Subjective weighting under organisational interdependence conditions: An experimental investigation

Purpose - Accounting research has long shown the effect of subjectivity in performance evaluation. This study investigates one form of subjectivity in performance evaluation: flexibility in weighting performance measures examining decisions made by supervisors about weighting. Empirical studies show that the performance-measure weights are only partially consistent with the predictions of the agency theory and they are a still outstanding issue.Methodology/approach - We develop an experiment to analyse supervisor decision-making, manipulating two factors: internal organisational interdependence and the level of managerial performance. We derive hypotheses along with both economic and behavioural approaches. The economic approach is based on agency theory predictions and the controllability principle while the behavioural approach is drawn on the organisational justice theory. We argue that in low interdependence contexts the supervisor's decision confirms the agency theory predictions, while in high interdependence conditions weighting decisions could be driven by behavioural considerations of fairness perceptions of the evaluation process and the level of managerial performance.Findings - We find that in low interdependence contexts the supervisor's decision confirms the agency theory predictions, while in high interdependence contexts it does not. The results indicate that the supervisor's decision stems from the integration of economic and behavioural perspectives.Research and social implications - The theoretical framework can be useful for interpreting the supervisor decision-making and the weighting process.Originality - The economic and behavioural approaches allow us to understand flexibility in weighting performance measures suggesting that, in addition to economic considerations, a behavioural perspective may also be relevant in explaining subjective weighting.