It has been proposed that intentional actions are supplied by a generative system of the sort proposed by Chomsky for language. In this paper I aim to provide a closer analysis of this claim for the sake of conceptual clarification. To this end, I will first clarify what is involved in the thesis of a structural analogy between language and action, and then I will consider what kind of evidence there seems to be in favour of the thesis of a neurobiological identity. On this basis, I will subsequently focus on two definitional issues. The first is whether, as the claim of a generative system for intentional action suggests, humans may perform an infinite number of possible actions. The second is whether, as the claim of a generative system for intentional action suggests, what is at issue is conscious planning of action and therefore controlled processing.
Titolo: | A generative system for intentional action? |
Autori interni: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2014 |
Rivista: | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11769/14742 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |