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Social discontinuity and systems thinking. Cultural differentiation and social integration in times of globalization

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Abstract. Given the obsolescence of a linear, homeostatic and reductionist worldview unable to face current social discontinuity, the laceration of a stable universe of expectations marking world scenarios, this paper argues the heuristic power of System Theory in understanding and managing, by emergence, circular causation between system and environmental and micro-macro co-essentiality conceptual frameworks, social integration crisis in our culturally differentiated and globalized western modern societies. The discussion on normative multiculturalism validity (in particular neo-communitarian multiculturalism) and, therefore, on sufficiency of procedural foundations as device of cultural difference integration and social cohesion is controversial and far from reaching a turning point. To get out of this impasse and support policymaking processes able to face social integration crisis, the paper argues to bring the debate on complexity epistemological plan. Systems Thinking could give new lymph to current debate, hooking it to a safer ground, made so by new acquisitions on systems' working and evolution mechanism. So, Complexity language intervenes fruitfully to justify the caution with which normative multiculturalism is believed that should be considered, by anchoring this caution to configuration of a society projected to dangerously visit that range of maximum differentiation among its components which should be avoided being identified as the range of disorder and ungovernability. Not only, in the emergence logic, integration is just one of the many possibilities to which self-organization process being initiated by processes of signifying of recognition policies is open, but sociologically there are even theoretical reasons to believe that in itself the same functionalist device is such as to make this possibility little probable and does not lead where it promises. How to reduce complexity' how to fill up this relationality deficit that normative multiculturalism institutes and avoid the risk of a society unable to regain order with coherence? The Complexity framework is where the whole debate must be kept. Here, the integration proposal of pluralism and interculturalism can gain greater meaning, avoiding the risks of mono-culturalism, on the one hand, and social balkanization, on the other hand.

Keywords: cultural differentiation, social integration, social complexity, Normative Multiculturalism, Pluralism, Interculturalism.

MODELLING SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN INDIVIDUALIZED AND MULTICULTURAL MODERNITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Given the obsolescence of a linear, homeostatic and reductionist worldview unable to face current social discontinuity and uncertainty, the laceration of a stable universe of expectations marking world scenarios, this paper argues the heuristic power of System Thinking in the reflection on social integration and coexistence strategies in an era of globalization.

The social integration issue, that state of the society where individuals are willing to coordinate their actions and to cooperate with a low degree of conflict, their “making society”, their inserting into an orderly network of social interactions made possible by stabilization of mutual expectations, today assumes a specificity having to take into account a social and cultural framework rendered complex by individualization and current globalization processes, by the pluralism of values and interests and by a surplus of diversity given by multiculturalism. Contrasting to expectations, current social integration crisis, has betrayed the Enlightenment trust placed in the rationality progresses and its no longer sustainable reductionist systemic assumptions. Thus, individualization and globalization have complicated the sociological response to the *irritating* fact of society (Archer 1991), to the problem of the bond that ties individual and society, eroding the basis of traditional order and questioning *the sharing* as foundation of social order, as generative factor of regulation and unification of social behaviour and mechanism for creating unity (integration) and union (cohesion) from differences. Contemporary social theory is called to propose solutions that require the delineation of coexistence strategies even more articulated than in the past.

The idea that social order cannot be reduced to merely economic and contractual order is shared by modern social theory (from Simmel to Durkheim to the initial Parsons) which entrusts and can still entrust the possibility of social interaction processes and unification of behaviour to a platform of *common* and above all *shared* values as integrative communicative and interactional constraint, to *pre-contractual* elements (*consensus*) enabling compliance with the contract itself on which social order is founded (Rosati 2001:16). *Sharing, consensus*, produced according to Parsons’ perspective by a successful socialization process, is the device that ensures the existence of social systems, reduces the differences in unity, while solving the problem of integration and cohesion. As it integrates differences into a unified whole, ties actors into a common destiny built on the basis of common values, it generates stable identities, social bonds, a sense of belonging (*identification*) and responsibility for the production of common goods, those same goods that the collective organization establishes being a value and therefore good for itself and for individuals, ensuring cooperation and lowering the degree of social conflict. The progressive increase of social complexity in its dimension of symbolic differentiation, as excess of choice possibilities conferred to the individual after having been absorbed in the regulatory mechanism of structures of the traditional order and in those identification forms still operating in early modernity (i.e. the class membership, the State- nation), already breaks this mechanism and triggers the dilemmas of freedom. On the one hand, it triggers the identity problem as dilemma of agents who are free to build their own individual biographical project, to give meaning to life by channelling the choice in the direction of the *et...et* (Beck 1993), but who, for this, live a life without foundations, are more lonely and insecure, increasingly committed in wandering in the waves of freedom without a compass by which to set the route except their own autonomous and personal ability to give meaning to life. And on the other, it triggers the emergence of social integration and governance problems as dilemma of social unity and union, of the relationship between multiplication of differences and need to compact them into a unified and cohesive whole. By de-structuring the traditional order built on a homogeneous ethic universe, on claims of solidity, certainty and security, with interactions, identities, social bonds and social commitment stabilized through the profound sharing of values rooted in the common belief in an Absolute Principle (the one God, the one law of history), post-modernity, due to its own peculiar traits (moral individualism, pluralism of values and interests, *disenchantment* or rarefaction of a transcendent foundation of solidarity, separation between systemic integration and social integration) reduces the platform of shared and common values capable unifying individual behaviour and being at the basis of the relationship and interaction and their stability. By narrowing the area of consensus and breaking up the holistic bond between individual and collectivity, it exacerbates atomization and social fragmentation process, decisively trans-

muting the foundation of order from moral to functional and, ultimately, separating the foundation of integration from that of cohesion. We live in a state of incomplete integration, where the functional interdependence, as connective network of increasingly diverse individuals, leaves intact cohesion problems and social conflicts triggered by free choice, by pluralism of values and interests. If it is true that there are no net boundaries between hypercomplexity and disorganization, that all the more complex a system is, involving variety and freedom from rigid structural integrative restraints, the more uncertain and fragile it is, exposed to *the unexpected, the contingency* (Morin 1977), social complexity increase means recognition of multiple possibilities to represent the world and construct an one's own biographical project as well as relational uncertainty, instability, discontinuity, because there is no solid, unitary and shared value criterion (a communicative/integrative general meaning constraint) to which the action can be conformed and which regulates and stabilizes the relationship.

The uncertainty and social complexity increase follow the weakening of the culture integrative and relational function. And this the more differentiated, individualized and culturally differentiated, the modern contemporary society is. The already fragile foundation of social order is made more problematic by globalization which adds difference to difference. Relational uncertainty expands when the *alter* is a culturally different one, adding tension to tension. On what basis, what integrative bond, is it possible to build relationships and interactions, to make society with a culturally different *other*, socialized to orientation principles of social action being different, even opposite, conflicting with moral individualism and the individual liberty-equality binomial as value criterion that, while separating, nevertheless unites, governing the modern individualized action and expectations into social interaction process? Given the pluralism and in respect of the pluralism and difference, in a social context where the polytheism of values has expanded to include a surplus of diversity given by multiculturalism, how can unity be created from difference, taming cultural conflict? Reformulating the problem by an epistemological language, how can complexity be reduced?

The contemporary debate is controversial and far from reaching a turning point. The discriminating factor lies in a moral or functional foundation of social order. Although sociological interpretation as Luhmannian or Elsterian one consider that in second modernity the order has no longer anything to do with consensus, remaining only the possibility of a functionalist system, which is based on the interdependence of functions and professions, on established role expectations, working «on the basis of the principle of equal freedom in leaving others to their destiny» (Donati 2008:30-31), a large part of contemporary social theory reflects about the possibility of recovering that *a-priori*, that shared common moral base which *today*, in a secularized and multicultural world, is able to integrate, that binder which we "feel", connects and binds us, creates cohesion and cooperation, tames conflicts, makes coexistence and social order possible. On the contrary, contemporary social philosophy of Taylor (1992) and Young (1990) Kymlicka (1995) adapts to a functionalist system, legitimizing a *functionalist-procedural foundation* as solution to integration problems reinforced by multiculturalism – the sufficiency of compliance to a common legal code, to common procedural rules, capable of structuring social interaction and ensuring collective commitment, cohesion and order, even in the face of a profound differentiation or moral division.

Can we do without sharing as social connective device? Does the normative multiculturalism's proceduralism reduce complexity? From my perspective, the answer is sociological and epistemological one. In order to get out of this impasse and support policymaking processes able to face current social integration problems in culturally differentiated western modern societies, the debate should be brought on an epistemological plan. What is, in fact, the system concept with which theoretically prefigured integrative proposals operate? Following the terms of the debate, this aspect is not clear, while the decisive role of its clarification appears strategic.

