people. I would only abandon it when I saw that it did not fulfil the object of its founders. Any state of things, despotism itself, was better than anarchy.

Talking of the difficulty of bringing the work of the Constitution to a conclusion, I said that, for the *ménagements* it had been necessary to observe, that had taken 18 months which might have been concluded in three; that my advice had not been listened to, or much of the subsequent difficulties would have been prevented. But, although such *ménagements* had been necessary in the case of *personnages aussi illustres*, that it might well be conceived that I should not have the same regard for others, and I was determined to put *main basse* upon all who should declare themselves as enemies of the Constitution.

We talked of the Army. I said it was necessary there should be one. I adverted to the vote of the last sessions, that no man should be forced to be a soldier or sailor. I said the contrary should have been voted. How were they to defend their country or their liberties without an army? They wanted liberty, but no one would make any sacrifice for it. I stated that militia could do very little; that war was a trade like every other, it must be learnt by experience. It was not enough to put an uniform on the back and a sword in the hand to make a man a soldier. He must see war. Three French battalions would drive all the Sicilian Militia from one end of the island to the other. I had always said that Sicily might be independent. I would have them independent both of their enemies and of their allies, and I should not use this language to them if Great Britain wanted to keep them in subjection.

I very much inculcated the keeping order in the House and particularly in the galleries. It was not a free assembly. Every man should have power to declare his opinion without being interrupted by the hisses of the galleries. Vaccaro said he did all in his power, but in vain. He wished I would give him instructions upon the subject. I said if the House did not support, he alone could do nothing. (Settimo told me that Rossi jogged him and said it was not so. Why did he admit this?)

I spoke also of the courts of justice. There was at present the greatest anarchy in the country. The tribunals should be immediately established, and the code might be referred to a future Parliament. They agreed in this. We talked of many other points, and we parted with my assuring them that I regretted very much the apparent difference which had existed, and that I hoped that we should always be the most intimate friends.

Wednesday, October 13, 1813. (1) The Ministers came by appointment, having seen the leading members of the House of Commons relative to the Budget. Averna said that they were ready to vote the charges, but not the ways and means. How did they know that they were not to be broke the next moment? Averna said that I had the Prince's authority to promise them they should no[t]; they said I had not given it. The Ministers then wanted me not to insist upon the ways and means being voted, but I stated the necessity of making a treaty with them. They did not trust me and I did not trust them. I was the strongest, and I was resolved to give them the law. I proposed that we should have another meeting with them at which he (Averna) should be present. I would beg Settimo and Airoidi to be present also. Averna thought it better they should not be there. I said I did not like to trust myself with them alone. I did not know whether they were friends or enemies. This was settled for

the next morning. It was settled that the Parliament should meet on Friday. Ferreri came in the evening to say that it had been so settled with the Prince, and that the corresponding dispatch would be made.

(1) Dined with Lord Montgomerie, Duke and Duchess of Orleans, Mademoiselle very much affected about her brother's allowance and with the doubts.
I saw Count Raimondi, Marquis Merlo.

Thursday, October 14, 1813. Averna came with the deputation from the Commons. Vaccaro and Rossi did not appear. Raimondi, Maccagnone, Palermo and others came. I begged Settimo and Airoidi to attend as witnesses. Averna told me before the meeting that they made some difficulty about voting the finances at once, and therefore it was settled between them that they should speak of other things also at their opening, and that they should go on together. He begged me to treat them kindly; that they had been rather frightened by my first conversation.

The meeting then took place, and Averna began by mentioning what were the objects of the Commons. I interrupted him by asking, as I did not see as many members as before, whether they were authorized by the party to come to an agreement with me upon future proceedings. They gave to understand that they were. I asked then what had been the difficulty. The Marquis Palermo then took the word and said that they were ready to vote the debt to England and other parts of the Budget not yet mentioned, with the exception of the bridges and roads and some few other articles about which further enquiry was necessary. I then asked about the *mezzi* (ways and means). I observed that I understood they required my assurance that the Parliament should be allowed to go on with other important business still necessary to be arranged. Palermo observed to me that it was a principle in England that the way to control the executive authority was with the purse and, this let out of their hand, all control was gone. I said this was true and my opinion was the same, and I would advise them to be always careful of this control. He then went on to say that it was their intention not to vote the ways and means till the last.

I said I could not consent to this. I required that they should be voted first, and I required it in order that the Hereditary Prince might have the power of proroguing the Parliament when he thought proper. I required this for the sake of the Sicilian nation, of which I was the advocate. Before my departure much had been done. Since, nothing had been done. There were many other points still to be arranged in the Parliament. If the House would sit forever, if the Hereditary Prince had not the power of proroguing them, and it was indispensable that their time should not be lost as it had been hitherto in personalities and absurdities of all kinds, I was determined to dictate the law to them and I would do so. I required an answer, yes or no, whether they would or would not vote them; and I said to Averna that, as the time was so short, I thought it better that there should be another *proroga*. They began to talk and excuse themselves, but I said it was necessary [not] to lose time in useless discourse, and I left the room.

Averna sent to say that he wished to see me again; that Palermo had misunderstood their intentions and misrepresented them, and he begged me to return. I said I would not. They must return to their friends and obtain proper authority. Besides, I did not see either Vaccaro or Rossi present, and I expected them both. I told Averna that they must be made to submit. There was no other way of going on with them. He wanted conciliation. He urged that they were well disposed and that he was assured that they would be easily managed. I said I did not think so and that these were the counsels of timidity and fear, and so we separated.

In the morning I saw the Duke of Orleans and asked him for a statement of the substance of the agreement made by the King to give him 144,000 ounces per ann[um] and instead of it 2,000 ounces per month. The original had been signed by the King and Queen; the Queen had kept [it] in her own possession. He sent it me afterwards. I intended to speak to the Commons upon the subject, but was prevented.

Lord Montgomerie told me that in my absence Poli had been to him to propose to him the introduction again into the Cabinet of Cassaro, Di Aci, and ... Lord Montgomerie expressed his surprise at such a proposal. Poli said he came from the Prince. When Lord Montgomerie mentioned it the same morning to the Hereditary Prince, the latter scouted the idea, pretended it did not come from him, and said of Cassaro and Di Aci that they had both deceived his father, his mother, and himself. Lord Montgomerie said Poli wanted to play the First Minister, but he put an end to it at once.

Lord Montgomerie said he had two or three set-tos with Belmonte. Belmonte, before the Duke of Orleans, said one day to Lord Montgomerie: "So I understand you have been writing to Lord William that I have been setting up a third party". Lord Montgomerie became angry and said: "No, Prince Belmonte. I said to Lord William that you had been intriguing with the opposition party, with Vaccaro, and you are heartily welcome to see what I have written". The Duke of Orleans turned the conversation at once. Upon some other occasion, angry language passed between them. Mme Montjoye told me that the Duke had spoken very clearly to Belmonte and had often reproached him for his conduct; that she has known Belmonte to leave the room all red in the middle of the Duke's conversation.

Friday, October 15, 1813. Having received no further assurance from the members of the House of Commons, I went to the palace at half past 12 and found the Hereditary Prince in Council with his Ministers. He turned them out and let me in. Having told him of the obstinacy of the Commons, I gave him my opinion, that a further prorogation should take place for a week, and if in that time no agreement was made, that the Parliament should be dissolved. He said his opinion was rather that they should not meet; that we should try whether they would vote or not, and then that they should be dissolved if they did not. I told him the disadvantages: that, for myself, I had made so positive a declaration that I could not possibly retract from it; that retreat would be my ruin. He agreed with me in thinking that no Ministry could govern the Parliament. He thought also with me that there was a French party at the bottom, who misled the well intentioned. He told me that all the

Council would be against me. He then desired the Council might be called in, and he recapitulated to them our conversation.

They said a further prorogation would give great disgust and only increase the irritation. I said this might be true and perhaps it would not succeed, but it was at any rate holding conciliation open, and a future justification. I repeated my opinion of French influence being at the bottom and of the necessity of firmness, or we hazarded being overrun by anarchy and revolution. All our present evils were owing to our present weakness. There arose a question whether the members would not have been satisfied if I had given them the guarantees required. Averna pretended that they had been frightened by me. I said this could not be so, as Averna had informed them previously that I was ready to give them this assurance, and yet their spokesman, Marquis Palermo, who was no fool, declared that the ways and means would only be voted at the last. He could not have mistaken the meaning of his colleagues if they had been determined to do what was required of them. The Hereditary Prince quite agreed in this.

With respect to the prorogation, I was quite clear that it should take place and they should not be permitted to meet again, in order that they might have no opportunity of making violent speeches and resolutions. I stated to them the advantage of a third independent power in the country which could act as the mediator. I was sure things could not go on without it. But it was necessary that this power, to do good, should be respected, and I was resolved it should be so.

The arguments I used did not convince them, and when the Hereditary Prince proposed the prorogation, Ferreri asked how it could be inserted that it was made with the advice of the *privato consiglio*. I said I could easily manage this by declaring that I could not be responsible for the public tranquillity, which depended upon me, if this measure was not carried. The Hereditary Prince proposed that I should give this in writing, and I went in consequence to the next room and prepared the Note which I read to the Council, and with which they were satisfied, and the Parliament was accordingly prorogued to the 20th.

The Duke of Orleans came. Said he had seen the Hereditary Prince the day before; that he was very kind to him.

The Duke de Berri had claimed a pension promised him by the King in consequence of an intended marriage with one of his daughters, the Duchess of Genevois. The King had sent for him for the purpose. He came, and the Queen then changed her mind and the marriage was prevented. The King gave him a pension, of which only 6 months of it had been paid. He now had written to the Duke of Orleans to apply for it. The Hereditary Prince said he knew nothing of the matter; that he should write to the Duke de Berri to say that things were now altered; that a specific allowance was voted for the Civil List, and that his demand had not been included in the Civil List; and the Duke added "and I will charge myself with saying to him that, if it had, he would not be at all more sure of receiving it". The Hereditary Prince opened his great eyes.

The Duke, talking of Belmonte, of the cowardice of the Sicilians, said that he had been with him that morning and had been coaxing him to say that it was not necessary for him to go to the House of Peers. He said they were all afraid of the vengeance of their countrymen.

Saturday, October 16, 1813. (1) Ferreri inserted in the dispatch sent to the Protonotaro proroguing the House that the Hereditary Prince, to whom the Minister of England had presented an official Note, had, with the advice of his Privy Council, further prorogued the House to the 20th.

(1) An amusing squib in the Cronica, that Sperlinga was going to Germany to replace Genl Moreau.

Sunday, October 17, 1813. (1) I saw Averna. He proposed to bring Rossi and Vaccaro. I suggested to him that I thought of a way of accommodation, and that is giving a certain time for the Budget and a certain time for the Parliament, say 10 or 15 days for the one and 2 months for the other. He thought this might do.

Vaccaro and Rossi came. Averna came with them. When this proposal was made to them, Rossi said they would want all December for the finances, and that the tribunals were of equal importance. I made my former answers, that the finances [were] very urgent, and that if the House of Commons mixed the subjects they would never conclude any. I said I would propose to them an accommodation, that they should pass the Budget in 15 days, and the whole of their business in two months; that I would undertake that all the points most essential to their liberties were arranged. They did not seem to be willing to agree to this, and they went away.

(1) This journal was omitted to the 21st. This, therefore, may be in part incorrect.

Tuesday, October 19, 1813. (1) I saw Averna again, who came back with Vaccaro and Rossi. Averna came first and told me that they would not agree to the proposal. I stated, in that case, my unwillingness to see them. However, he pressed me to do so, and they came in. Rossi took the lead, and he was entering into all the past and stating the just causes they had of distrust against the Government, and not the Government against them. I interrupted him and said that we better not talk upon what we could not agree; that I thought otherwise with him, and that I was not content with the Parliament and particularly with those who had misled its well intentioned members. They would not consent to the proposition I had made, and I did not further insist upon it, as I had reason to believe that we should have the majority in opposition to them. I told this to Averna. I said it was necessary we should be agreed about the finance; that I would therefore recommend that Ferreri should see the Committee of Finance and agree with them. I would on my part submit their plan to our party, and all the points agreed by both could be voted first and the disputed articles settled at last. This was arranged. I frequently urged to him the necessity of the machine going on. All should be united. Party might be an after consideration. He was to come to me before Cattolica's ball, or if not, to speak to me there.

He came there and said they had met, and that I should have the statement I wanted by Monday next. I said the Parliament was to meet tomorrow. How could we be all agreed? It evidently struck me that there was no intention on their part that we should be agreed. It was settled that I should see the 53 members who were to assemble at Bosco's.

(1) Was at ball given by Cattolica to all our party.

Wednesday, October 20, 1813. I went to the meeting at Bosco's. I found them all assembled round the room.

They read me the motion upon which they were agreed: to vote the finance by preference. The motion was read over and each member was called by his name and answered to it. Those absent were answered for by their friends. I then spoke to them at length; explained why I wanted the finances voted first; why I thought myself entitled to their confidence. I guaranteed to them the time necessary for completing the magistrature and other parts of the Constitution. I spoke of the *riveli*; they asked if I would undertake for this being passed by the Peers. I said no, I could only answer for their having the time to discuss it, but I would use all my influence that it should pass. But I recommended to them moderation in the pains they enacted; that excessive penalties would defeat the end and give to the Peers a pretext for throwing out the Bill. I recommended moderation in everything; that they wanted to have everything done too quickly. The *fidecommessi*, for example: get a part; if that will not do, renew the motion hereafter.

I spoke to them of the Duke of Orleans and stated in what respect I thought him entitled to the allowance, as well as to the respect and gratitude of the Sicilians. I concluded a long interview with begging every man to remain at his post, and that I would be the last to leave mine.

I went from thence to the palace and found the Council sitting. I showed the motion to the Hereditary Prince, which he entirely approved. The whole number of members were 150; seldom more than 130 were present. I had 53, so that a few more would give us a majority. Our lists were compared, and a few only of theirs were in mine. All the Ministers said they would do their utmost, and they had no doubt, they said, of gaining the number wanted.

I went away, and the Parliament opened at 5. To my great surprise it appeared that all my 53 with one exception (Prince Gangi) voted with us (Prince Gangi went away) and not one of the Ministers' friends voted with us. I wrote at night to the Prince to beg he would summon a Council for the next day.

Thursday, October 21, 1813. I sent for Settimo and talked to him about the new Ministry. I pressed him very much to come in, but he refused. He suggested Artale and Del Bono. I went from him to Villermosa, and I told him my opinion about the necessity of a change in the Ministry and the embarrassment in which I was for new Ministers. I told him, after the outcry that had been raised against him and Belmonte, I thought it not desirable that either

of them should come in, that I should be glad to have Settimo and Airoidi. There was also Artale. He said he would speak to Settimo.

I went from thence to the Hereditary Prince, whom I found in Council with his Ministers. They went out, and we began speaking of the defeat of last night. I accused the Ministry of perfidy. It was impossible to suppose that they could not influence a single vote. The Hereditary Prince asked me if I would see them. I said I hoped he would excuse me; that I wished to have nothing more to say to men in whom no confidence could be placed. He asked me what I thought should be done. I said the Ministry changed, and the Parliament dissolved. He said he had no difficulty for one or the other, but, he said, who would I recommend? I answered that I did not know who to name, and that I begged His Royal Highness would choose them.⁽¹⁾ He pressed me, and I answered, as was true, that I was quite unable to name anybody. I said it was necessary to have bold men who would not be afraid of doing their duty.

The Hereditary Prince then mentioned Artale. I said I believe[d] he was a courageous man, and that I thought he would be very *à propos* at this moment. He said it was necessary for the Ministers to be *d'accord*, and he advised me to send for Artale and to ask his opinion upon the subject. (I sent for Artale. He was out of town and was not to return before night). The Hereditary Prince then took up the list of the Peers and read it over. He stopped at Pantelleria's name. I objected, and he joined in the objection. At Trabia's, I said I rather liked him better than the rest, and it seemed to me that he had acted more moderately. We stopped at Scaletta. I thought he might do very well for a Minister. The Hereditary Prince said he liked him very much. I told him that Genl Montresor had promised him so much that I had intended to beg the Hereditary Prince to make him permanent Governor. We came only to the conclusion that I should see Artale.

We had a great deal of general conversation. I said that if I had known as much of the general character of the people as I did at present I do not think I should ever have undertaken the business. I said I doubted whether these people were made for freemen. I said what a pity it was that the Queen would not listen to me when I first came. All this would have been avoided, and it would have been much more easy for us to have acted with a King with one single authority than with a Parliament. He exclaimed that he had always said so, and that he had advised the Queen, instead of setting their pricks to the English, to unite with them, to save their money, to put their army in a good state, not to be thinking of petty expeditions which cost so much money and could end only in the sacrifice of their own partisans; but to be prepared, together with the English, to combat in some great enterprise. I said if this advice had been followed we should have had Naples long ago.

I said every effort must be tried to give a chance to the Constitution. He said I was witness that he never had thwarted it. I acknowledged that he never had; that he had given it fair play; that if another Parliament persevered in the same violence, that I thought then the sooner the country reverted to another form of government the better.

I went to Lord Montgomerie. The Duke of Orleans came there. I found on my return home Villermosa. We talked over the new administration, but without success. I saw Airoidi, who refused to have any part in the affairs.

I went again at night to Bocca di Falco by appointment, to bring him some proposition about the new Ministry. Stayed there for a short time and came away.

(1) Settimo had advised me to leave the choice with the Hereditary Prince, and to say that it was not men but measures that I wished to support.

Friday, October 22, 1813. I went to Villermosa with a new suggestion, that all the late administration should come in excepting Belmonte and Villermosa, and entreated him to beg Settimo and the rest to come in. I called again after breakfast on my way to the palace and found Settimo with him, who refused to come in and made difficulties. Airoidi came in and mentioned a proposition for a new Ministry from the Duke of Orleans (Artale, Del Bono, Scaletta, Serradifalco), and also positively refused. I talked a great deal to them, and I stated to them the hardship of my being deserted by everybody; that if I went through with it, as I was prepared to do, I should have to undertake a great deal of responsibility, and I was to do all this in conjunction with men whom I did not know and of whose principles I could not be assured. It was much more easy for me to say to the Hereditary Prince "I cannot go on, form a government from the opposite party", which he could do. In this case I should be beat, and certainly would not stay as I and all the troops should be insulted: I would go to Messina; and I believed that every man belonging to the party would be insulted also. It was much better for me to do this than to undertake a severe responsibility with the probability of failing.

Villermosa urged them both to accept. I made another proposition. I said, rather than undertake the thing with people I had no opinion of, I would rather the whole of the old party come in. I asked, would they come? It was now so late that I was obliged to go to the palace. It was settled that for the present the Parliament should only be prorogued, and during the prorogation they could meet and the thing be decided upon. I told Villermosa that he, with his old colleagues, would be called to the Council to give a majority, as the old Ministers would not prorogue the Parliament. The Hereditary Prince told me two days before that they had proposed ... Villermosa was alarmed and said anxiously: "Would they all come? Should I be there?" I said yes, and went to the Hereditary Prince.

The Hereditary Prince asked me what I had done. I said, nothing; that I had not seen Artale; that I had not been able to persuade Settimo to come in without the rest. He pressed me as to the arrangement, and I answered that I thought the best would be to bring in all the old Ministers and Council except Belmonte and Villermosa; to make Settimo (War); Scaletta (Foreign); Artale (Home); and Airoidi or Del Bono (Finance). I praised Airoidi very much, but the Hereditary Prince was very cool regarding him. He asked me if I did not think the old Ministers might go on. They thought they could obtain a majority. I said there was no confidence to be placed in them. He then spoke of the prorogation. I said it would be better to call in Belmonte, Villermosa, Cattolica and Fitalia. He sent for them to be with him at one.

I went in the meantime to the Duke of Orleans. While there, Belmonte came. I told Belmonte that he was expected in Council. He had not known of the summons. His face

lengthened and he was very much alarmed. The Duke laughed at him, but he preserved his long and frightened face to the last. The Duke said he wished I had known him before he went to Favignana. He was a dashing character (his expression), but now he had lost it all. Favignana had left him good for nothing, and he added that Belmonte had said that he would never sign another protest; would do nothing for his country rather than experience another such banishment; and the Duke said that his two brothers, who had been confined in France for several months, said that they would rather suffer death than submit to the same confinement.

I went from thence to the Council, and all were called in. It lasted for two hours. All my friends gave an opinion that the Parliament should be prorogued, all the rest that it should not. Ferreri stated a very solid objection, that the law expired in a few days by which the collections were made. The Hereditary Prince said this was the great difficulty also, for if once the people ceased to pay the *macina*, it would be difficult to restore the habit. Ferreri said that there had been already some riots about it. This was combated by Belmonte, who said that it was only putting off the evil day. Could the Hereditary Prince consent to having the supplies voted for a month only? Was the Parliament to make itself thus perpetual? And was the executive power to be treated like a servant? Naselli observed that he was sure the Parliament would vote all the supplies required before the expiration of the time stated. It was observed that no reliance could be placed in this assurance, as they had already failed.

Ferreri was very warm and eloquent about the prorogation. He said the law ceased by the end of the month, that it was only by extraordinary exertion that they could at present circulate the necessary authority for its collection. He said they, the Ministers, had always resisted the prorogations which had taken place. I said the responsibility must lay upon them. I brought them a list of 53 members; was it to be believed that they could not add 6 names to that list? And if they had found that their friends would not vote, why was not I informed of it, and a further prorogation might have taken place, in which time I could have gained the majority. I could not help thinking that the Ministers had been parties against the Government. I said that the inconveniences stated by the Marquis Ferreri were very great, but much greater embarrassment had the nation to suffer before it could get through the evils which had been brought upon her. Belmonte spoke very well, as did Cattolica, Fitalia, and Villermosa with great firmness. There was a question started by Ferreri whether in the dispatch proroguing the Parliament it should not be stated that it was with the consent of the four Counsellors now called that the Hereditary Prince decided. Belmonte combated this proposition, and said it must be expressed "by the opinion of the Privy Council". I begged the Marquis Ferreri not to introduce my name into the dispatch as he had done before. We separated, and the Parliament was prorogued without anything particular happening.

I saw the Duke of Orleans again in the evening, and I begged him to advise Belmonte not to think of coming into power.

Saturday, October 23, 1813. (1) I saw the Duke of Orleans, who told me that he had had a long conversation with Belmonte; that he had found him at first in very bad humour. The

Duke said to him: "You will go to Council for the dissolution of the Parliament". He said: "No, I never will go again to Council unless I am a Minister, and will never be a Minister without directing". "But", said the Duke, "you must consider whether you can direct, and whether under the present circumstances it is expedient that you and Villermosa should be in the Government". But how could he refuse to attend a Council for the purpose of carrying that measure which for three months he had been advising? Belmonte gave way to this argument, and after a long conversation he authorized the Duke to say: 1st, that he was ready to attend the Council for the dissolution; 2ndly, that he did not desire to belong to the Council, and that he would not attend it as a passive member, but that he would support the Government; that he never would join himself with the opposite party; that if I went away, he would go also. Both the Duke and I doubted his performance of this promise.

(1) Lord and Lady Montgomerie embarked on board the Bristol for Mahon. He was very unwell. Sent 23 to Lady William.

Sunday, October 24, 1813. I saw Settimo and could bring him to no decision. Airoidi had also refused the deputation to enter in any situation [other] than as a sub-director.

Villermosa and Settimo came afterwards together; the former refused to come in without Belmonte. He said he would be very dangerous in an opposition; that they could not go on without him. I told them clearly my opinion about Belmonte, that he was dangerous as an opponent, still more dangerous as a friend. This was proved in the ruin of his own administration; that I did not think he would resist the Duke of Orleans and myself for at least a length of time, but I was not sure in the long run. After much conversation, and no conclusion being come to (I was to have carried the decision to the Hereditary Prince yesterday and today equally), I begged them to call a meeting of all their party that same evening, and to say, yes or no, whether they would come in or not. I begged that my opinion might clearly be understood to be: that it was better for Belmonte and Villermosa not to be either of the Council or the Ministry; that I thought they would be great impediments to the gaining the majority in the House of Peers, one from his unpopularity about the *fidecommessi*, the other for his pride; that if they were not, I would undertake to get the majority in both Commons and Lords. If they were, I was sure I could not, and they must undertake it themselves; that I would support them at any rate.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans, who said he had seen Belmonte, who was sour, expressed his determination to have nothing to do with the government. Said he saw evidently it was to be Villermosa's Ministry, and thought they wanted to compromise him in it, but that he would not be taken >in<. He showed strongly his rooted jealousy of Villermosa. I told the Duke my opinion of what would be Belmonte's conduct, in which we agreed. He said he would not answer for him.

I told him my conversation with Settimo and Villermosa, and the embarrassment in which I should be if they left me in the lurch. The Duke has often given opinions, latterly since my return, not before, about the success of this revolution: that it would fail; that one cause was

- the same as in France - the discredited state of the nobility in the public opinion, from their irregular way of life and extravagances. There was this great difference, however, in favour of the French, that they were bold. He had seen no assemblies succeed that were not English. All other nations wanted their steadiness. France had also a great deal of civilization and instruction, which the Sicilians had not. The lawyers and physicians did much harm in France. He was very much for assembling the Parliament out of Palermo. How was it to be lodged elsewhere?

The Duke had seen the Hereditary Prince, who was now very kind to him. The Duke told him that I had said he had spoken very sensibly about the *macina*. He seemed delighted in this praise of mine, and made the Duke repeat three times over what I had said.

The Hereditary Prince was evidently disposed to keep the old Ministers. He said to the Duke: "I do not press for, *Je ne m'attache pas à ces ministres ou à d'autres*", meaning that He was indifferent to the question, but he said he believed that they could persuade the Houses of Parliament to vote the supplies.

In the evening Settimo, Villerosa, Airoldi, and Balsamo came. They told me that Belmonte declared his determination not to be in the Government, and therefore it was unnecessary there should be a meeting, and that he would not attend. Villerosa begged that at least the meeting might be held in his house, to have the sanction of his name. Belmonte refused. We then agreed upon the Ministry - Settimo, War; Bonanno, Finance; Carini, Home; Villafranca, Foreign - after a great deal of difficulty; Villerosa urging very strongly that at least Belmonte's name should be inserted among the Council.

Monday, October 25, 1813. I called upon the Hereditary Prince and showed him the list of the new Ministry. I had seen previously Villafranca, who refused to come in, excusing himself from his age, his unfitness for a sedentary life (his father and his uncle having died of apoplexy and himself having felt a disposition to it), and his opinion that he could do more good. I had seen also Belmonte, who looked very much annoyed and said that he was determined to retire from public business. I anticipated him by entering very angry and cursing the hour when I put my foot first in Sicily.

The Hereditary Prince read over the note, and then asked me if I did not think that the Ministers now in office could not persuade the Parliament to vote the supplies. I said I could not place any confidence in them, as they had already deceived His Royal Highness and myself; that I did not think it impossible, but that the Parliament might vote the supplies to them because the opposite party wished to have them in rather than others. They were their Ministers and not those of His Royal Highness. They were as weak as water, and the machine could not go on unless it was conducted with firmness. He said that it was the old Ministry over again. I told him it was impossible to find others. This was not a time in which volunteers could be found. He asked - interrupting himself by saying "*Vous comprenez bien que j'ai toute l'estime possible pour ces hommes. Ce m'est égal comme le Ministère est formé pourvu que la chose aille*" - would it not be said that all the *prorogás* and the opposition I had made was done for the sole purpose of bringing in the old

Ministers? [I answered] it might be so said, but that the interpretation was a matter of indifference to me.

He made no objection to any of the Ministers. When I told him Villafranca would not accept, I asked him whom he would wish. He said he did not care, because he himself wrote to Castalcicala whatever might be of importance. He carried on himself the correspondence with his foreign ministers.

We had some discussion about Villermosa. I said, when the present false impression passed, that he would be reinstated in his former good opinion. He answered with some warmth that he never was respected. I begged to differ with him. He was always reputed a very honest man. For integrity, yes, he said. I told him I had not ascertained the wish of Carini, and as for Villafranca, it was necessary to have a successor with whom the rest could agree.

Talking of the opposite party, I said my opinion was, if the new Ministers could not be appointed or hereafter failed, that His Royal Highness should form the strongest party he could out of the opposite party, and not leave the present weak men who could not protect the executive power from being insulted at every moment. For example, he said, take Trabia and say to him, you shall be Minister of Finance and agree with San Marco and others. The Hereditary Prince praised San Marco, said he was a firm man and that he, His Royal Highness, believed knew very well how to make people pay. He was very unwilling to the change and pressing me very much. I said my opinion was firm for the dissolution and change. In the present moment, and until the machine could go on by itself, it could alone be saved by the British power; that that power had been insulted and it was necessary that it should be respected. If it gave way it would be immediately trampled upon. I knew now these people. "Aye", said he, "I told you so before, and have given you many opinions you would not believe. We knew them well". I said it was a pity the court had not managed better; had not taken away all just causes of complaint, and then the nation would have led with a silken string. "Ah!" he said, "there was the pity".

With respect to the new Government, he brought out a paper containing certain assurances to which the new Ministers, he thought, should be required to subscribe (they were very just). "For", he added, "*il ne faut pas dans la suite qu'ils viennent vous chier en mains*" (he apologised for the expression) and tell you they cannot go on". I read the paper, and told the Hereditary Prince that I thought the contents were very wise.

There was then a Council to consider how the *macina* should be collected, the Deputation of the Kingdom having refused to issue the order. It was agreed that a proclamation should be issued ordering the continuance of it and its being placed in deposit until the Parliament might dispose of it. There was no difference of opinion upon this subject.

Settimo, Villermosa, and Airoidi met in the evening. Carini was written to. No answer from Belmonte, who was to try to persuade Villafranca to come in.

Tuesday, October 26, 1813. I rode to Villafranca's at the Colli. Saw him and the Princess. I did all in my power to persuade him to come in, but he refused. She took the word and he evidently entirely submitted to her will.

I called upon Villermosa and proposed to him that Fitalia should be Minister for Foreign Affairs *interinamente*.

I went to the Hereditary Prince at Bocca di Falco with military business. He talked to me a great deal about the new Ministry. Again he asked if I thought they would obtain a majority in the Parliament. I said I believed so. He said he doubted it. I added that I thought now they might have it, but I only felt doubts about the Peers. I said I conceived the island was nearly in the same state as in the beginning of the French Revolution, which might have been stopped by the firmness of Louis XVI, and unless firmness was shown here we should have the same misfortunes. This country had not the advantages France had of great civilization, great instruction, and some very superior characters. This country was ignorant, and there prevailed throughout a strong democratical spirit, very hostile to one order of the state if not both. This could only be kept down by force, and that force the British. It was necessary this should be respected, and that the people should see that it was able and ready to make itself respected. It was desirable that the government should become independent as soon as possible and that the British force should be withdrawn; at present this was not possible. I adverted to the hostility that existed towards us, and to the innumerable false and unfavourable reports circulating to our prejudice: plague, conscription, regency. To the latter I said I had spoken to the 53 members and told them that England could never wish to see a French prince on the throne of Sicily, and that any attempt of the kind I should be the first to resist. The Hereditary Prince said he never entertained such an idea for a moment (!).

He asked me if in England old Ministers were not provided for. I said no, never. They came in for honour and to serve their country; that the Lord Chancellor was the only lawyer, and he had made his fortune previously. The Hereditary Prince said that Ferreri and Averna had lost their places. I made no answer to this. He spoke of the dismissal[s], whether it should not be said that they asked them. I said I thought the best way was to do as in England and to give no reasons. I proposed Fitalia as *locum tenens* for Foreign Affairs. He made no objection. He said he was not very wise, but as good, certainly, as Lucchesi. I had a very long conversation with him, but it was for the most part a repetition of former conversations.

