We investigate a class of network games with strategic complements and congestion effects, by using the variational inequality approach. Our contribution is twofold. We first express the boundary components of the Nash equilibrium by means of the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. Then, we propose a new ranking of the network nodes based on the social welfare at equilibrium and compare this solution-based ranking with some classical topological ranking methods.
A Variational Inequality Approach to a Class of Network Games with Local Complementarities and Global Congestion
Raciti F.
2022-01-01
Abstract
We investigate a class of network games with strategic complements and congestion effects, by using the variational inequality approach. Our contribution is twofold. We first express the boundary components of the Nash equilibrium by means of the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. Then, we propose a new ranking of the network nodes based on the social welfare at equilibrium and compare this solution-based ranking with some classical topological ranking methods.File in questo prodotto:
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