Filosofia e disuguaglianze sociali. Criteri di coerenza

This paper conceptualises social inequality as a multidimensional and normatively mediated phenomenon. It proceeds from a distinction between equality as a political–institutional principle and empirical differences among individuals. Inequalities are not intrinsically unjust; rather, they acquire normative significance when they generate disadvantages that cannot be justified by publicly defensible reasons, or when they impair individuals’ capacity to participate as equals in social and political processes. The analysis is structured around two key distinctions. First, between formal equality, understood as equal legal status, and substantive equality, concerning the effective conditions for the exercise of rights. Second, between distributive equality, focused on the allocation of resources and opportunities, and relational equality, concerned with structures of status, recognition, and power. The paper argues that any adequate evaluation of inequality presupposes an explicit normative metric and cannot be reduced to outcome-based comparisons alone. Instead, it must account for the institutional arrangements and social relations through which inequalities are produced and stabilised. On this view, inequality becomes normatively problematic insofar as it entrenches relations of subordination, dependence, or exclusion, thereby undermining democratic legitimacy and equal standing.