I saw Settimo in the evening. He brought me Carini's acceptance of my offer, expressed in the most handsome manner. Belmonte also brought Villafranca, whom he persuaded to accept the charge. Before he came, Settimo told me that Villermosa had said he would bet that Belmonte meant to take the merit of persuading him, and so it was.

Wednesday, October 27, 1813. I went to the Hereditary Prince at 11. I told him of the new Ministers having at last accepted. He asked if I thought Villafranca capable of the office. I said he spoke well, and that, besides, His Royal Highness did the business himself. He said Caracciolo was a very honest man. Gerardi was the most capable. He said he saw Caracciolo every day. Did I think, he said, that the new Ministers would obtain a majority in the Parliament? I said yes, I hoped so. He talked of the manner of dismissing the old Ministers, that there would be no objection to thanking them for the services they had

rendered in the short time they had acted. I said I thought not. He said Ferreri had granted to him a pension of 400 ounces per ann[um]. I thought he was rich. [The] Hereditary Prince said he was, but it was his due. I said I thought they ought to be considered in any new arrangement of judicial offices. Averna, for example, might have an office in the magistracy. They had deceived in one instance, but they had not been generally contrary. The Ministers to be appointed directly, and the Council to be held tomorrow.

I sent for the printer of a paper very impertinent to myself. He refused to give the name of the author to me, but would do so to a magistrate. I sent for the magistrate in the evening, and the printer said it was the Marquis Merlo.

Thursday, October 28, 1813. I went at 12 to attend a Council on the question of the dissolution of the Parliament. The Hereditary Prince called me in before, and asked if they were agreed on the points expressed in the paper. I answered that they could not but be agreed. He talked of the troops marching to the interior, and said not a man would move.

I asked him if the King was at the Ficuzza. He said no, at Solanto. He said he was very quiet. I said the public said he wanted to return to power. I said I was disposed to believe it, as I did not otherwise think that the opposite party would hang so close together. I said His Royal Highness must know whether the King had any such intention. He said he did not know.

There was then Council, at which it was determined to dissolve the Parliament without calling it again immediately, but the latter point was not settled.

I saw Villafranca and told him that the Hereditary Prince opened all the letters addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and wrote them all without communicating to his Minister the contents. I conceived this to be quite unconstitutional, and I advised Villafranca to say to the Hereditary Prince that he must beg him to have the letters addressed to His Royal Highness him[self]; that he did not wish to know what might pass between His Royal Highness and others; but as Minister for Foreign Affairs he was answerable for the correspondence with the ministers as far as regarded the affairs of Sicily, and he should take the liberty of submitting for His Royal Highness' approbation from time to time such communications as he judged expedient.

I saw Bonanno for the first time. He seemed a sensible bold man. I suggested that previously to going to the Hereditary Prince we should assemble at his house to hear read the Speech from the Throne.

Friday, October 29, 1813. (1) We assembled at Bonanno's and heard his speech, which was good and for the most part approved. Great Britain was introduced, which I begged to have omitted. I also submitted my own proclamation, taking upon myself the public peace, which was approved with some few verbal alterations.

We then went to the Hereditary Prince, having shown him before the Council my proclamation. He made only this remark, whether it would not have been better to have

been issued in the name of the Prince. I said it would certainly be more regular, but I was confident his Ministers would not dare to do it. They were all afraid of the vengeance of their countrymen. Every set of Ministers he had had were the same in this respect. I begged him to propose it to them.

They came in, and the speech was read and further alterations made. The Hereditary Prince approved of it very much for the most part. They were of opinion that the old vote of the last Parliament respecting the finances might be legally continued. I expressed a doubt about it. I was to examine it afterwards. There was a good deal of discussion upon this point. I then showed my proclamation, and the Hereditary Prince stated the idea that it should be issued by Government. Belmonte took it up directly. The whole of them were alarmed and wished to have nothing to do with it.

I saw the Duke of Orleans afterwards, and I told him there had been a question about his money, and that it appeared to be the opinion of the Council that the vote of the last Parliament should hold good, by which the votes unfavourable to his claim in the present Parliament would not have effect. I ventured to give him my advice, and not to take it if it was offered to him; to say that as the present Parliament had refused it to him, it would be inconsistency with his ideas of delicacy to accept it again until another Parliament had renewed the vote. In the meantime I offered to pay him from the subsidy. He said he would think of it. He came back in the evening, and said the Duchess doubted very much of the policy of my advice, and that if once refused it was like expressing a doubt of the right. He said he would speak to Belmonte. Talking of the Council and the fear they all had of the responsibility, I observed they were in the right, for their fear of vengeance was just. The Duke said they were all alike, court and people. It was the common expression among all the court party. Salluzzo had the words always in his mouth: "*la cour ne pardonne jamais*".

(1) Packet arrived from England in 25 days.

Saturday, October 30, 1813. (1) The Duke of Orleans and Belmonte came to talk to me upon the question of the Duke's receiving the money. Belmonte agreed that there was no longer any Parliamentary sanction for the exaction of any further taxes after the end of October; that necessity was the only law. Both he and the Duke were of opinion that, if offered by the Government, the Duke should not refuse it; that it would operate against him with the Parliament. I observed that they were the best judges of the effect likely to be made upon these people. Elsewhere the delicacy I had proposed would operate favourably, and my giving the money in the meantime would disarm the vengeance entertained against him, as it would show its inefficiency. They both thought this would have a bad effect; that the Parliament would make it a pretext for shaking him off altogether. This latter objection seemed better founded.

Parliament dissolved. Some disturbance expected, but none took place.

(1) Parliament dissolved.

My proclamation issued making myself responsible for the public tranquillity.

Sunday, October 31, 1813. (1) The Duke of Orleans came. He read me a letter he had received from Proval relating a conversation with Castelcicala relative to the old Ministry, in which Castelcicala strongly approved the change, saying that it was quite right that the people should see the accounts before they imposed the taxes. A language very constitutional but quite new and foreign to Castelcicala's habit and principles.

The Duke also showed me the Hereditary Prince's answer to the Duke de Berri's application, of which the Hereditary Prince had given him a copy. In this the Hereditary Prince states that the King, "*toujours fidèle à ses engagements*", had not executed his promise because from the time of his leaving Naples to the period of the Constitution, the Army and other expenses of the government had reduced him to the greatest distress; that since the new Constitution he had been obliged to live very much *à l'étroit et même à des privations* ; that he could not therefore now either fulfil his engagement, but if he recovered his kingdom of Naples he might be assured that he would do what he could.

I told the Duke we were to have a meeting of the Council about finance etc., and I did not know if Belmonte would attend. He said that Belmonte seemed now quite pleased and contented. Belmonte happened to come, and I proposed to him to be present, telling him what was to be done. He said he was going out of town, but as it was finance, the old and the new Ministers of that branch were all that were necessary.

(1) I attended at Catarinelli's marriage.

Palermo, Monday, November 1, 1813.(1) I went to a meeting of the Ministers held at Bonanno's. We talked of the finances, and a statement was to be made showing the assistance he might want from me and the demands of the Army. Nothing particular occurred. Belmonte was [not] there but all the rest were present.

(1) Sir J. Murray dined with me.

Tuesday, November 2, 1813.(1) The Padre Piazza paid me a visit. He talked of the Sicilians. He said he had been 34 years in Sicily and knew the Sicilian character well. They were quick but not consequent or steady; lay before them three or four ideas and they saw the connection quickly, but add another and they were lost. He had observed this always in his instruction of the youth. He had been years before he could find a good assistant, notwithstanding he had taken the greatest pains. They would apply with great diligence for two or three months and then give it up. Then they wanted fortune all at once. It was the character of the people to be very envious. Tasso had said of them *vili in guerra, traditori in pace*. St Paul also said all islands were bad, but worst of all Sicily. He said upon a former occasion that they were a nation *des singes*. He undertook to bring Gagliani to me, who, he said, had great *connaissances, beaucoup d'esprit et de droiture*. Had been formerly

confined for a year for having imported French papers contrary to an edict of the court. Ardizzone fled to France and Gagliani was taken.

(1) Mr Smith went on board the *Unité* upon my persuasion, in exceedingly bad health. Dined with Sir J. Dalrymple.

Wednesday, November 3, 1813. (1) Nothing occurred of any moment. The town quiet. Settimo and Bonanno came to me and showed me a deficit to the end of December of 131,000 ounces. Settled with Mr Bissett for obtaining a loan of 100,000. Gibbs to be employed. Mr Bissett thought money could be raised on better terms at Gibraltar and Malta, at 10 instead of 12 per cent. He had some idea about a paper circulation. I asked Bonanno if there were no bankers here who would [or] might like to have a kind of Exchequer bills. He said none. Besides, people got half and 2 per cent per month for their money.

(1) Dined with Mr Stirling.

Thursday, November 4, 1813. The Duke of Angiò wrote a violent letter against me. I sent Krausse to him to beg him to come. He said he would, as soon as two persons left him. Wrote me a letter saying that he had come to me 5 times without seeing [me] and begged me to send an officer to him to say that I wished to see him. I went myself and left my name. I sent again to him, but the answer was that he was asleep. Douglas then saw him. He said he did not like to come. He was afraid of my insulting him. Douglas told him I had been always his friend. I had got him out of Marittimo. Angiò said it was not I but my Government. In the evening Douglas saw him, and he then said he would not come, upon which I sent him a message stating that I had treated him with every consideration; that I sincerely wished the affair amicably settled; that I had waited upon him myself for that purpose; and that now, if he did not come, I would have him brought by force. He begged time to reflect upon my message.

Friday, November 5, 1813.(1) I saw the Duke of Angiò and had a very long conversation with him in Douglas's presence, but it was not very satisfactory.

The Senate came to me. They said there was a scarcity of wine and almost a total want of it. They had been with Prince Carini, who treated them very ill, said they could obtain a supply of wine by force. I answered they should have it. I observed to them that the consequence of using force would be that in a few days there would be no wine at all, for the retailers would not bring their goods to market. They agreed in this. I then remarked to them that the great error was the fixed prices; that I thought they should be abolished, and at the same time a law against monopolists. Munzone, one of the Council, seemed to wish to compromise me with an opinion upon the total abolition. I told him that I thought some

few articles of the first necessity should have a fixed price, but the rest left open. We were in fact more imposed upon than before. They all admitted this. I said to them that if they would persuade the Civic Council to do away the *metà*, I would punish the monopolists. I asked them about grain. They said they had enough, I think 20,000 salms. I said I had 10,000 if they wanted any.

I saw Villermosa in the evening. The Hereditary Prince had said to them that he was determined to be upon the most intimate terms with me, like his two fingers (presenting together the forefingers of his two hands). He had also said to Angiò that what was an offence to me was as much so to himself. Met Airoidi, Settimo at Villermosa's to talk of future measures.

(1) Sent off n^o. 24 to Lady William by Resistance.

Saturday, November 6, 1813. (1) Nothing new occurred.

(1) Genl Bourse and Gosfield landed. The former came in the Cossack, Capt. Stanfield, a gentleman-like man.

Sunday, November 7, 1813. After church I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He told me of an idea he had of offering himself to >one< of the allies in Germany. He knew Bernadotte and thought he might wish to have him. At the same time he did not think it unlikely that he might aspire to the crown of France. I told him his plan was a very good one if he wanted to have a *carrière*, because if after all he failed he was only where he was before. I told him also that I thought we were more likely to succeed here as to his allowance when absent than when present. I thought he had been sacrificed to Belmonte. They had been coupled together, and upon their intimacy was built the story of the regency, which everyone believed.

I called upon the Hereditary Prince to enquire after the Princess, who had miscarried.

Monday, November 8, 1813. I saw the Duke of Orleans again. He spoke to me at length about his business. He said he had mentioned it to the Duchess, who had given her opinion that the Emperor was deeply prejudiced upon the subject of revolutionary principles, and that they none of them would like to see him.

He mentioned the Queen having wished the Emperor to have married the Duchess after the death of her sister. He said to me, "but if I go will you promise that I should come back again?", and had a distrust that I wanted to get him away. After trying to convince him of the folly of this feeling, after assuring him that I never had received a single line, private or public, about him (for such was the custom of our Ministry, whereas the French Government would have given the most precise instructions in such a case), and notwithstanding these assurances perceiving his distrust to continue, I became angry with him and expressed to him my surprise that he should not take me at my word. He then

begged my pardon. I told him I supposed one could not live so long in this country without catching some of the *maladie du pays*, which was distrust.

In this conversation I expressed my doubts about England having interfered with his objects in Spain. He said before he went Mr Cook and some other ministerial man (I think Mr Hammond) desired him not to go to Spain. He judged from this that the Government had defeated his views. I doubted this very much; that I believed they had never meddled with the Government; that it was entirely left to the Spaniards. He thought otherwise. When he went with Leopold, he had hoped that his going with him would offer the best proof that he had no views of his own.

He said the great fault we had made in Spain was not to have made a government before we made an assembly. There is some truth in this remark.

He said Lord Wellington had always wanted to be commander in chief and could never effect it. He talked of the plan upon which Lord Wellington would act when he entered France. I said he probably would have no plan, I mean of support of this or that person. He would do as in Spain, invite all to deliver their country from the tyranny of Bonaparte. He would of course receive all and give his support to anyone who would set up against him.

Tuesday, November 9, 1813.(1) Employed all day in writing dispatches for England.

(1) Went up [Mount] Pellegrino with Capt. Dundas.

Wednesday, November 10, 1813. (1) A Council was held for the nomination of the Gran Camerari. Hereditary Prince approved the recommendation of his Ministers. It was considered how Lucchesi could be provided for. It was first proposed by Villermosa to make him Minister in Sweden. It was afterwards suggested to send him to Spain, the Hereditary Prince saying that Priolo was a *bête*. He spoke of him with great displeasure. They all agreed that Priolo should be recalled. But as Lucchesi could not go, it was to be considered who should be *chargé d'affaires*. Belmonte proposed the Marquis Salvo. The Hereditary Prince bounced at this. Others proposed the young Aceto. The Hereditary Prince was not more pleased at this, and they came to no conclusion.

I saw the Duke of Orleans in the afternoon. I met him in the street. He told me he had been speaking at length to Catinelli, who gave him no hopes of success at Vienna; that if he went to the frontier in his own name, he was sure they would not let him even enter the territory. All would unite against him. It would be worse at the court of Russia, where they were a set of *polissons* (which is true), the court divided into parties as well as the army; that the Duke would not be able to put up with the *grossièretés* of the Grand-Duke Constantine for a week. The King of Prussia was the most enlightened of the whole. He was a real gentleman and wished for the good of his subjects; would be happy to give them a constitution. He might have been happy to have employed him, but he was not with the army. He had given all his power to Bernadotte.

(1) Dispatched packet for England. No. 25 to Lady William.

Thursday, November 11, 1813. I talked with Catinelli about the Duke of Orleans's plan. He said his only chance was of going through incognito. He told me a sensible remark of the Duke of Orleans's, that the 20 years of the French Revolution was worth the six ages of the Roman history; that in that time the French had gone through the whole of the five acts of Rome, liberty, slavery, universal dominion etc.

I called upon the King with Lt-Genl MacFarlane. It was just before dinner, about quarter before 12. Cassaro, the Archbishop, Circello and others were present. We talked of the good news received that day from Spain. Also of the hard weather last winter, by which, at the time and after, he had lost 150 of his stud. I said it was a pity they had not artificial grass and houses for their cattle. He said in this country they trusted themselves to Providence. They only knew the hour. I added if it was possible they would not even acknowledge that. He was very civil and looked very well.

Marchand told me that Bernadotte had been a great friend of Moreau's. After Moreau's trial, his estate was sold to pay the expenses of the process. Buonaparte, to make an effect upon the public, and to discredit and mortify Bernadotte, made him live in Moreau's house in Paris, and made him also give a ball in it. He was mortified to the quick at it. Buonaparte also made Berthier take his house at Grosbois. Berthier was another friend, but attached to Buonaparte, and although he did not like the proceeding, yet he consented with less ill will, and the good shooting at it consoled him in some respect. He said Bernadotte was a very serious man. Had made himself very much liked wherever he had been; was a Gascon; was *faible d'esprit* but firm from character, and a very good officer. In Italy his division and Moreau's in the beginning of the wars fought, calling each other Monsieur and Citoyen, one a royalist, the other Jacobin. Afterwards Bernadotte was Minister of War and employed all the most furious Jacobins. He was removed from thence by

Bernadotte was an excellent officer. Buonaparte never liked him and had always given him the worst commissions. I asked him if in Paris there were any civilians to whom the public looked up. He said none very popular, though much respected. I asked him what they would do in case Buonaparte was killed, or to die. He said the case had been foreseen after the battle of Aspern; that Talleyrand and others had considered the case and had resolved to call together the assemblies, to set up the King of Rome, and to repair the Constitution so as to give themselves liberty.

Friday, November 12, 1813. Salvo came in the morning, saying that Belmonte had recommended him in the Council for Spain, and hoping for my good word. I told him I had not interfered and did not wish to do so; that it was a matter of great delicacy as the Hereditary Prince thought England, as I believed, had opposed their interests, and as I knew the Hereditary Prince attached great value to the succession; but I thought another court would suit him as well, and I mentioned England.

Called upon the Hereditary Prince with the military papers. He spoke afterwards upon many subjects. 1st upon the proposal of sending Salvo to Spain. I said, speaking as an honest man, I could not say that such a nomination was at all suitable. I thought there should be a person of much more respectability. He asked me whom I thought. I said I did not know, but it appeared to me that Scaletta would be a proper person. His Royal Highness had confidence in him, and as His Royal Highness and his family had a great interest in Spanish affairs, it seemed requisite for the support of their rights that there should be a person there who might properly support the interests of the family. He said he liked Scaletta, but he did not know if he would go as second. I said he would probably have no objection of going as second with the promise of succeeding as first. I asked him if England had interfered on one side or the other. He said these things happened before his times, but he rather believed not and had left it to the Cortes. I said young Aceto was more objectionable than Salvo. He said Villafranca (1) had before proposed him as clerk in the House of Lords, and that Belmonte had said "*il ne faut pas mettre un jupon* in that situation". "This", said the Hereditary Prince, "I heard with my own ears". I said I thought Salvo had behaved well and might be employed in some other court, where he would be second (such, added the Hereditary Prince, as at Vienna under Ruffo, where he could do no harm and be kept in order). I said I was sorry to hear yesterday such a proposition made to him, and that if it had been first privately discussed it would not have been made.

2ndly, he asked me about the King, how I had found him. Did I think he would go back to Naples if there was an opening? I said yes, I thought he would, though he would not be acting wisely. Some time ago, the Hereditary Prince said, nothing would have tempted him to move, now he thought he would go.

He talked of Leopold and said he was a good young man. I observed it was a pity he had been brought up without any employment. He said he had always pressed the Queen to give him the command of a regiment, if only for occupation. He said he had a very good heart and very good principles. He had asked for another year's leave for his people, the officers who accompanied him, and had asked keys for them. The Hereditary Prince hoped there was nothing objectionable in this request. I thought not.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans.(2) He had said he had given my message to Belmonte, but that Belmonte was evidently not satisfied with it and said, "You see when once one belongs to a Ministry, it is difficult to keep away from the Council"; that people put unfavourable representations upon it, and that he would make another proposition to me, that there should only be one Council in the week. I begged the Duke to say to him that I would rather attend less often; that my wish had been that neither he or Villermosa should be in the Council; that they were the great obstacles to gaining the House of Peers; that as I must carry on the government for the next three or four months, so I wished that all difficulties should be as much as possible removed. I begged him to say this to Belmonte; that I wished him to lay by and regain his popularity, when he could come again, come forward with great advantage to himself and his country. I told the Duke that I knew very well he wanted to be in power and would be always unhappy out of it, and the Duke said it was very true. It was all his love of office. He suggested, as taking away from him a cause

of his acting wrong, that it would be well to send Raddusa to Spain. I told him what had passed with the Hereditary Prince.

Speaking of the Hereditary Prince and Belmonte, I told him that I was sure the Hereditary Prince did not like him. He did not like his flippant manner; that the Hereditary Prince was a plain matter of fact man, going more directly to the point, when the subject was not quite new to him, than any of his Counsellors; that his remarks were exceedingly *à propos* in general; that all of us Englishmen had been struck in the same manner; that Belmonte's digressions annoyed him; that Belmonte would never have influence again. He had made use of Belmonte when he was afraid of me. The Duke said St Clair had said of him before he went away, "you think him changed? You are mistaken. He is and ever will be the same as he is at present". I said all that Belmonte had persuaded him was the necessity of complete submission. He had done nothing else, and perhaps events had done as much as his persuasion. I remarked of the Hereditary Prince that his defect was not in understanding or comprehension but in weakness of character.

The Duke of Orleans came to me after dinner, and told me that he had communicated to Belmonte all that I had said to him in the morning, that I wished neither he or Villermosa had been in Council; that I wished that from the effect both here and in England; that at present I only wished him to come into the Council as seldom as possible; that I had stated home that he was only to come in once a month; that I had foreseen the possibility of their disapproving in England my seeming to force upon the country a Ministry which they had so lately rejected; that I had therefore represented him, Belmonte, as unwilling to come in but as having yielded to my persuasions; that I wished him to be consulted, and that I would consult him in everything. He said Belmonte was pleased and would do whatever I wished. The Duke told him that for the present I considered myself as the first Minister of the country, and that I must through necessity carry on the government, and that I wished all the obstacles to gaining the House of Peers to be removed. Belmonte talked of Salvo and Aceto and hoped Rosabia and Gregorio would be provided for.

The Duke of Serradifalco and Gagliani came in the evening with their plan for the establishment of courts of justice.

(1) The Hereditary Prince told me that Villafranca had proposed a court promotion. He asked me what I thought. I said I thought much better not to have it at present.

(2) The Duke of Orleans talked of Italy, and exactly specified the expedition intended to be made.

Saturday, November 13, 1813. Belmonte came. He adverted to the Duke of Orleans's communications respecting himself. He said it was impossible not to attend the Council without giving rise to foolish reports. I said I was aware of this, and I had something to propose which I thought would satisfy all parties. It was that in general the Ministers only should meet, and that the Council should only be called upon extraordinary occasions. It seemed to me that thus we should get rid of the difficulty over Belmonte's jealousy of Villermosa if the latter attended the Council oftener than himself.

At dinner with the Duke of Orleans, the Duchess talked to me a great deal about his going abroad. She seemed to wish that he should have a *carrière*. She spoke of it as a thing very much to be desired.

Sunday, November 14, 1813.(1) Nothing new occurred. Principessa Paternò, speaking of the Sicilians, said "for example, if you were to do me all the good possible; had made the marriage of my daughter; done this and that; serving me for years together; in a moment of humour, I might be capable of becoming your most violent enemy".

(1) Walked up to the flagstaff on Mount Pellegrino. Three quarters of an hour to church, half an hour to flagstaff. Back: 20 minutes to church, 50 down.

Monday, November 15, 1813.(1) Cattolica came to me in the morning and told me that, speaking to Linguaglossa (*une bête*) of the folly of the opposition of the Peers, he said: "I know it is useless", but added "do you know why? We all are convinced of the intention of the King to return".

The Duke of Orleans came in the evening. He had seen the King; nothing particular. He then went to the Hereditary Prince. It was the name day of Leopold, a day of compliment. The Duke had a long conversation with the Hereditary Prince. The Hereditary Prince did not know of the dinner at Cassaro's, where the King, with the Archbishop and Circello, were to be present. The Duke said there was to be a great *lévee* at the Colli today. The Duke said the King was very gay when he last saw him. This kind of appearance always indicated something going on. I told the Duke my belief, that they wanted to persuade the King to resume. The Hereditary Prince told the Duke that they, Cassaro and others, wanted to break his neck with the King's and the King's with his; that they did not want one or the other, but to get rid of the English and to establish a feudal aristocracy. Cassaro, he said, had always wanted him to break with the English. "In this very room, at that spot, he went down upon both knees to urge me to do so". Talking of him, he said he wanted to be Prime Minister, as did also Belmonte. (It was late, and I have not an accurate recollection of what passed).

I told the Duke that I had an idea of begging Caccamo to ask the King if he meant to return to Naples. I would simply ask the question. I was sure it would make a diversion; that the step could do no harm, and might do a great deal of good. It might bring me in contact with the King. It might enable me to remonstrate with him, to show him the inconsistency of his opposing us here while he wanted us there. The Duke thought it might answer some good purpose. The Duke said he had not seen Belmonte, but he had seen Aceto, who had consulted with him about Belmonte's going to England. Aceto thought Belmonte might be persuaded if Raddusa could accompany him.

(1) Sent orders to Col. Bruce about Buscemi.

Tuesday, November 16, 1813. I had a long consultation with Rowley and Dundas respecting the expedition of the 3rd Italians under Catinelli. Catinelli was present and pressed it very much. My mind misgives me very much. The chances appear to me so much against success. I said so to Catinelli. He said the French could not hurt him; that he was always safe in the mountains; that they could only attack with equal or superior numbers; that if equal, he could resist, if with superior they could not maintain themselves. The mountains were infinitely less accessible than those of Cataluna. The Aretins had never been dislodged.

The objections evidently were that such a small force could easily be dislodged; that we did not know the state of the country. We did not know whether the French and Austrian armies were actually in the field or not, or where; that the retreat of the Viceroy to Italy would make the thing more difficult; that it would be more easy for him to detach a force against us. I suggested that the regiment should go to Ponza, and from thence to send an officer to Italy to ascertain its state. This Catinelli resisted, saying he would be answerable for success. Other objections there were: that if the expedition did not succeed, that the partisans would be sacrificed and every future effort attended with the greatest difficulty. The advantages were that, if it succeeded, a very great diversion would be made and the whole chain of mountains put in insurrection. Capt. Rowley said Catinelli's confidence encouraged him, but he believed the more it was considered the more difficulties he feared would arise. Dundas thought it difficult but worth trying; it could only be done by men of war.

Catinelli went away at my request. I showed Rowley my instructions relative to assistance to be given to Italy under a variety of cases: by instructions from Lord Aberdeen, or from any general officer in Italy without my having heard from Lord Aberdeen. I said it would be a great justification if Lord Aberdeen had desired a diversion, or an Austrian general had asked. I thought if we could gain time, much would be obtained. In the meantime I should receive probably another communication in lieu of the two *parlementaires* sent from Murat, which had foundered at sea. We should also receive another mail from England, and I might hear from the Earl Aberdeen. The transports would probably arrive which I had sent for, and which were necessary to follow up the success of the first expedition. This might be objected to if I failed, that even with success I had made no provision for following it up. So we resolved to delay a week, and in the meantime the *America* was to be caulked.

Wednesday, November 17, 1813. I called upon the Duke of Orleans. We talked of Belmonte's going to England. Aceto had been with the Duke, as he had been with me the same day, projecting a mode by which Belmonte could be induced to go there. He had suggested the necessity of having a good person in London, and Belmonte entirely agreed in it. He left the case there, not daring to go further. Aceto said either I or the Duke must persuade him. Upon mentioning this subject to the Duke, he said he thought Belmonte had some wind of the idea, as the last time he had seen [him] he had been very *boutonné*.

The Duke, talking of the judges of France under the old system, said they were very good. They were however never taken from among the lawyers but from a class educated for that

purpose. He said the instances were numerous in which the King was cast in these courts. He said whole benches of them were swept off in the Revolution.

St Laurent told me that when he was formerly doing duty on the Alps on the frontier between Piedmont and France, that they suffered excessively from the cold, being obliged to thaw everything before they could eat it. The men had no greatcoats. The glaciers were very dangerous after the snow began to fall. Deep ravines were covered slightly over, and the snow gave way when walked upon. When the snow began to melt, fragments of rocks of ice were rent and fell, making a noise like a hundred pieces of cannon. There were deep in the mountains the chamois, but the flesh stringy and not good. The best was the *bouquetin*, an animal that lived on the glaciers, the flesh excellent but heating. The animal fed on moss and on a berry, which he pronounced like *tumpi*. He had drank of tea made from this berry, and the heating quality of it put him immediately in a state of high perspiration. Physicians in Piedmont mixed some of the blood of this animal in broths, as very nourishing and warming.

Thursday, November 18, 1813. (1) I sent St Laurent to Caccamo to beg him to ask the King whether he intended to resume the government at Naples in the event of that kingdom being reconquered. He said Caccamo seemed pleased with the commission.

I went to the Council. I saw the Hereditary Prince before it. He talked of the embassy in Spain, and asked me who I thought should go there for the present. I said I did not know. He asked me if I thought Scaletta would accept it. He said I could sound him when I went to Messina. I told him that I thought he ought to have a man to his own fancy; that, to Sicily, Spain was of no importance. She could scarcely at present take care of herself. Elsewhere she did not look. Hereafter it would be different, but regarding the rights of himself and his family it was important that they should have a person to look after them. I begged His Royal Highness to consider who would be agreeable to them.

He spoke of Niscemi and of his having lost his place. He said he was a good man; had always voted with whatever government, and had therefore never been very hostile. He begged me to speak to the Ministers.

He spoke of my journey in Sicily, and asked why I undertook it. I told him my great object was the administration of justice; to hear what the people wanted. I then told him my opinion that the *capoluoghi* would all prefer, if they could not have a tribunal, to have the circuit court. He said "you must not forget also to see the principal people, in order that the elections may go right".

There was then Council, and various appointments were made.

(1) Packet arrived from England, 24 days.

Friday, November 19, 1813. St Laurent returned to Caccamo to receive the King's answer. It was that he should resume the reins of government at Naples, that he begged me to put in writing what I had to communicate, or to charge some person with it.

I saw Pantelleria and had a long conversation with him about courts of justice. He said he believed he had been misrepresented to me; that he was old and wanted nothing; should be glad to show me what he had done, he having been one of the committee employed for the code. He said the nation was *avilie*, having been so long in slavery.

Saturday, November 20, 1813. (1) St Laurent went to Caccamo and told him that I wished to have a personal interview with the King regarding the subject of Naples, and that there was nothing at present to commit to writing; that I did not wish to make any communication through the means of a third person.

I went to the meeting of the Council at Villafranca's office. I spoke to them very strongly about the necessity of sending a Sicilian Minister to London; that there would probably be a general peace, and the English would leave the island. What then would become of the Constitution, left without the protection of a single Sicilian soldier against the ill will of the court? It was proposed to bring Castelcicala away. Both I and Belmonte assured them of the impossibility of this measure; that if they took away his salary, the King and Hereditary Prince would pay him out of their own pocket. Belmonte said that England would not desert Sicily. I said I did not see how she could keep any troops there during the peace. Every nation would be required to evacuate the territories of their allies. There was no pretext for interference, and the King, or whoever reigned, would be the first to require it in order to be master. Belmonte pressed the impossibility, but I strongly advised him to doubt our stay here. For this purpose it was necessary to have a man in London who could fight the case of Sicily, and it should be man of talents, for that man might really be the saviour of the country. Now the ground was in possession of our enemy, who did all in his power against Sicily. Belmonte desired Villafranca to speak to me about it. Other things were discussed, but of comparatively little importance.

I called upon the Hereditary Prince with the news. He had not heard it. He said he thought this a good time to treat with Murat. I thought so also, but that it was unnecessary to give him the same terms as before. I then told the Hereditary Prince that I had asked the King through Caccamo if he would go to Naples, and I told him exactly all that had passed. He asked me what I intended to propose to the King. I said I merely wished to speak to him upon the subject, and if possible to get more in contact with him and to undeceive him if possible. I said he was ill surrounded, there were those that *lui échauffaient la tête*; that otherwise I was sure he would be quiet. The Hereditary Prince said it was so; and when I said I wanted to be nearer to the King, he said, "I will tell you that since you have been nearer me I have thought very differently of you from what I did before"; that before I had been held up as a (I forget the expression) sort of monster. He said that he now knew that I wanted to do that which was [to] the benefit of the King, Queen and the royal family.

