We present a review of models that investigate quality competition in health care markets under price regulation, taking a differential-game approach. We analyse and discuss three different variants of a unified modelling framework, each of which incorporates specific institutional and behavioural characteristics of health care markets. In each case we derive and compare equilibrium strategies under open-loop and feedback closed-loop information structures. We also address potential policy implications from these analyses.
Differential Games in Health-Care Markets: Models of Quality Competition with Fixed Prices
Cellini, Roberto
;SICILIANI, Luigi;
2017-01-01
Abstract
We present a review of models that investigate quality competition in health care markets under price regulation, taking a differential-game approach. We analyse and discuss three different variants of a unified modelling framework, each of which incorporates specific institutional and behavioural characteristics of health care markets. In each case we derive and compare equilibrium strategies under open-loop and feedback closed-loop information structures. We also address potential policy implications from these analyses.File in questo prodotto:
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