The monograph aims at comparing Italy and the UK on the issue of liability of public bodies which have the task of supervising financial markets towards investors who claim to have suffered damages because of omissions in supervision or lacking supervision on firms raising funds from private individuals. Both in the Italian and the English system, in the last decade, a restriction on the liability of the financial regulators has been introduced by the FSMA 2000 in UK, and by the D.Lgs.303/2006 in Italy. According to these provisions, supervisors can be held liable in Italy only for “dolo o colpa grave” and in UK only for “bad faith”. These rules did not completely solve the issue of liability, since they do not make clear if the liability of financial regulators is the result of these provisions. In this way if they were not introduced, liability of these public bodies could not have been claimed, or rather if the provisions simply acknowledge liability which may have been claimed even in their absence. The recoverability of the economic loss suffered from the investor depends on the relevance of interest for the legal system. Therefore, a thorough analysis of either the system of regulation of financial markets or the common tort law principles is necessary to understand how the issue of liability of financial regulators may be framed within the two legal systems.The issue of liability of financial regulators encounters two hurdles. On the one hand, the recoverability of the specific kind of damage suffered by investors in both the legal systems is controversial, since the loss suffered from claimants is purely economical and does not involve an infringement of a ‘physical’ good. This damage is qualified in a very similar manner: as ‘danno meramente patrimoniale’ or purely economic loss. On the other, the liability of public bodies is admitted within narrow limits in order to safeguard their freedom to act in the pursuance of the public interest.The first part of the study focuses on the English system, sketching the rationale of the legal framework of regulation, and therefore reconstructing, through a case law analysis, the body of rules shaping liability for pure economic loss, and the liability of public bodies.The analysis of the Italian legal system is made in the same way. In particular, after having dealt with the most significant cases concerning Consob and Banca d’Italia, an effort of reconstructing the rationale behind the legislation providing for the powers of surveillance of Banca d’Italia on the banking system and the powers of control on prospectuses on behalf of Consob is made.The survey highlights clear similarities between the different formants of these two systems.
La questione che nello studio monografico si affronta è se ed a quali condizioni gli investitori/risparmiatori, negli ordinamenti italiano ed inglese, che hanno subito un’alterazione di segno negativo del loro patrimonio a seguito di investimenti che si sono rivelati infausti, possano agire nei confronti dei soggetti pubblici ai quali sono devolute funzioni di vigilanza, richiedendo il risarcimento del danno sofferto per omissioni o carenze nel controllo. La presenza nei sistemi considerati di norme di contenuto analogo che limitano la responsabilità delle autorità di vigilanza (il FSM Act in Inghilterra, il D.Lgs.303/2006 in Italia) ai casi di “dolo o colpa grave” (Italia) o “bad faith” (Inghilterra) non consente di ritenere definitivamente risolta la questione, poiché non risulta chiaro se la responsabilità si darebbe comunque in presenza di semplice colpa, anche in assenza delle suddette disposizioni, o se queste ultime introducano una responsabilità che in loro assenza sarebbe da escludere. Per considerare risarcibile la perdita patrimoniale, occorre accertare se l’interesse dei risparmiatori abbia rilevanza per l’ordinamento. L’indagine è stata condotta mettendo a confronto sistema giuridico inglese e sistema giuridico italiano secondo una prospettiva comparatistica. Al fine di ricostruire la questione alla luce del sistema generale della responsabilità civile e delle normative speciali regolanti il mercato bancario e mobiliare, si è pertanto effettuata, da una parte, una ricognizione in chiave diacronica dei poteri e dei compiti dei quali sono state investite Banca d’Italia e Consob e FSA e, dall’altra, attraverso un’analisi della casistica, si è fornita una ricostruzione del quadro di principi e regole concernenti la risarcibilità del danno meramente patrimoniale e della responsabilità della pubblica amministrazione, questioni che sono di rilievo preliminare rispetto a quella della responsabilità delle autorità di vigilanza.La conclusione che si è raggiunta è che, anche prima che la questione della responsabilità fosse positivamente regolata dal legislatore nei sistemi considerati, la soluzione in essi veicolata dai diversi formanti era restrittiva, non essendo sufficiente ai fini dell’accoglimento dell’azione di responsabilità la prova della mera negligenza da parte delle autorità di controllo.
Il problema della responsabilità delle autorità di vigilanza sui mercati finanziari. Profili comparatistici
ANDO', BIAGIO
2008-01-01
Abstract
The monograph aims at comparing Italy and the UK on the issue of liability of public bodies which have the task of supervising financial markets towards investors who claim to have suffered damages because of omissions in supervision or lacking supervision on firms raising funds from private individuals. Both in the Italian and the English system, in the last decade, a restriction on the liability of the financial regulators has been introduced by the FSMA 2000 in UK, and by the D.Lgs.303/2006 in Italy. According to these provisions, supervisors can be held liable in Italy only for “dolo o colpa grave” and in UK only for “bad faith”. These rules did not completely solve the issue of liability, since they do not make clear if the liability of financial regulators is the result of these provisions. In this way if they were not introduced, liability of these public bodies could not have been claimed, or rather if the provisions simply acknowledge liability which may have been claimed even in their absence. The recoverability of the economic loss suffered from the investor depends on the relevance of interest for the legal system. Therefore, a thorough analysis of either the system of regulation of financial markets or the common tort law principles is necessary to understand how the issue of liability of financial regulators may be framed within the two legal systems.The issue of liability of financial regulators encounters two hurdles. On the one hand, the recoverability of the specific kind of damage suffered by investors in both the legal systems is controversial, since the loss suffered from claimants is purely economical and does not involve an infringement of a ‘physical’ good. This damage is qualified in a very similar manner: as ‘danno meramente patrimoniale’ or purely economic loss. On the other, the liability of public bodies is admitted within narrow limits in order to safeguard their freedom to act in the pursuance of the public interest.The first part of the study focuses on the English system, sketching the rationale of the legal framework of regulation, and therefore reconstructing, through a case law analysis, the body of rules shaping liability for pure economic loss, and the liability of public bodies.The analysis of the Italian legal system is made in the same way. In particular, after having dealt with the most significant cases concerning Consob and Banca d’Italia, an effort of reconstructing the rationale behind the legislation providing for the powers of surveillance of Banca d’Italia on the banking system and the powers of control on prospectuses on behalf of Consob is made.The survey highlights clear similarities between the different formants of these two systems.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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