I said the King should assure the people of Naples, as an example of one thing necessary to be done, that there should be no retrospect and that the scenes of '99 were not to be acted over again. The Hereditary Prince said that was very necessary. He said he believed the King was liked. I answered I could not say. I asked him if the King would give an allowance to Murat. He said he certainly would, and told me that although he had not told the King what had passed at Ponza, yet that, Ruffo having written to him that Murat had made propositions to the court of Vienna, he had with the consent of the King expressed the King's readiness to make a provision for Murat; and he had told this transaction at the time to Lord Montgomerie.

The Duke of Orleans came in the evening. He read the gazette. He had known MacDonal, he had been an ADC of Dumouriez's: was not clever but a brave officer. The Duke full of an expedition to Italy of which he was to form a part.

I never saw Belmonte more vain. He always is so when in good health and spirits. Talking of himself, he said "You know me and that I have no ambition, that I have been content with being second and third when I have had Sicily in my hand" (opening it) "if I had chosen it".

Sir John and Lady Murray sailed in Cossack for coast of Spain.

Accounts came of the defeat of Buonaparte at Leipzig.

Sunday, November 21, 1813. Balsamo came to me and, speaking of Belmonte's going to England, he said he should be glad to accompany him. He said of him that in prosperity nobody was bolder, and if well encouraged, but against difficulties he could not struggle. He wanted somebody to urge him on.

I sent St Laurent to Caccamo for the King's answer. He seemed annoyed by the King's having said that he would send it through another person. Caccamo said "they think I belong to the English party". In the evening I received a letter from Circello saying that he had a letter from the King to deliver into my own hands.

Monday, November 22, 1813. I sent St Laurent in the morning to Circello for the King's letter. I wished to speak only to the King himself. In the evening I sent St Laurent back to Circello with a written answer to the King.

I saw the Duke of Serradifalco and Balsamo about the courts of justice. I took this opportunity of talking to them at length about the danger to which the Sicilian Constitution would be exposed by a general peace. The King was hostile to it, and had never lent himself to it. All that he had done was by force. Who was there to defend the liberty of Sicily? The nobility were against it, and the people were in no manner prepared for the contest. We had had now two Parliaments, and neither had adopted the measures necessary for their security. The first, instead of voting the principle that every man must defend his country, made the contrary resolution. The second did as bad. They joined with the court party to throw down the only security for their liberty. Both Parliaments had been pursuing the shadow and neglecting the substance. I stated the necessity of every man in his own sphere endeavouring all in his power to impress these truths, and to fill the nation with some enthusiasm and to rouse them from the degradation in which they were. I stated my conviction that if tomorrow the King said there should be no Parliament, not a hand would be lifted against so arbitrary an act.

I had a meeting with Turri and Catinelli to talk about Italy. Both Catinelli and I thought the Austrians were at Milan. We all thought that it was necessary to do something, to be beforehand if possible with the old sovereigns, and to give the people an opportunity of asserting their rights, liberty and independence. This consideration made me much more

anxious for the expedition than I before had been. Catinelli only regretted now that the expedition would be attended with *no danger*. For his part, he was ready to sacrifice himself for Italy, and he was anxious that the Italians should vindicate their honour as the other nations had done. He would not that they only should do nothing.

The Duke of Orleans came in the evening. He told me he had paid a visit to the King and found him going to dinner with Cassaro, Trabia, and Naselli. The King made an excuse for being found in such company, evidently, as the Duke thought, to be carried to me. He said he was dining with his country neighbours. The King was very gracious and in the highest spirits. The Duke was full of the expedition and said he was writing a memoir upon the subject. He wanted that we should go to Leghorn. I told him we had no transports and could not land if we did go, unless they opened their gates to us. I talked to him of Belmonte's going to England. He said Belmonte had been with him in the morning and had complained very much of the state of his health.

I went afterwards to Belmonte and proposed to him his going, but he rejected it and said his health would not permit, and wanted to persuade me that England would never abandon Sicily. I said he was mistaken in supposing that Sicily was necessary to Malta. Malta was quite independent, and in having it we thought we had everything. He said it would be impossible for him to stay if we were to go. I urged him by every means in my power, but apparently without success.

Tuesday, November 23, 1813. (1) Circello called upon St Laurent and told him he had a letter from the King which he was to deliver into my own hands.

I attended a Council of the Ministers. It was agreed that Villafranca should propose the next day to the Hereditary Prince that a Sicilian Minister should be sent to the court of London. There was considerable difficulty about the nomination of the Vice-Camerari. Bonanno proposed Prince Bosco, Ugo, Facchina, and Santa Lucia. Villafranca and Belmonte wanted Gregorio, Salvo, and Aceto to be employed also. For Salvo, he might go abroad; for the other two, various propositions were ineffectually made.

(1) French papers came. Buonaparte at Mainz, and battle of Hanau.

Wednesday, November 24, 1813. Saw Airoidi. Endeavoured to arrange with him the nomination of the Camerari. He brought young Marquis Gregorio to present to me.

I went to the Council. I saw the Hereditary Prince before it; but before I went to him I called upon Circello to receive the King's letter. He said the King was going tomorrow to the Ficuzza: if I had anything particular to say to him, I could see him before he went. I told him I had nothing to say to the King; that His Majesty had expressed his intention of resuming the government of Naples; that the events now passing might lead to that occasion, tomorrow or next day or three months hence, or never; we did not know, and I could wish to be prepared for it. I desired to talk with the King, and to hear his sentiments upon these subjects. Circello made a palaver about the King's sincerity, that he would be

everlastingly obliged to me, and so on. He wanted to draw out from me what I wanted to say to the King, and said, for example, the King is resolved to give a general amnesty even from the year 1799.

I told him my wish was to speak and to treat directly with the King; that I had seen the misunderstanding that took place when a third person interfered. Circello said no misunderstanding would now take place with the King, alluding to the Queen. I said I hoped not. I said I was going away tomorrow for a fortnight or three weeks; that in that time we should better see the state of affairs. He said the King wished to know what I wanted to say, as he was often troubled when questions were put to him.

Palermo, Saturday, December 25, 1813. (1) Arrived at Palermo from Valledlunga in a carriage and three horses abreast, once changed. Distance 60 miles in ten hours. Roads, part of them, were very much out of repair. Came 2 a.m. Call upon the Hereditary Prince, but did not see him. Went afterwards to the Duke of Orleans. Saw him. Had a long conversation with Belmonte.

(1) Went to church and received sacraments.

Sunday, December 26, 1813. Circello called upon me and said that he came from the King to express a wish to see me. I said I would call on the 28th at ten o'clock.

Monday, December 27, 1813. I called upon the Hereditary Prince and gave him an account of my journey. I told him of the *prepotenza* that generally prevailed, the result, I believed, of the feudal system and of the administration of justice being in the hands of the barons. I told him that I had found all ranks [...] except the nobles. The Hereditary Prince said they wanted back their old privileges and would be glad to establish an aristocracy in the country. I said it was impossible to know the country without having seen it. He said he thought of making a tour next spring. I told him I thought he would do well, that it would be of very great use.

I said I was to see the King the next day. The Hereditary Prince said he had told nothing to the King of what had passed.

Tuesday, December 28, 1813. I went to the King at the time appointed. He took me into his bedroom where he made me sit down. He then asked what had passed with M. de Schininà. I told him I would inform him of all that passed without any concealment; that he knew there was someone come, but that his son had told him nothing (I have every reason to believe this true in words but false in fact. Perhaps and probably false in both. I believe Poli to communicate everything to the King by the Hereditary Prince's order). The King said he wished the greatest frankness. I said he might depend upon it. I told him the whole

of Schininà's negotiation. The King would not believe that any proposition had been made by the allies. I said I believed the first, but not the second. I hoped the latter was not true, that I could not see the necessity of it, and that others might make the peace but that I would not make it. I thought, when the fate of Europe was doubtful, Naples might well be sacrificed to turn the scale. It was for the advantage of His Majesty as well as of the allies. After we had done upon the subject of Naples, I then adverted to Sicily. I observed to His Majesty that until affairs were settled here, we might make expeditions but we could not leave the island permanently. I said that there had been much confusion, that there were two descriptions of enemies which I had to contend with. One was the Jacobins, the other was a party who supposed they were doing what was pleasing to His Majesty in opposing the government of his son and resisting the Constitution. The King said he had given over the government of Sicily to his son, and that he really did not know what was going on (the greatest imaginable lie); that he interfered in nothing. He was evidently a good deal agitated. I said all that I requested of His Majesty was to say to those persons that such conduct was not pleasing to him. He said he could not interfere in Sicilian affairs. I said I could not go anywhere until affairs were settled here.

I changed the subject of conversation. In the course of it, he said he had been preparing something in writing. He said he spoke to nobody but Circello and myself upon the subject. He would desire Circello to show me what was written. He said he was ready to do whatever was wanted, to go to Milazzo and Messina, wherever I thought most good could be done.

Wednesday, December 29, 1813. There was a congress of Ministers at which I urged most strongly the earliest possible convocation of the Parliament. I told them that I could not be here, and they all agreed in the necessity of the presence of the British authority and force. I urged the importance of losing no time, and of taking advantage of the enthusiasm of the present moment. The Ministers at first made difficulties, but afterwards gave way; and it was to be called as soon as the Segreti and Capitani d'armi and Giustizieri should be appointed.

Thursday, December 30, 1813. Nothing very particular occurred.

Friday, December 31, 1813. I received by way of Calabria a letter from M. de Menz, the Austrian Counsellor of Legation at Naples, confirming the fact of a proposal to treat having been made by Austria to Naples under date the 28th October. I showed it to the Hereditary Prince, and told him that I thought all that could be done would be to inform the allies of the amount of our force here and of the extent of its probable effect on Murat's operations, in order that they might not think we could do nothing at all and that in consequence the allies should have all his force upon their backs.

I thought of sending Graham to Naples under the pretext of making the armistice, but with the real intent of going the shortest way via Naples to the headquarters of the allies. I would write at the same time by Zante.

There was then a Council.

In the evening I went with the same letter to the King, meeting Circello there by appointment. We were shown into a small house adjoining the Favorita. Circello read the letter to the King. He thought it might be a take in, but he approved entirely of the project of sending Graham.

I told the Duke of Orleans of the proclamations prepared by Circello, and of their having too much the tone of absolute power. I begged him to write ours, which he did, and which was very well drawn up. I gave it to O'Farris to translate, but he did it very ill. I took the liberty of making some few alterations in the Duke's. We scratched out some terms rather too extensive having reference to liberty.

Palermo, Saturday, January 1, 1814. (1) Graham proposed, if they would not let him go through Naples, that he should go to Messina and straight from thence to Vienna; but I said so much time would be lost that I thought it better not. I wrote a mem[orandum] of which he took a copy, but which he was not to take with him.

(1) Graham sailed in Furieuse. Made captain in the Italian Levy.

Sunday, January 2, 1814. Circello called upon me the next morning, and I read him the letters I had sent by Graham to the Duc de Gallo and M. de Menz.

Employed all day in preparing dispatches to the Earl of Aberdeen. Dispatched letters to Lord Aberdeen via Zante.

Monday, January 3, 1814. I called upon the Hereditary Prince after a congress which had been held for the appointment of Segreti and Capitani d'armi. I showed the answers I had made to M. de Menz and the Duc de Gallo. He approved them. He called me his *ange tutélaire*.

Tuesday, January 4, 1814. I begged the Duke of Orleans to assist in translating the proclamation into Italian, O'Farris having lost all the spirit of the original. He said he would get the Duchess to do it.

Wednesday, January 5, 1814. I received the translation from the Duke, which he said had occupied him till half past 2 in the morning.

Thursday, January 6, 1814. I went to the King at half past 10 by agreement with Circello. I did not advise either of the object of my visit. I did not tell it the day before to the Prince, because I suspected him of immediately saying what I told him to his father. I said that I had brought my idea of the proclamation that should be issued. I begged to make some previous remarks upon the difficulties of the recovery of Naples, and of the comparative advantages of the King and Murat. I said there were two ways of recovery: one by the success of the allies, and then no step on the part of the King would be necessary; the other by an effort of the affection of the Neapolitans themselves. This would be the most glorious for the King, as it would be also the most advantageous, as it would put him above error in any capitulation that the allies might make with Murat to his disadvantage. The King acknowledged this. I made the remark that I for one would be sorry to see Italy parcelled out among its ancient petty sovereigns. I said this with reference to the advantage of incorporating Italian territory. Circello said that once in London it was in consideration to give Lombardy, Genoa etc. to Sardinia, and Tuscany to Naples.

I added there were many difficulties. Murat had done all he could to ingratiate himself with his people, and the present had many more advantages than the absent. He had established a much better government. He had paid the utmost attention to his army. He had completely thrown himself upon his people, and had proclaimed the national independence. Speaking of the King, I said I believed His Majesty was liked but his government detested. Another difficulty was that no credit, after the events of 1799, would be given to the proclamation, and this defect could only be counteracted by such a proclamation as all would wish to believe in spite of their judgments, and by putting forward as much as possible the English name, which, although involved also in that transaction, had generally much more credit than any other nation. For this purpose I thought that the proclamation should be conceived in the most liberal spirit, without however committing the King to any specific measures. The King admitted, as before, that he had been wrong in 1799. He looked agitated and gave no opinions. I told the King that the proclamation did not go half far enough, but that I had formed it according to the King's feelings.

I made this remark also to him. We might land in Naples or in the north of Italy. If in the north, I should issue that proclamation which I should consider likely to have the greatest effect. If this contained principles much more agreeable to the Neapolitans than those published by him, might not there be this danger, that they might prefer the other system, to the total exclusion of the King's?

Circello then read the proclamation, which the King listened to but gave no opinion upon it. He begged to keep it, as it was to be considered. I told him that in my opinion it ought to be published immediately. Circello observed that there were a great many Frenchmen employed. We named the Ministers over. He said (I think) Campochiaro was a rogue and had robbed him of a certain sum of money. I asked him of Carrascosa. He said he was good for nothing. He said [he] should never forget his coming to him to Frascati when the aide de camp of Murat. The old rogue said that at first he must keep his eyes shut, and afterwards change the officers. He said there were [some] who could be trusted with the command of the troops, or generals to be trusted. It struck me that he alluded to Ascoli.

I went away thinking ill of the King's disposition towards the proclamation. I called upon the Duke of Orleans on my way home, and told him the reception given to his proclamation. We both agreed there was nothing to be done with the King's prejudices. I said there was only one way of treating them all, from top to bottom without exception, *il bastone*.

Friday, January 7, 1814. I saw the Hereditary Prince before the Council and showed him the proclamation. He said he thought there was nothing in it that the King might object to. I told him what the King had said about the officers at Naples, and of my supposing him to have alluded to Ascoli. He said he believed the officers were what was best at Naples. There was afterwards a Council, when the nominations of Captains of Justice and of Segreti was made by the Prince.

Saturday, January 8, 1814. I received a letter from General Manhès informing me of the arrival of Count Neipperg at Naples, and that he had officially stated that instructions were on their way to me to make a treaty of alliance with Murat, and inviting me to go to Naples or to send there a plenipotentiary.

I immediately took the letter to the King, whom I found alone and to whom I showed it. He was very much shocked. I said I could not now doubt the fact. I had had apprehensions of their treating with Murat when I saw that no progress was made in Italy, and the neutrality of Switzerland. I told him that I knew Neipperg, that he was a clever, amiable man but *volage*, and I was afraid of his doing more than was necessary. I thought it better that I should go directly to Naples myself, and do the best I could. I told His Majesty that he might be assured that, as far as my instructions would allow me (and to these I must of course yield implicit obedience), I would make the best terms I could for him. I asked the King if he had no reliance in Austria. He said he ought to have, but he was always afraid of the connection with Buonaparte. I said that did not seem to me to signify much now, but he said he had always seen that court balancing. I said I had no opinion of Metternich; he gave the same opinion. He asked if I thought Russia was also a party to it. I said no mention was made of the Emperor, but I thought it likely, as they were together. On coming away he said: "I believe you are an honest man. I trust myself to you and put myself entirely in your hands". He particularly wished that a negotiator should not come here. I asked his permission to tell it to the Hereditary Prince, who, I said, was an interested person. He said I might. I recommended to the King secrecy, as such a negotiation could only have a bad effect both here and there. The King said he had believed the proposition of the 7th October but not that of the 28th, and he did not seem to think unreasonable that of the 7th. I said I should be glad to have another conversation with him before I went.

I then went to the Hereditary Prince and made him the same communication. He said that he was always considered as the *bête noire* of the family, that he never saw things *en beau*, and expressed the same sentiments as the King respecting Austria. I told them I should send an aide de camp with a letter to Gallo informing him of my intention to go there.

Sunday, January 9, 1814. (1) Captain Foljambe took a letter to Gallo and another to Graham, which he was to deliver only into Graham's hands, desiring him not to suspend his negotiations till my arrival.

I told the Duke of Orleans of the arrival of Neipperg and of my intention of going to Naples. It was the least of two evils. My going gave a sort of sanction to Murat, while my not going might lose me the opportunity of preventing Neipperg from coming to some very unfavourable arrangement with Murat. He agreed in these sentiments.

(1) Captain Foljambe sailed for Naples.

Monday, January 10, 1814. (1) The packet for which I was waiting before my departure for Naples, in the hopes of receiving instructions as referring to the negotiations with Murat, arrived most opportunely, but not a word upon the subject was received. I received a letter at night from the Hereditary Prince asking me if these instructions were received.

(1) Packet arrived from England in 29 days.

Tuesday, January 11, 1814. I called upon the Hereditary Prince the next morning with my military business, and said it was my intention to go to Naples the next day; that I would call upon the King in the morning. He said 8 would suit him. I told the Hereditary Prince that I had said to Circello that it would be much better if the King would entrust his Neapolitan negotiation to the Hereditary Prince. The King never could bring himself to those measures that were necessary. Both he and Circello were like persons who had lain in their graves for the last century and had come again to life knowing nothing of the changes that had occurred in the last twenty years.

I then went to a congress of the Ministers, and urged, as usual, those arrangements which were necessary previous to the convocation of the Parliament.

Wednesday, January 12, 1814. (1) I called upon the King at 8 o'clock. Circello was present, at my request. He said he had received nothing from Castelcicala upon the subject of the negotiation, nor had I from my own Government. I said I should set off that night, and begged to know if he had any particular orders to give me. He was profuse in his demonstrations of confidence, always at command when interest prompts.

The Furieuse came from Naples with dispatches from Graham, informing me of Neipperg having concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Murat (he was to go on to the headquarters), and in the same vessel came two officers, Col. Barthemy, a Frenchman, aide de camp of Murat, and Baron d'Aspic, an Austrian captain on Neipperg's staff, to conclude with me an armistice consequent to the treaty. I went immediately to the

King and communicated to him the intelligence. He crossed himself and seemed very much annoyed, but not so much as I had expected. I told him of the arrival of the two officers, and that I proposed to have nothing to say to them. My answer would be that I had not instructions. I said I should not now go to Naples, as the mischief was done and my presence would be useless.

I went from him to the Hereditary Prince and made the same communication. I showed them both the treaty. The King asked me to leave it, but I declined on the ground that it was a communication made to me under a certain degree of confidence.

I then went on board the *Furieuse*. I took Col. Barthemey aside and told him that it was impossible for me to make an armistice, as I was totally without instructions; those that I had before received were applicable wholly to other circumstances. I was placed in a very delicate situation with regard to the court here, and could take no step of an unfavourable nature to their interests without being duly authorized to do so. I then spoke, also aside, with Baron d'Aspic, who was much more pressing than the Frenchman. I told him that I could not help myself; made the same observations of the impossibility of doing an act of friendship with Murat. He said an armistice was not friendship. I said it was the first step to it, and that it was the *premier pas qui coute*. He urged me exceedingly. I observed that I thought it very extraordinary Count Neipperg had brought no intimation to me from Lord Aberdeen, actually at the headquarters from whence Count Neipperg had brought the instructions which he said had been made known to Lord Aberdeen. I told him that I neither could nor would make the armistice; that I considered the terms of the treaty to be unnecessarily good. I was sure Murat was neither liked by the people or the Army. He answered that he had made enquiries, and that the result was that the King was *assez bien aimé, mais qu'on avait la Reine en horreur*. (I thought at the time he alluded to the King and Queen here, indeed I felt no doubt of the meaning, but now, writing, it appears to me that Murat and his Queen must have been intended). D'Aspic asked me to write some answer, but I said that, as the wind was fair, it was better they should sail immediately, and it was agreed that if the necessary instructions came there first, they should send a negotiator here; if they came here, I would go there, so that there might be no delay in the conclusion of the armistice.

(1) King Ferdinand's birthday. *Furieuse* arrived from Naples.

Thursday, January 13, 1814. I called upon the Hereditary Prince and told him the *Furieuse* was gone.

I then went to a congress. The business of a Sicilian Minister in England was talked over, and the representation proposed to be made to the Hereditary Prince was sent over. It was prepared by Villafranca, and not well done. Belmonte suggested some alterations that were very judicious. We talked also of the Parliament, and I urged as usual its early convocation. I told the Duke of Orleans of the arrival of the negotiators and of the treaty.

Friday, January 14, 1814. (1) Employed all day in preparing dispatches for England to go by *Minerva*, Sicilian frigate, to Mahon. I was to have read a part of Graham's dispatches to the Hereditary Prince, but I put it off to the next day.

(1) America arrived.

Saturday, January 15, 1814. (1) At four I waited upon the Hereditary Prince and read him the greatest part of Graham's dispatch no. 1. I left out parts, and [in] particular all such passages as related to the secret articles. The Hereditary Prince made memoranda as I read on. I showed him, of the enclosures, only those marked from no. 1 to 4 relative to the overtures made between the allies and Buonaparte after the battle of Leipzig. I had only time to read one dispatch. Of the other I put off the perusal till the following day.

(1) *Minerva* sailed for Mahon. [], Captain Hamilton, arrived.

Sunday, January 16, 1814. I waited upon the Hereditary Prince with Graham's dispatch no. 4, which I read to him and of which he took memoranda from my perusal of it. I made less alterations in the readings than in the other. Of the enclosures, I only read to him Mr []'s letter.

Sir J. Rowley showed me letters received from Captains Wemyss and Hamilton relative to Corsica. All favourable. Wemyss was against a landing near Bastia at the lake south of it as proposed; Hamilton for it, as were both Dundas and Rowley. They both said that getting round Cape Corse at this time was very difficult.

Monday, January 17, 1814. The Duke of Orleans called upon me before dinner. He had been at the Colli the day before. The King in low spirits and, remarked the Duchess, very affectionate to all his family, embraced the Hereditary Prince, took him in his arms and invited him to a shooting party, which he had not done before for two years. He adverted to the report of the King's resuming. I asked if the Duchess would be glad of it. He said he thought yes. They all so mistrusted one another.

I told him *Medici* was going to Austria; it was my own measure and selection. He regretted it, and I said I was now rather sorry that I had recommended it. But I was convinced that Naples was for ever gone from the King, and my sincere wish would be, if possible, to get it back for him, and if not I thought he was entitled to an equivalent elsewhere. The Duke did not think the King's chance so desperate. I answered that Austria had made the treaty. Neipperg had not exceeded his instructions, because Graham had seen them and the treaty prepared by Metternich. Upon this point there was no hope. Could the allies be ignorant of it? Hardly, and if they were, was it to be expected that they would undo it? The Duke foresaw new wars which might have the effect; but I said these were not among events to be calculated upon or to be foreseen. That which might make the change would be the

declaration of Italy and Naples for a third party and independence, a declaration to be controlled neither by one nor the other. I am sure this was on the cards. If the Government chose to give me such orders corresponding with such an object, I was sure I could succeed. I did not know whether, without doing anything, this might not happen. Suppose a cooperation on my part to be the consequence of the treaty or of the armistice, what line was I to take? If I came in contact with Murat, I really thought it more likely (although the chances were pretty nearly balanced) that his Neapolitans would come to us than ours go to him. He thought so too, and that Italy would certainly rally round our standard if we chose to hoist it.

He said the allies should certainly go to Paris. He said of Frenchmen that in the beginning of the Revolution they would never stand by each other.

Tuesday, January 18, 1814. The Cleveland transport returned from Naples, having on board Capt. Foljambe and General Barthemy. They brought letters from Lord Aberdeen dated 12 December relating to the treaty with Murat.

After a congress of the Ministers at which I attended, I went to the King and begged Circello to meet me. I read him Lord Aberdeen's dispatches. He was particularly grieved at them. He said he would never renounce the Kingdom of Naples. He asked me if I thought he should. I said there was at present no question about [it]. I was not charged with asking him the question. The communication now made by me was one of friendship only. I told the King that the only hope I entertained for him was that, before the separate treaty with Naples could be ratified, a general peace may have been made and this immediate treaty no longer necessary. I saw no other hope. He was of the same opinion.

He asked me what I meant to do. I said that, as it was now clear that my own Government had been a party to a treaty with Murat, the express object of which was the immediate cooperation of Murat's forces, so I did not feel myself at liberty to thwart this intention, and I thought I could not do otherwise than make the armistice. Circello said something about gaining time. I said there was no use in that. Nothing that we could do here would have any influence upon the decision of the allies, upon whom alone this depended. The King observed that I had said before that if I was sure the treaty was made I must make the armistice. I said I should propose to make the armistice in such a way as to leave myself completely at liberty. The circumstance that the condition insisted upon by Lord Aberdeen did not appear in the negotiation authorized me not to enter into any close arrangement. I should therefore do the least I could, and I would propose to make an armistice of twenty days only.

After dinner I called upon the Hereditary Prince and communicated the same papers to him (he had known it before from Circello), and at night I went to the Duke of Orleans and showed him the papers. They all agreed that the armistice was the best measure to be taken.

Wednesday, January 19, 1814. General Barthemy came ashore. He made great professions of Murat's respect etc. for me and of his anxious desire to see me. We talked for

some time, and he said that Murat particularly wished to see me there. I was to consider this.

I called upon the Duke. It was his opinion that I should not go if I could help it; that it was giving too much countenance to Murat. I stated this to be my position and the state of the questions:

1. Murat must now be considered as King of Naples. A treaty had been made with him by Austria with the consent of England, and this I could not prevent. This must be taken for granted.

2. The object of that treaty was Murat's cooperation. An armistice was necessary for that, and therefore I must make it.

3. Was I also to cooperate? This has also been determined by my instructions at the requisition of Austria. I am to assist with the disposable force in Sicily.

4. But to that cooperation was necessary some stronghold or place and some arrangement about supplies etc., and perhaps some understanding about the views of the different parties, both military and political, their lines of operation, the principles they mean to hold forth.

5. An armistice with me was considered indispensable to Murat's acting. If I gave it at once, I gave all wanted by Murat and all I had to give. It was then necessary, if I wanted something, that I should previously stipulate for it.

I consulted with Rowley and Dundas, but we came to no decision.

Thursday, January 20, 1814. I decided the question in favour of going to Naples, upon these grounds:

1. that by going I should better ascertain the state of affairs;

2. that nobody else so well as myself could fight the cessions to be made to us in return for the armistice;

3. that I, better than anyone else, could make Neipperg aware of the absurdity of what he had done and of the future bad consequences and disunion likely to arise from it.

I saw General Barthemy and I told him I had resolved to set off in 4 or 5 days; that he might go or stay as he pleased. He said he would stay and accompany me. I told him I must first ask the King's leave, as he had before objected to a negotiator coming here. He told me that the Hereditary Prince, the night before at the opera, had not looked at him with displeasure, which he attributed to the favourable report made of him by the family of Spain, he having been there Governor at Valencia during a year and, as Montrond says, having conducted himself very well.

I went to the Hereditary Prince and told him my determination and the reasons, which he approved, and I suggested two things: that the King should write me a letter saying in a vague manner that he could not give up his rights and stating at the same time that although his interests were neglected, he would only consider the good of the common cause and would cooperate with all his force. I proposed that this letter might be shown. I talked to him about the Neapolitan troops. He thought the best way would be to say nothing to them at present. When the armistice was made, it could be told them that it was only temporary. I

said we must reckon upon them, reasoning as we do, and that I thought, as a general maxim, it was always better to come to a clear and open explanation. I asked him if he knew the King's sentiments about renouncing his rights. He said he had declared to him the day before he never would. I said I thought this foolish. He might refuse to give up his rights till he knew what he was to get in return, but if he could not have Naples, it surely would be unwise for him to refuse everything else. With what he might now get, he might sometime or other negotiate his return hereafter to Naples. The Hereditary Prince was of this opinion.

I went from him to Circello. I said nearly the same to him, which I begged him to state to the King. He said the King would never renounce, and would rather have nothing than to do so. I advised him to leave this vague at any rate. He said he could not advise the King to do so. As I was to write to Lord Aberdeen the next day, I should wish to see previously the King to hear his sentiments. It was agreed that he should write me word from the King that he did not like Barthemy remaining here.

The Duke of Orleans called upon me in the afternoon. He told me that Montrond had told him that Murat had commissioned him to bring me back at any rate with him; that he was most anxious to have me there; that Barthemy had been a year Governor at Valencia and had behaved very well. He had only been five months with Murat; that Barthemy said that Bonaparte was mad and that Murat should be the King. "*C'est un homme qui a d[e] l]'élan*", the Duke said. He (the Duke) was for any change that would beat down Bonaparte.

Friday, January 21, 1814. I wanted to have seen the King, to have heard from his own mouth the sentiments which he might wish me to express to Lord Aberdeen, but Circello wrote me word that he had appointed a shooting party, and that I should not find him.

I called upon Villermosa, and from thence I went to the Hereditary Prince, to whom I showed the letter the King had written me declaring he would never renounce his rights upon the Kingdom of Naples. I said I should send it to Lord Aberdeen, but I thought it ought not to be made use of against the King.

I went to a meeting at Carini's office with Bonanno about the system of magistracy. I then saw M. Barthemy, and told him the King rather wished him away, and he immediately consented to go.

Saturday, January 22, 1814. (1) I gave General Barthemy letters for Count Neipperg and the Duke di Gallo informing them of my intending to sail for Naples on the 27th.

I received a kick from a horse on the ankle bone which confined me to the house. The Duke of Orleans called upon me and said that Barthemy had told [him] Montrond >had< said, Well, if Murat could not be King of France, he would be satisfied with being King of Naples. "*Ma foi*", said the other, "*je le crois bien*". The Duke said there was not one of them who thought himself secure.

(1) Capt. Foljambe sailed in Termagant with General Barthemey for Naples with dispatches for Lord Aberdeen.

Kick from horse of Capt. Woodgate.

Sunday, January 23, 1814. Confined to the room. Yesterday Rowley (now commanding here) and I had a conversation about the expedition. He thought it dangerous to attack Corsica at this season, as well as even to go into Maddalena with the expedition. I said my idea had been that the expedition should sail when I went to Naples, in order to gain time and to be ready to act. Otherwise Murat would be so far before us and we had no chance of dictating at all. The great points were to be in the way of fortune: if nothing was to be done till after my return to Naples, what time would be lost? I went on the 27th, I might be back by the 7th. Take to the 10th to give orders to divisions at Palermo and Milazzo to sail. Take twenty days to go to Leghorn (1st March), another month for return of transports to bring 2nd expedition (1st April). I might delay the meeting of Parliament for three months from this time but not later, and then I must be in Sicily, so that by the delay I could only be a month in Italy. It was ruin to my plans. I talked to Dundas, who did not think so much of the difficulties.

