This paper investigates the use of minimum tax thresholds to avoid income tax evasion. We analyze a moral-hazard model in which, given the endogenous audit probability, taxpayers may choose to comply or not with their tax obligation. The main result is that the imposition of a minimum tax, whereby taxpayers need to pay a tax on wealth no lower than a certain amount, can be Pareto efficient. The result hinges upon a critical level of wealth endowment: wealthy economies should ask for a minimum tax payment from all taxpayers; poor economies should only rely on income taxation, and allow taxpayers to be able to get away with their tax obligations. Minimum taxation, therefore, is like a luxury good and only rich economies can afford it.
|Titolo:||Minimum taxation as a luxury good|
REITO, FRANCESCO (Corresponding)
|Data di pubblicazione:||2015|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|
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|REITO - EPOL 2.pdf||REITO - EPOL 2||Documento in Post-print||Administrator|