The Mobility-Democracy Nexus Betrayed: When the European Commission's Talks Fall Apart in the Mediterranean

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In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the European Union's (EU) relations with the Southern neighbour countries (SNCs) have been reframed in the light of a new élan of democracy promotion. The underlying logic of this approach was to leverage the building and consolidation of democracy and rule of law through enhanced cooperation in terms of more 'markets, money and mobility'. A sort of mobility-democracy nexus has been assumed by the European Commission as a crucial dimension of the EU's external relations with SNCs. Within this strategy, Mobility Partnerships (MPs) with SNCs have been identified as a key policy tool for EU democracy promotion. Via original qualitative analysis of European Commission's documents, MPs, and other migration and mobility agreements that the EU has negotiated with SNCs since 2011, this paper explores how the mobility-democracy nexus has been defined in the Commission's talks. We critically discuss the effectiveness of this nexus and demonstrate the inefficacy of MPs as a tool to promote democracy by fostering more mobility and regular migration flows. Looking at the content of MPs with three SNCs (Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan) allows to trace the transformation of EU external relations with SNCs from a principled approach into selective issue-oriented cooperation based on more specific and sectorial policy choices.

Keywords: European Union, Southern neighbourhood, EU external policies, post-Arab uprisings, mobility partnerships, democracy promotion, migration, content analysis

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1   INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) has often found in critical junctures an *élan* to invest in new domestic or international cooperation frameworks. This has been the case of the Arab uprisings of 2011, initially regarded as a momentum for regime change in the European Southern neighbourhood and for renovated EU relations with Southern neighbour countries (SNCs). The political turmoil of 2011 compelled European leaders to revise their approach to SNCs on a broader scale. The European Commission (henceforth, Commission) promptly issued two key communications, *A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*[1] (PDSP) and *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood*[2] (NRCN), stressing the need to step-up EU-SNCs relations along three dimensions: markets, money, and mobility. The EU's response to the unfolding of events was a comprehensive revision of its democracy promotion strategy, according to a 'more for more' approach, offering more money, markets, and mobility, the so-called 3 'Ms', in exchange for cooperation on reforms.[3] At the same time, the revolts in the Southern Neighbourhood resulted in a steep increase of migrants and refugees towards the EU. External migration governance, therefore, came to the forefront of EU priorities, with the aim to build a 'coherent and comprehensive migration policy for the EU', as emphasized in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).[4]

The idea of 'more regular mobility', in particular, represents a largely innovative element in this comprehensive approach to promote democratic governance and rule of law, as defined in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).[5] In this context, the Commission has identified Mobility Partnerships (MPs) as an essential policy tool to materialize the 'more for more' approach to democracy promotion. Mobility, as intended here, has a different connotation from migration. It applies to 'a wide range of people, e.g., short-term visitors, tourists, students, researchers, business people or visiting family members' so that it is 'a much broader concept than migration'.[6] We then consider this broad notion of mobility as the starting point for our analysis of the nexus that the Commission has been constructing between mobility and democracy promotion.

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[1] European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, *A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*, COM (2011) 200 final (Brussels 8 Mar. 2011).

[2] European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood*, COM(2011) 303 final (25 May 2011).

[3] *A Partnership for Democracy, supra* n. 1.

[4] European Commission, *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*, COM(2011) 743 final (Brussels 18 Nov. 2011).

[5] *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, supra* n. 2.

[6] *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, supra* n. 4.

The Arab uprisings can be considered as a critical juncture for the process of anchoring EU external migration governance and democracy promotion policies. MPs, identified as key policy tools in this process, were thus placed at the crossroads between the GAMM and the EU's new approach to promote democracy in the Southern neighbourhood. While recent research has drawn attention to the discursive linkage between EU external migration policies and democracy promotion,[7] this relation has been largely discussed in terms of the how democratization impacts upon migration. Our research, instead, adopts a different approach. We look at how the Commission, since 2011, attempted to frame and integrate mobility cooperation as a tool for democracy promotion.

Furthermore, this paper aims to explain how the normative dimension embedded in such a mobility-democracy nexus as defined in the Commission's talks, has been replaced, over the years, by a selective issue-oriented approach, neglecting the regularization of irregular flows. Discussing the limits of MPs as a policy tool to manage cooperation with SNCs, this research illustrates the way how EU democracy promotion through mobility in the Mediterranean has lost adherence to its comprehensive principle-driven goals, widening the gap between its talks and action.[8] We focus on three SNCs (Tunisia, Moroccoand Jordan) that have concluded a MP with the EU, to test whether the mobility dimension enshrined into the '3 Ms' approach has delivered or rather failed to deliver in the Southern Neighbourhood. Analysing the Commission's documents in the time-span 2011–2022 a distinct approach emerges, with issues of cooperation selected by a matter of urgency. Regional stability matters and prevails over normative commitments, *de facto* betraying the idea of democracy promotion via more regular mobility. Challenging EU democracy promotion as a consistent component of EU relations with SNCs, this paper discusses the constraints that have rendered MPs empty boxes of cooperation. Against this background, the paper addresses the following research questions (RQs):

RQ1: How was the nexus between cooperation on mobility and democracy promotion articulated in EU relations with SNCs in the post-uprisings?

RQ2: Why did the Commission's mobility-democracy nexus exit the EU political agenda?

Our research aims to explain the misfortunes of the mobility-democracy nexus in the last decade. The paper is thus structured as follows. In section 2,

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[7] L. Faustini-Torres, *Another Nexus? Exploring Narratives on the Linkage between EU External Migration Policies and the Democratization of the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood*, 8(9) Comp. Migration Stud. 1–22 (2020), doi: 10.1186/s40878-019-0165-z.

[8] F. Longo, S. Panebianco & G. Cannata, *Mind the gap! Organized Hypocrisy in EU Cooperation with Southern Neighbor Countries on International Protection*, 53(3) Italian Pol. Sci. Rev./Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 367–383 (2023), doi: 10.1017/ipo.2023.9.

we sketch out the theoretical puzzle and contextualize the analysis of the mobility-democracy nexus in the existing literature. In section 3, we discuss the research design and the methodological approach, which combines content analysis and process tracing to analyse the parabola of the nexus. The remaining part of the paper is devoted to the empirical analysis. In section 4, we focus on the Commission's outward communication to understand how the nexus between mobility cooperation and democracy promotion emerged in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings and how it dropped off the radar in the last decade. We corroborate this analysis, in section 5, through looking at the specific case of MPs and related policy tools underlying EU-SNCs cooperation on migration governance, arguing that such tools failed to incorporate the dimension of democracy promotion in a comprehensive strategy. In section 6, we discuss the shift from a principled approach towards a selective and issue-oriented logic of action, complementing our explanation of the misfortunes of the nexus and the limits of MPs as policy tools. This empirical research, as we argue in the conclusion, contributes to the ongoing discussion on EU external policies at the crossroads between studies on EU migration governance and external democracy promotion, and bears crucial implications in terms of understanding the evolution of the EU approach to cooperation with SNCs.