Circello called upon me. I read him parts of my dispatch to Lord Aberdeen. In talking of that part wherein I mention that I did not think the King's letter should be brought against him (and I added that I thought it might easily be managed that the King should hear nothing at all about his rights at the peace and obtain an indemnity without being asked to renounce), Circello said this could hardly be, for it was always mentioned why such and such partitions of territory were allotted to this and that person. I did not see this necessity, but I understood Circello to say that the King in his own letter, which I had not remarked, had contrived for himself a mode of escaping from his own declaration, and I daresay he has.

Circello talked of the officers to go, and gave me the names of some in whom the King put confidence: Brigadiers Nunziante, Mirabelli, Ratti; Colonels Mary, Clary, ..., and a Di Pasquale who had been employed on the roads in Naples and now lived by killing game. He urged me to go forth with the troops and to cooperate. I said the advantages were that we put ourselves in the way of fortune and events. For example, Murat might be killed and his army might declare for their old king. There might be other chances that we could not foresee, but which might turn up, and not being on the spot, we might be prevented from profiting of them. The objections were the cooperation with such a man as Murat, his being long before us in the field, and various others. But Circello thought the advantages far counterbalanced the disadvantages, and pressed me strongly to go.

We talked of the intercourse to be established between Sicily and Naples. He thought it should be limited to merchant ships only, and particular ports should be designated.

Monday, January 24, 1814. The Duke of Orleans called upon me. He said he was preparing another memoir in which he himself was concerned. It related to his being

employed. He said he knew that I thought he could be made very useful. The difficulty, as he knew, was with the British Government, but he said their decision was not against it, as they had made no answer to the application.

He told me that the King was to come and sup at his house. I told him I should not be surprised if the King resumed and the Queen returned. He said he did not believe either one or the other.

He talked to me about Montrond and told me his history, and said that he was convinced that he was not a spy. He spoke to me about a passport for him.

Tuesday, January 25, 1814. (1) Montrond called and told me his own story, that Buonaparte had conceived a great dislike to him from his having commented upon his measures and particularly upon his first campaign in Spain. He was banished to Antwerp and afterwards to Chatillon. At Antwerp was his friend M. Argeneau. Buonaparte came there and was very angry with Mme de Salus (married to a Piedmontese and *dame d'honneur* of the Princess Borghese) for receiving him. Buonaparte abused her to her face. He said Oudinot asked Buonaparte that Montrond should be banished at his house. Buonaparte refused. He said he should have very soon *an armée de rebelles* if he was there. Everybody represents Oudinot as a most respectable man.

He was then sent with 6 gendarmes to Chatillon, where he said he was so much *ennuyé* that he went to Spain, and from thence made his escape. He said everybody hated Buonaparte. All those who surrounded him. They all had foreseen the issue of the Russian war. Everybody was however afraid of him. He had a friend, M. de F[], who had an intrigue with Mme Murat. Somebody wrote to Murat an anonymous letter telling him of it. He received it while F. was in the room. Murat said to him: "*Lisez-le*". F. said: "You must not believe these things. I am not made to be the rival of such a handsome man as Your Majesty". Murat was tying his neckcloth and, turning round to him, said with a smile of self-complacency: "*Je ne te crains pas*". Murat, he said, was a very vain man, but that I would find him easy, with a degree of reserve. Buonaparte had taught them all that. Mme Murat was without *faste*, capable of attachment and friendship to her lovers. "*Elle avait des qualités*". A Lameth, who was killed in Spain, was with Murat when he received at Madrid the offer of the crown of Naples. Lameth said he walked round the room like an actor: "*Malheureux trône, funeste diadème*. But", he said, "Buonaparte will be killed. *Je flanquerai ma couronne de côté. Si ce bougre de Vice-Roi m'oppose, je le battrai et je marcherai à Paris*", having then, he said, the idea of making himself king.

(1) Repulse's convoy arrived with arms.

Wednesday, January 26, 1814. I forgot to mention an interview I had had with Duke Sperlinga on the 24th. I had begged to see him. My object was to frighten the others by the discourse his conduct authorized me to hold with him. The amount of my discourse was to tell him that I had had the misfortune to consider him as one of the greatest enemies of the

Constitution and of England. So much so that I had doubted whether I would not oblige him to continue his voyage and, when returned from it, whether I would allow him to come back to Palermo.

The Duke entered into a long vindication of himself. I was deceived by those who surrounded me; that I would not see those of the opposite party. I said it was not so, that I had not happened to see them because I was not at home. We talked a great deal of the country and its liberty. He said he now despaired of the latter. I said I did not think so well of it, but I did not despair. I said this country wanted courage and virtue, its people were slaves and the nobles full of vanity. He said, how could it be otherwise? They had all the defects of having lived 400 years under the Spanish monarchy. He blamed Belmonte very much, talked of the *diritti angarici*, which he said he had abolished before the Parliament of 1812. When he saw the conduct of Belmonte, who voted in opposition to the speech he had made, he saw no good was to be done, and went away to the country.

I said I was sure the country was unanimous for the Constitution; if, however, the House of Commons acted otherwise, I saw no alternative but in the abolition of the Constitution. If, on the contrary, they were nearly unanimous, as I expected they would be, I had only to apprehend from the Peers. I believed them to be hostile to it, but if they were I was resolved to abolish the order altogether. To all those who opposed the wish of Great Britain and Sicily I would say, as I had said to the Queen, "Stay quiet at Palermo, and I will not hurt you". She did not, and I required her to go to the Ficuzza; still intriguing, and she went to Castelvetro; and finally she left the kingdom.

He talked of San Marco, and said he wished I would see him. I said I should be very glad to see him. I should not find him, he said, so bad as he had been represented. He said the Sicilians were to be taken by *dolcezza*; I said, *bonbons* in one hand and *il bastone* in the other.

I went to Belmonte, and I told him I was about to sign an armistice with Murat, and the question was, what should Sicily do? He said, exactly what England did. I proposed that after the congress he, I, and Villafranca should meet at his house.

At the congress it was agreed that the Parliament should be called on that day week. Belmonte, Villafranca, and I met accordingly at Belmonte's. I recapitulated that Barthemy and d'Aspic had come to request an armistice, that I would not grant it until I had heard from Lord Aberdeen, that I had since heard from Lord Aberdeen and that Gen. Barthemy had returned with that letter, that he had expressed Murat's wish that I should go there in preference to the armistice being signed here. I stated the wish of the King and Prince that I alone should make the armistice, and that they should have nothing at all to do with Murat, but I said I should prefer it otherwise, that I had no wish to incur any responsibility towards the Sicilian nation. It might so happen that the enemy would allow English merchant ships but not Sicilian. I, who made such an armistice, should appear in a very bad light as the Sicilian negotiator. There were many other things of the same kind that might happen. At any rate, if I was to negotiate, I must have authority from the Sicilian Government, and whether that was given to me or another was immaterial as far as concerned the question of an acknowledgment by such a transaction. It was agreed that the next day, when I was to

see the Hereditary Prince, I would advise him to have a Council, I sending previously a Note upon which the Ministers should meet in congress and make up their opinion.

I remarked to Belmonte and Villafranca the excessive good luck of Sicily, who would be free in spite of herself and all her efforts to the contrary. For, Murat being at Naples, the King and the Prince would be the first to wish for a British force in Sicily, as well for protection against Murat as their own subjects; that this could

Thursday, January 27, 1814. I called upon the Hereditary Prince at 4 o'clock, Circello being there by appointment. I remained there till near 6. The Hereditary Prince had sent me by Poli that he wished to have read to him my dispatches to Lord Aberdeen, but I thought it as well not to read them, as he notes everything down, and he came accordingly fully accoutred with pencils, knives, and papers. To write more quickly he has signs for certain words, a species of shorthand writing.

I began then with telling him I had regretted Lord Aberdeen's letter was so short as to perplex me very much. "To tell you the truth", he said, "it appeared to me in exactly the same light". I said perhaps it might be that Lord Aberdeen did not like to trust more than was necessary to M. de Mier, said to be the bearer of it. He may have written me more at length in another letter not yet received. I said that I had stated to Lord Aberdeen that, if the King of Sicily considered it for his interests, I would make a convention with Murat upon the terms authorized by Lord Aberdeen's instructions, by which there would be a written acknowledgment on the part of Murat and Austria that the King of Sicily was to have an indemnity. I said the advantage was to have in writing what was now only in words; the objection, that England acknowledged Murat. The King of Sicily was to have nothing to do with this agreement. It would be done without his participation in any manner whatever. It was the condition of my acceding to the armistice. The question for consideration was whether the King had irretrievably lost the Kingdom of Naples. If he thought so, it was then good by all means to assure the other. If he thought he had not, then this step on the part of England would be an obstacle removed, as Murat would thereby be acknowledged by England. What I proposed was solely from a consideration of the advantage of the King. For Great Britain it was preferable to make an armistice only, as that involved no question of acknowledgment, which the proposed convention would.

Circello was against it, the Hereditary Prince for it rather. I begged Circello to mention it to the King. I was asked if I did not choose to go. I said I saw no necessity, but the Hereditary Prince wished it, and I said I would. The Hereditary Prince asked who I thought should go on the part of the Sicilian Government. I said Settimo, and the Hereditary Prince very much approved him.

I reported to Belmonte and Villafranca what had passed. It was agreed that there should be congress next day. I was to send a Note to be laid before the Hereditary Prince, preparatory to his holding a Council.

Friday, January 28, 1814. (1) There was congress, and the conditions of the commerce were agreed upon. No difference of opinion appeared to exist upon the importance of an armistice for Sicily. Villafranca was to take my Note to the Hereditary Prince, and to fix for the Council the next day. At night Villafranca came to see me and said he had seen the Hereditary Prince, who told him that he had been reflecting all night upon the subject, and that he had changed his mind upon the subject, and that he could not send anyone on the part of the Sicilian Government. Villafranca endeavoured to persuade him that it was more consistent with the dignity of the country to send a person of their own to treat this affair. In the course of the conversation he expressed the opinion that Sicily could never be safe while Murat was on the throne of Naples, and that the presence of a British force in Sicily would be always indispensable to its security. Villafranca said the Hereditary Prince did not seem to like this proposition. He should not have made it.

(1) Carlotta with her convoy sailed. W. Lumet and Spaniard sailed for horses. Also R. Gordon, groom, dismissed, for England.

Saturday, January 29, 1814. I went to the King by appointment at eleven, where I found Circello. The King seemed very much *monté* and went off at once upon the injustice that had been done him, and upon his determination never to renounce his rights. His conversation was like that of an old priest, every other sentence being an appeal to God or to the Virgin. He said God had given him his kingdom and he could never renounce it with his own will. He was the son of an honest man, Carlo Borbone; *prima Carlo che re* was the saying of his father. He wished he was more like him, but he would live and die an honest man. He would not that his children should have to reproach him. He appealed to the image of our Saviour and the picture of the Virgin Mary that hung over his pillow. He should pass an unhappy old age, an *infelice vecchiaia*; but he could not help it. He talked of his misery. He said while he was reading books about horses or indifferent subjects, the tears trickled down his cheeks.

He said he hoped I respected him. I said I could not exactly be of his opinion, but it was impossible not to respect feelings which would sacrifice interest to honour. I took the liberty of asking if Providence might not now will that he should be deprived of his kingdom and also that he should receive an equivalent for it. And I asked, Supposing the general peace to be made and another kingdom assigned to it, in this *embarras de richesses*, what would His Majesty do, what *parti prendre*? He smiled at this. He said he could sanction no communication, direct or indirect, with Murat, neither for himself or his heir. He had the same interest as his son, his son as he.

I remained about half an hour, and on going away he took me by the hand and said: "I esteem you, so I hope you may esteem me". I asked him if he had any commission for Naples. He said there was a man of the name of Onorato who had been his great companion of the chase. He was the greatest coward in the world and had remained behind. He (the King), Onorato, and (I think) Tanucci had been three old fellow sportsmen, and they had

their nicknames, the King that of *celebrante*, the other two, *diacono* and *suddiacono*. Onorato was the last. He wished me to take a pheasant pie to him.

I went from the King to the Hereditary Prince. He was very unwell. I told him how I had found the King, and that he evidently would not consent to any act to be done either in his own or in His Royal Highness's name; that it did not [at] all signify. I could do it equally, and it would only be requisite that I should receive such an answer to my Note as would leave me completely at liberty, and I then could manage for Sicily. I pointed out to him a passage in a long letter I had received from him in the morning where he had mistaken him, relating to the treaty between Austria and Murat being made *sub spe rati*. I said this was the condition which was to have been required by Lord Aberdeen and myself had we treated. Austria had introduced no condition at all in favour of the King, and therefore the *sub spe rati* had no application and was not there. The Hereditary Prince then called in Villafranca and told him how he wished the Note to be made out, and said it was not now necessary that the Council should meet. The Hereditary Prince was evidently very anxious that the Council should not meet.

We then adjourned to Settimo's office. Villerosa made a remark which may perhaps be hereafter recollected. He said what was now done was unconstitutional, as the Hereditary Prince had decided without the advice of his Privy Council. I observed that this related to the King, who had forbid the Hereditary Prince from entering upon the subject. Villerosa was satisfied with the remark. I then told them that I would do, respecting the armistice and the treaty of commerce, whatever they wished; and after much conversation and discussion of the terms, they were settled.

Sunday, January 30, 1814. About twelve o'clock the Termagant returned from Naples with letters from Graham informing me that he had concluded an armistice. Villerosa was with me and I showed it to him. I also showed him the *projet* of my own, which he approved.

I took Graham's armistice to the Hereditary Prince. He took a copy of it, as well as of the *projet* of my own, which he said was excellent. I said I would go immediately to see what could be done. I could possibly confirm that which had been made. He gave me some commissions for the Hereditary Princess, and some letters and money to be paid at Naples. He brought in the Hereditary Princess. I asked him if there was anything at Naples that the Princess would like. He said he did not know.

I went from thence to the Duke of Orleans. I showed him the armistice. He said it was unlucky. I saw also the Duchess and Mademoiselle.

I embarked on board the America between 5 and 6 with St Laurent and Catinelli; made sail at quarter past 7.

America, Monday, January 31, 1814. We had a good deal of wind and rough sea. We arrived in the Bay of Naples between two and three o'clock. We made our private signal, 3 guns and a white flag at the main. We came to anchor about dark. General Bartheimy came

off and we immediately landed in a very heavy storm of hail. We went from thence to the inn of the Gran Bretagna. I found Neipperg and Graham. The rest of the night was passed in reading Graham's papers and hearing the report of his proceedings (see papers).

Naples, Tuesday, February 1, 1814. Neipperg came to me with all his papers. He showed me Metternich's instructions, very well drawn up, and very justly describing Murat's character, which was said to be in the highest degree *très subtil*. His instructions stated that he was to declare he was not come there to solicit an alliance but to know what Murat was, whether friend or foe. He showed me Metternich's *projet* of a treaty, and his own, which he begged me to compare with it, that I might see that his own was much less advantageous than the *projet*. He showed me an instruction brought by the Count de Mier in which three provinces in addition were to be given to Murat. By the *projet* he was to have the Roman States with the exception of Rome. I told Neipperg that I thought the terms much too good for him.

He asked me if I did not mean to make a treaty with Murat. I told him no, that I did not even mean to confirm the armistice that had been made. I had no authority for that purpose. He was excessively urgent, so much as to provoke me. I reproached him with asking for Murat more than he (Murat) ever had asked for himself. They had never asked for a peace. An armistice was the utmost extent of their demands.

We then went together to Gallo, who had been, as I saw, apprised by Neipperg of everything that had passed. They pressed me both very strongly to make a peace, Neipperg much the most urgently. I stated why I could not. I then showed two of the articles of my *projet*, the two first. Gallo showed two of his, but Neipperg thought mine were the best drawn up. Gallo wanted to introduce a sentence purporting that they were treating for peace at the headquarters, which I refused. I expressed my determination in no respect to *éloigner* myself from the limits within which my instructions placed me. I expressed this intention very decidedly. This conversation ended in the armistice seeming settled, that it should consist of my two articles and a third referring the duration of it to be decided by the negotiators at the headquarters of the Emperors. In the evening Neipperg gave me another article, which will be found in a separate paper.

I dined this day with Gallo and with a great number of Neapolitan *employés*. The Duchesse was not recovered from her lying in.

Naples, Wednesday, February 2, 1814. Neipperg and I went again to Gallo. He said he had shown the *projet* to the Queen, and he had to propose two different articles and an *entrechange* of the *projet*. The first article was to contain the armistice between Great Britain and Naples separately, and then was to follow the commercial and other articles, to conclude with an article comprehending Sicily. But this was objected to, and Neipperg also observed upon the inutility of some of the articles. Upon the one respecting captures I was to speak with Sir J. Rowley upon. It was proposed by Gallo that they should immediately cease. Rowley said it was always usual to give a period. In fact the article was of more use

to us than to them, for they had nothing to be taken by us, and we much by them. It was however settled that nothing should be mentioned; to leave the prize courts, whom we could not control, but who would probably respect our armistice.

In the evening Neipperg brought me another article, which referred to a peace to be concluded. I got very angry with Neipperg. I refused to agree to it, and said he had spoilt Murat by the terms he had given him. He resented this very warmly. I said I did not allude to him but to his Government. I said, then let the article I had proposed be done away and a term fixed for the duration of the armistice.

Dined again with Gallo. Neipperg came to me again after dinner and said he had seen the Queen, who said she would rather have the term than the other article, which went for nothing. We were to go next morning to Gallo.

Naples, Thursday, February 3, 1814. (1) We went to Gallo, who endeavoured to insinuate another article, but I would not hear of it, and the convention was finally concluded and agreed. I had intended it originally as a convention to be signed conjointly with Neipperg, but I do not know whether this was so understood by them or not, but at the signature nothing was said and I did not more mention the subject.

I called upon the Archbishop of Taranto and saw his collection of gems, and very curious they seemed to be. He had the day before shown me the palace, he being *grand aumônier* to the Queen. It was fitted up magnificently, and with taste. We saw the museum the Queen was forming, principally with the things discovered in Pompeii. Bonaparte's picture was in a great many of the rooms.

(1) Dined with Col. Roche. Met there Prince Castelfranco, a Spaniard; a Russian lady, and Mme Minutolo; Neipperg, and Count Schoenfelt, his aide de camp.

Naples, Friday, February 4, 1814. (1) Sir J. Rowley, Catinelli, Capt. Hamilton, Capt. Stowe, St Laurent, and myself went to Pompeii, a town buried at the same time with Herculaneum by an eruption of Vesuvius. The date of this event is variously given, some say 2000, others 1400 years ago. The present Queen employs a great many persons in excavating. She is a great encourager of the arts and sciences, and within the year some very fine things have been discovered; among the rest an amphitheatre larger than that of Verona, and a temple for the administration of justice, very large, with very fine columns. Herculaneum was the principal city, Pompeii a country town. A street of tombs, perfect and appearing just made, is very beautiful and very lately discovered. The whole of the exterior wall is discovered, and they are now excavating in different directions, following the line of the streets. The painting in the interior walls of the houses is as fresh as if done yesterday, and the colours much more vivid, particularly the green. On the side of one of the houses is a large - - - - -, supposed to be a house of ill fame and for the sale of such ornaments, worn round the necks of the women as a charm against sterility. We went from thence to Herculaneum; we went round the theatre, underground and covered with thick lava. The

present town of Portici is built upon it. We saw also the King's palace at Portici, but there was nothing very curious in it. Bonaparte's picture, as large as life, was also there.

Schininà came from the headquarters. I saw him at night. He said he had seen Lord Castlereagh, who had told him the tenor of the dispatch he had written to me, sent by his companion M. de Menz, the Austrian chargé d'affaires. They had both gone together with the treaty to headquarters and had returned together, but M. de Menz had stopped near Murat's headquarters to see M. de Mier, the Austrian Minister, then on his way to headquarters. He said there was every probability of peace. He said Lord Castlereagh was charming, and he told Count Neipperg that he was a man *si coulant*.

I told Schininà I was sorry not to have seen Murat; that I would have given him freely my sentiments; that we had ceased to be enemies, the first step to friendship. I had signed the armistice, and though it cost me much, I would be true to the engagement I had taken. I would have advised Murat to act without indecision, to be no longer *chancelant*, and to espouse heartily the cause he had undertaken. Why did he not act at once, without waiting for the armistice? His policy was to seize the moment and to make for himself a merit which he did not possess.

Naples, Saturday, February 5, 1814. Count Neipperg went away to the headquarters. Catinelli went at the same time. He took letters to Bellegarde and to Sir R. Wilson. He took also a mem[orandum] to ask Bellegarde, in case of a definitive peace, whether it was still his wish that I should land in Tuscany.

We went to see the Studii; the Hercules from the Farnese gallery and many most beautiful statues were there. We were shown the manner in which the writings discovered in Herculaneum have been unravelled. They are written on papyrus, and as it is unrolled a piece of gold beaten skin, blackened, is put upon the papyrus which receives the impression of the letters from the papyrus. It is very ingenious. There are several volumes already published, principally the works of Epidemus. No writings have been found at Pompeii, because the eruption was preceded by a shower of ashes which reduced everything to a cinder. Herculaneum was covered with the lava only. Every article of household furniture in both places is found on the spot.

Naples, Sunday, February 6, 1814. (1) We went to General Barthemy to see the stables of the palace, and we saw a great number of horses and carriages, the latter heavy but in good style. The horses were mostly coach horses of the Norman breed and exactly like our old English coach horses. There were a great many. We also saw his stallions, of which he had many, but none remarkably good. The stables were in capital order, and the horses groomed after our manner. They told us that Murat had taken 400 horses to the army, among which were 134 riding horses for himself.

Graham was dispatched with the armistice and with the *projet* of cooperation to Lord Castlereagh. I gave him besides a long letter to Lord Castlereagh respecting Sicily,

informing him of my correspondence with the Hereditary Prince respecting its cession to England.

I desired Graham to feel Lord Castlereagh upon the possibility of my having both missions, that of Naples and of Sicily. I wished to have Naples because it was a pleasanter place and the climate of Sicily did not agree with Lady William's health. The political reasons for it were that I could better watch over Murat's actions; against it, that Murat might not like to have a person there so instrumental to the liberty of Sicily. I was however resolved to stick by Sicily. I begged Graham to ascertain Lord Castlereagh's sentiments. If they should be unfavourable, I would not ask it. He was to say that my wish would be that the mission in Sicily should be placed under a good second in command, and that at Naples under a good secretary of legation. He said that Neipperg and others said that the man at Naples should be a military man, and that no other could have any control over Murat.

We embarked at half past 6 p. m. to return to Palermo.

(1) Graham started for the headquarters of the Emperor with dispatches for Lord Castlereagh.

America, Monday, February 7, 1814. We had very little wind during the night. In the course of the next day the wind came fair. We met brig Sheerwater, Capt. Smith, at sea, having A'Court from Tarragona. We took him on board.

America, Tuesday, February 8, 1814. The night was very uneasy; the wind being strong and the sea heavy set us so much to the east that, passing an island in the night, it was taken for Ischia when it was really one of the Liparis. This put us back so that we did not anchor before one o'clock.

I called upon the Hereditary Prince and the Orleanses. I gave the Hereditary Prince a copy of the armistice. I begged the Hereditary Prince to ask the King if he would wish to see me.

Palermo, Wednesday, February 9, 1814. I went to the Ficuzza with Sir Josias Rowley. We were about 3 and a half hours going and three back. Changed four times, 6 horses each time. Got there about ten.

I saw the King immediately, and told him the particulars of my negotiation at Naples about the armistice and the difficulty I principally experienced from Count Neipperg. The King expressed his hopes. I said I could not give him any. The only ones he had would be in Providence, which had produced such wonderful changes and whose ways were inscrutable; the other in Murat's conduct, whose vanity and ambition was without bounds, and whose indecision and want of principle would probably expose him to the dissatisfaction of the allies. He said he had three anchors of hope, God, the British Government, and myself.

He asked when and where I was going with the troops. I told him. He said if I wanted him he was ready to come at once, and to serve under me as a soldier. He said he was not a general, but he understood the military service. He had done the soldier and he behaved pretty well. I told him Naples was become quite a part of France: everything French, and that it was become a very formidable neighbour.

He talked to me about a great earthquake about 8 or 10 years ago, the day of St Anna at Naples. He said in the morning he felt a great depression and melancholy, and he told the Queen he should go to Portici. He said he must confide me a secret, that he had an *amicizia* with a lady of the name of Marianna. The Queen told him he was going there on account of its being her name day; but he said no, it was to divert his melancholy. He went by water, and when near the place he saw the sky very red and with a very heavy cloud, and he expected a storm. As he was sitting in the house, he heard a great shake. The candles on the table jumped up and the pictures beat against the walls. He run under the arch of the door, praying, as he said, to the *Santissima Trinità*. He saw the wall waving backwards and forwards. He then run into the yard, where he remained all night. There were two shocks afterwards in the course of the night. In Naples and Caserta many houses divided. There were only two men killed. I think he said that in Calabria 5,000 people perished at that time. In a former earthquake above 40,000. I asked if Caserta was in a beautiful country. He said he would not have built the house there; that somebody had said of it, it was a gem set in mud. I introduced to him Sir J. Rowley. He said he had known his cousin of the Eagle.

We sat down to dinner at eleven. He said his custom was, at the Ficuzza, to have three plates in the morning and three in the evening. He said he and his people had killed forty-two woodcocks the day before; not above five or six had escaped. Once, in the Kingdom of Naples, he had killed 1,000 woodcocks in a day, of which one hundred and two were killed to his gun.

At night dispatched order to General Montresor for embarkation and sailing of troops, and armistice to Gen. Campbell at Zante.

Thursday, February 10, 1814. Nothing new.

Graham told me at Naples that when Neipperg smiled at Murat, calling it a sacrifice his renouncing the Kingdom of Sicily, Murat answered: "Not so vain the hope of obtaining it. I know the people are against me, but I can show you letters from many of the nobility inviting me over".

Friday, February 11, 1814. (1) I called upon Settimo, and told him in confidence what had passed between me and the Hereditary Prince about the transfer of Sicily to England. Also that I had written to Lord Castlereagh about the future condition of Sicily, and that it was indispensable that the Government here should come to some resolution upon the subject. I told him that in my opinion the King and Hereditary Prince would be glad to wait for events and to see if they were likely to get Naples or not. They would be glad not to be hampered with the English at a peace in Sicily if it could be avoided. But, if he was to be

left to the mercy of Murat, he would prefer to that evil the lesser one of the English protection. I said this could not be mentioned in congress because it would be immediately reported to the Hereditary Prince by Cattolica (I believed, as did he also), or by the imprudence of Belmonte, who told it to others who carried it to the Prince. It was agreed that I should speak to Villermosa and Belmonte. I told him that I had prepared the way, by describing as strongly as possible the terrible military power which Murat was erecting in the Kingdom of Naples.

I called upon Circello. I told him the same about the power of Naples, and I said if these Sicilians did not take care, Murat would surprise them asleep. Circello repeated what he had always said, that Sicily could not exist without Naples. I observed that I knew the Sicilians well enough to be convinced that, with their violent passions and want of principle, any party that was beat would be quite capable of asking Murat's assistance. I said what Murat had said, of having received the invitations of many of the nobility to come to Sicily. When I told the same to the Prince he fully believed it.

I saw Villafranca in the evening. He showed me a Note which the Hereditary Prince proposed to address me, in which he made use of the expression "*nel permettere*" that the armistice should take effect, which Villafranca thought very objectionable and which he could not sign. It was agreed that it should be referred to the congress next day.

I saw Villermosa at night, and talked to him of the future situation of Sicily. I saw also Belmonte, to whom I spoke in the same strain, but I could not fix his attention to the subject. He went into a long harangue upon what he supposed to be the policy of England, without attending to the real state of the question, and, it being late, I left him.

(1) An aide de camp of Bellegarde arrived in Rainbow, Capt. Hamilton, from Naples with dispatches from Lord Castlereagh dated January 22nd, Basle.

Saturday, February 12, 1814. I called upon the Hereditary Prince and read him the long enclosure in Lord Castlereagh's dispatch, containing the secret articles in the treaty between Austria and Murat. I read him so much of Lord Castlereagh's dispatch as described Murat as "the person exercising the government of Naples". This expression pleased him very much. He noted down the principal articles, that is, the substance of them. He was much amused with the stipulation that Murat should receive compensation for the *sacrifices* he had made or was to make. I again referred to the assertion of Murat that he had received offers from here. The Hereditary Prince said he had written word of it immediately to the King.

There was a congress of Ministers upon the Note directed by the Hereditary Prince to be sent in answer to mine about the armistice. They all agreed that it was improper; an alteration was suggested, merely saying that the Hereditary Prince adhered to the armistice, but upon condition that no prejudice was done to his rights. I suggested that Villafranca should go directly to the Hereditary Prince, which he did, and we were to wait for him; and should say that the Ministers were unanimously of opinion that the Note ought not to be sent, and that it should be either Villafranca's old Note, which said nothing, or the amended

one. The Hereditary Prince, after a great deal of difficulty, chose Villafranca's old one; and it was dispatched. But soon after the Hereditary Prince desired it not to be sent, but Villafranca said it was already expedited.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. I begged him to speak to Belmonte about the necessity of their interfering with the British Government to keep a force in Sicily, and not to let him deceive himself that England would do this of her own accord, or that she would not be happy to get rid of Sicily and all its troubles. I told the Duke that Lord Castlereagh had said to Lamb, "When is all this interference to cease?" It was needless to fancy how it should be. I was fully convinced of the policy of England maintaining her influence in Sicily. But how did the fact really stand, and had England this interest upon the subject? No.

I saw Balsamo in the morning. Said that the Ministers never would go on if I remained long absent. He said they were divided. I told him I had always said that if Belmonte and Villermosa came into the Cabinet it never would go on. I could not persuade Settimo and Airoldi to come in without them. With four sensible men the Government would have gone on better. Now there was neither union nor secrecy in the Cabinet. How could it prosper?

Sunday, February 13, 1814. Circello called upon me. He said he came from the King to ask my opinion whether it might be advisable for him to issue a proclamation addressed to the Neapolitans, which he might contrive to have circulated into the Kingdom of Naples. I said, if the King meant to do any such thing, I must not know of it either privately or publicly, and I begged he would not speak to me upon the subject. He said the King would do nothing without having my opinion. I said I could not but regret that such a proclamation had not been issued before the negotiation took place; that now I thought it would be almost an act of hostility, and certainly of bad policy, to take a step which opposed the measures of Austria that had received the acquiescence of the British Government. How could the King regain Naples? Only by the good will of his allies and Murat's bad conduct. It was possible at a general peace that such an arrangement might be made, but he should avoid previously disgusting those who alone could accomplish it for him. What would be the use of such a proclamation? If he had an army of his own, or if the Neapolitans were likely to rise, in short if he was likely by means independent of his allies to regain his kingdom, then measures to that object would be wise. But he had no such hope. He had no army, and the Neapolitans were in complete subjection to Murat. His whole dependence was upon the allied sovereigns. He must therefore do nothing opposite to their views. At the peace, if he was resolved to receive no equivalent and not to sacrifice his rights, he then, in my opinion, would do well to protest against the sacrifice of his rights. I told Circello that Gallo had wanted me to guarantee that no hostility should be committed by Sicily upon Naples. I said military hostility was impossible because the King had no troops, and this I would not permit at any rate. Intrigues might possibly go on, and for this I would not be responsible for the Neapolitans in Sicily.

He said the King relied upon me. I said I did not see what good could be done him; that I thought it a hopeless case. But, said Circello, you can only profit of favourable circumstances now unforeseen. I said that I should be always happy to do for the King's

advantage. I told him that my opinion of that which was for the King's interest was this, that his friends should endeavour to give him what was intended for him without requiring a renunciation of his rights.