Contemporary epistemology has redefined the conceptual contours of the system analytical category in anti-reductionist, non-linear, emergentist terms. Understanding the *creativity* or systems' complexity, their capability of producing multiple possibilities of meaning and behaviour in their morphogenetic process, that is, the emerging quality of social systems as outcome of *novelty, uncertain, unpredictable* and *surprising* result of the *circularity* and *non-linearity* of communication flows, could give new lymph to current debate, hooking it to a safer ground made so by new acquisitions on systems' working and evolution mechanism. Indeed, the new systemic knowledge that the instability, and, consequently, emergence, surprise and uncertainty dilate as the integrative constraints loosen,

justifies the profitable use of *far from equilibrium* or *at the edge of the chaos* epistemological concept as an analytic tool for its implications about conditions for self-organization and stabilization, leading us to try to reduce complexity, to fear and avoid risks, always possible, that systems can fall into that state of max differentiation, irre-lation, disorder, in which they no longer able to find new meaning convergence, do not stabilize and any, even minimal, predictability and controllability is lost. In this meaning, complexity language can intervene fruitfully in justify the caution with which a great literature retains that *normative multiculturalism* should be considered, by anchoring this caution to the configuration of a society projected to dangerously visit that range of maximum differentiation among its components which should be avoided being identified as the range of disorder and ungovernability, that is, as the range of conflict or social disorder condition. Indeed, not only, in the emergence logic, integration is just one of the many possibilities to which self-organization process being initiated by interpretation of recognition policies is open, but sociologically there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that in itself the same functionalist-procedural device is such as to make this possibility unlikely and to does not lead where it promises. Many forms of cultural conflict even where the recognition policy prevails, without caring enough about reciprocity and a platform, although minimal, of shared values, support this and show that it is not just a theoretical possibility. This being stated, how to reduce complexity, the *emergence* of an unrelated and conflicting sociality? How to fill up this relationality deficit that normative multiculturalism institutes and avoid the risk of a society unable to regain order and social bond with coherence? From my point of view, there are valid reasons to believe that the Complexity framework is where the whole debate must be kept. Here, the integration proposal of Pluralism and Interculturalism can gain greater meaning, avoiding the risks of mono-culturalism, on the one hand, and social balkanization, on the other.

To clarify these points, we must first deal the *emergence mechanism* in more details.

THE CREATIVITY OF NATURAL AND SOCIAL LIFE: FROM HOMEOSTATIC REDUCTIONISM TO SOCIAL COMPLEXITY

It is possible to interpret the crisis of social integration in post-modernity by linking it to all the transformations, (i.e. industrialization, individualization and globalization processes) that contribute to the development of social complexity increasing process and generate the obsolescence of reductionism and linear homeostatic equilibrium interpretative paradigms.

The assumption of linear reductionism - the idea of a phenomenal, natural and social, world, similar to a gigantic machine, understandable analytically by breaking it down, reducing it into its individual parts and reassembling it as *the* and *from* the sum of individual parts (in relational terms, as the sum of the individual intentions and interactions taken one by one), designed within the framework of necessary, linear cause and effect relationships (Leibniz principle of causal proportionality and efficient cause) such as to ensure predictability and control over events - justified the myth of order and its possibility cultivated by classic science (Newton and Laplace, and Spencer, Dilthey Keynes, for example). This assumption regarding all systems as systems in stable equilibrium, supported the Enlightenment's trust in *reason* and in the idea of a linear progress, of a predictable evolution of history, centered on the real possibility of an orderable cosmos and society project. However, the assumption of a world that is, all in all, simple and easily understandable in its simplicity has proved to be increasingly unsustainable. Social systems as well as natural ones prove to be refractory to the analytic-reductionist logic, manifesting characteristics far from stability and homeostatic equilibrium. This logic, which may be effective if the problem is limited to a specific area, with systems immersed in a stable environment, is ineffective in the face of emergence, surprising, paradoxical, counterintuitive effects (in this sense unexpected and unpredictable) of systems in response to input coming from their external environment and, especially for social systems, from their internal environment, that is, from subjects of the vital world never completely determined by social organization and by structure of its integrative constraints. Indeterminacy of systems - which are all the less determinable, the more their complexity increases, that is, the more their constituent components are numerous and differentiated and their interdependence is rich

– imposes itself as a fact. Fluid, unstable, discontinuous scenarios, abrupt, unexpected organizational changes (in Physics phenomenal manifestations as well as of individual psychic life and associated living) have overshadowed the Newtonian-Laplacian classical determinism paradigm. Eventually, its idea of the world gave way to the Emergence logic, from the overcoming of the dichotomy between Cartesian dualism/materialistic monism and vitalism/mechanicism by first Emergentism of Mill, Lewes, Morgan and Broad to the more current epistemological perspective of *organized complexity* or *emerging self-organization*, to that *non-linear determinism* on which Prigogine founded the *new alliance* between nature and society (Prigogine, Stengers 1979).

It is the idea of life itself, natural and social, as of an inert world, subjected to linear deterministic laws that wait for nothing more than to be discovered to make it orderable, predictable and controllable, to fail and to leave space to that of a life characterized by continuous disorganization and essentially *creative* self-organization processes, immersed in the historical time of non-linearity and irreversibility.

If for reductionism the connection or interaction between the parts of the system does not produce emergence and disorder turns off in an asymptotic stability, the intertwining of micro interactions now generates the macro, and the macro, *the whole. the system*, emerges from the micro as an entity that *is* and *has* something more and different from the sum of the individual parts, connoting itself with novelty and unpredictability features that cannot be reduced to or deduced from properties of individual elements (regarding social systems, of individual intentions and interactions one by one taken). This new systemic awareness reconfigures the relationship *system-environment* in terms of *co-essentiality*, *autonomy* (*autopoiesis* and *operational closure*) (Maturana, Varela 1984) and spontaneous organization, not programmed by an external organizing principle, and the relationship between micro and macro in terms of *co-determination* or *bottom-up* and *up-down* circular determination dynamic relationship, which finds one of its translations more effective in the metaphorical image that Morin (1977) uses to equate the idea of complex system with that of *unitas multiplex, solidal ring*, interweaving of interdependence relationships that proceeds by qualitative leaps, constraints and emergences, working with that part of disorder, the unexpected or contingency, which disorganizes the system and which, in turn, is a source of morphogenesis, of new order, of qualitatively new structural configurations, impossible in systems in stable equilibrium, in an endless and circular game of disorganization and new, emerging, self-organization.

The emerging self-organization or, better still, the *essential unpredictability* of natural and social systems, the intrinsic uncertainty of their development process, with which Prigogine clarifies the concept of complexity (Prigogine 2010) as system property to show a multiplicity of possible but not predetermined behaviors, of unexpected and surprising meaning-productions (*equifinality*), captures the idea that life is possible only *at the edge of the chaos*, in an intermediate state between maximum connection, (maximum order or organizational constraints excess that blocks the system in an immovable order) and maximum differentiation (maximum disorder or absence of integrative and organizational constraints and, therefore, destruction-death of the system). It is only here that the conditions exist for the emergence of coherent structures, for the initiation of self-organization processes that reduce disorder triggered by environment, the complexity or systemic uncertainty. Any environmental input as well as any social intervention or innovation can initiate a process of morphogenetic reorganization, which is unpredictable in its outcomes, open to all possibilities (including those of modelled interventions as one of the many self-organization possibilities), without excluding, however, that, always possible, of going *beyond* the edge of the chaos, entering into that state of max differentiation (disorder as equilibrium or system death-entropy) in which the possibility of internal reorganization is lost (for social systems, in a state of conflict that destroys the relationship and makes impossible social systems). Hence the knowledge that systemic complexity – its *emergence* capability, the *surprise*, *uncertainty* and *unpredictability* of self-organizing process – increases as the integrative constraints- in relational terms, the communicative/interactional constraints – loosen until it flows into *chaos*.

The *complex thinking* does not eliminate paradox, surprise, uncertainty from reality. It teaches us to better understand the world around us, unexpected and counterintuitive effects, social disasters, cultural conflicts, emerging and unpredictable manifestations of economic, political and social systems (Morin 2014), input-interventions that expose themselves to the possibility of unexpected effects, multiple scenarios all equally possible and indeterminate a priori emerging decision-making processes that lose control over their products, and to deal with error,

the illusion of solutions definitive, uncertainty and risk, inducing us to assume an attitude of intellectual humility that must deal with the systems' freedom and with the fragility of their stability.

In light of these contents, the metaphors of *network society*, *risk society*, *uncertain* and *liquid society* actually photograph *emergence*, the unpredictable outcome of social systems *creativity*, in post-modernity, due to regression of rigid institutionalized regulation criteria. The increase in social complexity structures for post-modernity a differentiated, individualized and globalized, and interconnected society, enveloping the daily life between meshes of a dense network of interdependencies without more boundaries of space and time and, for this, dangerously exposed to contingency, all the more *irritable* – sensitive to unexpected changes of initial conditions and subjected to emerging self-organization processes as well as to possibility of flowing into chaos – the more differentiated and interconnected it is (Luhmann, De Giorgi 1992). Therefore, this is a society characterized by rapid, unexpected and profound changes brought about by scientific and technological-digital progress, a poly-centered system (Petitot 1977) composed by multiple and interdependent nodes – individuals, groups, communities, organizations – which are tied together by social communication networks being no longer integrated centrally by a single shared order principle and guarantor of social system stability as a whole, and based on the autonomy of organizational criteria and decision-making logics of action subsystems as well as on the possibility of multiple memberships and multiple processes of identity formation and world representation, on the experience of cultural differentiation and on the separation between state and nation, society and nation, induced by globalization processes and glocalization, in the multifaceted articulation between forms of homogenization and cultural heterogenization of the 'global village'.

