A tourism network is determined by close collaboration among various stakeholders working interactivelyon common problems or issues through formal and informal approaches. As many cases highlight, informalrelationships contribute to the formation of formal partnerships. In this study a game theoreticalmodel is applied to explain the decisional process of entrepreneurs about forming partnerships in formaltourism networks. The model shows that, in terms of Nash equilibrium, the cooperative optimization ofa tourism network should be achieved when entrepreneurs have the same business goals and a commontourism vision The chapter presents an empirical solution that arises from the case of Business Networksin Italy, which represents an innovation in Italian Law.

Cooperative optimization of tourism networks. An application of a game theory model

ASERO, VINCENZO
;
2017

Abstract

A tourism network is determined by close collaboration among various stakeholders working interactivelyon common problems or issues through formal and informal approaches. As many cases highlight, informalrelationships contribute to the formation of formal partnerships. In this study a game theoreticalmodel is applied to explain the decisional process of entrepreneurs about forming partnerships in formaltourism networks. The model shows that, in terms of Nash equilibrium, the cooperative optimization ofa tourism network should be achieved when entrepreneurs have the same business goals and a commontourism vision The chapter presents an empirical solution that arises from the case of Business Networksin Italy, which represents an innovation in Italian Law.
978-1-5225-1054-3
Tourism network; Business network; Cooperation; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Contratto di Rete d'Imprese
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11769/81677
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