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EnglishThis paper investigates the use of minimum tax thresholds to avoid income tax evasion. We analyze a moral-hazard model in which, given the endogenous audit probability, taxpayers may choose to comply or not with their tax obligation. The main result is that the imposition of a minimum tax, whereby taxpayers need to pay a tax on wealth no lower than a certain amount, can be Pareto efficient. The result hinges upon a critical level of wealth endowment: wealthy economies should ask for a minimum tax payment from all taxpayers; poor economies should only rely on income taxation, and allow taxpayers to be able to get away with their tax obligations. Minimum taxation, therefore, is like a luxury good and only rich economies can afford it.
| Titolo: | Minimum taxation as a luxury good |
| Autori interni: | REITO, FRANCESCO (Corresponding) |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2015 |
| Rivista: | |
| Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11769/357128 |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Descrizione | Tipologia | Licenza | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| REITO - EPOL 2.pdf | REITO - EPOL 2 | Documento in Post-print | Administrator |
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11769/357128
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