Therefore, the paradigmatic shift from Reductionism to System thinking has reconfigured in a new way the analysis of social system working and morphogenesis, understanding discontinuity and uncertainty as rule of social changes processes.

In particular, in *Systems Theory* Luhmann finds conceptual instruments suitable for a general theory of social systems (interaction, associations, organizations, society) capable of taking into account complexity and contingency of social world, the uncertainty that intrinsically structures the interaction and is celebrated to the maximum degree in modern functionally differentiated societies. Contingency, emergence, risk, decision uncertainty connote modern contemporary society which Luhmann (1984) theorises, complex in a complex environment, committed to reducing complexity and uncertainty through emerging processes of differentiation and self-organization. The transition from Parsonsian structural-functionalism to post-functionalism as *anti-humanist*, *anti-historicist* and *anti-normativist* and *constructionist* program of description and explanation of social reality in a framework of complexity and contingency finds in the concept of *structural coupling* between *system-environment*, – co-evolutionary unit of two differences or autonomies – the theoretical framework suitable for fixing that profound revision of Parsons' Agil. which began as early as the 1970s. In particular, after the 1980s, the conceptualization of *autopoiesis* and *self-referentiality* of the social in its relationship with the environment, developed into *Soziale Systeme* (1984), *Warum Agil?* (1988) and *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft* (1997), marked the definitive and conclusive detachment from Parsonsian normativism. The Luhmannian use of *autopoiesis* and *operational closure* concepts, borrowed from Maturana and Varela, and *emergence* concept leaves the mechanistic and homeostatic conceptualization of social systems behind, which still seems to affect the Parsonsian systematics with its idea of stable social systems tending to self-maintenance of order if disturbed (see Bailey 1984).

The Luhmannian revision involves all systemic levels, starting from the level of the relationship between Ego and Alter, conceived as a co-evolutionary unit of system /environment, in which each is environment for the other in the situation of double contingency, of mutual non-transparency, whose experience they reflexively live and where «the being depends on a selection that implies the possibility of not being and the being of other possibilities» (1976.509). Unlike Parsonsian normativism, the use of this conceptual category from Luhmann makes it possible to avoid the logical paradoxes created from the micro and macro theories starting from Old European metaphysical ontological tradition, that is, from the ontological assumption that society is made up of actors or men: the whole / part relationship model which considers individuals as elements or part of the whole. On the one hand, in fact, the conflation from bottom to up – the action determines the structure – does not solve the problem

of the social order and society as intertwining of interactions since the possibility of a stable interaction implies the systematic reciprocity of expectations and, therefore, *already* presupposes the existence of a structure, of an institutionalized regulatory framework capable of reducing the radical double contingency to at least a state of reciprocally calculable uncertainty in a similar way (Addario 2012). But, on the other hand, if individualistic approach must reintroduce into the model those structural constraints that it should have explained and which have to be assumed as ontological premise (*cit.*: 7), the conflation from up to down - the 'whole' or structure determines the action - does not explain the structure which is assumed as a ontological premise and leaves open the problem of individual conscience's autonomy of which social system is composed or *subjectivity problem*, and, consequently, of social change since the individual's role is reduced to that of mere executor or bearer of social structures and structures are understood in a framework of stability (*ibidem*). For its parts, Parsonsian theorization does not seem to overcome these logical aporias, solving the double contingency problem and social order starting from the assumption of strong, *a-priori*, value components as device for system integration by socialization process, that is, starting from an existing social system which has instead to be explained. Even here, while the Parsonsian model an analytical model, there is a logical contradiction: although personality system is external to social system, interaction process depends on and activates by *interiorization* of value and normative structures which model personality needs-dispositions and are *the condition* of interaction itself - the action finds itself to the level of the social system (*cit.*:8). And above all, social systems *have* a culture, in the sense of their tendency towards stability, towards self-maintenance of order. The classical Laplacian Newtonian theorization of systems as linear systems, whose evolution is extinguished in an asymptotic stability, is still evident in the Parsonsian theorization, which does not conceive of «random variability relative to the starting point» but «an ordered process of change» (Parsons and Shils 1951:107).

All aporias generated by the *whole/part unilateral relationship model* are challenged by the advent of complexity in sociology, by the *differentiation* and *autonomy (operational closure)* conceptualization between system and environment and the Luhmannian new *system/environment circular relationship model* - co-determination relationship between micro and macro - which considers the individuals as autonomous psychic systems (environment) from which communication (social system) emerges and as continuous source of environmental perturbation of social order, leading to question the systems' linearity and stability. Although communication presupposes subjects in its environment as a necessary condition of its constitution above the double contingency, the *structural coupling* between communication and subjectivity implies their reciprocal *operational autonomy*. Thus, the aporias are overcome. First, the two systems perturb each other, but respective autopoietic operations remain autonomous: a communication can be perceived by a subjective conscience and trigger a change of its state but cannot have a prescriptive function with respect to the meaning produced from this subjectivity, which self-produces a change in an autonomous way with respect to a given communication (Addario 2012:13-14). In other terms, the events of communication and subjectivity are coincident, contemporaneous and correlated but always separate events (*ibidem*). In this respect, from Luhmann onwards, the redefinition of social systems as complex systems means a new understanding of social systems as systems that have no culture, referring to structural discontinuity, to emergence or unexpected and unpredictable variability of structural configuration to which systems are open in their relationship with environment.

In more details, by assuming a higher level of conceptual abstraction, that is, by assuming as elements that make up the social system not the action, or actors which interpret the situation by their goals and beliefs, but the *pure* communication of meaning, the Luhmannian conceptual displacement of social systems from normative systems to pure communication systems solves the problem of order in conceiving the social dimension as an *emerging* reality. In so doing, the systemic production mechanism of von Foerster's *order of noise* (1960) is translated into a sociological language and extended to the process of social system formation. Luhmannian theoretical approach is strongly anti-reductionist. The *noise* represented by the situation of double contingency, produced from psychic systems that try to communicate with each other (Luhmann 1984), becomes an opportunity for the creation of an order - an actualized meaning for action as selection between infinite possibilities of meaning - as need to adapt to environmental complexity and reduce uncertainty. The meaning convergence and stabilization *emerge spontane-*

ously from mutual conditioning and learning from responses to these conditioning (Addario 2012: 20), by selection among multiple possible meanings. Social systems (the stabilization of a particular selection of expectations that would be exposed to the risk of being disappointed due to double contingency mechanism that makes uncertain the outcome of action) are far from being *only* the mental copy of the behaviour complementarity (Luhmann, 1984, 1997), because they always include other possible behaviors. Social systems appear understandable *only* as a reality *emerging* from the redundancy that characterizes the meaning as *excess of possibilities*, resource that, due to its charge of unpredictability and contingency, makes possible and understandable the emergence of increasingly richer order forms. By analogy to *dissipative structures* of Prigogine and von Foerster's *non-banal machines*, Luhmann's systems are historical, dynamic systems as well as undeterminable systems in their attempt to reduce the complexity, the uncertainty of double contingency, of the infinite multiplicity of possibilities of meaning to bring it back into a dimension that can be experienced as an expression of an actualized meaning for action, and this through an incessant circular process of production and reproduction of their constituent elements, of communication through communication (Luhmann, 1984). Therefore communication, the operation that identifies social systems, emerging reality from the double contingency, unexpected synthesis of the perspectives of Ego and Alter, to longer leaves room for any form of reductionism. Referring to social systems, it is *the meaning* to represent disorder and vital trigger of order, the driving force of evolutionary process of order forms and rationality as unexpected and unpredictable selections of infinite possibility of meaning in the complementary co-evolution between system and environment (ego and alter, each environment of the other). The Spencer-Brown's distinction logic (1969), already imported from Maturana and Varela as functioning model of cognitive process, inspires even Luhmann's formalist epistemology. A defining binary code (selected/rejected, true/false) guides the autopoietic process of meaning determining and system self-creation (1988). Thus, order can emerge from chaos, from uncertainty of reciprocal non-transparency. But the social systems autopoietic circuit continues to reproduce and feed itself. Social dynamic is a *continuous* differentiation process and uncertainty reducing. The system is constituted by differentiating itself from environment and, in this sense, is the reduction of that complexity, that uncertainty which the external environment as well as the internal one – the dimension of vital worlds – continuously reproduce, and which the system perceives as an ever looming threat to which it tries to adapt by increasing its own level of internal differentiation. From time to time, by differentiating and therefore, self-organizing, the social system reduces complexity but does not eliminate uncertainty, as it is always subject to external and internal perturbations. Self-organization by differentiation even increases the degree of systemic uncertainty and unpredictable emergence. In this sense, the meaning convergence and stabilization or actualized selection is in itself ephemeral in the face of continuous threats of the environment and in its continuous reference to other possibilities (*contingency*). In a Donati's effective concise expression, the social relationship becomes into Luhmann «communicative differentiation understood as a form of distinction according to contingency» (Donati 2009:246). The image of society as an emergent phenomenon of *permanent self-production* can rightly be derived.