2   THE THEORETICAL PUZZLE: LOGICS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION THROUGH MOBILITY

Despite the leopard spot political change that resulted from the Arab uprisings, autocracy and authoritarianism are far from eradicated in the SNCs. A wide range of 'gray areas' persists, i.e., forms of hybrid regimes in which party politics and enhanced liberalization coexist with, rather than replace, autocratic rule.[9] Even the incipient democratization process in Tunisia, supported by the EU, has been followed by an authoritarian *U-turn* characterized by the suspension of democratic institutions and parliamentary activity.[10] Literature on the international dimensions of democratization has extensively explored the EU's external support of such processes[11] and the interaction (or even interdependence) between domestic and international factors.[12] The current debate on the challenges to democratization,

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[9]   L. Diamond, *Thinking about Hybrid Regimes*, 13(2) J. Democracy 21–35 (2002), doi: 10.1353/jod.2002. 0025.

[10] A. Lührmann & S. I. Lindberg, *A Third Wave of Autocratization is here: What is New About It?*, 26(7) Democratization 1095–1113, at 1096 (2019), doi: 10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029.

[11] L. Whitehead ed, *The International Dimensions of Democratization. Europe and the Americas* (Oxford University Press 1996).

[12] R. O. Keohane & H. V. Milner eds, *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge University Press 1996).

indeed, considers both structural and domestic features to explain the main aspects of hybrid regimes.[13] In parallel with these theoretical developments, the role of third countries in migration governance has attracted growing scholarly attention, but there have been limited attempts to link these two fields of research. Bridging these two strands of literature, our analysis aims to investigate how the approach of the EU as an external actor of democratization has evolved across time in relation to the critical case of migration and mobility cooperation.

Most of recent literature agrees on the fact that democratic norms and practices can be hardly promoted in non-democratic regimes without the explicit involvement of partner countries. Domestic and local actors are not passive receivers of democratic norms: their preferences and interests do matter in shaping the outcomes of EU external policies.[14] Sector-specific cooperation, in this regard, offers a critical ground to understand whether principles and practices of democratic governance could be transferred, and actors in target countries socialized to democratic norms.[15] There is, thus, a potential for interactions between sectoral policies, such as migration and mobility policy, and democratization dynamics. In this regard, scholarship on EU external migration governance has, from a different perspective, engaged with the issue of norm promotion.[16] Recent research, for instance, emphasized the interplay between EU-level and domestic preferences as a precondition for the success of external migration policies[17] and how EU migration governance impacts third countries' policies and norms.[18] Migration governance scholarship points at the fact that EU cooperation on migration might have a negative impact on governance institutions in partner countries.[19]

Adding to this debate, our paper combines insights from literature on democracy promotion with EU external migration governance by focusing on EU-SNCs cooperation on mobility through MPs. These Partnerships are

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[13] D. Huber & B. Pisciotta, *From Democracy to Hybrid Regime. Democratic Backsliding and Populism in Hungary and Tunisia*, 29(3) Contemp. Politics 357–378 (2023), doi: 10.1080/13569775.2022.2162210.

[14] I. Fontana, *The EU Neighbourhood Policy in the Maghreb: Implementing the ENP in Tunisia and Morocco Before and after the Arab Uprisings* (Routledge 2017); E-M. Maggi, *The Will of Change: European Neighborhood Policy, Domestic Actors and Institutional Change in Morocco* (Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2016).

[15] T. Freyburg, S. Lavenex, F. Schimmelfennig, T. Skripka & A. Wetzel, *EU promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood*, 16(6) J. Eur. Pub. Pol'y 916–934 (2009), doi: 10.1080/13501760903088405.

[16] S. Lavenex & E. M. Uçarer, *The External Dimension of Europeanization: The Case of Immigration Policies*, 39(4) Cooperation & Conflict 417–443 (2004), doi: 10.1177/0010836704047582.

[17] N. Reslow, *'Not Everything that Counts can be Counted': Assessing 'Success' of EU External Migration Policy*, 55(6) Int'l Migration 156–169 (2017), doi: 10.1111/imig.12355.

[18] A. Niemann & N. Zaun, *Introduction: EU external migration policy and EU migration governance*, 49(12) J. Ethnic & Migration Stud. 2965–2985 (2023), doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2023.2193710.

[19] K. P. Norman & N. R. Micinski, *The European Union's Migration Management Aid: Developing Democracies or Supporting Authoritarianism?*, 61(4) Int'l Migration 57–71 (2023), doi: 10.1111/imig.13075.

conceived as non-binding soft law instruments concluded between the EU and third countries[20] and came to play a pivotal role in the wider framework of EU democracy promotion in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. Looking at the MPs, we aim to explore how the EU, the Commission in particular, has been developing a 'mobility-democracy' nexus and which specific policy-tools have been introduced, beyond MPs, to deliver on such a nexus.

For our analysis, we rely on the work of Lavenex and Schimmelfennig about external democracy promotion.[21] According to their framework, EU external democracy promotion follows three different mechanisms: linkage, leverage, and governance. While leverage is based on conditionality, linkage and governance mechanisms aim at promoting democratic norms and practices through a process of socialization, targeting respectively civil society and policy actors. Hence, we postulate that the Commission has been constructing its democracy-through-mobility argument according to these three logics of action: sustaining the empowerment of domestic democratic constituencies, through fostering people-to-people contacts and transnational socialization (*linkage*); consolidating democratic institutions and procedures through negotiating conditional financial and political support in the field of migration and mobility (*leverage*); or strengthening forms of transparent, accountable and inclusive governance through functional cooperation with migration policy actors in SNCs (*governance*).

Drawing on Lavenex and Schimmelfennig's framework, we inquire into how the Commission has been constructing the mobility-democracy nexus in terms of linkage, leverage and governance. The Commission has been endeavouring to construct this link at the level of talks. However, in delivering on this nexus, it faced different political and contingent constraints. Hence, we retrace the trajectory of the nexus, and the role of MPs in this context, to explain how it has been exiting the Commission's talks and EU-SNCs cooperation. As Reslow and Vink argue, EU external policies can be better understood in terms of a 'three-level game', in which the EU functions as an international political arena for EU Member States (EUMS) and, at the same time, a domestic arena vis-à-vis non-EU actors, for instance in negotiations between the EU as a whole and third countries.[22] Adopting such a perspective, we can consider policy-making on mobility and democracy promotion as occurring at the same time at the 'domestic level', between the Commission and EUMS, and at the 'international level', during negotiations with third countries. We then formulate our hypotheses on

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[20]   F. Tittel-Mosser, *Implementing EU Mobility Partnerships: Putting Soft Law into Practice* (Routledge 2020).

[21]   S. Lavenex & F. Schimmelfennig, *EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance*?, 18(4) Democratization 885–909 (2011), doi: 10.1080/13510347.2011.584730.

