In this paper, we develop a cooperative game framework for modeling the pollution control problem in a time-dependent setting. We examine the situation in which different countries, aiming at reducing pollution emissions, coordinate both emissions and investment strategies to optimize jointly their welfare. We state the equilibrium conditions underlying the model and provide a formulation in terms of an evolutionary variational inequality. Then, by means of infinite dimensional duality tools, we prove the existence of Lagrange multipliers that play a fundamental role to describe countries' decision-making processes. Finally, we discuss the existence of solutions and provide a numerical example.

Cooperation in pollution control problems via evolutionary variational inequalities

SCRIMALI, Laura Rosa Maria;
2018-01-01

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a cooperative game framework for modeling the pollution control problem in a time-dependent setting. We examine the situation in which different countries, aiming at reducing pollution emissions, coordinate both emissions and investment strategies to optimize jointly their welfare. We state the equilibrium conditions underlying the model and provide a formulation in terms of an evolutionary variational inequality. Then, by means of infinite dimensional duality tools, we prove the existence of Lagrange multipliers that play a fundamental role to describe countries' decision-making processes. Finally, we discuss the existence of solutions and provide a numerical example.
2018
Evolutionary variational inequality · Infinite dimensional duality · Cooperative games · Kyoto Protocol
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
scrimali_mirabella.pdf

solo gestori archivio

Tipologia: Versione Editoriale (PDF)
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione 467.92 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
467.92 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11769/116867
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 14
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 12
social impact