Asked to evaluate the constitutional legitimacy of art. 495 of the criminal code, according to the parameters given by article 3 and article 24 of the Constitution, where it applies to false statements made in the context of criminal proceedings by the suspect/accused in relation to his criminal record and, in general, to the circumstances set out in art. 21 n. att. code of criminal procedure, the Court, after having considered the lack of grounds of the question raised by the referring judge as principal issue, takes into consideration the questions raised in the alternative; so it declares, for contrast with art. 24 of the Constitution, the partial constitutional illegitimacy of article 64 paragraph 3 of the criminal procedure code, and of article 495 of the criminal code, through a logical argumentative itinerary which seems to ignore the semantic versatility of the right to silence.
Chiamata a valutare la legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 495 c.p., in relazione agli artt. 3 e 24 Cost., nella parte in cui si applica alle false dichiarazioni rese, nell’ambito di un procedimento penale, dall’indagato/imputato, in relazione ai propri precedenti penali e, in generale, in relazione alle circostanze indicate nell’art. 21 norme att. c.p.p., la Corte, dopo aver ritenuto l’infondatezza della questione sollevata dal rimettente in via principale, accoglie le questioni prospettate in via subordinata, dichiarando, per contrasto con l’art. 24 Cost. la parziale illegittimità costituzionale degli artt. 64 comma 3 c.p.p., e 495 c.p., attraverso un itinerario logico argomentativo che sembra ignorare la polivalenza semantica del diritto al silenzio.
Ancora una pronuncia della Corte costituzionale sul controverso perimetro applicativo del diritto al silenzio
patane vania
2023-01-01
Abstract
Asked to evaluate the constitutional legitimacy of art. 495 of the criminal code, according to the parameters given by article 3 and article 24 of the Constitution, where it applies to false statements made in the context of criminal proceedings by the suspect/accused in relation to his criminal record and, in general, to the circumstances set out in art. 21 n. att. code of criminal procedure, the Court, after having considered the lack of grounds of the question raised by the referring judge as principal issue, takes into consideration the questions raised in the alternative; so it declares, for contrast with art. 24 of the Constitution, the partial constitutional illegitimacy of article 64 paragraph 3 of the criminal procedure code, and of article 495 of the criminal code, through a logical argumentative itinerary which seems to ignore the semantic versatility of the right to silence.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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