Mademoiselle d'Orléans begged me to call upon her. It was to say that the Duke had begged her to ask me an explanation which from delicacy he did not like to do. It was, as I was going, whether I meant to employ him or not. I said I really had not thought upon it. I told her my great objections to go, which seemed to me to apply to him with greater force, namely the cause, as tending to confirm the slavery of Italy whose liberation had been my constant hope; Murat; and the little prospect of military advantage and reputation [in] Whitehall. My presence was necessary. She said that about Murat he did not care; that he wanted to be employed; that he did not want any immediate charge, only to be permitted to follow the army. I said in Italy there was nothing to be done; it was in France that he could be brought into action. She said he would prefer anywhere else than in France, because it would be said that he wanted to be King of France. She said his situation was a *triste* one; that, with his talents, to do nothing was lamentable; that, having a son and children, he was bound to make a career for himself and them. Nothing could be more uncertain than his situation in this country. She said the Duchess had written me a long letter about the Duke, but had been prevailed upon by the Duke not to send it. She said the silence of the British Government was not unfavourable. I told >her< I thought the contrary. I promised to consider the subject, and to explain myself fully and clearly with the Duke before I went. I talked to her also about the Duke's allowance, and said I feared we should have difficulty about it. I regretted it had been ever so large. I thought it not proportioned to the finances of the country. She said it was not larger in comparison than that of the rest of the royal family. I said not, but that I had always thought the whole had been too large. She said that it was only what had been promised by the King, and that the amount could make no difference in the Sicilian finances. I agreed in this, but it gave a handle for opposition. I said, if I saw the King again, I would speak to him upon the subject. She thought it would be well.

In the evening I saw first Villermosa and Settimo, and then Belmonte and Villafranca, about the question of retaining the British troops in Sicily. I proposed that I should sound the Hereditary Prince upon the subject tomorrow. The latter two had just heard that I was to go away on the 20th. They were much annoyed by it.

Monday, February 14, 1814. I saw Medici, who came for the first time after his return from Cagliari. He begged me for letters to Lords Aberdeen and Castlereagh and spoke about his route. I undertook to put him in the Austrian States. I then said to him that I was anxious for the King's interests, and that it appeared to me very desirable that the King should get his equivalent without being compelled to renounce his rights upon the Kingdom of Naples. He went into some few details. He made the difficulty to consist as to the communication with a king whom you had not acknowledged. I did not see the difficulty, and that would not only be the embarrassment now, but hereafter, for at the general peace,

if the King would not acknowledge Murat, that difficulty would always exist. We were interrupted, and I put him off till tomorrow.

I then went to the Hereditary Prince, and I talked the same subject over with him, and Medici had been with him directly from me. I said the embarrassments were many. Did the King mean always to remain at war with Murat? The danger would be his if he did. Would the nation expose themselves to such risk? With respect to the equivalent, my idea of the way of doing it would be that the King's allies, England and Russia, should in the general treaty allot to the King what was intended, and that the King should neither speak nor appear in it. Murat ought not to care about it when his own king[dom] was guaranteed to him by all the sovereigns in Europe. I said I was to see Medici again the next day.

I also talked to him about the proposition from the King yesterday about the proclamation. He said he perfectly agreed in my sentiments. I showed him Murat's order of the day of the 7th January to his guards, which the Hereditary Prince told me had been afterwards recalled by the gazette or contradicted.

I then said that, as I was going away on the 20th and not to return for the present, it was necessary before my departure and that of Medici to decide what was to be done about the treaty, which expired, I believed, with the war; and, he said, if [it] did, whether it was now to be renewed or not. I said His Royal Highness knew my opinion, that he could not govern Sicily without assistance at present; that he would neither be safe against internal or external danger. There was no national force. He said he was entirely of my opinion, and that I must recollect he had always been of opinion that the British troops should remain here. He asked how I thought it should be done. I said by a new treaty stipulating that 5,000 British troops should remain here, and that Sicily should furnish 5,000 or more men for the general operations of the Mediterranean. I said that it was to be hoped shortly the Government would take consistency. He said we should see what the new Parliament would do. He was for the Constitution and always had been. He hoped in the new Parliament things would take an *assiette*, but if they did not, he was of opinion that the hands of the executive government should be strengthened. I expressed the same opinion. I said I was most anxious the new Constitution should succeed, because I had always hoped and thought it would be the great engine of destruction of the French despotism in Italy, and I now believed that it would be the surest means of making all the Neapolitans desire him to the exclusion of Murat. He said he thought so too. I told him I thought it would be well if he would communicate with the King upon the subject. I suggested to send Circello; he said he would go himself.

In talking of Italy and his chances of recovering Naples, I said there appeared to be none that could be foreseen. With reference to the liberty here established, I expected to be well received by the Italians. I thought there might still be a revolution in Italy. The time for such a combination would be when Italy should be cleared and the Austrian armies should enter France. Italy would then be free of police and surveillance and could combine her own liberation. There might then be a general declaration to the Italians. The Neapolitan army might follow the example, and then perhaps Murat might be driven from Naples by a revolution of his own subjects and army. He hoped I would take advantage of any favourable circumstances; I said I would certainly. I told the Hereditary Prince I might very

likely go myself to Lord Castlereagh. He also talked about the militia which he thought should be raised, and I said I thought it would be desirable if possible that the Neapolitans should be naturalized as Sicilians by the new Parliament. I certainly never saw the Prince more reasonable and sensible or more apparently sincere, but *nimum ne crede!*

I related this conversation to Belmonte, Villafranca, Villermosa, and Settimo. The two former were very urgent with me about leaving a commander and more troops.

Mr Clive told me that the Duke of Orleans had failed in Cadiz in great measure through the interference of Sir H. Wellesley, who acted without the orders of the British Government, but whose conduct afterwards had been decidedly approved. The Spaniards were very jealous of him as being a Frenchman.

Tuesday, February 15, 1814. Nothing particular occurred. It was a very rainy day, and I saw nobody. Engaged all day in writing letters for England.

Wednesday, February 16, 1814. There was a congress of Ministers about the meeting of Parliament. Carini, Bonanno, and Villafranca were against the elections being made in my absence. Belmonte supported this opinion. Villermosa was for the immediate elections. Settimo suggested that Bonanno should make enquiry from the Government servants in the country whether it was a favourable moment. I opposed strongly any delay. They all agreed that the Parliament could not meet without my presence. Now my anxious wish was to have it over as soon as possible. I believed the elections would go better off the sooner they were made. They admitted, with the exception of Bonanno, that delay would create great disgust. But I told them I did not care whether good or bad members were returned; that I would undertake to make them do their duty at any rate. All I wished was to have the power of assembling them. At this moment, if the Parliament could meet, no difficulty would be experienced either in Lords or Commons, well disposed as was the King and looking up to me for everything. It was at last agreed that there should be another congress on Friday, and a Council, before which final arrangements could be made with the Hereditary Prince.

Villafranca also introduced the subject of the renewal of the treaty with England, and read the draft of a Note to me hoping that England would not withdraw their troops from Sicily, which was threatened both by Murat and internal disorder. I advised him to do nothing till Friday's congress. Belmonte was strongly for the English remaining.

I saw the Duke of Orleans, and carried to him my answer upon Mademoiselle's proposition. I told him if he had asked me the question downright I must have refused it, because in addition to all former difficulties I knew that all royal persons had been forbid from going to any of the armies. The Duke of Cumberland had not been allowed, and all the Austrian archdukes. I did not know either that the Government would like to have a Bourbon set forward. I saw that in the proclamations no mention had been made of them. But, as I wished sincerely to forward his views, that might be done by stratagem which could not by force. I would propose that he should write me a letter asking me for a passport to go upon the Continent, which I would give him. He could then come to the army and in the

meantime, if I chose it, I could ask Lord Castlereagh's leave for him to stay. I might or might not, but I wished to be at liberty to do as I pleased. He was very much pleased with this arrangement.

Thursday, February 17, 1814. (1) I saw the Hereditary Prince. He said the King was to be in town Saturday; did not believe Di Aci and Naselli were with him. He had lent them other woods, not liking to be at any expense. Knew Gen. Arcovita, now commanding in Calabria, was the son of a man who worked in ivory and ebony. The King took a fancy to him as a boy and educated him in the Naval College; sent him to serve in the Swedish Marine. Was then at the revolution in Sweden, and distinguished himself. He was a man of talents. At the revolution in Naples he put himself forward, and fell in consequence into disgrace.

I spoke to him about the money asked of me by the Duke of Orleans. He said there was more deductions than at first supposed to be made against the King, and they agreed to divide it between them.

I showed him Turri's proclamation in draft. He did not approve it. He talked to me of giving out a general order to the troops, which I said I could not object to. He said, as the King was coming to town, he had said nothing to him, for it would take volumes in writing and would only make an imbroglio.

I told this to Villafranca in the evening.

(1) Packet sailed for England.

Friday, February 18, 1814. I went to a congress, where Villafranca read anew his Note, in which Belmonte suggested an alteration for the word advantage of Great Britain. He proposed glory. We had a great deal of conversation. I told them that it appeared to me better not to show the Note to the Hereditary Prince, but that Villafranca should report to him that it was the unanimous opinion of his Ministers that a request should be made to the British Government to allow the British troops to remain in Sicily after the war. I thought this better because with the Hereditary Prince I had gone further. I had with him established the necessity of keeping [troops], and the question between us was how it should be done. Here the first part was only proposed to the Hereditary Prince, namely the application to England. What would be the fate of this application? It would be sent to Lord Castlereagh, who would send it to England. This would take 3 months. Then the treaty is to be made, if the answer is favourable. This will take 3 months more. I was for losing no time. Let the projet of the treaty be sent at once to Lord Castlereagh, approved from hence, and the whole question would then be settled at once in half the time.

Belmonte was of a different opinion. He said, if a treaty was proposed, the articles would be a pretext to the King to make delay. I did not think so. I thought the King would object. His reasoning would be: the English would not be in a hurry, since this agreement could be made in the end if necessary; and why bind himself in the meantime? He would rather prefer the lesser evil of the two, the stay of the British, than to be left without protection

from Murat. I said there were two reasons which would induce the British Government to keep the troops: to support the new system of liberty; the other, as an excuse with the Parliament to keep more troops in the Mediterranean. Otherwise I thought they would rather withdraw them. Belmonte said he could not think so.

In the evening I saw the Duke of Orleans. He told me that he had a long conversation with Medici. Medici, in speaking of the Queen's conduct here, said that he supposed that I must have in my possession the rough draft of a letter written (the Duke did not say to whom written) by the Queen which went to criminate her exceedingly; that any direct communication to Bonaparte she had not made. The Duchess, who was present, asked why the Queen had not shown it to the King so as to have brought him off, that he might at once have cleared himself of it. Medici said because there was something in it respecting the King which he would not like to have read. Medici said the opinion in England was that my conduct regarding the Queen had been too tame. The Duke then expressed a strong opinion that the British Government would be glad to withdraw the troops, and that it would be more for their advantage in the beginning of a new war to take it for themselves than to be embarrassed as they have been with its defence for another. Medici, he said, was very much struck with this opinion, and seemed strongly impressed with the necessity of an arrangement.

Villafranca came and told me that he had made the proposition of the morning to the Hereditary Prince, whom he had found very reasonable upon it. The Hereditary Prince said Ruffo was gone to the Congress. Villafranca said that he had not been ordered by him, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Hereditary Prince was embarrassed. Villafranca said Ruffo could not have much the confidence of the present Government. Villafranca agreed at last with the Hereditary Prince that instructions should be given to Ruffo to obtain if possible the Kingdom of Naples for the King, and to preserve the independence of Sicily, and further that British troops should be continued in Sicily in case Naples was not regained.

Saturday, February 19, 1814. (1) I saw Medici, who spoke to me in favour of Ferreri. I told him I thought he had been the cause of the failure of the last Ministry. He said he was under great obligations to Ferreri for having defended him unknown.

He said he had seen Leckie, and had convinced him of the injustice of his opinion that the barons and the crown were united and had been so. He said the crown had always taken the part of the people against the barons, and that I might see in all the former Parliaments a vote, a *supplica*, that the King would revoke an edict by which he had forbidden that a vassal of a baron should be confined without an order from a judge (as well as I recollect). His opinions were very liberal.

Gargallo came to me about his peerage, and said he would, if I pleased, put San Marco, Cutò, Campofranco into my hands; that they, as ardently as I did, wished for the establishment of the Constitution. I received him well.

I saw the Hereditary Prince. I showed him the letter I had received from Prince Pignatelli. He showed me an order he had prepared to be issued to the Army, which I thought unobjectionable. He proposed that it should be sent as a dispatch through the Minister of

War. He talked to me about the flags, and his unwillingness to admit that of Naples. I endeavoured to convince him of the futility of his objections, and that the commerce allowed by the armistice was advantageous to the people of both countries without affecting at all the question of acknowledging Murat. He talked to me about the British troops remaining in Sicily. He said he thought the best way would be to send instructions to Castalcicala and Ruffo to settle the matter either in London or at the headquarters, as the British Government might choose. He evidently wished to evade an immediate arrangement. He probably wished only then to conclude it when he should find that Naples was irrecoverable and that Murat must be his neighbour. I begged him to let me know when I ought to go to the King.

(1) Termagant returned from Naples.

Sunday, February 20, 1814. (1) I called upon the King at ten. He took me into his room, where I sat down. He was very civil and gracious. He repeated the same things as before. Said he hoped the war would continue, although the wish was not Christianlike. He said his whole confidence was in Providence, in the British Government, and in me, and he might add also in his own firmness; what he once said he never departed from. He would never give up his rights. He might die poor, but he would die *onorato*. God had given him his kingdom, God might take it away. He talked less in religious phrases and exclamations than usual. He abused Austria very much, saying their conduct had been *infâme*, believed she had intercepted all his letters. Ruffo was a very attentive man and must have written. He said all these events quite confused him. He sometimes lost his reason altogether. He said after dinner the day we were at the Ficuzza, his party killed 43 woodcocks, the next day 50, and 7 or 11 wild boars, but they were small and females or he would have sent one as he had promised me. He said he had ordered a pie with truffles to be made for the voyage, which he would send to me, and it came accordingly and was not bad.

I saw Villafranca and settled with him that he should go to the Hereditary Prince in the evening, and if he had seen the King about the British troops there should be Council tomorrow, if not, congress. I told him what the Hereditary Prince had proposed. He said that at any rate what was sent to them should be also communicated to me. I said the reverse should take place. The application should be made to me and copies sent to them. We then here should arrange the point, and by this means there could be no deception. I told him I thought England would not make any treaty with them, but would give the men. He had seen the inconveniences of the last treaty. I saw Villermosa and Belmonte upon the same subject.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans. He repeated again what Medici had said to the Duchess about the paper of the Queen he supposed to be in my possession: namely a rough draft the Queen had made of an overture to Bonaparte. And the Duke added that Medici also said that I was supposed to have received many papers from Mme Castrone. Medici also told the Duchess that the King had said that I would give three pounds of my blood (the very expression) to get back for him Naples.

The King had supped with him the night before, the first time in two years and since Belmonte's arrest. Was in high good humour. He stayed till half past 9, eat and drank a good deal, as did also the Hereditary Prince. The latter drank a little too much. The Hereditary Prince had a long conversation with the King. The Duke observed to him that he had had this long confab. The Hereditary Prince answered: "It is a pity that the King always preserves this *rancune*". He said the Hereditary Prince recovered himself and explained it away, evidently sorry for having let slip the expression. The Duke supposed it to allude to the British troops.

We talked of the Sicilians. I told him of my resolution to remain in Sicily as long as I could be useful. He said I must govern it, and England must do so for many years to come. The Ministers must be my clerks. I mentioned San Marco as a person desirable to be got. He said he was just like the rest. He would be unfit for anything, as they all were. He said how much he had been deceived in Belmonte, who was clearly a man of superior abilities. San Marco had failed in all the situations he had been ever in.

I told him of a project I had for the establishment of Italian independence. To go to Bellegarde and say to him: You see the Italians are against you. They keep their fortresses, and it will take you the greater part of your army to blockade or take them. You have also Murat, in whom you can place no reliance whatever. Here is my plan. Whatever portion of Italy you want, to the Adda or to the Oglio, you shall have. Leave to me to declare the independence of Italy under a free constitution, and the whole of Italy will be yours and Murat at once reduced to nothing. He liked the plan.

(1) Termagant went to Naples with Montrond and Baron Froelich on board.

Monday, February 21, 1814. (1) I went to a congress of Ministers. Villafranca told me that the Hereditary Prince and the King were determined to make no application for British troops till the peace. It was then simple enough to do so. There was a great deal of discussion upon this subject, and Belmonte made this suggestion, that a paper signed by all present should be given to me containing their opinion and request, which I might show to the British Government and might be a document for me to act upon. I said this would be a very useful paper, but was objectionable as an unconstitutional measure. They of themselves, without the sanction of the Prince, could do nothing; much less against his known will.

(1) Transports with the troops arrived from Milazzo.
A long visit from Ferreri.

Tuesday, February 22, 1814. I went to a Council.

I saw the Hereditary Prince before it. The Hereditary Prince said he would not have the Parliament assemble until my return, let what will happen. I told him I hoped to be able [to] establish one thing, that the Parliament should not take upon themselves the executive

government. Nothing very important passed, except that I told him I thought, before I went away, I would express my hope to the King that he would never allow the Queen to return to him, whether he had Naples or any other equivalent. I had repented very much of not having told the King that the fear of the Queen's return was as great as the desire of his, at Naples. He said it was a pity a person having such talents - and did not continue. I said it was clear the great injury she had done to the King's interests, and that it appeared to me she always preserved an *ascendant* over him. He seemed to doubt it. He gave no opinion as to the point of my speaking to the King.

He, before Council, said he saw no necessity for Salvo going to Vienna. I said it was a question I had nothing to do with. I avoided it.

The Ministers then came in, and the following points were discussed.

1. The meeting of Parliament. It was agreed that the dispatch should be issued by the 1st March, and the Parliament should meet by the 20th April. I asked, in case I should desire it to be prorogued for another month, whether this could be done without inconvenience. Bonanno said without any, for it was agreed at all hands that the Parliament could not succeed without my presence, and Belmonte expressed the same opinion as at the congress, that even the elections would not go on well in my absence.

2. The intercourse with Naples. The Hereditary Prince agreed that it should be carried on with a British Jack over the national flag. The same for both sides. I asked, in case at Naples they objected to this, whether some conventional flag might not be established for either side. The Hereditary Prince agreed to this.

3. The British troops. The Hereditary Prince said that both he and the King wished for the troops if Murat was left at Naples. He said that instructions to this effect should be given both to Castalcicala and Ruffo. He contended that a verbal communication to me would be sufficient. I said if any was made to me it must be in writing, and it was necessary it should, because, if such an arrangement was to be made at the peace, it must be previously arranged at the Congress, or otherwise the other powers might complain that the British troops should be left in Sicily when all other foreign troops were withdrawn from the countries in which they were. There was no discussion upon the subject.

4. A proclamation I proposed to issue upon my departure, which the Hereditary Prince approved. I had struck out words "*presso Sua Maestà il Re e il Principe Vicario Generale*". The Hereditary Prince thought them better in.

Settimo told me a curious confidential conversation he had with San Marco, and another between Santa Lucia of the Marine, Vassallo, and San Marco. The former rallied them about their attachment to France, and cited the disadvantages under which those countries suffered who had been connected with France. The Neapolitans, for example, had 25 per cent property tax, besides others. Vassallo said: "Well, I will not be French any longer".

Wednesday, February 23, 1814. Villafranca read me the Note which, after much trouble and many alterations from the Hereditary Prince, he had at last fixed. I suggested to him some further alterations, required, as I thought, by his responsibility to the Parliament. He told me that in his Note he had made the demand for the British troops positive. The

Hereditary Prince has put the demand itself as conditional, *potrebbe qualora*. The Note altogether was much better than I had expected it would have been.

I called upon Villermosa. I spoke to him about [a] peerage for Gargallo, and spoke to him of the necessity of gaining San Marco. If our party had been sufficiently strong, overtures to those who had showed no good will to the Constitution were to be avoided, but there was now no alternative. I was not for making any compromise with them. No political alliance, but I would merely enter into closer and more friendly communication, and according to their conduct and to their demonstration of better conduct I would enlarge my confidence. He agreed with me.

I saw Princess Paternò. She told me, as a great secret, that she wanted to marry Agatina to Monteleone's son, and for this reason she wanted my assistance in procuring his return to Sicily. I told her my conversation with San Marco upon this subject, and that I had given it as my opinion that his estates ought to be confiscated. I suggested an idea of the moment, that the father would do well to go to Spain and to send his son to Sicily, saying to the country "at least, if I have been guilty, do not punish my son". She said Monteleone was to come and see me in Italy. Capecelatro was his friend and would speak to me about him. She said this matrimonial arrangement had united her with San Marco, and that she would answer for his doing whatever I wished. I said I should be glad to see him. She desired I would order him to be admitted.

Thursday, February 24, 1814. Circello came and brought me from the King extract of a letter received from Serracapirola, recommending the King to make very strong remonstrances to the Emperor of Russia, who had never acknowledged Murat. He left the paper with me. He came to ask me from the King my opinion whether he would not do well to send Serracapirola to the Congress, he having great influence with the Emperor. I answered yes. Circello said he had shown the same paper to the Hereditary Prince the day before yesterday. (This would lead me to suppose that the King first read all the dispatches and not the Hereditary Prince.)

I saw Belmonte. He told me that the Hereditary Prince had kept him after Council for three quarters of an hour and was not only amiable but tender.

I called upon the Duke of Orleans about his claim on the British Government, and told him my opinion was rather against him. His reasoning was that by my giving 16,000 ounces to the Hereditary Prince no deduction had been made from his account, but I had made a deduction from the sum to be paid to the Duke. He said the Hereditary Prince's credit was 45,000 and his debt to the King for maintenance 38,000, and I gave him 16,000 when the balance was only 7. His credit was 5,333, and his debt, the correctness of which he did not acknowledge, was 1,300. I had deducted all this from him while I gave the Hereditary Prince twice as much as he had a right to. I explained to him that at the time he (the Duke) had admitted the account, that is, he said he would not object to it. His account had nothing to do with the Hereditary Prince's. The Hereditary Prince would not admit his account, and I agreed with him at the time that he should receive from me 16,000 ounces and make no

demand upon the King. He thought I was in the wrong, but he would rather have nothing than put me to inconvenience hereafter.

He said he had dined with the King, by whom he and all of them had been very kindly treated.

Friday, February 25, 1814. I had a long conversation with Gargallo and San Marco. Their great object was to persuade me that they could not but be friendly to the Constitution. I spoke to them plainly. I hoped they were, but from their past actions it was difficult for me to think so. I saw Gargallo first. He spoke in favour of the King, evidently insinuated that he would be more fit to govern than the Hereditary Prince; that he was a man of good faith. I said I should give no opinion upon that subject. I acknowledged his good natural talents and disposition, but he had received no education, and his habits for 50 years had been entirely despotic. I told him it would have been much better if I had done the work in 3 months. Everyone would have been thankful and the work would already have made great progress. But I did not know the nation as well >before as since<. I adverted also to the general character: that they never reasoned upon what they saw, but upon what they supposed. They were led by their imagination and not their reason. No man calculated that 2 and 2 made 4. It was either 5 and 6 or 2 and 3. They were poets.

I said I should be happy to see them support the new Constitution. I told them I was determined to do my business *bon gré mal gré*, but that my wish was to do it constitutionally, to do it with unanimity, to hold up to Europe a whole nation united in the cause of liberty. This had been one great means, the constant subject of all my prayers, by which I hoped to overthrow the French despotism in Italy. I had indeed been disappointed.

I spoke decidedly of the degradation of the nation. I praised the Hereditary Prince very much, that he was just and good, perhaps too good. I could not conceive a better constitutional king. They talked a great deal. They were violent against Belmonte. I praised him. I talked of his sacrifices for the cause of liberty. They said his motives were ambition and no other. I said so every man might be decried. So had Villermosa been treated. His honesty nobody could find fault with. The only attack was by saying that he was surrounded with rogues. The country was now so constituted, such the distrust, such the jealousy, such the eagerness after self interest that no Ministry could stand without the aid of some protecting foreign power.

They talked of Monteleone. I said I would see his family in Naples and advise them for the best. I said I had been of opinion that his estates should be sold, because the nation wanted capital and I saw no other means of obtaining [it], but I had since found that there was national property which could be disposed of; I said I did not wish to meddle with the question. They said places had been sold. I said it was not unlikely, but I was sure that charge could be laid to any Ministry, the most virtuous, such was the general bad opinion of each other universally prevailing.

Palermo, Thursday, June 8, 1814. Anchored at 3 p. m. and landed about 5. I went immediately to the Hereditary Prince at Bocca di Falco and remained with him about an hour and a half. I told him of the communication from the Neapolitan Army; of my having named to them the King; of their not having listened to the idea at all; of their having expressed their obligations to Murat and of their being content with him as a constitutional king; of my having observed to them that it would be easier to tie the hands of a king not military than of one that was, and bred up in the Bonaparte school. I also mentioned my having suggested whether the union of our 5,000 Neapolitans with theirs would not be useful. I gave as my reason that the great object was confusion and resistance to Murat, and it would be good that the King should have so many partisans on the other side. The King had everything to gain and nothing to lose. I told him I could not interfere.

Friday, June 9, 1814. I went with Lord Exmouth to Solanto to call upon the King.

Tuesday, June 14, 1814. I went to Solanto with Lord Exmouth at 8. Went to the tunny fishing. Caught 180 *thons* but small. The King in great glee. Present Capts Thompson, Sage, Chamberlayne, Mme Matalona and her daughter. We dined at 11 with the King, who was in great spirits and got half tipsy. He quizzed Mme Matalona. Said he had known her at Naples 29 years ago.

Wednesday, June 15, 1814. Lord Exmouth visited by the King off the port.

The Neapolitan frigate the *Coraline* brought General Barthemy to confer with me upon certain points mentioned in letters from the Duc de Gallo and Genl MacDonald, principally about the non admission of the Neapolitan flag. I rather think Murat's object was to reconnoitre what we were about.

I called upon the Hereditary Prince in the afternoon and showed him the letter, and endeavoured to persuade him to receive the flag; but he said he was resolved not to do it. He would not consent to any direct or indirect acknowledgment of Murat. I contended that the question was not affected by it; that England had not, by the armistice or by trading with Murat: neither would he. He said there was great difference between what was done by a great and a small power.

He asked me what had been done at the congress on that day. I said we had been engaged in reading the list of peers, of which we thought we had the majority. He said he believed otherwise. He praised Settimo as a frank honest man, and Villafranca as being conciliatory. Villafranca told me that to two peers he had given 20 ounces (£12) to the one, and 15 ounces (£9) to the other, for their proxies for the session.

Thursday, June 16, 1814. A meeting took place at my house with Belmonte, Villerosa, Settimo, and Villafranca. I told them that it was necessary I should inform them that the

British Minister could now no longer assume that direction and control which it had hitherto done, the war being over; that the King might resume his powers; Queen, Ascoli must now come back if they pleased.

To a remark that the King could sacrifice them (the barons) again if he chose, I said no, that in such a case the British Minister would always interfere in their behalf. To punish them for their attachment to Great Britain would be an insult to that power which she was bound in honour and justice not to submit to. But Belmonte said this would not be done directly, but under some pretext. I said it was easy to be ascertained at the time if the pretext was real or feigned.

I told them therefore that it was now necessary for the Ministers to understand that they must march by themselves; that I could only assist and should assist with that influence which an English Minister must always have: 1st, because after the millions spent and the interference taken in behalf of Sicily, nobody from the King to the last man in his dominions would believe that England did not mean to continue the system hitherto adopted. 2nd, the maritime power would give her great weight. 3rd, the general feeling of the nation towards her, and, if Murat stayed, the desire of the King himself to have the protection of Great Britain against [him]: the guarantee of all the powers of Europe would not satisfy the timid mind of the King or be equal in his opinion to the presence of a British force.

Belmonte repeated what he had said before, that his opinion was that England would never leave Sicily, that Sicily would become an English province, or so dependent upon it as to be the same thing. He therefore expressed his tranquillity about the future. I said this was very well for him to *imagine*, but to his imagination and theory I had to oppose facts which I knew, viz. that England neither could nor would direct or command in Sicily as she had done; and therefore they must consider how they as a Sicilian Ministry were to go on.

The first question was, as they had the House of Commons, whether they had also the House of Peers. I had before said that I would answer for the Peers, now I could no longer do so. Belmonte said he was doubtful; he believed they could. The second question was, how to gain them and strengthen the Government; and then was considered whether it was better or not to unite with San Marco and Trabia and how. Belmonte was against it, Villafranca gave no opinion, and Settimo and Villermosa for it. Belmonte said he was for whatever I wished, but I told him it was no longer my concern; it was theirs. I stated my opinion that they had not and would not have the House of Peers, and that it would be indispensable that they should as much as possible be strengthened. It was agreed that I should see San Marco and Trabia and should hear what they had to say. It was said that, as they had themselves proposed reconciliation, it could not appear as an acknowledgment of weakness on our part.

I had seen earlier Gargallo and San Marco. It was a visit of ceremony. We talked of Monteleone. San Marco read a letter he had received from him at Florence, stating his interviews with me at my passing and re-passing; that the first time he found me *molto duro*, the second time *molto amabile*. I told them the reason of this was that I found him supporting his cause with the most absurd arguments, which provoked me. He maintained that he was not a Sicilian, and that he had a right to serve the Neapolitan Government. I

added to them that I was sure it was better he should not come to Sicily, that his cause might be in any other hands than his own. I told them that my project was, if his son had come from Paris, to have made him my aide de camp, and under that dress to have given him as much merit as possible with the Sicilian nation.

We talked then of the elections. They said there had been great irregularities. I said I believed it. Knowing as well as I did the character of the nation, it was impossible that so many new officers as had been created should not have acted improperly, some from ignorance, others from the vanity of displaying their consequence, others again from zeal to serve the government by whom they had been appointed. Such irregularities ought to be remedied, but it was only to be done constitutionally by the House of Commons. It was certainly my opinion that the Government should as much as possible, both by example and precept, discourage the system of *prepotenza* by which the country had been so long oppressed, from the sovereign downwards by every agent of every baron and by all the agents of every government.

Dined with the Duchess of Orleans.

Friday, June 17, 1814. Gargallo came to me again about the peerage. I spoke to him at length about it, and it was agreed I should see Villafranca.

About Sicily, he said he thought it could not remain independent. The country was entirely demoralized. It must either be dependent upon Naples or England. It could not remain alone. History proved that it had always been a prey to civil discord, as well in its time of prosperity as adversity.

I did not quite agree as to the impossibility, although I admitted the doubtfulness of the success. Institutions made men good or bad. Administration of justice had the most influence, as well upon national character as upon the tranquillity and good order of society. It was this which alone could rectify the evils of which all complained. Before we could say that the Constitution would not succeed, we must see the effect of such institutions, and of time. If in the new Parliament a good judicial system, roads for Sicily, and a modification of landed possession so as to disperse landed property more generally could be settled, more would be done for Sicily in one session than by all its kings together for the last two or three centuries. I had considered the question of the state of Sicily in all its bearings. If the King should return to Naples, he might, if England chose it, destroy the Constitution. He might, with England, destroy it here if he chose it, but it could not be done without confusion and difficulty, and I really thought that, as it was difficult for it to go on, so it was infinitely more difficult for it to go back. Speaking of past events and persons, I said I had been disappointed; I thought things would have gone on better.

I saw also the Duke of Ferla, who complained also of the irregularities that had been committed. He said I alone could give the remedy. I begged him to say what it was. He declined. His son-in-law, Remondati, told me that he was disappointed; he thought he had not been sufficiently considered. He was evidently hostile, though he maintained that he was impartial and neither belonging to one side or the other.