[22]   N. Reslow & M. Vink, *Three-Level Games in EU External Migration Policy: Negotiating Mobility Partnerships in West Africa*, 54(4) J. Com. Mkt. Stud. 857–874 (2015), doi: 10.1111/jcms.12233.

the basis of such an understanding of EU external migration policy. As for the domestic dimension, existing studies on EU policy-making emphasize how the Commission's entrepreneurship is often curtailed by EUMS' resistances in inter-governmental policy areas such as external migration governance, especially in those cases where national sovereignty is at stake.[23] This often results in the Commission's inability to turn talks into policy action. Hence, we claim that the nexus has dropped off the radars because the Commission did not manage to translate the nexus into consistent policy tools.

Furthermore, external events such as the so-called migration crisis of the mid-2010s have further constrained the Commission's room of manoeuvre. Indeed, it resulted in a prioritization of the control of migration flows across the Mediterranean region over other dimensions of EU external action, including democracy promotion. Existing literature has emphasized how the construction of the need to 'manage the crisis', at the level of framing, impacts policy-making and shifts power dynamics.[24] While our work does not focus on crisis framing, we join recent research in arguing that the 'migration crisis' resulted in shifting the EU approach towards more immediate control-oriented forms of mobility coopera-tion. The simultaneous revision of the ENP in 2015 and of the migration governance architecture, through the European Agenda on Migration (EAM),[25] suggests an interpretation of the crisis as a critical juncture. Hence, we argue that the migration crisis prompted the Commission to abandon the mobility-democ-racy nexus in favour of short-term issue-oriented policies.

A further possible explanation for the abandonment of the nexus hinges upon the agency of third countries. Scholarship on the international dimension of democratization has emphasized the relevance of EU-level hindrances to norm promotion, pointing at the intrinsic inconsistencies and conflicting interests of EU policies towards its neighbourhood, often described as a sort of stability-democracy dilemma.[26] Börzel and Lebanidze, for instance, identify the concomitant absence of 'stability-democratisation' dilemmas and the presence of domestic-level

[23] G. Menz, *The European Commission as a Policy Entrepreneur in European Migration Policy Making*, 3(3) Regions & Cohesion 86–102 (2013), doi: 10.3167/reco.2013.030305; M. Riddervold, *(Not) in the Hands of the Member States: How the European Commission Influences EU Security and Defence Policies*, 54(2) J. Com. Mkt. Stud. 353–369 (2016), doi: 10.1111/jcms.12288.

[24] V. Bello, *The Spiralling of the Securitisation of Migration in the EU: From the Management of a 'Crisis' to a Governance of Human Mobility?*, 48(6) J. Ethnic & Migration Stud. 1327–1344 (2022), doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851464.

[25] European Commission, *A European Agenda on Migration*, COM(2015) 240 final (Brussels 13 May 2015).

[26] A. Jünemann, *Security-Building in the Mediterranean After September 11*, 8(2) Mediterranean Politics 1–20 (2003), doi: 10.1080/13629390308230002; N. R. Smith, N. Markovic Khaze & M. Kovacevic, *The EU's Stability-Democracy Dilemma in the Context of the Problematic Accession of the Western Balkan states*, 29(2) J. Contemp. Eur. Stud. 69–183 (2021), doi: 10.1080/14782804.2020.1823823.

coalitions favourable to democratic reforms as essential conditions for democratic leverage to obtain.[27] In this regard, the EU's perception of a trade-off between stability and democracy in the Southern Mediterranean can result in a prioritization of stability and security concerns over normative aims.[28] Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that, when enlargement is not a political offer on the negotiating table, the EU lacks credible incentives to act as a 'democracy-facilitator'.[29] Recent research in the field of democratization studies points at factors such as third countries' reversed conditionality[30] or patterns of strategic interaction during negotiations[31] that can constrain EU democracy promotion efforts. In other terms, EU external norm-promotion is constrained by the agency of the 'target side' of democracy promotion efforts, i.e., partner countries.[32] Since this paper looks at the 'EU-side' of the explanation, we could not consider the agency of third countries among our hypotheses, at least in its most outright form of mismatch between the EU intentions and SNCs' expectations. Hence, we argue that despite the Commission's efforts to streamline the nexus, the EU actions end up being hindered by the lack of credible incentives.

3   METHODS AND CASE SELECTION

To explore and problematize the nexus between democracy and mobility, we adopted a two-stage research strategy. In the first place, we explain how the nexus was constructed in the Commission's talks. Hence, we decided to focus on documents concerning EU relations with those SNCs that have signed an MP, namely Morocco (2013), Tunisia and Jordan (2014). In Figure 1 we contextualize the signing of MPs in the broader framework of the EU-SNCs relations over the last two decades, focusing on relevant policy initiatives.

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[27] T. A. Börzel & B. Lebanidze, *'The Transformative Power of Europe' Beyond Enlargement: The EU's Performance in Promoting Democracy in Its Neighbourhood*, 33(1) East Eur. Pol. 17–35 (2017), doi: 10. 1080/21599165.2017.1280473.

[28] A. Dandashly, *EU Democracy Promotion and the Dominance of the Security – Stability Nexus*, 23(1) Mediterranean Pol. 62–82 (2018), doi: 10.1080/13629395.2017.1358900.

[29] S. Panebianco, *Democratic Turmoil in the MENA Area: Challenges for the EU as an External Actor of Democracy Promotion*, in *Winds of Democratic Change in the Mediterranean? Processes, Actors and Possible Outcomes* (S. Panebianco & R. Rossi eds, Rubbettino 2012).

[30] J-P. Cassarino, *Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood*, 42(2) Int'l Spectator 179–196 (2007), doi: 10.1080/03932720701406365.

[31] V. van Hüllen, *Negotiating Democracy with Authoritarian Regimes. EU Democracy Promotion in North Africa*, 26(5) Democratization 869–888 (2019), doi: 10.1080/13510347.2019.1593377.

[32] A. Khakee & S. Wolff, *EU Democracy Projection in the Southern Mediterranean: A Practice Analysis*, 27(4) Mediterranean Pol. 419–434, at 424 (2022), doi: 10.1080/13629395.2021.1883283.

Figure 1   Timeline of EU relations with SNCs (2004–2021).