The epistemology of autopoietic self-determination of action makes radical Agil's revision, marking the abandonment of any residual role of culture as the center and summit of the action system. Social system autonomy from the point of view structural (*self-organization*) and operative (*autopoiesis*, social system which autonomously produce the communicative elements of which they are constituted, translate, by distinction logic, into their specific symbolic code the environmental information stimuli transforming them into communications in accordance with their specific function) closes the possibility of a normative conception of social integration which implies an unity of the system or a central link. In modernity, order has nothing to do with the consensus. According to Luhmann, it concerns the autonomy of individual social subsystems, which must follow their own rationality and operating logic, in order to maintain their specific functional differentiation. In this sense, it is dis-integration to be the condition for order. In this framework, AGIL is simply the «autopoietic mechanism of the social system» (Donati, 2010:151), «an automatic way of functioning on the part of the social system» (*ibidem*), which functionally differentiates to reduce environmental complexity, performing an indefinite number of functions – well beyond the four parsonian functional pre-requisites – and especially not normatively ordered or guided (*ibidem*). There is no center or summit.

Nevertheless, the conception of the culture as a pure emerging fact of communication process, of the values and goals as selection of pure contingency, simple functions among others, pure contributions to emergence of action (Luhmann 1984, 1997), has given rise to new problems. For some, Luhmannian theory has made more abstract the substance of institutions, as emerging facts, and more precarious their existence (Belvisi 2010:50). In what sense is it possible to realistically reduce the social to pure contingency? This aspect marks the difference with the neo-Parsonsians, where culture has an autonomous role, although in a context of greater contingency in its concretization in the world of everyday life, and it is the content of the communication (Alexander 1990). Where, then, do the luhmannian system/environment complex unity and its implications lead? Does thinking of society as order from noise, of values as pure form, adaptive selection of contingency, perhaps end up by showing us the image of an order without society, of a death of the social? Many agree on this aspect (i.e. see Donati, 1991). Looking from another perspective, it is also true that many interpreters of social system from an anti-reductionist-emergentist perspective (for example, just to name a few, Bailey (1994), Sawyer (2005) or, even earlier, Byrne (1998), Reed and Harvey (1992)) have seen in the complexity the possibility to overcome the tension between critical sociological realism and postmodernist vitalism, between the search for a general theory and instances of contextual explanation (Harvey and Reed 1997). If, on the one hand, Cilliers (1998) supported the compatibility of Complexity with Postmodernism (emphasizing the lack of stable sources of meaning and of a rational teleology of history, the dismissal of the possibility of social causality and of a systematic social investigation in favor of uncertainty, unpredictability and surprise), on the other hand, the construct of emergent self-organization allows Byrne (1998; Byrne and Callaghan, 2014) to underline the compatibility between sociological realism (the idea of a stable order of meaning in line with the conception of a world deterministic, endowed with an intrinsic order) and social non-linear determinism or emergence. The theoretical position of Complex Realism grasps the potential of the Theory of Complexity to go beyond the dichotomy between Postmodernism and Realism, linking determinism and unpredictability, order and disorder (Reed and Harvey 1992). It remains within the modernist program of progressive thought and, at the same time, rejects the canons of reductionist and postmodernist positivism

In conclusion, facing to coexistence problems and cultural conflicts given by multiculturalism, the luhmannian system / environment relationship model emphasizes a reflection on role of the culture. On the one hand, complexity and co-determination relationship between micro e macro, lead us to recognize the creativity of social systems, the space of freedom and unpredictability of the meaning and the emergence of the social from the intertwining of interactions of actors who interpret the situation and never rigidly flatten themselves on the integrative constraints of social organization. On the other hand, there are reasons not to neglect the autonomy of the culture and renew its integrative power in the framework of a de-reified conception, as dynamic process which emerges from micro interactions, orients relationships, and continues to be made through relationships and for relationships, for the creation of a whole human community with a common and sharing moral basis built together.

At this point we can go back to the initial problem: how can the crisis of social integration and cohesion in our modern culturally differentiated societies be faced?

First, having nullified any claim of being able to drive social systems, any claim of certainty and predictability, the fact of *emergence* urgently places decision-making processes ahead of the demand for intervention strategies aimed at attempting to reduce social uncertainty, complexity, to avoid the risk, always possible, of disorder/chaos, promoting (not prescribing or determining) virtuous processes of self-organization, integration and social cohesion by balancing differentiation and connection/integration

Second, the awareness of a weak, not mechanically necessary, link between decision and future, input (decision-making processes) and output, protects from the most insidious heuristic implications inherent in a linear and non-emergentist approach to reality. Insisting on predicted solutions, while underlying problems still remain or perhaps worsen, proves to be a reliable indicator of non-systemic thinking, strong in its linear and reductionist determinism. In this sense, therefore, not only does a reductionist theoretical orientation risks being metaphysical in the Popperian meaning of the term but risks worsening the situation it intends to solve. On the contrary, Systemic Thinking, far from offering reasons for inaction given the uncertainty of the result, leads us to a new type of action rooted in a new way of thinking which promises and allows us to better understand reality (Ceruti

2007), readjusting complexity reduction strategies from time to time, cautiously avoiding more or less dangerous insistences.

That being said, a non-systemic way of proceeding, which operates with criteria that expel the consideration of relational emergence from conceptual frameworks, does not seem to be extraneous to normative multiculturalism

DOES NORMATIVE MULTICULTURALISM'S *PROCEDURAL MODEL* OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION REDUCE COMPLEXITY?

Normative multiculturalism's integrative model, both in its communitarist and pluralist versions, raises several doubts from a sociological, epistemological, methodological and ethical point of view.

Emphasizing ethnic roots, identity construction enveloped within the safe meshes of network of community traditions and bonds against an individualized modernity that has worn down, loosened and deformed the intertwining of the community fabric until it loses all ability to hold the self's formation process, it is well suited to the idea of a functionalist system, specifying itself in a integration functionalist-procedural model that considers compliance with common rules sufficient and does not require cultural integration in settlement societies, moral adherence to the spirit of values underlying the rules. The crucial question is knotted around the request of *public* recognition of differences by the host society through *special rights*, and *sectional institutions*, self-governed by individual cultural groups.

In the normative communitarian multiculturalism social vision the primary good to be protected is group freedom, whose recognition is articulated in the framework of a concept of equality that overturns the terms of the liberal model, presenting itself in terms of an equal right to remain different in the context of a non-neutral, color sensitive State, sectional, particularistic laws and a differentiated citizenship, all devices that from the liberal and pluralist perspective appear, instead, cause of inequality and social segmentation. The origins of this recognition and tolerance significance, exempt from an explicit qualification that refers to reciprocity, not specifying the modes of exercise in a relational perspective between the groups, stem from the theoretical communitarian core with its primacy of community over individual and its critique of the assumptions that govern the individualistic and liberal modern society (moral individualism, universalism of individual rights, neutrality of the State) responsible for a modernity that has fragmented social ties and identities, and in particular with its critics of Rawls' individualistic Neo-Contractualism with its primacy of *the justice over the good* and universalism of rights and juridical norms (1971). In brief, also in reference to the management of cultural differences in our globalized Western societies, the main battleground between communitarian and liberals about the foundation of political subjectivity repeats. In broad terms, the Neo-Aristotelians/Neo-Kantians opposition grasps the core of the question. By emphasizing the primacy of *the good* as a criterion to which every ideal of justice must be related, communitarians place it within a community ethos, as source of identity, self-esteem and self-determination, whose recognition is essential to guarantee effective realization of individuals, while liberals, referring to the Kantian theorization of modern individualism that rises the individual as goal and never as a means of the action, place this possibility of identity self-realization and self-determination in the universalism of the norms, in the recognition of freedom and equality universal rights. The emphasis of liberals on individual dimension and of communitarians on community dimension or particularism of ethics raises the question of the conflict between individual and community rights, between universal juridical rights and collective cultural ones.