The French General made this reflection. The Sicilians have neither army or navy and nobody to command them: *quel beau pays!*

Saturday, June 18, 1814. General Barthemy returned to Naples.

I saw San Marco in the morning. He said Settimo had told him I should be glad to see him and Trabia. I said I did. He then said that Trabia was at the Bagaria, that he would see him and then come to fix a time for coming. He begged to bring one of the spiritual peers with them, Monsignor Gravina. I said, with the greatest pleasure.

I afterwards went to congress, when the speech was read and copies given to us all for consideration. It was not bad.

I spoke afterwards with Settimo, who had seen San Marco. He said San Marco had said that neither he or Trabia could come into the Council, but suggested that Averna and Ferreri might. They seemed to want to turn out Bonanno and Carini. I said this could never be. The best would be that Trabia and San Marco should come into the Council. Averna might be President of the House of Lords. I remarked generally, upon the character of this union, that had it been possible to avoid it it would have been much better. I said that Belmonte fancied San Marco and Trabia were not sincere. I asked Settimo his opinion. He doubted it also. I said perhaps it was so; although I had lived now so long in Sicily and knew the distrust to be put in all, yet, considering their characters as moral men and consistency, I was disposed to confide in their sincerity. But I said it mattered not, because it was clear that we could not go on without the union, and therefore it was a measure of necessity and not of choice; and here he entirely agreed. I said I supposed Monsignor Gravina meant to be the Archbishop.

I saw the Duchess of Orleans. Talked to her about her pecuniary concerns with the Parliament, of which she gave me a memorandum. It was agreed I should speak to Circello and ask him to obtain from the King something in confirmation of the statement made. I asked her if I ought to go and wait upon the King at Colli. She said it would be well taken.

I saw Mademoiselle, whom I asked if she thought Belmonte would like to go as Minister to Paris. She said yes, but would be much mortified if he thought I wanted to get rid of him. She had already advised him to make a journey, which he had resolved to do, but not till after the Parliament.

I went to the King in the evening. He received me very well. Talked with great delight of his visit to the Caledonia and in great praise of the Admiral. Said he was four hours rowing back and found it very hot.

Sunday, June 19, 1814. Paid a visit to Padre Caccamo at convent. He talked of going to Rome if the King went back to Naples. He was very desirous of ascertaining if this was to be so.

Dined at Paternò's. Mixed dinner. Cassaro, Mocenigo. His garden was illuminated.

Monday, June 20, 1814. Received the treaty of peace from Lord Castlereagh. Letters from the Duke of Orleans for the Duchess. I went to her and she read them to me. They were most favourable as to his reception by the King and as to the state of his property. She also read me his conversation with the two Emperors and the King of France relative to Sicily. She also showed me his letter to the King upon the same subjects. The Emperor of Russia begged him to tell him how things were in Sicily, which he did. Desired him to tell the King that it was his own fault if he was not upon the throne of Naples again; that the executions of 1799 had done him a great deal of harm and made the people afraid of having him back; that the Neapolitan Army was good and brave and its dispersion or destruction could not be permitted. He desired him also to say that the world could no longer be governed as it had been; that more liberal principles must be adopted, and expressed disapprobation of his conduct in Sicily. He said, however, that a congress was to be held at Vienna, when the affairs of Italy were to be finally arranged.

The Emperor of Austria also expressed great regard for the King. Told the Duke that Murat had been useful, while the King, with greater means, had done nothing; that now his return must depend upon the will of the people. The conversation of the latter was much less encouraging than that of the former. The King of France told the Duke that the King must do as he did, forgetting all the past and uniting himself with all for the good of the state.

I begged the Duchess to advise the King to put himself in strict concert with me, whose desire to restore him to the Kingdom of Naples he could not possibly doubt. Belmonte told me afterwards that the Duchess had read the whole to the King, but [he] received it so ill that she did not dare add anything, with the exception of begging the King to attend to what the Emperors said, and to remark that utility was that which had decided the fate of Murat. The King's remark upon the letter was to this effect, that it was very well for those gentlemen to give advice to others, but did they follow it in their own case?

Dined with Mocenigo.

Tuesday, June 21, 1814. I had a meeting by appointment with San Marco, Trabia, Gravina, and Campofranco. The first spoke and said they all wished the Constitution, that whatever they might have done before, now it was necessary to rescue the country from the anarchy in which it was placed. It was clear they admitted that they could not recover their privileges.

They made great complaints of the violence and irregularities which had been committed. I supposed there might have been irregularities, and nobody could reprobate them more strongly than myself. They said they were willing to overlook all the past, the Prince's speech at the conclusion of the last Parliament, and all the unconstitutional acts since committed; but for the irregularities of the elections it was necessary to find a remedy. I asked them, what? They said a new Parliament. I said that was impossible; business must go on. The remedy was constitutionally in the House itself, and all ought to use their whole influence that the House, when met, should decide justly on the petitions. They said the Government had interfered. I said I did not know that they had not, but I did not believe so. They said Bonanno was a despot. I said I thought he was a man of energy and talents and

integrity. I said where so many new officers had been made and sent out to the thing, ignorance, presumption, and zeal to their employers would make many abuse their powers. It could not be otherwise with such a universal disposition to *prepotenza*. We talked a great deal more upon this subject. I admitted the great advantage of a union: that it was desirable that the Constitution should be established with unanimity. I proposed that one of them should be appointed to talk with me; our business would be done more quickly. They named San Marco.

He remaining, I asked him what they wanted, and he said equality in the Ministry and Council. I asked who he would bring in. Averna (I said I had no objection to him). When together, it had been said that Averna and Ferreri had the public opinion; I said the first yes, but the latter no. San Marco made a distinction, that the other had a higher reputation for talents, not for as much probity as the other. It was proposed by San Marco that Averna and Ferreri should succeed Carini and Bonanno. I said I could not give up the latter. For the Council he proposed Cutò, Pantelleria, himself, and Trabia. I asked about Pantelleria. He said that the night before nobody could have spoken more strongly on the necessity of establishing as soon as possible the Constitution, that the King might go back [to] Naples, nobody knew what was to happen. (They evidently looked again to the possibility of a Neapolitan reunion, and seemed to wish to avoid the being governed again by Neapolitans). I saw Settimo in the evening and told him what had passed. He agreed with me that Bonanno could not go out, and we thought that Averna should come into the Ministry and Cutò and Trabia and San Marco into the Council.

Wednesday, June 22, 1814. Went to a congress where the speech from the throne was agreed upon. In the morning I saw Villermosa. Talked to him of the speech, much of which he did not approve. Also of the plan of amalgamation, which he thought indispensable. I then urged him to come to the congress. He said he would come to the first Council. I told him of the bad effect it had already produced, as both Gargallo and others had talked of it as a proof of disunion in the Cabinet and as a proof of his disapprobation of the irregularities that had been committed. I said he should have expressed his opinion at the time, and only absented himself if they continued. He excused himself from coming to that day's congress, but said he would to the first Council before the Prince.

I saw Villafranca and told him it was all our own fault; we had to accuse nobody but ourselves, our own littleness, folly, and mismanagement. I knew at first that the Ministry could not go on. Belmonte and Villermosa, I knew, would not agree. We charged the King and the Prince and others; the whole fault and cause was in ourselves alone. I was heartily disgusted and should be most glad to go away. I saw no chance of success but by mixing the Ministry.

I saw also Carini. He agreed that we had not the Peers. His opinion was that the King must be made either *nul* or friendly. There could not be two heads as at present. Either the King must be set on one side, or he must be asked to come back, or to say whether these Ministers pleased him or others. (This seemed a very just opinion).

I had a very long conversation with Belmonte in the evening, in which I stated to him my clear conviction of the impossibility, under the influence, that must be diminished, of the English, to go on - that is, to have the House of Peers; that I thought it was necessary to make the King null or friendly. Of the two, I thought the first was the best, because in the King the Constitution was sure of an enemy; in the Prince, no enemy though no friend. If anyone would say to the Prince, I will undertake to destroy the Constitution without exposing you to the least danger, he would hail with transport such a proposal; but he himself, however much he wished it, would not expose a hair of his head to gain his point. I always thought him a most excellent constitutional king. It was with the want of spirit in the nation, and not of an enmity on his part, that I complained.

To render him null, it was necessary to take from him his friends, who would be ready to leave him if they could be employed. I believed they all wished the Constitution. They wished more for place, but place with a constitution they would prefer to place without it. To render him friendly would be to ask him who he would like as the Ministers, and, these appointed, to beg him to show them good will.

Belmonte was against a coalition. He said there was no trusting them, and they would soon turn the remainder out. I said I myself did not look for the existence of the proposed arrangement above three months, beyond the present Parliament, but that I thought the success of the Parliament would be secured and a great good thus obtained. The Constitution would be completed, and I did not look beyond that. Belmonte said he thought conciliation with the King would be the best plan. (He flatters himself that the King likes him, and Mocenigo has flattered him with such an idea, humbugging him evidently).

I also told him that, independently of my interest in the welfare and the success of the Constitution, I otherwise wished for a strong government, that could go on upon its own bottom; namely, that I wished myself to go away. I was disgusted. The importance of my situation had ceased, and I should like to have a better mission if again to be employed. I owed nothing to the country, which I despised. I cared only for individuals, and I was ready to come back if in my absence they should be exposed to any danger. I said I thought him exactly in my position. Talking of the Ministry, he said he believed they had the majority of peers. I said nobody but himself thought so.

Thursday, June 23, 1814. In the morning came Settimo and Fitalia. They were accidentally joined by Villafranca and Belmonte, and the question of the union with the opposite party was again discussed. They were all against an equal division, Belmonte against any. Villafranca pretty much of the same opinion. Settimo thought two only should come in, and that then the coalition would be highly advantageous. It was settled that in the evening the same persons, with Villermosa, should assemble to take a definitive resolution thereupon.

I went to San Marco and had some general conversation with him. I urged the difficulty of uniting or of cordial cooperation between the two parties who had never agreed and seemed of opposite sentiments, one who had always been for, the other against the Constitution. He denied that he was. He said a man must be a blockhead that did not want the Constitution,

and gave many very good and strong reasons for this. They all wanted it. They said I would never allow them to approach me, or I should have known their sentiments. He talked of Angiò and Sperlinga as furious patriots for the Constitution.

I asked their sentiments about the King and the Hereditary Prince. It was understood that they espoused the party of the King. He said there was no question about him, as it was understood that he could not return without the consent of the British Government. This therefore remained with them. I adverted to the King's having a party and interfering in affairs. He protected all those who were hostile to the Constitution. He said, no; he considered that he protected the King more than the King protected them. It was from respect and compassion more than any other reason.

I asked him his opinion about the independence of Sicily. He said he had not voted upon that question. He thought they had neither money nor men to maintain their independence, and they must always require the protection of some other power. I said I was not of his opinion. If Sicily was inhabited by Spaniards or any other high-spirited nation, its independence would be out of all doubt, but constituted as at present and, as he added, without the least military spirit, it could not immediately be so.

I went from him to Bocca di Falco to the Hereditary Prince, with whom I had a very long conversation. We first began about the King and Naples. I regretted that there was nobody about him but Circello, who was perfectly *passé*. I told him that I had seen Circello some time ago and had recommended to him to make known to the heads of the Neapolitan Army his disposition to give them a constitution. I had told him how this was done; that a few days ago I had called to ask him the result, and that the King was unwilling to do anything; that, not knowing the intentions of the allies, he was afraid of taking any step which might displease them. I told him that I advised the King to assist here by declaring *hautement* his desire to protect the Constitution. Circello had answered that it was better not to speak to the King, as, if he took one step, he might take another. I told him I could not make him at all comprehend me. I asked if there was anybody that could approach the King who had more sense. Tomasi, for example. He said no. I mentioned Canosa. He said Canosa was a clever man but he had never *démêlé* him. He did not know exactly his character. The Hereditary Prince regretted very much that the King would take advantage of no opening that circumstances offered.

He then told me that the King had sent to him Circello with the Duke of Orleans' letter addressed to the King, and told him from the King that he (the King) was ready to publish and declare whatever was judged most effectual to assure the Neapolitans of his intentions and desire to give them a constitutional government. The Hereditary Prince said he thought this should be done immediately. I stated the objection that it would be an act of hostility to Murat. I thought, however, it might be done indirectly by sending to the chiefs some officer with some assurance from himself. He said: "the King must authorize me. I must have it *in writing* from the King or otherwise, *voyez-vous bien*, I cannot do it". He mentioned O'Farris as a good person to employ. He said he himself would like De Sauget better. I said perhaps, but his having ... before would give suspicion.

I mentioned another way (just then occurring to me), that the King should authorize him to say in his speech at the opening of the Parliament that he, the King, entirely assented to the

Constitution and was extremely anxious to see its complete establishment. I also recommended that persons should be employed in Palermo to communicate the same impressions to all the Neapolitans who came over. I told him we did nothing. We sat with our hands before us while we had everything to gain and nothing to lose. Why would not the King issue the proclamation I had recommended to him? He said he would send for Circello and speak to him.

I asked him if he knew what the King's sentiments and wishes were about the Constitution or the Government. He said he did not. He had never *entaméd* a conversation with him upon it. I told him how desirable it was that the King should not retain his attitude of hostility. He asked me what had passed with San Marco and the other peers, if it was no secret. I told him I was for it, but I found the others objecting very much. I told him the propositions made by them, half Council and half Ministry. The Hereditary Prince said if that was the arrangement, they would all be by the ears, and that I must bring with me a whip to Council to keep order - laughing very much.

The Hereditary Prince said he had been afraid of sending the Duke of Orleans' letter to the King, but now he had seen that the Duke had written to the King in the same style, he should send it. He said the Duke's letter was very *sage*.

Upon mentioning the name of San Marco, he said he was firm and capable, but he thought he had some *poils* (hairs, as I understood him) about his heart. Pantelleria he did not like either.

I asked him if the Emperors' speeches gave any encouragement. He said none whatever; that he depended upon an effort of the people; that he believed the allies would be glad to see him replaced, but that they could not directly assist him.

In the evening a meeting of Fitalia, Settimo, Villermosa, Belmonte, and Villafranca to come to a decision about the coalition. Belmonte and Villafranca were against it, the first very decidedly. Villafranca gave up many of his former opinions and agreed with him. Villermosa thought they could not go on without it. Fitalia and Settimo were for a partial junction. I was for coalition, as I was sure we should not otherwise have the House of Peers. Belmonte proposed that we should rather amalgamate with the King, and it was agreed that in the Council he should propose to the Hereditary Prince to say to the King that, as long as he made a party against the Vicariate, affairs could not go on quietly, and that it was necessary that this difficulty should be removed; that they were ready to make any sacrifice on their part if any objection was made to them individually. Let there be a change, provided there could be a united and energetic administration.

Friday, June 24, 1814. A Council was held, at which Belmonte held the discourse he proposed, and did it well. They gave many instances of the King's hostility and interference. He protected all the opposers of the Government. The procurations or proxies of his own chaplain were given to persons the most contrary to the Constitution. The Hereditary Prince said: "How am I to tell this to the King?" He was embarrassed by the proposition.

I should have said that before the Council he spoke to me and told me that he had seen Circello the night before and made him understand our conversation of the preceding day, and for his better understanding had given him a note in writing. Circello told him that some of the barons had been with the King to ask his opinion. He had answered that he wished to have no party, that he wished to have the Constitution maintained and supported, but he did not wish that it should be made the engine of gratifying private interests.

After the Council, he called me in and begged me to tell him frankly what this meant. "*Est-ce qu'ils veulent se retirer en bon ordre?*" I said no, and related to him what had passed the night before. I said I was for the coalition because I thought it would secure a successful Parliament; further I did not look for success or the continuation of this coalescing Ministry, and further, after the Parliament, I did not think it signified who were the Ministers, provided they could carry on the government. He said he was quite of this opinion. He was now fully convinced that personal feeling or choice could no longer be considered, and that he must accept and embrace the man who could carry forward the machine. He then told me that he thought speaking to the King would have very little result. I thought so too, and that his answer might probably be that he took no part in affairs and wished to have nothing to say to it. He then said that he would write a memoir to the King, in which he would state what had been said to him both by me and the Ministers. He would propose to him either to give all his support to the existing Government, or to remove the reins which he would most willingly give up, and to which I also entirely assented. He desired me to call at 3 tomorrow that I might see the paper before he sent it.

Saturday, June 25, 1814. I went to the Hereditary Prince at 3, and he read me his *memoria* to the King and begged me to suggest any alteration in it. I had none to offer. It was well written, urging the King very strongly to resume, and making that the first proposition instead of the representation that the King would direct his party to support the Vicariate, which came in the second instance. The Hereditary Prince seemed very desirous the King should resume, from the effect it was likely to have upon the Neapolitans if he really supported the Constitution in Sicily.

The Hereditary Prince asked my opinion about the letter. I said I agreed entirely as to the advantage to his Neapolitan views by the King's resumption. I thought His Royal Highness had done right in the manner in which he had proposed the subject, but I should have done it otherwise. I should have made the last proposition the first, because I should be very unwilling to advise the King to resume the superintendence of a constitution to which he had always been so adverse, and to which I thought it would be difficult for him to conform. The Hereditary Prince said he could not help himself.

(Before we began the conversation, I asked the Hereditary Prince the King's answer to his two propositions. He said, to the first, viz. the communication to the Neapolitan generals, he would do it himself; to the second, authorizing the Hereditary Prince to declare his entire approbation of the Constitution and his wish to see it established, he answered he was ready to do anything, but hoped his son did not mean to compromise him).

I therefore thought it better for Naples the King should resume, better for Sicily he should not.

He then talked of the Ministry the King might have. I said I thought it had better be a mixed one, as had been before proposed. He was very much against Cassaro, and he said he should advise the King against employing him, for he was the enemy of both. He mentioned Pantelleria as a likely person. I said there was a way of getting rid of Belmonte by sending him to Paris to compliment the King. This did not necessarily keep him there, and I was aware that His Royal Highness might possibly wish for a Neapolitan. This temporary arrangement would not interfere with these views. He did not seem to object to the idea. He praised Villermosa, and particularly Aversa.

He begged me to come the next morning at 11, when he would read the paper over to Circello in my presence, in order that he might understand it. He proposed to me to add my approbation at the bottom of the paper and to sign it, which I said I would do to the fair copy. He asked me if I thought it better that he should go to the King by himself, or he with Circello, or I with Circello, or Circello alone. I said Circello alone. He said this was also his opinion. I asked if he thought the King would resume. He said he did not know. I said I thought he would.

Sunday, June 26, 1814. I went to Boccadifalco to meet Circello, who read the paper in the Hereditary Prince's presence and mine. Circello remarked that the King had promised not to resume without the consent of the British Government and could not without it. I said I was ready to give that consent, and I added afterwards that I was ready to assure and tranquillize the King in any way he might wish. It was agreed that the King, if he should decide upon resuming, should ask this assurance from me through the Hereditary Prince.

Circello declared that the King did not interfere. The assertion was false, and added when, in consequence of a former conversation with me some days before, he had spoken to the King that he might desire his friends to support the Constitution: the King told him that Trabia had been with him *pour le prévenir* of what then was going on about the coalition (as I understood, but did not exactly understand Circello), and that the King had answered that he did not want this *prévention*. He had none and wished to have no party. He wished the Constitution to be upheld and observed.

It was then proposed to me to sign the paper, to which I objected, because, although my opinion was not contrary to that of the Hereditary Prince, there was yet a difference in it, at least a shadow of a difference. I never could advise the King to resume, because I doubted his conforming to the Constitution. Circello interrupted me and said there was no reason to doubt, because the King had already made up his mind. He had already written to Ruffo, Serracapriola, and Castelcicala to say that he was perfectly disposed to adopt the liberal principles that were recommended. Besides that, the letters from the Duke of Orleans containing the Emperor of Russia's sentiments had completely decided him.

There was a question about the Ministers not having called upon the King. Circello blamed them and said they might have gone. The Hereditary Prince defended them, and said he himself had asked the King if they might go, and his answer was that the gentlemen of the

chamber might (Villermosa and Bonanno are not gentlemen, but Counsellors have also a right). This doubtful answer prevented their going.

To that part where it was said that I wished only a strong Ministry who alone should go on without British support, I observed that I had always wished that, and I appealed to the Hereditary Prince, who answered he would give me a certificate to that effect if I wished. I asked him for a copy of his paper, which he said he would send me.

I went to the Duchess of Orleans and told her what had passed. She did not think the King would resume. I saw afterwards Mademoiselle, who told me that she had been speaking to Belmonte, who said that he should be glad to go to Paris as Minister to compliment the King, but that he would not ask for it. She said he had also told her of the speech he had made in the Council the day before, which he described as very fine. Mademoiselle said he had no suspicion that the King would resume the reins of government.

Monday, June 27, 1814. Poli brought me a copy of the Hereditary Prince's *memoria* to the King, and upon a second copy he begged me to certify that the paper was made with my knowledge and agreement. I asked him the words he wished to have written. He dictated as follows: "*Ce papier a été fait avec mon intelligence et accord*", and I signed it.

I asked his opinion what the King would do. He said, resume. We both praised the Hereditary Prince. I said I wished him to remain. I did not think a man who had governed ill for 50 years could all of a sudden change. He said the King was a good and sensible man, but he wanted attention, and from hence had failed. He said it all depended upon those who surrounded him. He said the Hereditary Prince was an excellent moral man; had never told a lie in his life (to a similar assertion from the same person, Prince Belmonte replied to him that he should be quite satisfied if the Hereditary Prince had only told one a day). He said the Hereditary Prince's letter was entirely written by himself in one hour's time. Said the Hereditary Prince had received no answer, and that Circello had not come back or sent any intelligence.

I saw the Duchess of Orleans in the evening and told her no decision was yet made. She hoped the King might resume but did not think he would. He certainly, she said, was not satisfied with his situation. He was constantly saying "*che figura io fo*". I asked her advice if the King asked my opinion, whether I should give it him or not, respecting the persons he should employ. I thought I had better not, but I thought I might advise him what not to do, and that I was resolved upon: for example, not to employ Cassaro or bring back Ascoli, who was equally hated here and at Naples. In which she entirely concurred.

I called upon Mocenigo.

Tuesday, June 28, 1814. Marquis of Siciliani returned to Naples. I strongly recommended the Duchess of Sangro to Gallo.

I had a long conversation with San Marco, who came to propose that the Ministry should be composed 4 of his party, 4 of Villermosa's, and 4 of Belmonte's. He said he came for the last time, to prevent the confusion and disorder that he believed would arise in the

Parliament. I might go away; they were to remain, and would feel the unfortunate consequences. I begged him to wait for a couple of days, that the question was suspended, not decided. He disclaimed any connection with the King, or any care about his return to power.

I called upon Circello. He told me that he had been the day before to the King and had gone to the Hereditary Prince the night before. The King had said that his intentions were to act entirely up to the letter of the Constitution; that, however, he should not think of resuming without the consent of the British Government, as he had given his word to that effect, which he would never break. Circello was sent to the Hereditary Prince to know about the Parliament, which the King had understood could not meet on account of the irregularity of the elections, and he was to return tomorrow to the King, when the King would give his final answer. I asked Circello how the King had received the Hereditary Prince's letter. Circello said: "I cannot say that he received *avec l'enthousiasme*". The King knew *l'embarras* of finances, parties etc. into which he was about to throw himself, but if his return could be of public advantage, he would not refuse to make the sacrifice (the old rogue! *pour se faire valoir!*)

I communicated the certainty of the King's return to power to the Duchess and Mademoiselle.

Wednesday, June 29, 1814. I called upon the Hereditary Prince. He told me that Circello had brought him back the following observations from the King: 1st, that if he resumed it was his intention to govern according to the Constitution. 2nd, that before he gave his decision about resuming, he required from me to be absolved from the contract made to the British Government, viz. that he would not resume without their consent. 3rd, he wanted information about the Parliament, which he had understood, from being illegally elected, could not be assembled. He desired all Wednesday to make his decision.

The Hereditary Prince then read me a memoir he had written upon this subject, showing how the Constitution had provided for the remedy of all irregularities. It was very clear and correct. The Hereditary Prince said he did not think the King would resume. I suggested to him an idea that I thought would be the best arrangement: that the King should resume, should open the Parliament, make use of this opportunity, as no other offered, of declaring his constitutional sentiments, and then give up the management of affairs again to the Hereditary Prince. The Hereditary Prince understood that I meant him to be a sort of Prime Minister or Grand Chancellor, to report to his father, and he immediately said that never would do. He knew very well what it was, and continual embarrassment and displeasure must arise from such a state of things. I answered that I meant that he should be again the Vicar General. I said I never could think it desirable that the King should conduct the government. The appearances in favour of his return, and the reasons, were very favourable at this moment. His professions and intentions were just now excellent, but how could we suppose that the habits of 50 years could be overcome or that he could have the patience to attend to business?

In the evening I received a letter from the Hereditary Prince, saying that before the King gave an opinion upon the proposition made to him, he desired to be absolved by me from his obligation to the British Government.

Thursday, June 30, 1814. I went again to the Hereditary Prince by his invitation. He said Circello had returned from Solanto the evening before, and he had written me the letter which I had received the night before. He said that Circello had told him further, 1st, that he supposed an act of the King must precede his resumption. Certainly, said the Hereditary Prince, the Vicariate must be put an end to by a regular act of the King, and in the document should be favourable expressions about himself, so that everything might appear in the most friendly and conciliatory shape. 2nd, that he should appoint his Ministry. He told me that the King meant to have only his four Ministers in Council, and to call in others hereafter as he thought fit. He asked whether the present men had not better resign. I said that depended upon them, but in their places I would be turned out. However, I said, this would be better left to their own choice. He was to talk to Carini upon the subject. 3rd, that it would be necessary to prorogue the Parliament, that his Ministers might look about them and see what they had to do.

I thought they might not meet till after the feast of Santa Rosalia. I said it was very important they should meet to decide the controverted elections before Santa Rosalia, or otherwise they could not proceed to business for very long after, that is, until many of the new elections had taken place.

He read me the King's answer to his *memoria*. It was begun and ended by the King. He said "I employ the faithful Circello to write the rest" (the King's hand shakes so much he can now scarcely write his own name, and yet he shoots very well). The letter was very kind and complimentary and talked of the *saviezza* of his proposition. States his desire that the Constitution should be *perfezionata*, and in other passages was very constitutional. The Hereditary Prince, talking of himself and his past conduct, said that he always looked at the main object, that he did not allow little things or little feelings to interfere with general views. He said I must have observed this, and that he had submitted to many unpleasant circumstances for the sake of the principal object in view.

I talked to the Hereditary Prince about the command of the Army. He said he should be very willing to take it, and he suggested that I should mention it to the King, which I said I would.

I mentioned to the Hereditary Prince that the King's government would have as much difficulty with the House of Commons as we had had with the House of Peers. His feeling was strongly against the House of Peers, as it always had been. I said things never would go on well until there should rise up some commoners of sufficient weight and talents to be employed in the government. He said the peers did not wish to pay and that the government should be aristocratical.

Palermo, Friday, July 1, 1814. I had a very long conversation with Mr A'Court, as I had had many before upon the affairs of Sicily. He has unluckily come with a decided and active hostility to the new Constitution; with a rooted aversion to all popular assemblies; with the knowledge that both these sentiments are also entertained by his superior Lord Castlereagh; with the worst opinion (not very much undeserved) of the Sicilian people, and with a deep conviction amounting almost to an irritable determination that the Constitution cannot and shall not succeed. He thinks that people should have civil but not political liberty, and that it is more advantageous to England that Sicily should have a despotic monarch than a free government. He delights in contradiction, seems to have no objection to a paradox, not to have a remarkably good temper, seems to be a clever and honourable man and, as his brother tells me, is a great admirer of Voltaire, the whole almost of whose opinions he has adopted. He is perfectly of opinion that any attempt made by the King to revenge himself upon those who may have attached themselves to us should be strongly resisted.

Villafranca and Cattolica said they would not serve the King. They both talked of going away for fear of the King's vengeance.

I saw Poli in the evening, who said the King had sent no answer yet, that Circello had only gone to him that morning; that Circello had been much satisfied with my letter.

Saturday, July 2, 1814. *Parlementaire* came from Naples with a letter from the Duc de Gallo sending newspapers and the new French Constitution.

I attended a Council at the palace. The Hereditary Prince told me before it that the King would come on Monday and probably resume on Tuesday; that he would probably see me on Monday. He told me among other things that he had desired Circello to tell the King that he would have no interference in public business; that he was ready to give his opinion whenever the King might wish it either verbally or in writing, but an intermediary between the King and his Ministers it did not suit him as Hereditary Prince to become. The Hereditary Prince said he was determined not to see any of the then Ministers in private, as he would be called the head of the opposition and they would say of him what they had said of the King. He said Circello had told him that the dispatch putting an end to the Vicariate was to be very complimentary to him. The Hereditary Prince said he had written to the King to advise him strongly to pursue a conciliatory conduct.

The rest of the Council then came in. The Hereditary Prince said he did not know whom the King meant to make his Ministers, but he said he believed he did not mean to continue them. It was for them to determine whether they would give in their resignation or wait to be turned out. Belmonte proposed that they should consider as to their answer, and, after some conversation, which had better not have been entered into but from which it is difficult to stop a Sicilian, a determination was put off. The Hereditary Prince recapitulated to them what he had written to the King, as coinciding with the discourse and representation of Belmonte in Council, and that he had done justice to their sentiments.

The Hereditary Prince told me he had in contemplation to make an excursion to the Continent by sea to Spain, Paris, London, Prague, Vienna. This was his *château en Espagne*.

After leaving Council I begged we might meet, so that all might agree upon the language to be held and that they might be consequent in their conduct. I recommended that they should beg the Hereditary Prince to say to the King that they were ready to do whatever he pleased and would always support his government and the Constitution. It was agreed that we should meet the next day at my house.

Sunday, July 3, 1814. All the Ministers met at my house. Belmonte laid down the principles upon which, in his opinion, the conduct and language of Ministers should be regulated. He spoke very sensibly and all agreed with him. It was agreed that they should all beg the Hereditary Prince to say to the King that they were ready to serve His Majesty as they had served the Hereditary Prince, that is upon the same principles, and, if he had no occasion for their services, to beg him to consider their resignations as already given in. They all expressed their determination to support the Constitution and the Government. Before they came, I saw Circello, who came from the King to beg to see me on Tuesday morning. He told me that the King had expressed his determination to forget everything, to reunite all, and to complete the Constitution. I told these circumstances to the Ministers. I went afterwards to the Hereditary Prince. I asked him about the command of the Army. He said he should be glad if I would suggest to the King the command being given to him. I said I would. I praised Fardella very much to him. He agreed with me that he was the only officer they had. He said he had his prejudices and partialities against which it was necessary to be guarded.

Monday, July 4, 1814. I was engaged all day in writing dispatches for England.

Tuesday, July 5, 1814. I called upon the King at ten by appointment. He seemed a good deal embarrassed. He told me at once that he was determined to support the Constitution; that he said this to all; when he once said a thing he adhered to it, he was a man of his word, and I should see that he was. I told him what he said gave me great pleasure, and that I was convinced he would reap the fruits both here and in Naples.

Upon the word Naples being mentioned, he said they had received dispatches from Castelcicala which when deciphered he would desire Circello to show me. He conceived that they contained more direct proofs of Murat's treachery. He mentioned the Empress Josephine's death and stated clearly his opinion that Austria had purposely poisoned her that she might not stand in the way of their daughter. He said the Queen had seen Buonaparte's son at Vienna and described him as having a very ferocious countenance. He gave me some military petitions, which he said he must give "*al mio capitano generale*". He asked for some arab horses from [the] 20th, which I promised him.