To address RQ1, *how the Commission has been developing its discourse about the nexus*, we analysed EU documents issued between 2011 and 2022 as well as the existing MPs, conceived as the instrument to materialize the EU offer for 'more mobility'. Given our exploratory aim, we adopted a 'directed content analysis' approach, to identify key concepts or variables as 'initial coding categories' on the basis of existing theories and prior research.[33] Such an approach, indeed, proves to be useful when applying existing concepts from one theoretical domain to a new context, i.e., cooperation on migration and mobility. Hence, drawing on Lavenex and Schimmelfennig's typology[34] we set up a theory-driven categorization matrix concerning the role of 'more mobility' in relation to democracy promotion. Based

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[33]   H-F. Hsieh & S.E. Shannon, *Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis*, 15(9) Qualitative Health Res. 1277–1288, at 1281 (2005), doi: 10.1177/1049732305276687.
[34]   Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, *supra* n. 21.

on such a matrix, we coded a sample of both 'programmatic' or 'framework' documents that underlie the Commission's approach to the Southern Neighbourhood, issued between the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, in 2011, and the launch of the New Agenda for the Mediterranean, in February 2021.[35] Furthermore, our content analysis focused on press releases, statements, and speeches by members of the European Commission delivered in the time-span 2011–2022. In this latter case, we used specific combinations of keywords, i.e., scanning for documents including the words 'mobility', 'democracy', 'neighbourhood', to narrow the focus of research. Such a wide time-frame is suitable to track how the nexus was discursively constructed by the Commission and how it changed over time.

Our choice to focus on the Commission rather than other institutions, responds to a twofold logic. Looking at the Commission's outward communications allows us to analyse discourses and claims that have a direct impact on the ENP tools, translating EU narratives and norms into practices and procedures.[36] Furthermore, such an approach ensures internal coherence among the documents scrutinized, which allows to keep other factors stable, such as actors characteristics, form and nature of the documents, and, hence, for a stronger diachronic analysis of the Commission's talks.

To answer RQ2, *to explain the decline of the nexus between mobility and democracy in the Commission's discourse*, we adopted a different strategy. We started from the idea that there were both contextual and political conditions that constrained the Commission's attempt to integrate mobility and democracy promotion agendas in the Southern neighbourhood. We then opted for a process tracing approach to retrace the trajectory of MPs and related policy tools through which the Commission was aiming to put the nexus into practice. From a formal point of view, MPs consist of a political declaration, signed between the EU and the concerned partner, and an Annex intended as a work-in-progress document including projects to be carried out within this framework. As a result, the actual projects to be implemented should be re-negotiated on a regular basis and monitored through a specific Scoreboard, which is prepared by the Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME).

Yet, information about the implementation of the MPs is rarefied, the Annexes and Scoreboards are not public, and it is hardly possible to reconstruct

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[35] European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, *Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean*, COM(2021) 2 final (Brussels 9 Feb. 2021).

[36] A. Jones & J. Clark, *Europeanisation and discourse building: the European Commission, European narratives and European Neighbourhood Policy*, 13(3) Geopolitics 545–571 (2008), doi: 10.1080/14650040802203851.

the net of projects and funds under the umbrella of MPs. We then followed an inductive approach working backward from the outcome of interest, i.e., the abandonment of the nexus in favour of an issue-oriented approach, as to trace the plausible sufficient causal mechanism that produced such an outcome. Hence, in order to deal with the lack of reliable open-access data about MPs and other policy tools, we adopted a process-tracing logic.[37] We retraced the process through which EU policy instruments were adopted and then refocused, according to an issue-oriented approach, as to search for diagnostic pieces of evidence to support the hypotheses outlined above.

The three cases considered present some relevant variation with regard to both their trajectory of political change and their track of cooperation with the EU. On the one hand, Tunisia represents a standalone example of 'successful transition' to democracy in the Southern Neighbourhood, even though the democratization process has been reversed since 2020. On the other hand, Jordan and Morocco, despite cosmetic reforms towards liberalization, can be considered as examples of authoritarian persistence.[38] In terms of cooperation on migration, however, Morocco has a long track record of formal relations with the EU, the roots of which trace back to the surge of Moroccans' labour migration, in the 1980s. Tunisia, instead, has been a rather reticent partner until Ben Ali's regime was upturned, in 2011, while for Jordan migration has been a rather marginal issue on the agenda until the Syrian refugee crisis.

4 THE MOBILITY-DEMOCRACY NEXUS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S TALKS

Since the early 2000s, the EU-SNCs relations have been developing within the framework of the ENP, whose original aim was to guarantee stability in the European Neighbourhood 'by transforming the borderlands in line with European values'.[39] After its launch, the ENP went through two major revisions, following the Arab uprisings in 2011, and again in 2015, to respond to the challenges of the so-called migration crisis. These subsequent revisions altered some of the main features of the ENP, which can be conceived as an 'adaptive' policy, responding to external events that shape and constrain EU actions, democratization in particular, more than to EU values and principles.[40]

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[37] D. Beach & R. B. Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (University of Michigan Press 2013).

[38] H. A. Barari, *The Persistence of Autocracy: Jordan, Morocco and the Gulf*, 24(1) Middle East Critique 99–111 (2015), doi: 10.1080/19436149.2014.1000084.

[39] A. Teti, P. Abbott, V. Talbot & P. Maggiolini, *Democratisation Against Democracy: How EU Foreign Policy Fails the Middle East* 5 (Palgrave Macmillan 2020), doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-33883-1.

[40] S. Panebianco, *The Constraints on EU Action as a 'Norm Exporter' in the Mediterranean*, in *The European Union's Roles in International Politics* 136–154, at 161 (O. Elgström & M. Smith eds, Routledge 2006).

While the EU has put a lot of emphasis on mobility in its 'more for more' approach, it is far from evident how mobility and democracy are correlated, and EU programmatic documents often lack a straightforward definition of this nexus. In the two main communications issued after the Arab uprisings by the European Commission, PDSP and NRCN, mobility is framed as a tool for conditionality, alongside market access and funding. From the perspective of the EU, the facilitation of regular migration through MPs is a relevant incentive 'to be made available, based on mutual accountability, to those partner countries most advanced in the consolidation of reforms',[41] according to a leverage logic. On the one hand, the EU relies on positive conditionality, in terms of technical and financial support to reforms, domestic migration, and refugee policies, as well as enhanced conditions for legal movements through Visa Facilitation Agreements (VFAs). On the other hand, engaging with local authorities, civil society organizations and other domestic actors, the EU supports 'democratic governance' through horizontal cooperation and gradual approximation to the EU standards of 'transparency, accountability, and participation'.[42]

When looking at the Commission's outward communication, however, we can observe a more nuanced and multidimensional interpretation of the nexus, in which the three logics of linkage, leverage, and governance coexist (see Figure 2). For instance, while mobility was introduced in PDSP and NRCN mainly as a tool for leverage, the Commission was already then stressing how 'people-to-people contacts', a privileged channel of linkage, 'are important to promote mutual understanding as well as business, which will benefit the cultural and economic development of the entire Mediterranean region'.[43] More specifically, the Commission advanced the idea that mobility could be an instrument to socialize neighbourhood countries' citizens to democratic practices and ideas, through 'sharing the values on which [the EU] is built'.[44] Hence, mobility is considered as a tool to foster linkage, in the framework of a wider democracy promotion strategy, as much as an incentive for leverage.

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[41]   European Commission, *Memo, The EU's Response to the 'Arab Spring'*, MEMO/11/918 (16 Dec. 2011) (accessed 15 Jul. 2023).

