The opposition between behaviour- and mind-reading accounts of data on infants and non-human primates could be less dramatic than has been thought up to now. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by analysing a possible neuro-computational explanation of early mind-reading, based on a mechanism of associative generalization which is apt to implement the notion of mental states as intervening variables proposed by Andrew Whiten. This account allows capturing important continuities between behaviour-reading and mind-reading, insofar as both are supposed to be just different kinds of generalization from perceptual experience. Specifically, I will argue that the projection of inner experiences to others which is involved in early mind-reading does not imply a computational leap beyond associative generalization from perceptual experience.
|Titolo:||Mental states as generalizations from experience: a neuro-computational hypothesis|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2014|
|Citazione:||Mental states as generalizations from experience: a neuro-computational hypothesis / MAZZONE M. - In: PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS. - ISSN 1386-9795. - 17:2(2014), pp. 223-240.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|