This communitarian theoretical nucleus, whether it is based on a neo-positivistic matrix (Taylor 1992; Walzer, 1999; Sandel, 1982) or on a neo-Aristotelian one (MacIntyre 1981), is identified in the acceptance of a *cultural relativism* justified by the assumption that values are far from being able to acquire a status of objectivity and universality as they are embedded in the different concrete human communities and, therefore, relative to them. Hence, from questioning the legitimacy of a universal reference criterion, that incommensurability of cultures - all worthy of *equal* value and *equal* respect (Taylor 1992) - which justifies their recognition in their indivisible and intangible totality of meaning as condition to protect the community integrity and, consequently, the same identity of

individuals who recognize themselves in it. This unitary perspective emerges in respect to multiculturalism management, although among communitarians the theoretical references that justify the primacy of community over individual are different

Nietzsche or Aristotle? McIntyre wonders provocatively in the pages of his *After the virtue* (1981). The reasons for the radical refutation of individualism and liberalism privileging individual rights all lie in this passage, in the *after virtue*, in the progressive disappearance from the public scene of an ideal of good produced, shared and enjoyed together, in the loss of a *collective telos* which was sacrificed to the Enlightenment project to found an autonomous, rational and secular morals, capable of tracing, outside of any teleological and theological perspective, the founding criteria of the rules of conduct in nothing more than in the individual, in his free choice of his own ideal of good. It is precisely this reduction, this passage from the ideal of a good life for man from the community foundation to free individual choice which preludes to the failure of the Enlightenment project, to that fragmentation of morals and individual identity which for the Neo-communitarists appears typical of the contemporary age. In McIntyre's peculiar reconstruction, it is the *Übermensch* which is the final product of this process of historical and cultural change that has seen the faith in Aristotelian teleology and in the classical tradition of the virtues fall into disrepute in favor of a rationalist individualism unable to universalize individual motives as ethical principles. The *emotivism*, the progressive reduction of ultimate objectives to objects of free choice which are, for this reason, not rationally justifiable, the process of justification always having to refer to a choice that is no longer justifiable, not guided by any unifying criteria, marks the gap between present and past, between the fragmentation of contemporary moral discourse, understood as a place of incommensurable, interminable, absolutely insoluble by rational means, dissensions on issues of public interest, and what ethics once was, that ideal of a good life for man rooted in the Aristotelian search for the "golden mean", for wisdom and the contemplation of truth, or in a solid theological terrain as in the Middle Ages. Aristotle and Nietzsche are the extreme poles of this social and ethic change process, the emblems the most representative of two contrasting ethical conceptions, of two antithetical visions of man, of a contrasting model of actor and social world. At the end of his intellectual journey, there is no longer anything that the man of ancient Greece as well as that of the Middle Ages and even that of 1700 Pennsylvania is susceptible to share with the modern 'emotivist self', principle of authority to himself, solitary inhabitant of a disenchanting and void of telos and meaning universe, citizen of nowhere, separated and prior to its bonds, whose goals have been relegated to the context of contingency, identifying a more free to build his own biographical project but fragmented, disoriented, unstable, isolated and more lonely man.

The belief that the history of our life cannot be separated from the history of those communities in which it is inserted, from which we draw our identity (McIntyre 1988), directs jointly the communitarian reflection against that unencumbered, independent, pre-social self (Sandel, 1982), against what Walzer has defined as a nullifying process of self-formation, self-creation acted by men and women who are entrepreneurs of themselves (1999: 30), redefine their goals in an incessant and never definitive work of construction and reconstruction rather than fixing them once and for all on a solid sense of membership to a group with its values, beliefs, practises and on a spontaneous identification between expectations of personal fulfilment and interest collective. «There really cannot be individuals of this sort», Walzer says (1990: 20-21). For communitarians, looking upon contemporary ethics means, therefore, recording the loss of whole pieces of the process of meaning construction, the loss of concepts such as *unity*, *history*, *narration*, entirely void of meaning and erased from the cognitive horizons of modern man. The reference to the *situated self* in opposition to an *unencumbered self* (Sandel 1982), the consideration of a *frame of reference* by the light of which we can build our own identities (Taylor 1992), the insistence on the *virtus tradition* (McIntyre 1981) are all ways, different in formulation but substantially the same, to refer, instead, to a life project rooted in a telos established and shared in a collective way and on which a conception of a life understood as *unity* can be structured.

With Taylor, the primacy of community over individual is justified in reference to the Meadian Theory of self formation as a *social product* emerging from the relationship with the significant other and the generalized other (Taylor 1992). Mead provides him with more appropriate to the contemporary world sociological and psychological categories to theoretically support the recognition of the right of everyone to form his own identity not only as an

individual but also as a culture (Taylor 1992: 63). The substance of the conclusion does not change. Taylor rejects the ethical neutrality of law and identifies its dangers, assimilating the non-recognition to a form of oppression that damages the psychological integrity of the individual, preventing him from realizing his own identity and imprisoning him in a false, distorted and reduced way of being (Taylor 1992; however, on the concept of oppression see the critical details of Sartori 2000: 67-68).

Cultural relativism and incommensurability among cultures implies that cultural difference is only to be recorded (Zamagni 2002:3). It requires an attitude of simple acknowledgment. Hence, the justification of legitimacy of the *struggles for the recognition* derives as well as the proposal of a *differentiated citizenship* that ensures to members of different cultural communities the right to pursue the complex values of their own culture on public sphere, and, consequently, to respective communities the right to self-manage by the recognition of *collective rights*. According to Taylor, it is the feeling of authenticity, that same sentiment which modern sensibility advocates, to ask today to Western contemporary democracies an active commitment towards identity policies. In this framework, also the walzerian proposal for a type 2 liberalism can be placed. Walzer (1999) challenges liberalism on issues connected with social democracy and related to the sense of community membership, the management of social conflict, the role of passionate engagement in politics. The type 2 liberalism is the response to the fact that inherited communal identities continue to survive in spite of the territorial and social separation due to the four mobilities – geographic, social, marital and political mobility – produced from economic globalization process and favored from technological progress. This explains why, according to Walzer, the type 2 liberalism proposal, which recognizes the individual as holder not only of individual rights to freedom and life but also of other rights that do not derive from our humanity but from collective goods with a local and particular character, is a necessary corrective of the type 1 liberalism, with its endorsement of moral individualism's social disruptive effects – from institutionalization of weak social ties to the inconsistency of identity, to social isolation and political disengagement – , as well as the only condition for fully realizing the promises of liberalism's freedom, justice and equality.

At the same way, the *good society*, Iris Young writes in what is among the most articulate theoretical formulations of ideological multiculturalism, «does not eliminate or transcends group differences» (1990:163). *Justice*, given the qualities of inevitability and, above all, desirability of the group differentiation in modern social processes, «does not require fusion (the melting away) of differences, *but rather institutions that promote the reproduction and respect of group differences without oppression*» (1990: 47, our Italics). This public respect of community life is the condition for promoting peaceful relationships among communities (also Thompson 2002).

The request of differentiated public institutions recognition returns in the pluralist version of normative Multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 1995a; 2018). On the one hand, Pluralist multiculturalism sets a threshold to the recognition by admitting the non-recognition of traditions opposing liberal principles (for example, in the case of Islamic culture groups: polygamy, infibulation, talaq divorces, arranged marriages and so on). On the other hand, it supports the implementation of interventions able to make liberal institutions truly accessible and usable by immigrants (for example, school curriculum adjustments, adapting standards for job selection to curriculum, modifying times and workplaces, dress code adjustments) and the recognition of institutions conforming to specific traditions of immigrant communities, in particular schools, hospitals, houses, and cemeteries. The request of a differentiated citizenship, of including “pieces” of minority group culture in our institutions, seems to remain in the social-democratic domain (Zamagni 2002). However, as we will argue later, even this position does not eliminate the integration problems implied by the communitarian version.

The differentiated citizenship as integrative strategy is shared from all normative multiculturalists (see also Modood 2007, 2018; Meer and Modood 2013). The *salad bowl* seems to be the most suitable metaphor for expressing the multiculturalist idea of a social coexistence project where all differences coexist, distinctly and publicly recognized, without annulling themselves or merging into a single cultural and social reality (melting pot).

Therefore, normative multiculturalism, even pluralist normative multiculturalism which appears to be less radical than the communitarian on some points, leaves open problematic issues.

Sociologically there are good reasons to believe that normative multiculturalism model is not sufficient for integration, for producing unity from difference. Although, in emergence logic, integration can be one of the many

possibilities to which self-organization process being initiated by processes of signifying of recognition policies is open, the functionalist-procedural device is such as to make this possibility unlikely. Indeed, the lack of attention given to reciprocity and to every effort towards a platform, albeit the least, of common meanings shared between groups risks exacerbating differentiation, segmenting society into separate communities, unable to communicate, which do not share anything significant, making mutual adaptation between groups difficult. The risk of dangerous *isolationist drift*, establishing a sociality that does not find points of unity and union, characterized by closed, unrelated groups which have strong intra-group bonds and weak inter-group bonds (Donati 2008), destined to remain increasingly stranger to each other and potentially in conflict on the level of important relational orientation values (e.g. gender equality), does not go unnoticed. From this angle, normative multiculturalism appears far from a culture conception as source of relationship and integration and, for this, susceptible to a dynamic formation process. The communitarian implication is to reify cultures, understood as homogeneous entities, fixed and immutable blocks, impermeable to innovation and exchange processes (see Benhabib 2002) as well as that to admit a process of self's formation which is not dynamic, which blocks social agents in rigid identities. Terms such as *social balkanization*, *tribalization*, formation of *parallel societies* (e.g. Touraine 1998; Heller 1996; Baumann 1999; Barry 2000; Carens 2000; Sartori 2000; Benhabib 2002; Tibi 2002; Donati 2008; Sen 2006a, 2006b; Malik 2014; Guidikova 2014; Cantle 2016) have been used to indicate the normative multiculturalism peculiarity of eroding the foundations of community coexistence, its inability to forge a common and shared identity while it fragments social fabric into a multiplicity of non-communicating social worlds, into a multi-communitarianism (Wieviorka 1998) or pluralism of monocultures, of traditions that coexist side by side without meeting, without sharing anything (Sen 2006a), and, ultimately, complicating and problematizing the conditions of integration, cohesion and social peace. According to Sen, the history of multiculturalism is one of the many examples of how fallacious reasoning can trap people into the inextricable quagmire which it has created (Sen 2006b:35).

