Institutional quality and the growth rates of the Italian regions: The costs of regulatory complexity

In this paper we study the impact of regulatory complexity, a measure of institutional quality, on the GDP, on per capita income and on the growth rate of the Italian regions. For comparative reasons we also use the duration of civil disputes as a further indicator of institutional quality used in the regressions as an alternative to the indicator of regulatory complexity. From the theoretical point of view, we use the approach of negative co-ordination externalities, among the four sources of regulatory production that are at work at the same time. Our approach may be applied in all the countries with a multi-level government system. Using the random effects and quantile regressions models we are able to quantify the effects of an improvement in institutional quality on the GDP and the growth rate, making a comparison between the results obtained using regulatory complexity or the duration of civil disputes as covariates. We also check for spatial dependence among variables. Econometric analysis supports the theoretical assumption that regulatory complexity is an impediment to the growth of regional GDP and per capita income. The main finding of our analysis is that a reduction in regulatory complexity would be more effective than a reduction in the duration of civil disputes in increasing the income and growth rate. This result could be useful for the policy-maker because by reducing regulatory complexity we may obtain a considerable by-product in the shorter duration of civil disputes.