This paper shows that, in a group‐lending scheme with joint liability, a microfinance institution can achieve a Pareto improvement by promoting negative assortative matching among borrowers. The main results are: (i) borrowers may be better off in heterogeneous groups; and (ii) a heterogeneous group equilibrium is possible when individual or homogeneous group equilibria do not exist.
Is it better to be mixed in group lending?
Francesco Reito
2019-01-01
Abstract
This paper shows that, in a group‐lending scheme with joint liability, a microfinance institution can achieve a Pareto improvement by promoting negative assortative matching among borrowers. The main results are: (i) borrowers may be better off in heterogeneous groups; and (ii) a heterogeneous group equilibrium is possible when individual or homogeneous group equilibria do not exist.File in questo prodotto:
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