Sociologically the idea of a externalized integration, which allows groups to survive without integrating culturally, indifference towards reciprocity and culture as relational fact (Donati 2008: 30), appears to lead to emergence of a fragile sociality. It leaves the problem of cohesion intact and offers no mediation and solution to cultural conflicts, rather justifying for this a theoretical leap backwards, a problematic return to the Hobbesian state. Communitarization promises to strengthen cultural divide lines between groups and preludes to mutual separation rather than social integration, intolerance rather than tolerance, conflict rather than peaceful coexistence. In other terms, the procedural foundation of social integration raises serious doubts about its power to reduce social complexity.

From a sociological perspective, even the model of cohabitation and integration proposed by pluralist multiculturalism does not get rid of those relational short-circuit problems and balkanization issues previously observed. As certain institutions are thought to be separate from those of host society, including schools that preside over socialization, the main question remains open. There would always be a lack of that meaning bond, that platform of shared values at the base of cohesion and integration, that enable "to make society", a common world, reducing the risk of a segmentation of the social fabric into non-communicating, in potential conflict, sub-communities.

Epistemologically, considering systemic complexity, the normative multiculturalism project is not enough to favor system self-organization, to reduce uncertainty of this process, the system emergence property by balancing differentiation and integration. Due to its peculiar traits, it ends up modeling a society risking overcoming the edge of the chaos, falling into that state of max differentiation, unrelation, which should be avoided being identified as the range of disorder and ungovernability. Indeed, in relational terms, this range corresponds to that where interaction processes are not governed from mutual common value and behaviour expectations, and are so disordered - disunited, disjointed, incoherent, discontinuous, conflicting- that they are no longer able to find meaning convergence and to be mutually coherent and coordinated, social systems do not stabilize into a new order in response to environmental perturbations, self organization and morphogenesis become impossible since adaptation process finds no stopping point, and any social controllability and predictability is lost. Today, many forms of cultural conflicts, many signs of difficult coexistence between *us* and *them* revealed by proceeding on this path without caring enough about symbolic reciprocity are proof of this and show that we are far from a merely theoretical possibility. Contrary to expectations, Islamic radicalism cases (infibulations, forced marriages, polygamy,

honor-based violences, Condorelli 2018) as well as fundamentalism events and signs of xenophobia and nationalist extremism are not infrequent even in social contexts oriented in a multiculturalist way such as Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway. They are all expressive of a separate sociality generated from the intertwining of action of a plurality of subjects oriented by a unilateral interpretation of recognition policies. In particular, *Sharia courts* and *faith school* recognition have not kept away multi-ethnic Great Britain from cultural tensions, Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism episodes (the numerous attacks on the London underground are well known as well as the Islam4UK demonstrations for the inclusion of the Sharia in the liberal Europe British Law), describing UK society as a collation of close and separates communities, with parallel lives in separate institutions, incapable of meaningful interchanges, lacking a meta-community as a common ground of union between ethnic-cultural differences (Cantle 2001). All this makes us reflect on consequences of ethic relativism and political correctness attitudes, capable favouring that illiberal confusion (Sen 2006a) which leads away from the Enlightenment roots of European culture, and, consequently, produces social fragmentation and uncertainty.

However, the need for the recognition of group rights and religions in the public sphere continues to be confirmed as *nation-remaking project* (Modood 2018; Kymlicka, 2018).

Methodologically, Systemic thinking, then, leads us to consider with caution this insistence. It suggests a way of proceeding which operates in reductionist terms: it expels the consideration of emergence and unpredictability from conceptual framework, and, for the reasons previously said, exposes the Normative Multiculturalism to the judgment of being a metaphysical theory in the Popperian sense of the term.

Finally, even the serious problems that the group rights recognition raises on an ethical level have not gone unnoticed, that is, the risk of legitimizing those cultural traditions that generate intra-group discriminatory practices, as in the case of the condition of women in sexist societies (see Condorelli 2018), and perpetuating and endorsing forms of social injustice protected by the *politically correct* (Sen, 2006c). Ethic limits deriving from the axiological relativism have been widely treated in academic debate. For Heller, the rule of multiculturalism can become an instrument of abuse and imposition when the decisions of individuals are prejudiced or subject to generalized preferences (Heller 1996: 34). Which means, according to the author, that Multiculturalism, as a *utopia* of the same opportunities for all the communities and for the individuals recognized in them, is destined to remain an incomplete utopia if it reifies cultures, if freedom, as a superior value, that is, the possibility to belong or leave any cultural community, native or not, as an act of free choice (*ibidem*), is not incorporated into the same utopia. If this possibility (as in the case of mixed marriages or acts of conversion to another faith) is not accepted, but sanctioned, impeded by force or even death, multiculturalism risks falling into that *illiberal confusion* mentioned by Sen (2006b), into that protection of forms of intra-group oppression that deny that instance of freedom, equity, and social justice that normative multiculturalism would want, instead, to guarantee. Boudon seems to have put an end to the question by saying: «that the ‘cultural’ rights of groups and subgroups must be recognized is one thing, that this should imply the acceptance of axiological relativism is another» (Boudon 1999: 45).

To be precise, within Multiculturalism there is a wide range of intellectual positions. The variety of ways in which the difference recognition is theorized finds further specifications in the Habermas’s approach, in some intermediate positions as Honneth’s one. There is to be seen whether and to what extent the critical considerations here presented can be addressed to these theoretical positions.

Habermas’s perspective presents interesting peculiarities which mark a significant difference with Kymlicka and Taylor (Habermas, 1996, 1998). The qualifying aspect is that Habermas excludes that the valorization of cultural differences requires collective, ethic, rights recognition, since it is ensured by juridical universalism, by the system of individual rights understood as praxis based on universalistic and trans-cultural criteria. It is, in fact, the condition of *co-originary* of private autonomy and public autonomy that makes not necessary the recognition of special group rights and sufficient the recognition of full citizenship to immigrants, especially second generation, born in the host society (*ius soli vs ius sanguinis*) so they are able to participate in democratic political dialectics and to reach a possible public recognition of their interests simply by following the rules of democracy and pluralism. In other terms, Habermas proposes a political integration, according to *patriotic constitutionalism* which implies an acceptance of the rules of production of laws and democratic power, considering that moral integration

cannot be demanded by a liberal state. The “solidarity among strangers” is that of a law community. All we need is a procedural legal democracy, capable of guaranteeing both private and public autonomy by ensuring a transversal, not mono-cultural, participation in the public arena. Habermas insists on the integrative function of the norms and procedures of law democratic production. The difference with neocommunitarian multiculturalist are evident on more levels. Beyond the many reflections that this intellectual position has aroused, one aspect appears relevant for the purposes of this work: Habermasian Theory implies the sharing a democratic ethos as *a priori* of social action (i.e see Rosati 2001). The importance of this assumptions is evident as a condition to prevent the risk to destroy the democracy by using democratic tools in a purely functional and anti-democratic way. The question will be argued again in the next paragraph.

For his part, Honneth’s recognition Theory proposes an original conceptual integration between Hegel and Kant, between the particularism of recognition of community forms of life and values, related to individual self-esteem and the liberal and habermasian universalism of juridical principles, related to individual autonomy. By finding in Mead an empirical justification to the communitarian positions and a way to reinterpret heghelian positions by more updated sociological and psychological categories, the identification of three degrees in the recognition process corresponding to three moments of identity formation process – that of primary relations, that of juridical relations and that of the ethical community – realizes the conceptual union between *self-determination* and *self-esteem* which cannot be preserved regardless the possibility of putting shared group values into practice. Starting from belief that the solidarity cannot be structured by law universalism but only by value and forms of life sharing, the Honnet’s multicultural solidarity with its consequential recognition of particularism of ethics is a solidarity between anonymous which does not solve social balkanization problems. According to many interpreters the Honneth’s attempt to connect *self-determination* and *self-esteem* does not seem to resolve the intrinsic collision between the universalism of juridical principles and the particularism of ethics (i.e see Rosati 2001). In other respects, this approach is placed in an intermediate position and opens to perspectives of inter-culturality where individual self-realization is endorsed by referring to a network of inter-subjective relationships of mutual recognition., Dwelling on his aspect, however, the mutual respect of anthropological needs for security, recognition of one’s dignity, identity and form of life, appears be ensured on a not institutional basis, unlike the Normative Interculturalism. Social integration and conflict problems as well as ethical problems seem to remain open.

