The paper deal with the problems related to the so-called "filter" limiting the possibility to appeal in labour proceedings. One overcome the political controversies raised by the institute, and reached a fairly uniform judicial application of the rather uncertain notion of “lack of any probability of admitting the appeal", the Author focuses on two other aspects currently debated in case law. The former concerns the possibility of an appeal against the “filter”- ordinance within the perspective of Art. 111, par. 7 of the Constitution: question settled by the judgment of the Corte di Cassazione, SS.UU., February 2, 2016, no. 1914. The latter deals with the use of the “filter” for the rejection of appeals which are manifestly inadmissible, or otherwise unlike to get to a merit judgment. On the first matter, it should be noted that, beyond the solution given by the supreme court, the question about the protection generally afforded in the Supreme Court to procedural individual rights, is still open. On the other hand, the essay supports the choice of the Supreme Court against the use of the “filter” in case of appeals grounded on the traditional hypotheses of inadmissibility. The last part of the essay highlights the residual application of the institute in the labour proceedings.
|Titolo:||Il "filtro" nell'appello del lavoro|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2017|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|