Despite research provides wide evidence that family-controlled firms face underinvestment and low growth problems, literature provides limited insight on what factors are able to incite investment spending in family firms. Building on agency and stewardship constructs as complementary frameworks, this study investigates whether board monitoring and CEO emotional attachment might affect investment spending within family firms. Empirical results show that family-controlled firms invest less than non-family firms. However, findings also show that, within family firms, board independence and the presence of a family CEO have a positive impact on the level of investments.
Family ownership and investment decisions. an empirical analysis on the role of board monitoring and ceo emotional attachment
Frisenna C.;Rizzotti D.
2020-01-01
Abstract
Despite research provides wide evidence that family-controlled firms face underinvestment and low growth problems, literature provides limited insight on what factors are able to incite investment spending in family firms. Building on agency and stewardship constructs as complementary frameworks, this study investigates whether board monitoring and CEO emotional attachment might affect investment spending within family firms. Empirical results show that family-controlled firms invest less than non-family firms. However, findings also show that, within family firms, board independence and the presence of a family CEO have a positive impact on the level of investments.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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