Il New Federalism ed Il Processo di Integrazione Europea-Compound Democracies a confronto

Since the beginning of the United States of America, there has been an enduring debate over the roles of the different levels of government due to the fact that a federation is a compound republic and must preserve its main principle, the balance of power, between the federal government and the member states. At least through the first hundred and seventy years of the American republic, the balance of power remained in the hands of the state and local officials, those closest to the people, but during national crises, the balance of power swung to the federal government. Beginning with the era of Great Depression, however, the power swung far to the left. The conservative answer that rose since President Nixon was to reduce the size of the federal government in order to empower state and local governments, to encourage competition among states, since a country cannot prosper when success and failure is determined by the federal government, and to restore federalism. The main idea that comes up is that the federal government must enact means to make states more accountable and to encourage citizen participation in the decision-making process. As Ellers said: «Government can do only so much. The rest is up to us». Beside the rise of a new federalism in the political agenda a new judicial federalism arose. Starting from 1990s the Supreme Court started limiting the federal powers through judicial review, declaring unconstitutional many Congress statutes, striking down some of its own previous judgments and restoring some of the powers states had before Roosevelt s New Deal. Despite many scholars have criticized the increased power of the Court, I assume that the Supreme Court has acted, in accordance to the independence of its office, to enact the concept of Federalism, in the respect of the Constitutional boundaries and of individual Liberty. I assume that the experience of New Federalism, in its main aspects, the renewed role of the Supreme Court in re-establishing the balance of powers and in strengthening the compound democracy, is a useful example for the UE compound democracy to look at. Nevertheless, since that compoundness is due to the centrality of the Constitution, we cannot assume that it constitutes for the UE a model to follow.