[42]   T. Freyburg, S. Lavenex, F. Schimmelfennig, T. Skripka & A. Wetzel, *Democracy Promotion Through Functional Cooperation? The case of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, 18(4) Democratization 1026–1054 (2011), doi: 10.1080/13510347.2011.584738.

[43]   *A Partnership for Democracy*, supra n. 1, at 6.

[44]   European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, *European Neighbourhood Policy: Working towards a Stronger Partnership*, JOIN(2013) 4 final (Brussels 20 Mar. 2013).

Figure 2   Evolution of European Commission's Talks on Democracy Promotion Through Mobility.

Source: Own elaboration of data from the coding of speeches and press releases listed in Appendix (N=62).

Such an emphasis on people-to-people contacts as a tool to 'socialize' neighbour countries' citizens to the democratic values emerges also from the discourse of the members of the Commission. In the speeches of Štefan Füle, at the time Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, we found multiple references to the idea that 'mobility of people stimulates the mobility of ideas and values'.[45] Yet, after 2014, such a linkage logic seems to be less present. This notion of creating the conditions for democratic ideas through mobility becomes rather marginal in the speeches by Johannes Hahn, the Commissioner for ENP and Enlargement Negotiations in 2014–2019, who endorses a more leverage-focused interpretation of the nexus. As for the third mechanism of democratic governance, our content analysis offers more modest results. Nonetheless, the Commission has been observed emphasizing the importance of trans-governmental cooperation on sectoral policies both to enhance the accountability of SNCs' migration and

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[45]   Š. Füle, *Presentation of the European Neighbourhood Policy package*, Press Release SPEECH/13/246 (20 Mar. 2013).

mobility governance and encourage wider participation of civil society in these processes.

Overall, the systematic analysis of European Commission's documents seems to support a multidimensional understanding of the nexus between mobility and democracy. Both in its programmatic documents and outwards communications, the Commission has been championing the crucial role of mobility, according to different logics of leverage, linkage, and governance, as a tool to support demo-cratization in the neighbourhood. As Figure 2 shows, the attention towards such a mobility-democracy nexus has been falling apart over the years, especially since 2015. Based on our hypotheses, we advance two main explanations for this parabola of the nexus, that we further explore in the next sections. On the one hand, the fading of such normative discourse in the Commission's talks can be regarded as a consequence of the unsuccessful embodiment of the nexus into policy tools. Soon after the uprisings, the Commission tried to capitalize on the turmoil to introduce a more comprehensive approach to democracy promotion, integrating mobility cooperation as a part of it. Yet, the policy tools adopted after 2011 in the field of external migration governance did not incorporate the democracy-through-mobility logic.

On the other hand, the migration crisis can be thought of as a shock altering the priorities of Commission as well as of EUMS. Traditionally there is a wide consensus on the existence of a tension between the EU democratization agenda and its short-term concerns about security and stability in the Mediterranean.[46] Our analysis of the programmatic documents acknowledges this crucial tension inherent to the policy tools adopted.

5 BEYOND MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS: THE PARABOLA OF THE NEXUS

In 2011, the Commission identified MPs as a privileged tool to materialize the nexus and contribute to democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean. Inquiring into the misfortunes of MPs allows us to better understand the parabola of the nexus. At first, these policy tools were not meant to target the Mediterranean area and democracy promotion was not part of the deal. In the early 2000s, pilot agreements were concluded with Moldova and Capo Verde to address the fragmentation of EU external migration governance.[47] MPs were presented as flexible tools of soft law that could integrate different aspects of

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[46]   R. Hollis, *No Friend of Democratization: Europe's Role in the Genesis of the 'Arab Spring'*, 88(1) Int'l Aff. 81–94 (2012), doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01058.x; S. Wolff, *The Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union's Internal Security* (Palgrave McMillan 2012).
[47]   Tittel-Mosser, *supra* n. 20.

migration management, fostering further cooperation on managing irregular migration in exchange for improved opportunities for legal mobility and assistance to develop partners' capacities to manage migration flows.[48] After the uprisings, however, MPs were repurposed as proper tools to 'materialize' conditionality through the offer of enhanced mobility for SNC nationals as well as financial and technical incentives in the form of *ad hoc* projects targeting the different dimensions of the GAMM.

While DG HOME is the leading Directorate-General for migration policies, and hence for managing MPs, the ENP is under the *aegis* of the DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR). Furthermore, part of the funds depends also on the EU agencies and other sources outside the EU budget, such as the Trust Funds that came to play a crucial role in financing EU initiatives in the field of migration policy since 2014, and imply a further diversification of the actors involved. Along with this institutional fragmentation, the ambiguousness of the objectives to be achieved has been identified as an inherent obstacle to deliver on the Partnerships.[49] Since MPs lay at the crossroads between the competence of different DGs, funding schemes, and management bodies, a coherent approach linking mobility to democracy promotion objective presents structural hindrances. The lack of a consistent line of action within the Commission has constrained its ability to craft a consensus within the EU and embedding the nexus into its policy tools, a circumstance that became evident in the case of the so-called migration crisis of the mid-2010s. This crisis reinforced, in a sense, the centrality of migration and mobility policies for EU external action. Yet, rather than making such policies more coherent, it ended up exacerbating the inherent tension between the Commission's talks and Member States' prioritization of stability, resulting in further fragmentation in terms of tools and funding instruments available. From 2014 onwards, the Commission has introduced a range of new instruments beyond MPs, *de facto* promoting a sort of decoupling between democratic reforms, cooperation on regular and labour mobility, and cooperation on irregular migration, in stark contrast with the original logic of the MPs. In 2014, the Commission launched the idea of a MP Facility, later renamed as Migration Partnership Facility (MPF), under the management of an external organization, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).[50] While the MPF was meant as a tool to centralize project

[48] European Commission, *On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries*, COM(2007) 248 final (Brussels 16 May 2007).

[49] N. Reslow, *EU 'Mobility' Partnerships: An Initial Assessment of Implementation Dynamics*, 3(2) Pol. & Governance 117–128 (2015), doi: 10.17645/pag.v3i2.398.

[50] European Commission, *Work programme for 2014 and the financing for Union actions and emergency assistance within the framework of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund*, C(2014) 5652 final, Annex I (8 Aug. 2014). While the management of the facility is delegated to the ICMPD, the Commission ensures strategic guidance and monitors the activities of the MPF through sitting in a steering committee along with EEAS representatives.

management and improving flexibility,[51] its limits have been clear since it became operational in 2016. In line with El Quadim's findings concerning the EU-Morocco MP,[52] most of the projects funded under the MPF, through DG HOME funds, tend to target selected categories of beneficiaries that already enjoy facilitated international circulation. MPF projects, indeed, focus on circular migration and training opportunities for students and youth more than incentives for other groups of people on the move such as seasonal workers, which tend to be neglected during talks about mobility and visa (see Figure 3).

Figure 3   *Beneficiaries of MPF projects involving Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan under the MPF.*

Source: Own elaboration of ICMPD data.

