This paper presents a theoretical description of some of the recent developments in the financial programs offered by microfinance institutions (MFIs). We show that MFIs may optimally choose to offer both joint liability contracts (to poor borrowers) and individual liability contracts (to wealthier borrowers). We conclude that, even under for-profit MFIs, there is not necessarily a crowding out of the poorest microentrepreneurs.
Outreach and Mission Drift in Microfinance: An Interpretation of the New Trend
REITO, FRANCESCO;CASERTA M.
2013-01-01
Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical description of some of the recent developments in the financial programs offered by microfinance institutions (MFIs). We show that MFIs may optimally choose to offer both joint liability contracts (to poor borrowers) and individual liability contracts (to wealthier borrowers). We conclude that, even under for-profit MFIs, there is not necessarily a crowding out of the poorest microentrepreneurs.File in questo prodotto:
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