I then asked him to come to our house at the *fête* of Santa Rosalia. He answered that although he seldom went anywhere but to the *feste di chiesa*, yet, to show his attachment to the British nation and to me, he would make a point of attending on both the 11th and the 13th. He might be too tired to come the second day, but he would if he could. He was particularly gracious and cordial, but no dependence is to be placed in him.

I saw the Hereditary Prince afterwards upon military business.

Wednesday, July 6, 1814. Maitland sailed with dispatches for England.

The King resumed. There was a gala in the evening which was very numerous attended. The town was also illuminated for three nights. The people showed very great satisfaction with the King's return. Prince Belmonte and all the party belonging to the late Government were hissed and insulted in the streets. The new Ministers were: Ferreri, Finances; Averna, Grace and Justice; Naselli, War; Lucchesi, Foreign Affairs. Cassaro and Cutò were replaced in their offices.

The King was very gracious to me.

Thursday, July 7, 1814. The insults continued in the streets.

A complaint was made by Chiavetta against Statella. I asked his brother to settle it, but he declined. I then asked Circello to interfere with his father, but he declined also, and then Ruffo undertook it from friendship. Statella denied the words imputed to him (*monaco fottuto*). After reproaching him for the meanness of insulting a man who could not defend himself, and my asking him if he did or did not insult the Padre and his saying he should be a *vile* to insult a priest, I ended it in that manner, happy to avail myself of any opening to get them out of the scrape. I told Poli for the Hereditary Prince's information the progress of this business.

Friday, July 8, 1814. Mr A'Court told me of a positive lie told him by Mocenigo, respecting his mention of the name of Belmonte to the King. To him he said he liked it but the King did not like it. To me, the night before, he positively said that six weeks ago the King seemed very favourably disposed to him.

I saw the Hereditary Prince about military business. Nothing particular passed. To Poli, whom I saw at door, I said things did not begin well. He said they hoped they would stop now.

I called upon Mademoiselle d'Orléans. She said she had dined at the Colli, and the attentions of the King to her and his affectations of affection and regard to the Duke were as ridiculous as they were mean. She urged me very much to obtain the King's consent to Belmonte going to France as Minister.

Villafranca was very impatient for his leave to go out of Sicily. I and all his friends most strongly urged him against the step, as betraying fear and bringing great discredit upon his character. He was not to be persuaded.

I went to see Belmonte at the Olivuzza, who was very unwell. His language upon the present crisis was excellent, but I have been disgusted to see the little *caractère* displayed by the party, such general fear and disappointment upon the idea of being abandoned by England and left to the effects of the King's vengeance. They say in their defence, We know the King to be unforgiving and bloodthirsty, we have had numerous instances of it. He insults you in the beginning by bringing in the Ministry you turned out, and Cassaro and Cutò against whom the English objection was particularly marked. What will he do with us hereafter when your protection is wholly withdrawn?

Saturday, July 9, 1814. I called upon all the Ministers, Cutò, Sangro, etc. I saw Circello and had a long conversation with him. He repeated that the King was the most constitutional of the constitutionals; that some days ago the King said to him at Solanto, "I wish you had been here three hours ago to hear how *je me suis battu même pour la Constitution*". I said the King had not begun fortunately; that his acts had not corresponded with his professions. I instanced Cassaro's appointment, which I regretted because nobody would believe that he was not the Prime Minister; but that the strongest objections to him were his connection with the bloody scenes of 1799 in Naples when he was Viceroy, and his known aversion to the constitutional changes adopted in Sicily. Circello said the King had purposely named him to that situation that he might not be in the Council. He said that Averna was not a man to do anything he thought wrong, and Ferreri was certainly no friend of Cassaro's. He said, besides, it must be allowed that their removal had been a little brusque. I did not deny that, but it was to be remembered that the King now returned under the profession of healing and forgetting all past wounds and enmities. I told him there would be great difficulty with the Government, and that I was sorry the King had not endeavoured to reunite all parties as he had expressed his intention to do.

I saw Settimo in the evening at Belmonte's, who told me confidentially that San Marco and Trabia had proposed to unite with him and Villermosa and they were to have a meeting the next day. San Marco, he said, was not pleased at being excluded from the Ministry. All the King had said to him was, tapping him upon the shoulder, "You have added ten years to my life".

Sunday, July 10, 1814. Aboukir with Mme Montjoye and Duke San Giovanni, Tylden, Don [] came back from Naples.

Young Prince Butera called upon me.

I waited upon the King at the Favorita. He took me into a private room, where we sat down at a table. I begged him to accept my resignation of the command of the Army. I then recommended to him Fardella, whom I described as without comparison the best officer in the Army. He said he was *duro*. I said he was so, but it was necessary for this army, which required to be ruled with an energetic hand and to be raised from its general relaxation of military feeling, the consequence of *avilissement* and wretchedness. He said it was

necessary the Army should have a chief that it likes. He showed great disinclination to Fardella. We talked of *graduazione*, which he very much disapproved.

I talked to him of a promotion of brigadiers. I said on military grounds it was desirable, pecuniary considerations might forbid it. He said there was great embarrassment and added that everything was *disunito*. He spoke very favourably of his own military qualities and very contemptibly of those of his son. He talked of his Roman campaign, of his six regiments of grenadiers at the head of which he thought himself invincible.

We talked a great deal of Naples. Also of Sicily. I said it was necessary there should be reunion and that all, and particularly those about him, should carry into effect the beneficent intentions of His Majesty. He said I might depend on him. Nothing should be wanting on his part. I said we, the English, who had had so much to say with Sicily, might contribute to this, and I would propose to him for this purpose that Mr A'Court and myself should have a conversation with His Majesty in conjunction with Circello, that we might determined upon the language to be held. He seemed a good deal agitated. He said he could not see A'Court till his credentials were presented. Afterwards he should be very glad. I was not altogether satisfied with the conversation. Too much *aigreur* and *prévention* on the part of the King towards the actual system.

Monday, July 11, 1814. Mr A'Court presented his credentials. It seems that it is the practice that the new Minister should himself address the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and not the actual Minister. He also presents himself. Where a new Minister is appointed this may be correct, but not so, I think, in the present case, when Mr A'Court is only Minister in second during my absence. He in fact does not supersede me, and there cannot properly be two Ministers at the same time communicating with the same court. Mr A'Court presented his credentials and said the King was very much embarrassed, made a sort of schoolboy's speech, and got off as soon as possible. The King was very cheerful in the evening and very gracious.

The King and all the royal family came to my house to see the beginning of the feast of Santa Rosalia.

Received a diamond snuffbox from the Pope.

Tuesday, July 12, 1814. Mr A'Court and I had a long conversation with Circello, as friends, upon the state of affairs and the King's conduct. Mr A'Court spoke to him very plainly, condemned very much the beginning made by the King, words of conciliation but acts of unforgiveness and vengeance. He adverted to all the reports current, that he was come with orders from home to reverse all the system pursued by me, whereas he was come to support it, and that revenge or persecution towards those who had supported us could not be permitted. I remarked that the King's having taken back the same Ministry removed by the British authority was considered by all as intended to be an insult to that authority, and this done at a time when every hope was fixed on Great Britain and some reliance also placed upon my own individual exertion. Was this wise? I observed that the

language held now put me in my mind of my first conversations at Palermo, always the finest professions but no corresponding actions. I said if the Ministry at home ask me what has been the King's conduct since he has resumed, I should answer all he has said has been good, all he has done, bad. What else can I say? His wise conduct would have been to unite all parties. The machine could not otherwise go on.

Mr A'Court adverted to the nomination of Ferreri as Minister of Finance, the president of the old Tribunal of Patrimony so much detested in Sicily. Circello admitted it to be justly detested. Circello, talking of the Constitution, said that everyone in Sicily wished it, man, woman and child. The King was the most constitutional of all. He stated the reasons why, before repeated in this journal.

I expressed my hope that neither the Queen nor Ascoli would return. He said the Queen would not. As for Ascoli, I said I could prove him to be a traitor. I had the proofs in my possession.

He said the Hereditary Prince wanted to be commander in chief. It must be a Sicilian and the choice was confined to three, Cattolica, Di Aci, and Fardella. The two first were very objectionable. Mr A'Court mentioned that it would be a proper mark of respect to the Hereditary Prince. I repeated, what I had often said, the extreme respect always manifested by the Hereditary Prince to the King.

Wednesday, July 13, 1814. I called upon the King about military business. He seemed to think that great injustice had been done in the Army. I told him there were officers for an army of 20,000 men, that we had been obliged to draw a line between those who were actively employed and those not. Great hardship had been done, but it could not be helped, and I strongly advised that the principle should remain untouched. He would be involved in endless embarrassment if he departed from it.

I proposed to him some promotions of brigadiers as well as some decorations of the Cross of St Ferdinand. I had before made the latter proposition. I had taken the paper to revise it because the King thought it too extended, and I was only to include those who really came within the spirit of the order. I found that no man had really done any extraordinary act of merit, and I told the King so. But it was to be considered whether it was not politic to recompense when all officers of foreign services were covered with orders and distinctions. He seemed against it, and I left the paper with him. He talked much of his military feeling and of the concurrence of our sentiments upon these subjects. I presented to him the request of a captain of grenadiers to be made major because he was on guard when the King resumed. The King, without hearing my opinion, objected to it at once. He repeated his former professions of acting according to the Constitution.

I asked the King for leave of absence for Villafranca. The King did not like it, and I expressed the same opinion: it had a bad effect.

The King said he would come to the *fête* if he could.

I saw the Hereditary Prince afterwards. He said Circello had told him he was to be commander in chief. He said he would not be unless he had the choice of all his own instruments.

I saw Villermosa, who said he had had a meeting with Trabia, San Marco to consider about the conduct of the Parliament and how to obtain union in the House. They proposed the dissolution of the House of Commons, which he objected to. It was proposed to be done by an address to the King from the House of Peers. Villermosa said it would be better that it should meet, and they never would have so amenable a chamber. San Marco said how could they reconcile silence now to their former clamour? Villermosa said it would be better to consult with other peers. A meeting was proposed at Pantelleria[*s*]. Belmonte, Carini, Villafranca were to be invited there.

Thursday, July 14, 1814. The Duke of Orleans came in the Ville de Marseille, a French 74, with Admiral [] in 4 days from Toulon. I never saw so lubberly a ship. Their unseaworthiness and ignorance were obvious to all the world. The King went out in person to meet the Duke and steered with his own hand the boat that conducted him to the shore. I met them on their way to the shore. The Duke was dressed in his new French uniform of lieutenant general and looked remarkably well. He had put on a false toupee since we had seen him. He brought me letters of the 25th June from Lady William.

I called upon the Duke afterwards and he told me a great variety of circumstances; that he had seen the Prince Regent several times, who had received him with the greatest kindness. The Prince Regent was perfectly right about Sicily. He had also agreed in his views about Italy, and had called in Lords Liverpool and Castlereagh, who were in the next room (and, as the Duke said, were both in their blue ribbons, with something of the same manner and figure, and would go very well in a carriage together) to hear the Duke's opinion in his own words.

The Prince Regent complained much of the Emperor of Russia and the Princess. He said, "Between you and me, the King of Prussia is the only gentleman amongst them". Of the Emperor of Russia he said: "*Vous voyez bien, il ne faut plus avoir de colosses en Europe, et peu importe* whether it is French or Russian". It seems that the Emperor of Russia wishes to be King of Poland and that the other powers object to it. The Prince Regent said Austria, Prussia, and ourselves will unite against it. He said the Emperor of Russia had resolved to go straight back to Russia; that both Metternich and Lord Castlereagh had endeavoured to prevent it. The Duke seemed to think that there would be no congress at Vienna; that Lord Castlereagh was to have gone to Vienna immediately if it should be held; that Meerfeldt said that there would be congress and that all would terminate favourably.

The Prince said that the marriage between Princess Charlotte and the >Prince< of Orange was broken off. He stated the facts as we see them in the papers. The Prince ascribed it to the intrigues of the Duchess of Oldenburg, who, he said, wished herself to marry the Prince of Orange - a pretty alternative, he said, either way, to be obliged to marry one or the other. It seems that the Prince hates his daughter. The Duchess of Oldenburg had very often seen the Princess. When the Princess refused the Prince of Orange, the Emperor of Russia proposed his brother Nicholas to the Prince, who at once downright refused his consent. The Duke said the Prince seemed very fond of Lord Wellesley. He took off the Prince's manner and voice to him with great exactness.

The Duke of Orleans had a long conversation with Lord Wellesley. The latter said the late changes in Sicily were his measure, and he spoke of them with vanity. The Duke had difficulty to make him understand why the fear of the King had been always greater than of us. Lord Wellesley understood it perfectly at last. The Duke was much pleased with Lord Wellesley.

The Duke saw the Emperor of Russia frequently. He said the Emperor was a complete Jacobin. He had appreciated much the opposition in England, where he did not think there was sufficient liberty. The Emperor, talking of the old kings, said: "If you were to transplant them into Russia, where the people are still more servile and greater beasts than elsewhere, they will still not be sufficiently servile and beastly for them". He talked of a king as being honoured at sitting by the representatives of a nation.

He had a long conversation with the Emperor of Austria. The Emperor said to him: "*Nous sommes vos cousins, et nous connaissons votre belle-mère et beau-père*". The latter is a good man, but nothing can go well where the former is".

Friday, July 15, 1814. This conversation was continued on the 15th at 1 p. m. He told me the Emperor had offered to take the Hereditary Prince's eldest daughter and to find a match for her. He did not like making marriages without the parties first seeing and knowing each other. (The Duke said the Hereditary Prince of Prussia was to marry the Emperor's daughter). The Duke told me that the Queen had written him word that if the Hereditary Prince sent his daughter she begged to have nothing to do with her; that the Hereditary Prince had begged her to take her (the daughter) with her to Germany, which she had positively refused. In the view, I suppose, that she should marry Leopold. The Hereditary Prince once told me this was his wish.

The Duke had seen Metternich and had talked to him much about Italy. He found him upon the whole very reasonable. The Duke took the possibility of war between Russia and Austria for granted, and upon that hypothesis endeavoured to convince him of the impolicy of establishing in Italy an order of things which, by setting all the Italians against Austria, should make always necessary the presence of a very large Austrian army in Italy. The same argument was also applied to Murat and to the objection of having as well him as Bonaparte at Elba, viz. that if there was war, the Emperor of Russia might cultivate the alliance with Murat, Buonaparte and the Italians. He said Metternich seemed to agree in this. The Duke said it seemed to be agreed by all that Buonaparte should be removed from Elba. The Duke said, regarding Murat, to Metternich, by whom is his expulsion to be effected? Not by France, for it would not suit you to have a French army in Italy. The English, said the Duke, might perhaps be the best. But, said Metternich, if once resolved upon there would be no difficulty of employing the Austrian Army for this purpose.

The Duke had met his mother by accident at Marseilles and had been very well received by her.

He said the army of France was not well disposed, but the people exceedingly well. He said the King had mistaken something, rather distrustful. He mentioned none of the royal family but himself having worn the French uniform of the present day.

APPENDICE II

Si riporta, qui di seguito, una tabella dei nomi maggiormente ricorrenti nel *Sicilian Journal*. Con questa tabella si è voluta creare una sorta di statistica dei personaggi con cui Lord Bentinck è venuto in contatto durante il suo mandato in Sicilia. Essa riporta il numero di volte con cui ogni personaggio presente nel diario (sia esso nobile, militare, membro del clero o della borghesia siciliana) ricorre nel racconto del comandante inglese, sia che abbia avuto un rapporto diretto e personale con Bentinck, sia semplicemente citato perché personaggio di rilievo di quegli anni.

Innanzitutto bisogna dire che il numero di persone con cui Bentinck viene a contatto durante il periodo della sua permanenza in Sicilia è veramente elevato. Nel suo diario sono citati oltre 700 personaggi, il che sottolinea la centralità del nostro personaggio nella vita politica siciliana negli anni del protettorato inglese. Tutta la politica, l'economia e l'organizzazione militare dell'isola, passavano, in maniera diretta o anche solo marginalmente, al vaglio di Bentinck.

Ai fini di una significativa analisi statistica, la tabella è stata ordinata secondo il numero di ricorrenze del nome di un dato personaggio, da quello più citato a quello meno citato. Per rendere la tabella più efficace e comprensiva sono stati omessi i nomi che ricorrono nel diario meno di 20 volte.

Ad una prima occhiata, è subito evidente chi sono i personaggi con cui Bentinck interagisce con maggiore frequenza. Sono ovviamente i protagonisti, assieme a lui, di questo periodo storico e cioè la famiglia reale dei Borbone (il Re Ferdinando, la Regina Carolina e il Principe Ereditario Francesco) e i Baroni promotori di questa fase politica (Belmonte, Cassaro, Di Aci e Villa Hermosa). I loro nomi superano di gran lunga tutti gli altri personaggi.

Il Re Ferdinando è quello che viene maggiormente citato nel *Sicilian Journal* (circa 2400 volte), più che per gli incontri diretti che ebbe con il Ministro Plenipotenziario (che non furono moltissimi), per il fatto che il Re e la famiglia reale in genere erano l'argomento principale delle riunioni politiche che Bentinck teneva con i membri del Governo Siciliano. Per la stessa ragione la Regina si trova al quarto posto. La Regina, in particolare, ricorre molto spesso nelle pagine del diario riguardanti la prima parte del triennio (circa 1200 volte), periodo in cui la regnante era dedita ai suoi intrighi politici con i Francesi volti a riacquistare i possedimenti dei Borboni a Napoli. In questa fase, Bentinck si adoperò con tutti i mezzi diplomatici a sua disposizione (ricorrendo anche a minacce non sempre velate) affinché la Regina venisse allontanata dall'isola, anche per l'influenza negativa che aveva sul Re e sul Principe Ereditario, all'epoca anche Principe Reggente.

È proprio quello del Principe Ereditario il secondo nome più ricorrente nelle pagine del diario. Egli, all'inizio del periodo del protettorato Britannico, era infatti stato nominato Vicario-Generale con pieni poteri di governo al posto del Re, la cui incapacità di agire e di governare e soprattutto l'influenza negativa della consorte, avevano fatto sì che Bentinck ne chiedesse e ottenesse la rimozione. Era con il Principe Ereditario che Bentinck aveva la

maggior parte dei contatti e con cui conduceva tutti i negoziati riguardanti sia l'azione di governo, che la stesura e promulgazione della Costituzione Siciliana.

Altro protagonista è il Principe Belmonte (ricorre circa 1500 volte), principale alleato di Bentinck nella prima fase del progetto politico che portò alla Costituzione. Egli, nella prima parte del diario, visita quasi giornalmente la residenza del Lord inglese, per discutere degli articoli della Costituzione o per riportare l'esito di un incontro con il Re o la Regina, per negoziare la convocazione del Parlamento o per parlare di affari di governo. La presenza di Belmonte nell'ultima parte del soggiorno di Bentinck in Sicilia si fa meno ricorrente. Belmonte viene escluso, infatti, dagli ultimi governi che precedettero la caduta di Napoleone e il ritorno dei Borbone al potere. Bentinck stesso si rende conto della "vanità" e della inefficacia di Belmonte come uomo politico e ne prende logicamente le distanze.

A seguire in ordine di importanza sono gli altri Baroni, Cassaro, Di Aci, e Villa Hermosa (nel testo compare anche con Villarmosa o Villermosa). Anch'essi membri del governo e protagonisti della vita politica siciliana. Il nome di Cassaro ricorre oltre 600 volte nel journal, mentre Di Aci e Villa Hermosa circa 300. Con essi Bentinck ebbe un rapporto diretto e costante nell'arco della sua permanenza nell'isola.

Una figura che non aveva un ruolo diretto e attivo nella politica isolana, ma pur sempre una figura di rilievo di quel periodo, è quella del Duca d'Orleans. Genero di Re Ferdinando per aver sposato una delle sue figlie e futuro Re di Francia dopo la Restaurazione, il Duca d'Orleans, pur non ricoprendo nessun incarico politico o di governo, è una presenza costante nelle pagine del diario. Membro di spicco dell'alta società europea e persona politicamente attiva, egli si propone molto spesso come mediatore tra Bentinck e la famiglia reale. Come detto prima Bentinck ebbe pochi incontri diretti con il Re e meno ancora con la Regina Carolina, ma non per questo le comunicazioni con i Reali erano infrequenti. Esse passavano tutte dal Principe Ereditario e, per l'appunto dal Duca d'Orleans. Dalle pagine di Bentinck sembra emergere la figura di un uomo di grande sensibilità e acume politico, nonché dalle grandi doti diplomatiche. Bentinck pur non esprimendo giudizi diretti sul Duca, ne dà comunque un'immagine positiva nella sua cronaca dei fatti.

Questi i protagonisti del *Sicilian Journal*. A seguire ci sono tutta una serie di personaggi che non ebbero una parte di spicco nel panorama politico-militare-sociale, ma che ricorrono comunque con una certa frequenza nel racconto del Ministro inglese, per aver rapporti di vario tipo (diretti o indiretti) con Bentinck. Vale la pena citare tra tutti Mr Frederick Lamb, il segretario personale di Bentinck, e Padre Caccamo, confessore di Re Ferdinando (uomo molto religioso), il quale aveva una certa influenza sul Re, tanto da determinarne a volte alcune scelte politiche.

Tabella 1 Tabella dei nomi ricorrenti del *Sicilian Journal*

Name	Occurrence
King (Ferdinand)	2429
Hereditary prince	1950
Belmonte	1541
Queen	1239
Cassaro	624
Di Aci Prince	366
Villa Hermosa (o Villarmosa o Villermosa)	353
Orleans Duke of	276
Circello	209
Murat	144
Caccamo King's confessor	133
Poli Lt Col	128
Leopold Prince	112
St Clair Marquise	111
Lamb	104
Settimo Don Ruggero	98
Ascoli	82
Fagan	82
Villafranca	78
Barons	75
Moliterno Prince	71
William Lady	70
MacFarlane Gen.	68
Bonaparte Napoleon	67
Fardella	56
Orleans Duchess of	56
Spaccaforno marchese di	56
Sangro Duke of	53
Butera	51

Tabella dei nomi ricorrenti nel *Sicilian Journal*

Balsamo Abate	50
Castelcicala	43
A' Court major	41
Averna	39
Castlereagh Lord	39
Carini prince	37
Mackenzie Mr.	37
Montgomerie lord	37
San Marco Count	37
Airoldi Don Cesare	33
Cattolica Prince	33
Wellesley H. mr	33
Neipperg Count	32
Pantelleria	32
Trabia	32
Fitalia	31
Greig Admiral	31
Maitland Gen.	30
Pellew E sir	29
Dumouriez	28
Medici	28
Castrone	27
La Tour Count	27
Cutò principe	26
Ferreri (lawyer)	26
Ruffo	26
Wellington Lord	25
Graham Mr	24
St Laurent Capt.	24
Tomasi	24
Aberdeen Lord	23
Metternich	22
Montjoye Mme de	22
Nugent Gen.	21

APPENDICE III

Qui di seguito sono riportate, in trascrizione, le lettere inedite inviate a Lord Bentinck dall'abate Paolo Balsamo conservate, tra le epistole, nel sottogruppo *Correspondence from Abate Paolo Balsamo to Lord William Bentinck* (BP, PwJd 412-421) presso la Nottingham University Library, Department of Manuscripts and Special Collections, nella sezione Bentinck Papers. Oltre alle otto lettere, si riportano altri due documenti, sempre inviati da Balsamo a Bentinck, facenti parte della catalogazione medesima: *On the Sicilian Constitution* (BP, PwJd 419) e *Note sul commercio dei grani* (BP, PwJd 421).

Volendo mantenere il carattere originario dei documenti, non privi di imperfezioni (quali nomi di persone e località, termini inglesi e forme verbali storpiate), si è fatto uso dei seguenti segni diacritici:

[word]:	parola aggiunta, integrazione
[]:	parola illegibile
Pal[erm]o:	sola iniziale nel testo
<i>majorca bianca</i> :	parole marcate nel testo

My Lord,

I have the honour of laying before your Lordship the best information in my power, concerning Sir John Sinclair's queries contained in his letter dated May 30th 1811.

1. The wheat in Sicily, before it is sent to the mill, does not undergo any preparation, in order the mill-stones might be enabled thereby to grind it in a convenient manner. And I think, that in England if they were to make use of the sicilian grind-stones, they could as easily and perfectly as in this Island convert into a good meal the hardest wheat of any country.

2. It is a pretty general custom in Palermo to put in every kind of wheat, the day before it is to be ground, some water, at the rate of about two gallons per quarter; but this is not done to soften, and consequently to render it easier to be broken by the mill-stone, but to purify it as much as possible from all extraneous matter, and in particular from earth. The water mollifies the earthy particles mixed with wheat; and these afterwards by stirring, and sifting are broken, and separated from grain. Such a practice prevails only in Palermo, where whiteness is a great requisite for good bread; but in the other parts of the Kingdom every sort of wheat goes to the mill, without being previously soked at all in water, and is ground there, just as in the Capital, without any difficulty with the usual mill-stones.

3. There is not therefore any peculiar process practiced in Sicily, and which the english miller ought to learn, for the easy, and due grinding of hard wheat: though it may perhaps be worthy of some consideration, that all the sicilian mills are moved by the force of water, and the greatest part of the English are turned by that of the wind.

4. The wheat, that may be exported from Sicily, in a year of a middling crop, is reckoned about 100,000 salms, and in that of a good crop 200,000.

5. There is not the least objection for procuring the small quantity of *Majorca bianca* (a veri excellent species of sicilian soft wheat) that Sir John Sinclair wishes to be sent in England. The best is to be found in Santo Stefano, a very large, and rich estate belonging to the Prince of Belmonte.

Pal[erm]o, July 5th 1812

I am with the greatest respect
your Lordship's

Most obedient humble Servant
Paolo Balsamo

To Lord W. Bentinck Env Extraord.,
and Min. Plenip. of H.B.M. in
Palermo etc.

Monday, July 1812

Dear Sir,

In compliance with your commands, I do tell you, that the substance of the speech, which the Archbishop delivered to the Ecclesiastical Braccio, as exactly as I can recollect, was as follows “The king should be very much pleased, if the Parliament putting aside all thoughts of innovation would adhere to the old sicilian constitution; and in this case he will be ready to redress all the grievances, that may have crept in for the space of 54 years, that is to say since he took the oath to observe the laws of the Country; nay he will be prompt even to revoke, or annul the circular letters of Caraccioli. But if notwithstanding this the Parliament should persist in the idea of changing the constitution of the Realm, then the King has not any objection to propose the english constitution as a model of the new, that is to be adopted in Sicily” etc.

I have the honor to be

your most obed[ien]t hum[bl]e Serv[an]t
P. Balsamo

To F. Lamb Esq.^r,
Palermo

Palermo, June 13 1813

My Lord,

I received the honour of your lordship's letter of June the 6th, and heard with concern, that lady Bentinck had been a little sick for the bad smell of the water, and was very much pleased with the news, that both she, and you had always enjoyed perfect health.

The Prince of Castelnuovo, notwithstanding his natural grave countenance, smiled at your handsome compliments, and uttered precisely the following words "Thank for me my lord, express to him my firmest attachment, and deepest gratitude, and tell him, that he overrates my merit, by writing what he did about me; but I do not certainly overprize his, by calling him the deliverer of Sicily, and one of the best hopes, and supports of her liberty, and beginning prosperity".

To give you some account of the state of this Island, I do acquaint you, that, since your untimely departure, the alarms for its tranquility, and the safety of its constitution have kept increasing. There is undoubtedly some exaggeration in such gloomy apprehensions; but it is certain, that at this time do not exist flattering symptoms for the success of next Parliament. Its members seem to be animated with a spirit of niggardness for the restoration of the desolated finances; and not to possess a due sense of the precious privileges, which chiefly through your means they have already obtained; since instead of thinking to consolidate them, and to set in order their always unsettled country, they show an inclination to run into wild ideas, and schemes of fantastical optimism. Add to this, that the French party seconds with industry, and exasperates these dangerous humours; and though they are few in number, and have not by themselves a considerable influence, yet they are very active, and assuming the mask of patriotism, and philanthropy, and declaiming against heavy taxes, high prices of provisions, aristocracy, the riches of the clergy, and the excessive burden of the proposed military establishments, are powerful enough to get proselytes, and to disturb the proceeding of our political machine. What is to be expected from these rising clouds it is not easy to foretell; but there is not a single wise, and well meaning man in the kingdom, who grievously regretting your absence, does not firmly believe, that your return, and presence would be the only effectual means to avert any storm, by which we are threatened at a distance. This nation, My Lord, has been too long debased by despotism, and her morals have been till now too much neglected, to be able at once to bear, without inconveniencies, the change from a slavish to free form of government; wherefore she wants, at the very beginning of her liberty, some enforcing authority, which, without violating her rights, might direct, and lead her into the path of law, and regular subordination; and this she cannot look for, but from your Lordship, who, to speak pure truth, is respected, and beloved, and enjoys the confidence of all classes of people.

Mean while I perfectly agree with you, that a vigorous, and a thoroughly united administration would in a good measure overcome the difficulties, and prevent the impending evils; but in the present circumstances of this country, I do not know *wether*, without some first mover, or common center, such a sublime doctrine may be understood, and practiced to perfection. However efforts are daily making, for gaining completely this point, and with this view a council was held in the house of the Prince of Belmonte, the

other day, of the four Secretaries of state, for the purpose of discussing the budget, and some other thing relating to Parliament. The Prince of Castelnuovo opened the session by telling his colleagues, that he did not intend to defend, but what should be approved by all four; and that everyone of them should cordially, and with all his power support what should be determined by the same unanimously. I, who had the honour of sitting in such an assembly, following the steps of my excellent friend, spoke frankly for the same object, and with a good deal of animation. The meeting, to all appearances, went on, and ended with satisfaction of every Minister, and the Prince of Belmonte behaved admirably well. The Parliament has been prorogued to the first of July.

The next day you set off, I received 12 volumes of Cobbett's parliamentary History, from which I have reaped, and expect to reap a good deal of instruction.

The plague of Malta is a dreadful calamity, and the fear of its communication is felt here perhaps more than it deserved, and perhaps, as some say, artfully exaggerated.

The Prince of Castelnuovo has a good opinion of Dolce's character and abilities, and in *compliance* with your Lordship's desire, upon any opportunity, will do what is in his power, in order he may get some proper place.

The Princess of Castelnuovo joins her husband in paying you, and Lady Bentinck her best compliments, and regards. My respectful duties to Lady Bentinck.

I sincerely wish you health, happiness, and that true glory which proceeds from the good of the human kind, and subscribe myself

My Lord,

Your Lordship's

Most humble devot[e]d Serv[an]t
Paolo Balsamo

P.S. 17th

Mr Smith sent the papers from Malta concerning the best organization of Courts of justice; but the Prince of Castelnuovo has strictly prohibited me of reading them, until our present parliamentary occupations will be over. Afterwards I shall not neglect to give you proper account.

[To] Lord W. Bentinck,
Alicante or elsewhere

Palermo, July 14th 1813

My Lord,

I take this opportunity for troubling you with these few lines, to pay you my respectful compliments, and to give you some account of the apparent political state of this country. But above all I think my duty to acquaint your Lordship, that I have already read over, and with good deal of attention the papers sent from Malta by Dr Sewell, and even have made some extracts thereof for the consideration of the Princes of Castelnuovo, and Carini, who by the Her[editary] Prince's commission will propose to Parliament a new plan of Judges, and Courts of Judicature for Palermo, and the rest of the kingdom. You have perused, by this time, the aforesaid papers; wherefore it is needless to tell you, that through the whole of them prevails a vast erudition, and an exquisite good sense; and that the Doctor having reproved the system and policy of Magistrates, which was proposed or adopted for this Island by the last Parliament, recommends strongly no other, than that, which exists in England, viz. justices of peace, quarter-sessions, Assizes, and supreme tribunals in the sole Capital. As for me, I have always admired such a juridical organization of Great Britain, but have entertained, and still do entertain great doubts, wether in its totality may be adapted to the present circumstances of Sicily, and wether the sicilian lawyers possess sufficient capacity, and knowledge to put it in practice with the wished-for success. However this is a point to be seriously minded upon; and we will endeavour to speculate, and set up a scheme, which may agree better with the ideas of Dr Sewell, and the actual morals, customs and knowledge of the Sicilians, than any other.