While enhancing selective cooperation on regular mobility, in June 2016 the Commission introduced a new policy instrument, the Partnership Framework (PF), as to integrate migration issues in EU foreign policy. This framework was meant to be translated into comprehensive partnerships (*compacts*) to better manage migration and was embedded 'within the existing and future processes and partnership'.[53] The PF responds to a crisis management logic of intervention that

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[51]   *Ibid.*, at 10–11.
[52]   N. El Qadim, *The Symbolic Meaning of International Mobility: EU – Morocco Negotiations on visa Facilitation*, 6(2) Migration Stud. 279–305 (2018), doi: 10.1093/migration/mnx048.
[53]   European Commission, *A new Partnership Framework With Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration* COM(2016) 700 final (Brussels 18 Oct. 2016).

creates room for further informalization of EU-SNCs cooperation on migration and mobility.[54] As the Commission underscores, the new framework builds on the 'broader engagements' of MPs to develop 'more effective cooperation on return and readmission'.[55] After the migration crisis, we can observe a sort of decoupling of frameworks and financial instruments concerning migration management. Indeed, the initiatives under the PF draw on existing EU external instruments as much as Trust Funds, while blending facilities at the national and European level. For instance, the 2016 EU-Jordan Compact marks a drift away from the comprehensive approach of the post-uprising period towards issue-specific cooperation centred around the hosting and management of refugees. Democracy is mentioned in rather vague terms, such as in relation to the EU's commitment to support 'Jordan's efforts to strengthen democratic governance'.[56] While a large part of the projects implemented under the MPF fall under the two GAMM pillars of cooperation on regular mobility and the developmental impact of migration,[57] cooperation on managing irregular migration has become a crucial aspect in EU foreign policy under the PF.

Despite the post-uprisings normative *élan*, the logic embedded in the tools adopted during and after the so-called migration crisis support our two first hypotheses. On the one hand, the Commission did not manage to embed its nexus into policy tools adopted after 2011. Neither the MPs, nor the MPF and other instruments were integrating a 'democracy-through-mobility logic'. More recent initiatives launched by the Commission such as the Talent Partnership,[58] which was a key feature of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum,[59] seem to respond to this logic of decoupling, advancing an idea of 'more mobility' that is limited to a narrow circle of beneficiaries. This circumstance further corroborates our argument about the inability of the Commission to translate its talks into actual EU policy tools.

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[54] P. J. Cardwell & R. Dickson, *'Formal Informality' in EU External Migration Governance: The Case of Mobility Partnerships*, 49(12) J. Ethnic & Migration Stud. 3121–3139 (2023), doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2023.2193743.

[55] *On circular migration and mobility partnerships, supra* n. 48, at 14.

[56] Council of the European Union, *Annex to the Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the Union position within the Association Council with regard to the adoption of EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities and annexed Compact*, 12384/16 ADD 1 (Brussels 20 Sep. 2016).

[57] Some of the MPF projects fall under the second pillar of the GAMM, i.e., preventing and reducing irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, yet their actual funding is quite modest, being devoted to targeted training initiatives for law enforcement officials, studies, and capacity-building.

[58] European Commission, *Attracting skills and talent to the EU*, COM(2022) 657 final (Brussels 27 Apr. 2022).

[59] European Commission, *A New Pact on Migration and Asylum*, COM(2020) 609 final (Brussels 23 Sep. 2020).

Furthermore, the diminishing interest in mobility as a tool for democracy promotion can be linked in particular to the outbreak of the migration crisis and the consequent prioritization of cooperation on border management and irregular migration over democratic reforms. The significant decrease of the number of speeches and press releases linking mobility to democratic reform efforts supports such an interpretation. When comparing the ENP review of 2015 to the NRCN and PDSP we observe a further retrenchment in the direction of hard leverage. In this regard, EU-SNCs cooperation on mobility and migration governance through MPs has been falling short of its ambitious goal of promoting and diffusing democratic norms and practices. In this sense, the migration crisis brought to the fore what can be considered as an inherent contradiction in the EU's approach. The EU was offering 'more mobility' to SNCs in exchange for two distinct demands, democratic reforms and more cooperation on migration management. When, in the wake of the crisis, the two EU goals started to clash, the EU opted for prioritizing the latter, resulting in a gradual abandonment of the mobility-democracy nexus at the level of both discourses and practices.

6   FROM PRINCIPLES TO ISSUES: WHAT'S LEFT OF MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS

Our analysis of the nexus points towards what we define as a shift from a principled to an issue-oriented approach. The decoupling of cooperation on democratic reforms from cooperation on migration management resulted in a rather modest leverage for the EU to negotiate with SNCs. This is a crucial part of our explanations for the Commission's abandonment of the nexus. MPs, which according to the logic of the nexus should have contributed to the wider agenda of democracy promotion, were not effective enough in supporting the EU efforts because the offered incentives were indeed not credible or sufficient in the eyes of SNCs' governments. Such a mismatch between EU's offers and SNCs' demands has been affecting MPs since the very beginning.

Negotiations between the EU and SNCs on MPs have been characterized by protracted disagreement on the projects to be funded and, in particular, on the balance between cooperation on returns and visa facilitation. A notable consequence of these tensions is the fact that none of the MPs with Tunisia and Jordan included a public Annex at the moment of their signature, since no agreement was reached on specific projects. Furthermore, the negotiations concerning EU Readmission Agreements (EURAs) and VFAs, these latter being regarded as a conditional incentive, continue to be quite controversial in all three cases.

Between 2015 and 2019, Morocco has suspended high-level dialogue with the EU *tout court*, as a retaliation for the judgment of the European Court of Justice, which excluded Western Sahara territories from the application of EU-Morocco trade agreements. Moroccan representatives in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Council have long been contesting the credibility of commitments in terms of EU offers for mobility, in particular regarding the portability of social rights of migrant workers. Negotiations with Tunisia have been smoother concerning technical aspects, but the most contentious issues are still on the table at the time of writing. MPs have been the object of bitter debates in Tunisia, with post-uprisings governments joining civil society actors in criticizing the EU's emphasis on readmissions, prevention of irregular migration and other contested policies.[60] Even in the case of Jordan, which was expected to be a rather unproblematic partner due to the limited migratory flows involving Jordanian nationals, negotiations were suspended after their launch in 2016. In this case, the intensification of the Syrian refugee crisis in the region compelled the parties to shift the focus of EU-Jordan relations towards the improvement of Jordan's reception capacities and facilities. As a result, negotiations over EURA and VFA have been neglected. We argue that the absence of public records about the project implemented can be read as an instance of 'strategic ignorance'.[61] From such a perspective, we argue, the blurriness of the activities and projects implemented under MPs, can be interpreted as the product of disagreement and tensions during the negotiations as much as a strategic choice to grant the Commission a wiggle room to reconcile different logics of action in implementing MPs.

