This paper presents an agent-based model of a simple economic system where the personal satisfaction gained from public services and the perceived opinion of neighbors are shown to drive the individual decision about tax compliance. Results of simulations, consistent with existing literature on the topic, suggest a peculiar approach to face the plague of tax evasion.
Tax evasion as a contagion game: evidences from an agent-based model
DI MAURO, LETIZIA STELLA;Pluchino A.;Biondo A. E.
2019-01-01
Abstract
This paper presents an agent-based model of a simple economic system where the personal satisfaction gained from public services and the perceived opinion of neighbors are shown to drive the individual decision about tax compliance. Results of simulations, consistent with existing literature on the topic, suggest a peculiar approach to face the plague of tax evasion.File in questo prodotto:
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