The budget of the Prince of Castelnuovo for next year was completely approved by the Ministers in two private meetings, and afterwards by the Her. Prince in Council. But shall it pass in both houses, to save the kingdom from a dissolution, for want of proper funds to pay the army, and the navy, and to support the other essential parts of the political machine? I can't tell; but surely it will not be an easy task. The french, and puritanical party, since I wrote you last, has kept rather increasing in number, industry, and perhaps in bad practices; no step whatever have been taken to restrain, or curt them; and it is impossible to foresee, how far, in your and Mr. Lamb's absence, they will succeed in perplexing, or destroying what has been established for the good, and the exaltation of the nation. At all events the true friends of their country's liberty, and prosperity will exert themselves to the utmost to prevent the alarming evils, with which this kingdom is seriously threatened; I, and the Prince of Castelnuovo are coming just now from Lord Montgomerie, to concert with him measures, in order to disturb, and overturn the wicked plans of our enemies; and if through the british influence, and the efforts of our friends our motion upon the finances will be carried tomorrow in the house of Comons, we may begin to cherish hopes for the security, and firmness of that excellent constitution, which we have obtained through your means.

The opening of the new Parliament, which took place July the 8th, was truly magnificent. Why were not you present, My Lord, I said at that moment, to be the best ornament of such an awful spectacle? And why my ignorant or deluded countrymen d'ont set a convenient price to the privileges, which with a generous people's arms they have conquered, and d'ont strain every nerve to keep them unimpaired?

Our Airoldi was chosen President, or Speaker of the house of Comons, but I am ashamed to let you know that he had 58 voted, and Mr Vaccaro 46. Does not this show some strong prevalence of the French faction?

Villafranca is the President of the House of Lord, and was decorated with the order of S. January. Lardaria, Settimo, Sperlinga, and the famous Raddusa got the golden key; but Castelnuovo refused flatly all such dazzling honours, and God knows how was made a Counsellor of State.

I have spoken this morning for the first time with the Duke of Orleans, and have found him a very sensible, and well meaning Prince.

My dutiful respects to Lady Bentinck.

Believe me, My Lord, your return would be the only effectual means to avert the dangers, which, if I mistake not, are perhaps imminent to my Country.

I wish you cordially health, and happiness, and subscribe myself,

My Lord,

your Lordship's

Most devoted humble Serv[an]t

Paolo Abbè Balsamo

To Lord William Bentinck

Palermo, July 25th 1813

My Lord,

As the ship is in the point of sailing, I take the liberty of writing you very few lines.

I am very sorry to tell you, that my apprehensions, of which I gave you some hints in my last, were not ill founded, and that things within these last days have been here growing continually worse, so as to wear a bad, not to say an alarming appearance. It is now plain, that we have but little to hope for the proper subsidies from the house of Comons; while the Finances want the most speedy assistance, since the troops are in the greatest distress, and every public department is in a state of stagnation, and confusion.

The Prince of Castelnuovo seems firmly determined to resign his Ministry; and though I am doing, and shall do to the utmost what is in my power to retain him therein, because I am pretty clear, that his resignation would be at this critical moment an irretrievable loss for my country; however I fear it will not be for me an easy task; considering, that if the national treasury is not conveniently supported, and as soon as possible, the kingdom by and by will fall into a ruin, and perhaps into a total dissolution; and then the best wishes, and the most efficacious endeavours of any well meaning and honest sicilian will be totally useless to save his country from the tremendous storm.

Does not your Lordship recollect, that since Christmas the Prince of Castelnuovo protested to you, and to the Her[editary] Prince, that he could not absolutely go on with his ministry, if the Parliament at an earlier period were not called, to give the necessary aid to the ruined finances? Well: the Parliament has been already assembled; and they mind, and talk but little of finances; how then can he remain in his place without the means of conducting it in a tolerable way? At all events I will not despair of the safety of my Country to the last; but I firmly declare, that without you, who would mix good manners with some fear, we will be in a great danger of losing whatever we have got, and to sink perhaps in a worse condition.

The French party gains here daily ground. You are acquainted with the late disturbances; and God knows, if any thing worse will happen afterwards.

I rejoice with the brilliant successes of the british troops in Spains, and I wish better, and better again. Health, and happiness and glory. Believe me,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's

Most ob[edien]t hum[bl]e serv[an]t
Paolo Balsamo

Palermo August 18th 1813

My Lord,

As I am going to set off for the country, and as I hear that within three, or four days there will be a ship sailing off for Spain, I take the liberty of writing you few lines to give you some further account of the present state of this unfortunate kingdom.

To be short, your Lordship may clearly know, and estimate the dangerous situation, in which it is involved, from the following circumstance; that we are overcharged with debts, cannot pay the troops, and in two weeks, at the end of this month, we won't have a single penny in our treasury. The mutinous Comons, countenanced by the discontent'd Peers, notwithstanding all the efforts of the new Ministry, and the repeated messages of the Her[editary] Prince, have refused constantly to grant any supply, to meet the exigencies of the present, and of the ensuing year, so that the first of September there will not be in Sicily neither taxes, nor money to defray the most unavoidable public expenses. They have voted already two *promodali*, or temporary subsidies, and both the one, and the other in every sense of the world resolves itself into a mere impudent nothing; and I need not say, or comment much to make you understand, what are the views, and what is to be apprehended from such a foolish, and criminal conduct.

While both houses of Parliament, the one openly, and the other under hand, show the most invincible obstinacy to give to the government the necessary means for its subsistence, they are going on with their extravagant, and absurd ideas, and schemes of reformation, and improvement of the constitution. They talk of the spanish constitution, which, as you wrote me, has almost ruined the Peninsula. They seem to have some thing in mind for seizing the church-revenues to kindle a war of fanaticism. They intend to invest the Deputation of public health with full powers over all military, and civil authority. They threaten, and actually persecute the supreme Magistrates, to loosen the most effectual ties of order, and subordination. In short, we have here all the seeds, and appearances of some thing like the French revolution, and destruction. As for the people at large, they are awake, but keep still tolerably quiet; but nobody can tell how long they will persevere in such a state.

Your Lordship may ask me, wether any measures are taken to stop, and avert the approaching tempest: to which I answer, nothing, and nothing again. The Her[editary] Prince is irresolute, and seems to mind not much of the matter; the old Ministers are kept, and keep themselves at a distance from him; the new ones hardly know what to do; all the friends of the good cause are astonished at what has happened, and have quitted the Parliament; Lord Montgomerie has behaved with great judgement, but is ill, and is gone to Termini; Mr Smith has given many arguments of his excellent sentiments, and conduct, but considering circumstances he does not think to enterprise any bold plan at all. In few words nobody acts, or thinks, or dares to act; the wicked are let to run wherever they please, and one, and all of the good Sicilians wish your speedy return here, as the only, and but the only sure remedy to the tremendous impending evils, with which we are menaced. Yes, My Lord, you alone may save once more my poor desolate country; some management, and fear will do what is necessary to bring people, and things into the right road; and you undoubtedly possess the proper abilities to execute it with glory, and honour to yourself, and to the generous nation, that you represent.

Our worthy friend Airoidi has resigned the presidency of the house of Comons, and has been succeeded by Vaccaro, a staunch french, and a declared enemy of the English. The french party increases every day, and God knows, what it will attempt. General Murray seems not much regarded by the english, and the Sicilians. I shall come back from my farm, the moment you will arrive here, and I will be able to afford some service to my country.

Prince of Castelnuovo's respectful compliments to you. Believe me,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's

Devot[e]d humble Serv[an]t

Paolo Balsamo

To Lord William Bentinck

Abatato, October 4, 1813

My Lord,

As unavoidable circumstances oblige me to stay in the country two, or three days more, I take the liberty of writing this, to anticipate to me the honour, and pleasure of paying my respects, and holding some conversation with your Lordship.

I heartily, and joyfully congratulate you, and all good Sicilians for your safe return to this Island; both because I am, for many titles, sincerely attached to you, and without flattery you are the only man, who may extinguish the torch of discord among us, and reestablish order, and tranquillity in our public affairs. I am persuaded, My Lord, that the critical state, wherein you have found Sicily, is so unexpected, and extraordinary, that you hardly could imagine it at a distance; and some ill informed persons might be tempted to ascribe it wholly, or partly to want of foresight, and conduct of the government, and in particular of the dismissed Ministers. But fortunately for our worthy friends a single obvious consideration is sufficient to save them before you from any imputation, which either ignorance, or malignity could throw against their honour, or abilities. The fatal epoch, in which broke out all the animosities, and hostilities against the administration, the English, and whatever had been done to benefit this kingdom, was precisely that of the opening of the new Parliament, that is to say about seven, or eight weeks after your untimely departure from this Island. Now I defy the most bitter among our enemies to point out the crimes, or irregularities, which, within such a narrow compass of time, committed the Ministers; and the changes, and alterations, which they made in their principles, their plans, and their methods, and manners of discharging the duties of their respective departments. I am sure, they can't, they d'ont dare to produce any instance to this effect, which is so true, that they have not planned, or directed their violent attacks against the operations of the government in the above said period, but against those of a more ancient date, I mean those, which were executed, while you were among us, and under your eyes, and some times with your full approbation.

It may be urged, that they did[n]'t exert themselves with that industry and judgement, which was requisite for securing favorable elections in the house of Comons. I avow, that conscious and penetrated of the justice and excellency of their cause, they perhaps did[n]'t fear from that quarter as much as they should have done; and full of reverence for the constitution already published, they perhaps made use on that point of more reserve and delicacy, than the character of the nation, and very likely the stubborn nature of the human heart should have allowed. However it is false, that they totally overlooked, or neglected it; and if the success of their efforts was not very brilliant, such a failure must be attributed to deficiency of more efficacious means. No new system of finances, and magistracies had yet been put in practice, wherefore in the Districts and Towns they had no people devoted to them to favour their interest; they laboured under all the difficulties, which brings forth an empty Treasury; they had very little power in giving offices, and preferments in a new order of things, as they were very little acquainted with the electors, and with the proper ways to manage them. And yet, through mere influence, and regard to their persons, and exhortations, they got admitted in the house of Comons many of their adherents, as it was conspicuous in the election of the President; and if soon after such a party of honest and

well meaning members was outdone, and defeated, this event was owing to a combination of powerful circumstances, which perhaps no human ingenuity or prudence could prevent or avert.

The fact is this, My Lord. The moment you left this kingdom, all disaffected to the Constitution, to the English, and to the Administration thought themselves fully emancipated; and intoxicated with the idea, that they had nobody to fear, or to manage, they believed it to be now high time, for revenging their past injuries, and setting the government to their fancy, passions, and pleasure. For this wild end the French faction joined, and contracted strict alliance in Parliament with the royal, or *unconstitutional* one; and this united body, by working on the folly, and-prejudices of the ignorant, and unwearied, gained speedily many partizans, and at last acquired the majority of both houses of Parliament.

The weapons, which they made use of, both in and out of Parliament, to descry the english name, and character, were the plague of Malta, the diversity of religion, the jealousy of commerce! And the arms, which they employed to blacken, and render odious the Ministry, and Government were high prices of provisions, liberty of trade, wasting of public money, and above all a design to load, and overcharge the nation with ruinous, and insupportable taxes! These stories, and calumnies, however unfounded, and ridiculous, produced a surprising effect among the stupid and the wicked; the mysterious sedition happened in Palermo added materials to the combustion; the public opinion seemed on a sudden to have deserted those, who had been a little before the idols of the people; and everybody was astonished to find himself unexpectedly in the middle of a serious, and threatening revolution.

But, however dark and formidable might have appeared such a change, and combination of things, I am not far from believing, that some vigorous measures would directly have dissipated and crushed it to pieces, since at the bottom all the disturbances had been raised, and were kept up by a handful of persons, who had little weight in themselves, and derived all their credit, and importance from their temerity in attacking the ruling power, and their malicious arts in seducing the people, and spreading every where the disorder, with impunity. But you, by the greatest of all misfortunes, were absent; the Prince was timid, and irresolute; and the Ministers, and the whole Council, in order to remove further evils, judged expedient to relinquish their places, and retire.

I confess, My Lord, that such a step, abstractely considered, might seem objectionable; but in my opinion was justified at the time by the force of the prevailing circumstances. The Finances at the latter end of July were interely exhausted; the troops could not be paid; every department of the government was stopt; and what was more than all the rest, the annual subsidies were expiring; and if those for the ensuing year were not immediately granted, no new plan of impositions could be adopted at the beginning of September with the desired success. For this purpose the Prince sent messages upon messages to the Comons, entreating them to vote the subsidies for the next year with the necessary celerity; but they, countenanced by the leaders of the Peers, and aiming at distressing, and keeping the crown under an absolute dependence, eluded constantly these sollicitations, and under various frivolous pretexts postponed to take them into due and effectual consideration. At

last the Vicar, by way of an ultimate trial, forwarded them a dispatch, in which in the strongest terms insisted for the supplies, and told them plainly that he would look upon any delay on this subject, as a flat refusal. But they paid no more regard to this, than to the former ones, returned no answer to H.R.H., and as usual referred the matter to their Committee, who till then had done nothing, and, as the fact shew afterwards, had no inclination to do any thing at all.

In this difficult, and perplexing state of affairs, the Ministers, who had neither ambition, or private interest to keep their station, thought proper, for the sake of their Country's good, to quit their places, and withdraw with their principal friends from Parliament; since they conceived that by transferring the power, and the administration from theirs into other's hands, they would abate, and quell the rancour against them, and the mutinous spirit of the refractory members of the two houses; whereby the Parliament would be induced to grant the wished for subsidies, and consequently save the kingdom from an impending dissolution. It is true that their expectations were now crowned with the intended success; nevertheless no body will deny, that their resolution was prudent, and laudable their intention.

Indeed the retreat of the Ministers rather exasperated, than quieted the minds, and the proceedings of the malcontents who nourishing further and deeper designs, grew for it bolder, and more thirsty than ever, of disorder, and vengeance. From that epoch, as they became complete masters of the field of battle, they have kept no measures at all to carry on their plan, and satisfy their passions. This paper would swell to a very tedious length, if I were to relate the particulars of what in both houses of Parliament they have done or attempted. Your Lordship will be fully informed thereof from every company, and from the perusal of any newspaper. It suffices me to hint, that in three months they have spent a good deal of their time in attacking the Prince's prerogatives, in censuring, and condemning the operations of the past Administration, in rendering odious the English, in destroying the Constitution, in arraigning, and discrediting the courts of judicature, and in taking vengeance, or threatening those, who do not adhere to their party, and can throw obstacles to their views, and machinations. They seem to have chosen for a model, or guide of their proceedings the long Parliament of England; but happily for us they had not a Cromwell; and our Monk, though in Spain, could not forget Sicily, and refuse her the wanted assistance, and protection against those, who intended to erect the fabric of their wealth and importance on the ruins of their country. As for the finances, they have taken very little care of, not considering, that to provide the kingdom with a suitable revenue is one of the first duties of Parliament, and an essential clause of the contract between the Sovereign, and his subjects. Neither they have bestowed any material attention to consolidate, and ameliorate the constitution by prudent, and well discriminated regulations; taking little notice of those inconveniencies, which have arisen from the execution of several new laws, which required modifications, or further explanations. In short, they have acted, as if had not been convoked to Parliament for that State, but for themselves.

The consequence of these parliamentary convulsions, and disturbances would have been shocking, if the bulk of the people had been prone to arms, and riots. However they have produced some bad ones, which, if not stopt speedily, will become of a very alarming

nature. A factious spirit prevails every where, which was before unknown. The government, which was already weak, has still lost much of its former weight, and force. Symptoms appear in all places and classes of insubordination; and the mob shows a dangerous tendency to invade property. The Magistrates afraid of parliamentary impeachments, and prosecutions have grown timid, and are more remiss, and less active, than ever in keeping the peace, and administering justice. Each individual lives in suspense for the destiny of his country, and for the course, which will take public affairs; and this uncertainty is dangerous, because makes people an easy prey of those, who employ more deceitful arts to seduce them. By all this, it is evident that in Sicily there exist already the elements of a dreadful revolution, and that the most effectual precautions are necessary to keep it at a distance. Fortunately the partizans of the French are not yet considerable for their number and credit; and if the English party is properly countenanced, it will be undoubtedly the majority of the whole nation.

This is, My Lord, the awkward situation of this Island, and these are the formidable evils, to which it lays exposed. As for the remedies, I d'ont dare to touch upon, being this a province, which apartains to your Lordship's experienced wisdom. Nevertheless give me leave to submit you few general observations. The measures to be taken, whichever they will be, must be steady, and vigorous.

The executive, and judicial power must be strengthened. Any expedient to better the country will avail little, or nothing, if before hand a perfect submission, and obedience to the laws is not established, and the kingdom is not thoroughly settled.

Several articles of the new constitution must be rectified, explained, and adapted to the degree of civilization of the nation. I recollect what you once told me, viz: that the principle of adopting in its totality the british constitution could be carried to a dangerous length. Sicily is now for knowledge and morals what was England two centuries back. Too much liberty is for the Sicilian, what would be a pistol, or a stiletto in the hands of a boy, or a madman. Excuse the length of the letter, and the rude style, in which it is written. I am with the greatest respect.

My Lord,
Your Lordship's

Most obed[ien]t hum[ble] serv[an]t
Paolo Balsamo

On the Sicilian Constitution (1813)

The new constitution of Sicily (or rather the sketch of it) must be kept untouched in its principles, but accommodated in some of its parts to the actual knowledge, morals and customs of the people.

Without this no solid goal is to be expected from it with all the power on earth. It must also be speedily finished, and in its totality published at once, and executed.

It is by this only that parties, and factions may be extinguished, and the minds of the people quieted, and the kingdom thoroughly settled.

These two measures cannot in a competent manner be carried on by the next Parliament, even if we were to be so fortunate, as to have an excellent house of Comons. The ignorance, prejudices, presumption, jealousies, and selfish views, and interests of the Members of Parliament, and of the different corporations, and districts of the Island either would hinder the execution of the abovesaid schemes, or set forth such a chaos of regulations, as to be worse the remedy than the evil.

It seems therefore beyond all doubt, that the completing and reforming of the present constitution ought in the shortest time be done by the Executive Government, and afterwards accepted by the nation at large. Such a work with convenient application and activity, probably could be done in five weeks; and then the H. Prince warranted (if possible) by Great Britain should proclaim it, enforce its immediate and full execution, and send it printed to all the corporations of the kingdom, allowing them liberty to examine, and manifest their opinions upon the articles contained therein, in order that their objections, through their Representatives, might be proposed and discussed in the following, and other subsequent Parliaments. This bold and decisive step, few excepted, would be highly approved by all the Sicilians; and bring directly a general calm, and give firmness, and solidity to the constitution, and liberty of the kingdom.

But what are the points of the constitution, that want a reformation? And what are those that are to be added to it, in order to complete it? We shall hint them under the following heads.

Finances

A complete plan of finances for the service of the year should be proclaimed along with the constitution by the H. Prince; and therein as a rule for the insuing years the following distinction should be established between the national taxes, and the articles of public expenditure.

1st. Perpetual taxes (independent from any parliamentary grant) to pay the interests of the national debt; the civil list, and the necessary charges of Government.

2nd. Ordinary taxes, viz those allotted to maintain the army and navy. Such taxes must be perpetual, but their revenue must be granted by the Parliament every one or two years at the beginning of the sessions.

3rd. Extraordinary taxes, that is to say those, which for a limited time grants the Parliament upon any uncommon occasion, as that of war etc.

The Parliament must retain the full power of altering, or changing any perpetual, or ordinary tax.

National Representation

154 members for the house of Comons are too many; and it is impossible to get elected for it 154 inlightened and indipendent Sicilians. Such a number must be reduced to 80, or 90. Ireland is three times as much as Sicily, and is represented by 100 members.

Elections

The sum, by which the present constitution gives a right for voting at the elections, should be augmented; and the necessary annual revenue for the Electors, and the Elected to the house of Comons, should be ascertained, and verified at the assessment book for the land, and other property's tax.

Responsibilities of the Ministers, Justices, etc.

The very extensive powers given by the constitution to both Houses of Parliament of inquiring into the conduct of Ministers, Courts of Justice, and other public authorities; accusing, trying, and condemning them, is incompatible with the present manners, and civilization of Sicily. In the exercise of such ample and delicate jurisdiction, private interests and passions would easily prevail above motives of justice, and public utility; the executive, and judicial power would be more and more weaken'd; the Parliament would be exposed to continual convulsions; and people of honour ad properly would be terrified from accepting any office, or place of trust, and importance.

Both houses should be empowered to examine the conduct of the above-said public authorities; to petition the Executive Government for their removal; and even to try, and condemn them, whenever there is the royal assent to a bill brought forward for the purpose.

Policy in both houses

There should be fixed some rules for the two houses to proceed upon, and carry on their business.

1st. No new motion should be made, or discussed, unless before hand be dispatch'd the order of the day.

2nd. Any new motion should be presented in writing, and subscribed by some member.

3rd. It should be strictly prohibited to any member to interrupt another, that is speaking.

4th. Every member should be allowed to speak but once upon any question, excepting that, who has been the mover.

5th. Any deviation from the subject under discussion, and all indecent words, and injuries should be forbidden, and in some cases punished.

The admittance of the strangers in the galleries should be properly limited, and regulated.

Presidents of both houses

Should finally decide any controversy relating to forms, ways of proceeding, precedency of speaking etc.; and be empowered to inflict some light punishment on disorderly, and refractory members. And on the other hand they should answer for the irregularities, and the transgressions committed against the constitution.

Limits of parliamentary authority

A capital maxim of the constitution should be, that laws and taxes are the only objects of the authority and functions of the two houses; without being allowed to take the least part in any department of the executive, and judicial power.

Theoretical maxims

All abstract maxims concerning liberty, equality, and the like should be expunged from the constitution. The mass of the people is ignorant and always perverts them; and in France the rights of man did more harm, than any thing else.

Civil councils

The number of their members should be lessened, and the necessary revenue for being admitted in them considerably augmented. No person should be capable of being elected municipal magistrate, who had not a solid property, to be proportion'd to the different towns and cities.

These are the chief points to be attended to in correcting the constitution; and to finish, and perfect the same the underwritten articles are of a material importance.

Explanations and deficiencies

In a country like this of petty-foggers every point of the constitution must be distinctly defined, and no room left for interpretations. Wherefore it should be accurately revised, to clean up the ambiguities, and supply the deficiencies.

Code

A new code is ardently wished for by the whole nation; but it is a very difficult task, and in France it could not be done by the most eminent lawyers in less than six years time. However some steps might be attempted towards the attainment of such a valuable object.

Criminal Code

Notice should be taken of that compiled by the committee elected by the Government; and in this case it should prove unsatisfactory, some detached laws should be made, insomuch the constitution might be executed, and for the rest, meanwhile, should remain in force the old ones. If the trial by jury should be directly put in practice, all the English laws relating thereto, and extracted from Blackstone should be published in the new constitution.

Civil Code

It being absolutely impossible to make a complete one in a short time; some detached laws could be published now to encourage agriculture, arts, and trade. At the same time, a commission should be given to some learned and prudent lawyers, and philosophers to compile in due time the new criminal code totally from the English jurisprudence, and the Civil Code from the same, and from the French Napoleon Code.

Entails, or Fidecomessi

Here is the rub, here is the gulph, which perhaps none can pass unhurt. The generality cry for their abolition; the nobility, and gentry are very eager for keeping them intire. It seems, that at least some attempt should be made to conciliate the opposite wishes, and interests. The following is submitted to this effect.

Let the fidecomessi be authoris'd by the new constitution; but let be enacted, that they may be broken in the underwritten cases.

1. They may be broken, whenever there is the consent of the possessor, and of his immediate substitute.
2. By an act of Parliament
3. When one fidecomesso, or at least one peerage is consiliated by descent with another.
4. When there is a bankruptcy for speculations in commerce, and agriculture.

New ones should not be permitted without an Act of Parliament.

Magistrates and Courts of Justice

The following are the outlines of a plan of Magistrates and Courts of Justice, which is thought the most convenient for Sicily.

There shall be in each place one, or more justices of peace, whose duty shall be to superintend the execution of the laws, to arrest and examine the criminals, and to define in a summary way the causes of small consequence, either civil, or criminal. They shall be wealthy gentlemen, and of an established credit, for their abilities, and honour.

There shall be in the chief place of each district a superior justice under the name of Potestà, whose office shall be to oversee, and keep the peace all over the District, to arrest like local Justices, and examine the criminals of the whole district, to hear and pronounce judgment upon the appeals from the determinations of all the Justices of peace of the District, to decide all the civil causes of the District of a certain nature and extent, to try by a jury, and decide along with some Justices of peace of the District, all the criminal causes of the same, except felonies, every three months, or at the Quarter-Sessions; and to do all the judicial acts that are necessary previous to the criminal trials at the quarter-sessions, or at the Circuit-Assizes.

From the sentences of the Potestà in civil causes, and from those of the Quarter-Sessions in criminal ones, they may appeal to the supreme Courts of Justice in Palermo.

A superior justice, or Potestà in every District with considerable powers is absolutely necessary to give force to the government, and the laws, and to protect the weak against the strong; and it is a fact, that, excepting Catania and Messina, nothing is so popular all over the kingdom that a Court of Judicature, or something like it in every District. These Potestàs shall be respectable lawyers with competent salaries allotted to them.

In Messina and Catania, beside the Potestà, and the Quarter-Sessions, there should be a superior Court composed of three judges, to receive the appeals from the Potestà, and the Quarter-Sessions, to try felonies, and to decide all civil causes of the District of almost any nature, and extent.

In some cases, from the decisions of the Superior Courts of Messina, and Catania there shall be an appeal to the supreme Courts of Palermo

There shall be at Palermo three supreme Courts of justice, composed each of four judges, and a President, to which, without any exception, shall be subordinate at large all the judicial authorities in the whole kingdom.

To allow to Messina, and Catania supreme Courts, totally independent from those of Palermo, would be contrary to the practice of all nations in the world, would dangerously split a small kingdom in three separate, and independent provinces, would destroy uniformity, and unity in the judicial proceedings, and lastly would be acceptable to the above-said towns only, but disgusting to Palermo, and the rest of the realm in a considerable degree.

The three supreme Courts of justice of Palermo, which must be composed of the most distinguished lawyers in the kingdom, and handsomely paid, shall decide the civil causes of great weight, and consequence, that can not decide the Potestàs of the Districts, and the superior Courts of Messina, and Catania; and shall revise, and pronounce judgment, or appeal upon the sentences of the Potestàs, and other like authorities. Out of their body,

twice a year, shall be sent seven Judges to the several Districts of the kingdom to try by jury, and decide all the criminal causes, which are above the jurisdiction of the Potestàs, and Quarter-Sessions: such itinerant Tribunals might in time, and by degrees, decide also some civil causes.

The Exchequer or Erario wants not a particular Tribunal, but if they think otherwise, a fourth may be added to the supreme Courts of Palermo. The public health should be a department of the Justices of peace, and the Segreti under the control of the King's Privy Council. The particulars of this sketch will be accurately given, if wanted.

1813

My Lord.

It is somewhat embarrassing, in compliance with the Prince of Castelnuovo's desire, to address your Lordship upon the extraordinary opinion of the Prince of Cassero, who thinks unlawful and simoniacal my promotion to the Abbey of Santa Maria dell'Arco, because I am already invested with another of a smaller revenue. Such an objection, My Lord, against my preferment, is so plainly frivolous, that it perplexes me to refute it seriously since not a single canon, not a single instance, not the least shadow of reason may be adduced against the advancement of an Ecclesiastic from a lower to a higher Benefice; and innumerable are the examples, in past and present times, of Sicilian churchmen, who have been translated from one to another, and who have even been allowed to have and retain two livings, in particular when one of them has afforded a scanty income, such as mine, which gives me no more than ten english pounds a year. However, My Lord, to confirm this with a proper aucturity, I have consulted the Professor of Canon law in our University, a dignified clergyman of probity, and abilities; and I take the liberty of enclosing herein the answer, which he has favoured me with.

My Lord, it is not my business to penetrate, and discuss the particular motives, and views, that in an ungenerous way induce the Prince of Cassero to protract under gross pretexts, and through unreasonable impediments to my attaining what I have not asked, and has totally proceeded from your generosity, and the goodness of my Excellent friends towards me. But since I have broken the ice of speaking of a subject, of which, out of delicacy till now I have thought proper not to speak at all; permit me to beg you will be so kind as to bring the affair in whatever manner to a quick decision; because it is very hard for my feelings to become the tale of the Public, which, by the imprudence of the Prince of Cassero, has expected daily my promotion, and now accounts for the disappointment with many disagreeable stories. Nay, My Lord, I am so much eager for whatever conclusion, that I entreat you to leave off any idea of whatever may advantage, and preferment, if the attainment thereof, by the malignant intrigues of some people, will cost you considerable trouble and anxiety. I can assure your Lordship, that I have no ambition at all for public affairs, am tolerably well satisfied with my narrow circumstances, and have a very strong inclination to pass the remainder of my days quietly in the country among my sheep, and oxen.

I am, My Lord, with the greatest respect.

Your Lordship's

Your devoted hum[ble]. Serv[an]t
Paolo Balsamo

To Lord William Bentinck
Minist. Plenip., and Env. Extraor. of Great Britain

Note sul commercio dei grani

Allow full liberty in every town of the kingdom to every body to make, and sell bread at any price he likes.

Allow, and protect the free circulation of corn all over the kingdom, and d'ont permit to be violated for any reason, or pretext whatever.

For Palermo. Show the greatest firmness, and vigour against the insolent, and extravagant ideas of the comon people, and make them steadily understand, that they must eat bread at the current prices of corn. Without this, there will never be an end to the evil. The mob will always pretend some thing, and will always be dissatisfied with every thing. Without this there never will be security of property, and trade, and consequently it will be impossible to have a regular supply of corn.

Buy moreover from the Caricatori 6000, or 7000 salms of wheat, and in the shortest time import, and store them up in Palermo. Such a quantity of wheat will serve to check the too high prices, and to provide therewith the Capital in the sowing-season, and in bad weather. The bread is to be made, and sold with the above-said wheat, ought never to be cheaper that the comon, viz than what will permit the weekly prices of corn in the market, so that it may last the longest possible time. When that is done (unless you may import wheat from abroad) trouble no more your head about corn, and bread for the Capital; and leave totally to the interest, and the exertions of the Merchants, and Farmers to afford to its population the necessary stock of wheat, and bread.

The money to be employed to purchase from the Caricatori the 6000, or 7000 salms of wheat, may be had partly from the capital already in the hands of the Senate, and partly by a loan from the bank, from the Deputazione delle nuove gabelle, and perhaps from the generosity of Great Britain.

If to satisfy the ignorance and the folly of the people, some thing beside will be done; an assize every week, or fortnight may be put by the Magistrate upon the bread, according the *free current prices* of wheat, just as they practice in England. The present pressure is not small, but not a little exaggerated, and owing chiefly to bad administration. Fear is the root of great many evils.

The abovestated means are not brilliant, but perhaps the most adapted to the nature of the subject. In matters of commerce, and of provisions, we know from experience and good sense, frequently the least is done by Government, the best is done to all intents and purposes.