Our argument about the lack of credibility of EU incentives for cooperation on mobility is further reinforced by the analysis of actual cooperation on mobility with SNCs. If we look at short-term visa, which are a crucial tool for circular migration, the gradual but continuous increase in rates of rejections showed in Figure 4, attests a counterintuitive trend towards an even more restrictive access after the signing of the MPs.

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[60] K. Natter, *Tunisia's Migration Politics Throughout the 2011 Revolution: Revisiting the Democratisation – Migrant Rights Nexus*, 43(7) Third W. Q. 1551–1569 (2022), doi: 10.1080/01436597.2021.1940126.

[61] C. Aradau & S. Perret, *The Politics of (Non-)knowledge at Europe's Borders: Errors, Fakes, and Subjectivity*, 48(3) Rev. Int'l Stud. 405–424 (2022), doi: 10.1017/S0260210522000080.

Figure 4   Rate of rejection of short-term uniform visa applications.

Source: Own elaboration on DG HOME visa statistics for consulates.

In parallel with these developments, the PF offered a platform for strengthening cooperation on border control, returns and readmissions, and externalization of migration governance in an even more informal framework than MPs.[62] Compacts, as devised in the PF, are supposed to focus on filling out the implementation gap in terms of numbers and rate of returns, rather than investing in other forms of cooperation. As a result, the MPs' original aim of bringing together different aspects of migration management in a coherent framework did not translate into appropriate policy tools. The analysis thus shows that the external cooperation on regular mobility and the management of irregular migration have been moving along parallel and partly disconnected paths, both in terms of frameworks and financial instruments. When compared to the European Commission's talks in the aftermath of the uprisings, these developments mark a clear shift away from the principled approach underlying the mobility–democracy nexus. This latter appears to be no longer a priority on

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[62]   P. Seeberg, *Mobility Partnerships and Security Subcomplexes in the Mediterranean: The Strategic Role of Migration and the European Union's Foreign and Security Policies Towards the MENA Region*, 22(1) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 91–110 (2017), doi: 10.54648/EERR2017006; P. Seeberg & F. Zardo, *From Mobility Partnerships to Migration Compacts: security implications of EU-Jordan relations and the informalization of migration governance*, 48(6) J. Ethnic & Migration Stud. 1345–1362 (2022), doi: 10.1080/1369183X. 2020.1851465.

the political agenda, to the point that democracy is hardly mentioned in recent EU documents, including the New Agenda for the Mediterranean.

Based on this reconstruction, we can read the Commission's failed attempt as the product of different dynamics. On the one hand, the disruptive effect of the migration and refugee crisis on Member States' own priorities. On the other, as the resort to growing informalization[63] of EU cooperation frameworks suggests, the ineffectiveness of the solutions and tools engineered to link mobility and democracy agendas. The absence of credible incentives for SNCs in terms of regular mobility and the decoupling between cooperation on reforms and migration management, compelled the Commission to abandon its normative ambition in favour of a more pragmatic issue-oriented approach. The informal character of newer policy tools has also fundamental implications for transparency and accountability of EU external action, in antithesis with the principles underlying the promotion democratic governance.

7   CONCLUSION

The EU often reacts to crises with innovative policy instruments and a reno-vated integration *élan*. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the Commission has framed EU-SNCs relations within a mobility-democracy nexus. The underlying logic of this approach was to leverage the building and consolidation of democracy and rule of law through enhanced cooperation in terms of more 'markets, money and mobility'. More than a decade later, EU external policies towards SNCs appear to have left behind the ambition of a comprehensive approach integrating democracy promotion and mobility. Situating MPs in the broader framework of the revised ENP and retracing the developments of EU-SNCs cooperation on migration and mobility since 2011 allowed us to draw some relevant considerations on the misfortunes of the mobility-democracy nexus.

Looking at the global picture, this qualitative analysis of the trajectory of the mobility-democracy nexus in the last decade indicates that the Commission has not been able to translate the nexus into policy tools such as MPs. Furthermore, a comprehensive approach to democracy promotion through mobility has dropped off the radar. While MPs had been identified as the main tool to deliver on the mobility-democracy nexus, the inherent contradictions discussed in this paper have limited their effectiveness. The *quid pro quo* logic at the core of the

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63   Cardwell & Dickson, *supra* n. 54; Seeberg & Zardo, *supra* n. 62.

MPs was received with scepticism by SNCs, in particular concerning read-missions. Moreover, the EU's incentives for more mobility *de facto* were traded for both enhanced cooperation on returns and readmission, and for democratic reforms. These contradictions were further reinforced in the aftermath of the migration crisis, when border control and returns became a priority for the EUMS, putting democracy promotion on the backburner.

Our analysis of EU tools and initiatives supports the argument that the offer for more mobility has been quite a 'selective' one. Both the negotiation process of MPs, the initiatives adopted in the context of the MPF, and the soon-to-be-launched Talent Partnership focus on specific forms of high-skilled, short-term mobility for a limited number of beneficiaries. Moreover, MPs have been complemented and partially replaced by tools developed after the migration crisis, such as the PF. Such instruments and frameworks were conceived outside the logic of mobility-democracy nexus, according to a sort of informalizing and decoupling approach.

As a result, our analysis suggests that the growing fragmentation in terms of funding and cooperation tools and frameworks, undermined the comprehensive approach that was introduced in 2011 by the Commission. Democratic reforms have been slowly slipping down the EU's agenda, being replaced by vague commitments to promote good governance in the Southern Neighbourhood. Even in the case of migration cooperation, the EU seems entrapped in a sort of (not-new) stability-democracy dilemma. Confronted with increasing pressures on the Mediterranean and Eastern borders, the EU responded through reframing its tools according to an issue-oriented crisis management logic, prioritizing border controls, returns and readmission. As a consequence, the underlying mechanisms of the mobility-democracy nexus ended up falling apart. After a decade, the Commission's New Agenda for the Mediterranean refrains from establishing an explicit link between mobility cooperation and democratic reforms and values, thus sanctioning the abandonment of the nexus also at the level of the European Commission's talks. Democracy promotion via more regular mobility has been betrayed.

APPENDIX

SELECTED SPEECHES AND PRESS RELEASES (2011–2022)

ID	Author	Reference Number	Title	Year
DOC1	Štefan Füle[64]	SPEECH/11/15	Address at the EU Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Policy	2011
DOC2	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/18	Address at the Foreign Affairs Committee	2011
DOC3	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/10/48	Exchange of views on European Neighbourhood Policy Review	2011
DOC4	Catherine Ashton[65]	SPEECH/11/66	Remarks on Egypt and Tunisia	2011
DOC5	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/130	Speech on the recent events in North Africa	2011
DOC6	José Manuel Durão Barroso[66]	SPEECH/11/137	Statement by President Barroso on the situation in North Africa	2011
DOC7	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/148	Eastern Partnership of the EU	2011
DOC8	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/179	Strengthening Cooperation on Democracy Support	2011
DOC9	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/186	ENP	2011
DOC10	Catherine Ashton	SPEECH/11/202	Remarks at the AFET Committee	2011
DOC11	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/239	Address to the European Parliament on the ENP Review	2011
DOC12	Catherine Ashton	SPEECH/11/326	Speech on main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and	2011

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[64] Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (2009–2014).
[65] EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, 2009–2014.
[66] President of the European Commission, 2009–2014.

