We present a sequential game to study the introduction of collective property rights, such as trademark, in cultural districts, aimed at protecting and supporting the idiosyncratic nature of local production. The first step of the game is the public decision on whether creating the trademark or not; the second step is represented by the decisions of firms on whether adopting the mark or not for their individual production; the third step is represented by election, in which individuals take into consideration the change in their personal utility deriving from the possible introduction of the mark. Different cases can emerge and conclusions appear to be consistent with preliminary evidence evidence coming from Italian cultural districts.
|Titolo:||Policy Decisions on Collective Property Rights in Cultural Districts: A Positive Model|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2005|
|Citazione:||Policy Decisions on Collective Property Rights in Cultural Districts: A Positive Model / CELLINI R; CUCCIA T; SANTAGATA W. - In: RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA. - ISSN 0035-6468. - 95(2005), pp. 247-265.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|