What kind of associative and inferential processes? A response to Rubio-Fernández (2013)

Rubio-Fernández (2013) is a noteworthy instance of the recent efforts of grounding speculative pragmatic models into empirical research. However, it also shows that between pragmatic theories and the relevant psycholinguist research there are still conceptual gaps. Specifically, Rubio-Fernández reports two studies concerning emergent properties, that is, properties that are not associatively activated by related concepts but need to be inferred thanks to contextual information. These studies seem to show that emergent properties are activated by an early integration of associative and inferential processes and this is taken as evidence in favour of one-stage over two stage models of pragmatic processing. I analyse the relevant notions of associative and inferential process in terms of, respectively, automatic activation of directly accessible information and consciously sustained activation of indirectly accessible information. These are not, however, the notions adopted in the pragmatic models considered by Rubio-Fernández. At a closer analysis, therefore, none of these models is fully compatible with her evidence. My line of argument is based on a crucial, but too often ignored, distinction between two meanings of “associative”: as a behavioral description of cognitive processes and as a model for their implementation. I also illustrate some consequences of neglecting this distinction.