ID	Author	Reference Number	Title	Year
			Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence policy	
DOC13	Catherine Ashton	SPEECH/11/380	A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy	2011
DOC14	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/381	A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy	2011
DOC15	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/383	Presentation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Review to the European Parliament	2011
DOC16	José Manuel Durão Barroso	SPEECH/11/384	New approaches to tomorrow's challenges	2011
DOC17	José Manuel Durão Barroso	SPEECH/11/387	Statement by President Barroso at the press conference in advance of the G8 Summit in Deauville	2011
DOC18	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/436	'Revolutionising the European Neighbourhood Policy in response to tougher Mediterranean revolutions'	2011
DOC19	José Manuel Durão Barroso	SPEECH/11/459	Press conference in advance of the European Council	2011
DOC20	José Manuel Durão Barroso	SPEECH/11/523	Partners in Freedom: the EU response to the Arab Spring	2011
DOC21	Catherine Ashton	SPEECH/11/608	Address to the European Parliament on the United Nations General Assembly, the Middle East Peace Process and the Arab spring	2011
DOC22	European Commission	IP/11/1075	The Commission makes headway in its cooperation in the area of Justice and	2011

ID	Author	Reference Number	Title	Year
			Home Affairs within the Eastern Partnership	
DOC23	European Commission	IP/11/1087	First meeting of EU/Tunisia Task Force to support transition to democracy and economic recovery	2011
DOC24	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/679	Talk at St Antony's College Oxford University	2011
DOC25	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/770	Address to Euromed Summit of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions	2011
DOC26	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/11/884	Opening Remarks: Review of the ENP	2011
DOC27	European Commission	IP/12/27	Morocco: Š. Füle in Rabat on reforms and bilateral cooperation	2012
DOC28	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/12/33	One year after the Arab spring	
DOC29	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/12/175	The EU and the Challenges of Arab Transitions	2012
DOC30	Cecilia Malmström[67]	SPEECH/12/417	Migration is an opportunity, not a threat	2012
DOC31	Androulla Vassiliou[68]	SPEECH/12/514	Launch event on dialogue with Southern Mediterranean countries	2012
DOC32	José Manuel Durão Barroso	SPEECH/12/585	Speech by President Barroso to EU Heads of Delegation	2012
DOC33	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/13/245	Press points: Presentation of the annual ENP Package	2013
DOC34	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/13/246	Presentation of the ENP package	2013
DOC35	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/13/661	ENP – Priorities and Directions for Change	2013

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[67] Commissioner responsible for Home Affairs, 2009–2014.
[68] Member of the European Commission responsible for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth.

ID	Author	Reference Number	Title	Year
DOC36	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/14/264	2013 ENP Package – Presentation to AFET committee European Parliament, Brussels	2014
DOC37	Štefan Füle	SPEECH/14/374	EU's support to partners in transition links values with economic and social progress	2014
DOC38	Johannes Hahn[69]	SPEECH/14/2607	Morocco: an indispensable strategic neighbour of Europe	2014
DOC39	Johannes Hahn	SPEECH/15/4020	Commissioner Hahn Speech at Jordanian Diplomatic Institute EU-Jordan relations in the framework of the review of the ENP	2015
DOC40	Johannes Hahn	SPEECH/15/4623	EU – key partner for all countries in our neighbourhood	2015
DOC41	Johannes Hahn	SPEECH/15/6618	Speech by Commissioner Hahn on the ENP Review in Barcelona	2015
DOC42	Johannes Hahn	SPEECH/15/5073	Address at the Civil Society Forum on Southern Neighbourhood	2015
DOC43	European Commission	IP/15/6121	Review of the ENP: stronger partnerships for a stronger neighbourhood	2015
DOC44	Johannes Hahn	SPEECH/15/6135	Speech of Commissioner Johannes Hahn at the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum 2015, Kyiv	2015
DOC45	NA	SPEECH/16/5874	Building dialogue through education and youth action	2016
DOC46	European Commission	IP/16/3192	EU – Tunisia: enhanced partnership and more EU	2016

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[69] European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement, 2014–2019.

ID	Author	Reference Number	Title	Year
			support for Tunisia's democratic transition	
DOC47	European Commission	IP/16/4262	The EU is providing aid worth EUR213.5 million to Tunisia for reforms and funding social infrastructure	2016
DOC48	European Commission	IP/17/487	EU–Algeria: EU adopts EUR40 million projects to support Algeria's renewable energy, public finances reform and to facilitate trade	2017
DOC49	European Commission	IP/17/1334	Revised ENP: supporting stabilization, resilience, security	2017
DOC50	European Commission	IP/17/3708	EU approves EUR200 million disbursement in Macro-Financial Assistance to Tunisia	2017
DOC51	Johannes Hahn	STATEMENT/ 17/6031	Remarks by Johannes Hahn at the OSCE Permanent Council meeting	2017
DOC52	European Commission	IP/18/3564	Report on the state of EU-Algeria relations: implementing a partnership rich in challenges and opportunities	2018
DOC53	European Commission	IP/19/2498	EU and Tunisia work to strengthen their Privileged Partnership	2019
DOC54	European Commission	IP/19/2651	EU-Armenia Partnership Implementation Report: the EU is a crucial partner for Armenia's reform agenda	2019
DOC55	European Commission	IP/19/6150	EU report: EU-Jordan cooperation remains strong and diverse	2019

ID	Author	Reference Number	Title	Year
DOC56	Dīmītrīs Avramopoulos[70]	SPEECH/19/7030	Keynote speech by Commissioner Avramopoulos on the 'Global Challenges of Security and Migration' at the Atlantic Council	2019
DOC57	European Commission	IP/21/426	Southern Neighbourhood: EU proposes new Agenda for the Mediterranean	2021
DOC58	European Commission	STATEMENT/ 21/2845	Joint Communiqué on EU–Tunisia relations: 'For a renewed partnership'	2021
DOC59	European Commission	IP/21/3367	Eastern Partnership: a renewed agenda for recovery, resilience and reform underpinned by an Economic and Investment plan	2021
DOC60	European Commission	IP/21/6794	EU further steps up its support to the people of Belarus	2021
DOC61	Dubravka Šuica[71]	SPEECH/22/8311	Vice-President Suica speech for the European Parliament High-Level Conference on ten years of Supporting Democracy Beyond the EU	2022
DOC62	Dubravka Šuica	SPEECH/22/8335	Vice-President Suica's speech for the Feedback Event of the Conference on the Future of Europe	2022

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[70] European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, 2014–2019.
[71] Vice-President of the European Commission for Democracy and Demography, 2019–2024.