From my perspective, these problems seem to remain open even in Margalit’s recognition Theory (1996). The theorization of the *decent society*, as society which bases its solidarity on the *non-humiliation* of its members as normative principle of orientation of social institutions, requires 1) the need of different cultural identities recognition as well as political citizenship as corrective of that status disparity condition capable of legitimizing a dialectic similar to humiliating and undignified slave/master one, 2) the commitment by institutions not to produce and not to use humiliating collective representations. Although in line of principle this perspective is acceptable, those identity making processes that are linked to group traditional cultural practices which humiliate the human dignity such as sexist ones should not be underestimated. The recognition question still shows itself in all its problematic nature.

Currently the debate is focused on the relationship between normative Multiculturalism and normative Interculturalism. In the next paragraph the terms of this controversial debate will be argued.

In conclusion, considering the sociological, epistemological, methodological warnings dealt with here, how to reduce complexity? How to fill up this relational gap that normative multiculturalism, in its pluralist and communitarian version, institutes and avoid the risk of a society undermined from an anomic differentiation process and unable, for this, to re-organize in new order configurations?

REDUCING COMPLEXITY: THE *SHARING* IN PLURALIST AND INTERCULTURALIST INTEGRATION MODEL

A sociality capable, in the respect of pluralism, finding points of unity and union through sharing of common values is the central core of the Pluralism and Interculturalism model integrative strategy

Pluralism recommends that least bit of assimilation that is necessary to create integration (Sartori 2000: 56). All the reasoning focuses on the need of a moral foundation of integration and cohesion consisting in *sharing*, albeit the least, of common values as a means necessary to activate relationships and cooperation (Baubock 1996; Putnam 2007) and to reduce complexity in the face of procedural foundation inefficiencies. It is to the *reciprocity* of tolerance that Pluralism consigns the possibility of the society in an individualized, pluralistic, social context and especially in a multicultural one. *Reciprocity*, understood as a reciprocal disposition to openness and acceptance, implies the recognition of coexistence rules of host society and of those individual liberty and equality values underlying the rules and role expectations by those who are hosted, and the recognition of traditional values of those who are hosted by host society, provided that these values are not contrary to those of liberty and equality. On the one hand, reciprocity tempers the sharing as conceived in the assimilationist model. On the other hand, reciprocity avoids the isolationist drift of normative multiculturalism. By fostering a relational meaning bond capable of forging that behavior unity and sense of belonging, that stable social union which can, consequently, strengthen efforts at collective commitment and reduce the level of relational conflict, pluralistic sharing and mutual tolerance can, in principle, remedy the differentiation excess which prevents the system's self-organization, the possibility of its stabilization in a new pluralistic and multicultural social order. In short, it can build that relational bond and that possibility of dialogue between groups capable of balancing respect for difference and need for social integration. In this meaning Sartori sees in pluralistic reciprocity the condition for living together in difference and with differences, without which recognition policy and integration reciprocally exclude (2000: 114). So, Pluralistic sharing renders coexistence possible and is the condition for *undifferentiated citizenship*, that recognition of individual universal rights which enshrine individual freedom and equality values. Understanding and reforging one's identity in reference to modern moral individualism values, and, for this, feeling itself as citizen and placing on social scene as holder of individual, non-collective, rights, is that point of unity and union that channels mutual behavior expectations on a shared binary, makes social interaction and solidarity possible, tempering cultural conflicts as well as pluralistic-democratic society destruction risks which can result from an anti pluralistic, anti liberal and anti democratic use of universal individual rights (e.g. the right to vote). In this respect, Habermas' integration proposal is significant (Habermas 1996). The Habermas' integration as political integration, according to a *patriotic constitutionalism* which implies an acceptance of legal power and law production process rules in a pluralistic society and liberal State which cannot require moral integration, works by involving the sharing of the democratic ethos governing this process as *a priori* of social action.

This position is *sociologically* correct. However, it is impossible to deny all the difficulty of "the sharing" in reference to individuals already socialized to other value contents which reject it, intending to remain rooted in their ethnic roots. Starting from this consideration, some perplexities seems to be raised even by the idea of multicultural society proposed by Touraine (1998) and based on the notion of *subject*. The reassessment of the subjectivity, of the non-social of the social, appear to Touraine functional to the intercultural communications and democracy, as a fundamental condition for combining the universalistic principle of equality between human beings and the particularism of ethics. Radical criticisms are addressed at cultural relativism perspective as well as to instrumental logic of the market reducing everything to profit. Only *subjects*, individuals who constitute themselves as such and as actors into collective movements by disengaging both from community holism and the market logic, can recognize each other, *equal and different*. Utopia? The one and the other side, both a strong and persistent attachment to the profit logic and many cases of Islamic radicalism or fundamentalism expressing a strong closure towards individualism which is the prelude to *the subject*, show how much the Touraine multicultural society vision is placed on a ground that is difficult to till.

Facing these perplexities, Normative Interculturalism appears a possible solution. In this sense, Interculturalism is configured as an interactive project of coexistence in difference and with difference and a model of integration that assumes the need for a core of shared values whose construction—here lies its novelty—is conceived with in a *mutual learning process* among cultures. Therefore, it bases *sharing* on a reciprocity concept which, on the one hand, incorporates that of pluralism (reciprocity oriented to sharing of individual liberty-equality binomial and democratic ethos that mark modern Western societies), on the other, "expands" it in the context of a *bi-directional*

adaptation process (Rodriguez-Garcia 2010; Rattansi 2011; Barret 2013; Bouchard 2015; Guidikova 2015; Cantele 2016; Zapata-Barrero 2017; Levrau and Loobuyck 2018), namely a process of *mutual fertilization* or *enrichment* of cultures for the formation of an *enriched identity* contrasting to the strengthened and homogeneous identities created from Multiculturalism. In the attempt to reduce complexity by knotting the threads of sharing and relationship and de-reifying every cultural reification, *bi-directionality* goes to the more proper meaning of reciprocity, completing the path of recognition in terms of a circular relational process open to a possible *morphogenesis* of all the identities involved in the relational circuit (cultural majority and minority groups). It is not a matter, in fact, of erasing the differences (homogenizing assimilation or solution by subtraction), nor of crystallizing them, separating them, estranging them, and ultimately opposing them (multiculturalist isolationism or solution by addition), but of encouraging all groups, minority groups and the host society's cultural majority, to engage in a significant dialogue in the public sphere aimed at a process of *mutual learning* able to lead to unity from and of difference, to sharing of a common symbolic code as necessary condition for mutual understanding and relationship. Compared to pluralism, therefore, inter-culturalism insists on the possibility that minority groups propose changes to host society, if it can be shown that these changes are in the best interest of the proposing cultural group while do not violate the rights of any other group (Rodriguez-Garcia 2010; Cantele 2016). In so doing, Interculturalism emphasizes the semantic negotiation, the *demiotic* (Baumann 1999), dialogic, processual nature of the culture, understood not as a fixed, static, entity but dynamic process of constructing meanings, with others and through others. Hence, a new way of conceptualizing the citizenship, understood as a *bottom-up* process governed by that condition of *collective rational reflexivity* on values, as Donati called it, necessary for promoting those that favor a humanization of relationships that they inform and are worthy of be pursued as citizenship rights by the entire political community (Donati 2008: 44).

Intercultural dialogue generates sharing and requires sharing, a common meaning bond which allows relationality and dialogue between groups, and a more solid basis for cohesion and integration. In this regard, the debate on the criteria that can drive dialogue, make it possible and leads it to a peaceful conclusion is significant. Since the beginning, in fact, in order to dialogue on values, as dialogue is not a colloquy at the end of which everyone goes on his own way, with his own convictions intact, but aspires to build a common world and an enriched identity, the Interculturalist strategy has required serious reflections on criteria governing the value selection process, orienting dialogue and making possible the mutual sharing. In this regard, while cultural specificities are allowed the recognition of the right to preserve their own identity, Interculturalism institutionalizes this recognition within parameters of the respect for human dignity which, although it finds its codification in European Constitutions, is established as a meta-cultural heritage enables, regardless of any cultural specificity and dogmatic beliefs, to discriminate between cultural differences that can be accepted and confirmed and those that cannot be part of a common world of symbolic meanings. In so doing, Interculturalism ensures the possibility of intercultural dialogue and conflict composition. On the one hand, it is possible to build that enriched common base, capable of forging bonds between groups and peaceful social cooperation. On the other hand, the intercultural solution responds to principles of social fairness, avoiding that confusion between cultural freedom, fundamental for human dignity, and defence of cultural traditions that dehumanize relationships, as not taking into account the human values of freedom of choice and equality (Sen 2006b).

From a sociological perspective, according to Donati, overcoming multiculturalism requires a theoretical revision of rationality, i.e a conceptualization that expands rationality beyond its classical dimensions, both from the still too restrictive functionalist Durkheimian conception and from the Weberian conception, overcoming the idea that values cannot be judged when they are the expression of a common feeling. In more specific terms, in Donati's perspective, given that each culture differs according to the effects that its symbolic values produce in the relationship they inform, the recognition of cultural diversity (accepted and confirmed rather than rejected and dismissed) emanates from exercise of a public reason applied to relationships. This is a reflexive faculty that evaluates rationality (the good reasons) of any culture, relating this rationality judgment not only to its content of instrumental rationality (of means) or of situated purpose or of relational normativity, but to its ultimate sense of conformity to what is worthy of human being to that which, as such, is inalienable, non-negotiable, that is, to its content of

symbolic rationality (rationality exercised on values) or rationality of dignity (Donati 2008:109). What matters, therefore, is whether or not certain symbolic values produce a humanization growth of the individuals involved in relationships that values orient. Following this line of reasoning, for example, according to our author, we can recognize infibulation, polygamy, repudiation, arranged marriages, the relationship between man and woman marked by various forms of social and legal discrimination against women, and why not Islamic veil, as irrational practices, as well as the Barbagia code that legitimizes revenge. And this is not because these practices violate human rights – an all-Western conception, on which, therefore, identity conflicts are triggered – but because, explains Donati, they are lacking to produce a growth of humanization of the woman, of her dignity as proper characteristic (property) of the human (*ibidem*). It is thus, through reflexive rationality, that it is possible to activate a mutual exchange of symbolic meanings capable of leading to a morphogenesis of the cultural identities involved and to the formation of a common world, of a new State and culture laicity, which confers cultural citizenship to values if and as they respond to what is worthy of the human individual, regardless of justifications based on faith. The adoption, therefore, of what Donati called a relational paradigm ensures the effective feasibility of the intercultural project for the foundation of that *societarismo costituzionale* where the overcoming of multiculturalist isolationism is identified and the possibility of cosmopolitanism can be based.

In other terms, the benefits of the inter-cultural approach reverberate over all parties involved. Reciprocity oriented by human dignity appears to act as a catalyst for positive changes within different cultures: for minority cultures, mutual comparison could be an incentive to open up to liberal and democratic values, and, for post-modern Western societies it could act as an incentive to revisit certain extremisms of individualization and secularization process that marks them (i.e. see Marzano, 2002)

In this respect, a qualifying aspect of the Interculturalist integration model is a new understanding of the concept of secularism. While this model it does not question the secular nature of the State in the sense of its neutrality with respect to religion, it enhances the relational resource of different religious expressions which occupy and which are destined to occupy the Western public sphere more and more permanently by recognizing their inclusion in the public debate sphere, sphere that, however, remain secular as far as it always keeps firm the reference to respect for human dignity as a principle of reason which must preside over dialogue in the public sphere regardless of considerations related to dogmas of faith. In other words, the Interculturalist model operates using a concept of secularism understood as an *open secularism*, where the dialogue between different religious groups is submitted to a criterion of mutual “moderation” between faith and reason. Thus, this reciprocal “moderation” function appears to be the keystone of all Interculturalist discourse, which enables overcoming the limits of assimilationist models, on the one hand, and the problems of ethical relativism involved in multiculturalist ideology, on the other, achieving integration, new order with coherence.

Some successful Interculturalism attempts are exemplified by the Canadian debate on Sharia courts, held in 2005 in Ontario. The public debate between supporters of religious rights and supporters of women’s rights, among neo-traditionalist Muslims, liberal Muslims and non Muslim women and men, led to prohibition of all forms of arbitration based on religion, and this through peaceful negotiation processes driven by the primacy of the meta-cultural rule of respect for dignity and freedom of woman on both collective rights recognition and classic public space secularism principle

The Canadian case shows how other controversial issues in the West could find appropriate solution, as well, such as, for example, the issue of the head veil for Muslim women. The controversy, in France and in other European countries, lies in the fact that the prohibition is usually justified by appealing to Secular State principle. At this level, the question seems bound to constitute a perennial source of identity cultural conflicts. Instead, by reasoning on the protection of those women who do not freely choose to wear the veil as a symbol of their religious and cultural identity but undergo this practice, a public debate which refers to super-ordinate, secular, principle of human dignity respect seems better to dissolve the tangles that induce identity conflicts. It is interesting that this principle is invoked by many secular Muslim feminists against both the manifestations of tolerance on the use of the veil as well as the requests in this sense made by Islamic feminists and assessed expressive of a naive multiculturalism (i.e. see the ever relevant contribution of Tamzali 2010).

In conclusion, conceiving culture as a process and multicultural society as network of crossed identifications (Baumann 1999) can avoid the impasse in which normative multiculturalism halts, by balancing cultural differentiation and the need for integration and social cohesion. So, Interculturalism enables to safeguard the possibility of regaining that shared symbolic code capable *sociologically* of constituting an integrative, connective, constraint and relational bond, and, reveals a greater possibility of reducing complexity, socio-cultural conflict, and producing social organization

CONCLUSIONS

The challenge of “society shaping” with cultural diversity in times of globalization, reconciling respect for pluralism and difference and the need for integration and social cohesion, is a sociological and epistemological problem. As here argued, while reflection on *the system*, how it works and how it evolves according to acquisitions of contemporary epistemology is not a matter of contemporary debate on the issue in question, the discriminating heuristic power of this preliminary clarification proves to be decisive.

In modern poly-ethnic democracies, the notion that social cohesion and civic equality must require cultural homogeneity is a hardly sustainable idea for the same reason that an ossified humanity, that is, a culture not being a process, was already inconceivable to Lévi-Strauss in his *Race et Histoire* (1952). But if the idea of cultural homologation is unsustainable in an era of super-diversity, similarly it is problematic to support the idea of separation, of estrangement between cultures that are in the same social space, of the closure in communities of similar ones, in islands of uniformity (Bauman 2005), both the one imposed from above and the one in which the multiculturalist dream seems to shatter. In the framework of system consideration as an intertwining of constraints and emergence, able to self-organize and to survive by forming new integrative constraints and not get lost in *chaos* only if they are in an intermediate position between connection and differentiation (*at the edge of chaos*), neither too connected nor too differentiated, unrelated and irregular, disordered to the point of no longer finding internal organization forms, procedural integration seems to exhibit serious limits. In the absence of those minimum requirements of reciprocity and sharing as condition of social system existence, there is a risk of not reducing social complexity, exacerbating differentiation, establishing a Balkanized sociality, with closed and reified cultures and groups destined to remain estranged to each other, and amplifying the potential for social conflict. Indeed, fundamentalist tendencies, the various - world -*ism* to which History has accustomed us, with their concentration camps and lagers, ethnic cleansing, enslavement, *shahids* of militant neo-asceticism, rampant Christian-phobia and gender oppression, mixophobic and xenophobic tendencies, fear of cultural diversity within its gated communities (Bauman 2005), the estrangement and mutual opposition between *us* and *them* with its cultural ghettos (it does not matter whether they are imposed or even wanted by individuals who want to remain separated), appear to be fomented whenever cultures are reified and the impossibility for groups of mutually engaging in meaningful communication, in an intimate and profound way, in a human way (Sennett 1996), arises. Therefore, it seems unrealistic to think that a new positive cohabitation can arise from the *salad bowl model*.

The solution against fear of nihilistic danger that frightens the detractors of polytheism cannot reside in what, in the end, can be considered an anachronistic leap back in time. That's how the communitarian multiculturalism appears to Bauman to be. One cannot but recognize, for Bauman, that the openness toward dialogue encouraged by pluralism – the pluralizing hermeneutics of Marquand – teaches, on the contrary, to lay down arms, to discolor the intransigence of the singularizing hermeneutics in the art of mutually negotiating meanings (Bauman, 1999).

The solution, then, has to be found in the de-reification of any cultural reification, in overcoming the relational gap between the cultures that leads to that social balkanization which not resolve conflicts but rather compromises peace and social integration.

In conclusion, taking into account, on the one hand, the need to form a national liberal conscience as condition for the recognition of individual universal rights, through scholastic and juridical inclusion, and, on the other hand, the need of a cautious recognition of collective rights that is not only affirmed in principle, far from

any evaluation whatsoever (in fact, one thing is recognition of places of worship or special cemetery, recognition of significant religious festivity and work permits for worship practices, support for food codes and slaughter practices, another thing is the recognition of *faith schools* or *Sharia courts*), Interculturalism can reconcile integration, cohesion and diversity, by repairing the relational gap among identity differences where the axiological relativism of the normative multiculturalism integration model lands. And it can do so, not merely because it admits the creation of civic, public, dialogic space, but above all because it anchors the possibility and resolution of dialogue to mutual sharing of the inalienable trans-cultural value principle of human dignity as integrative communicative/interactional general meaning bond that comes *first*, before any reason without faith, that impoverishes and empties reason itself of any humanism, and before any faith that prevaricates reason, discoloring it into violence.

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