Co-Management of Fisheries Through a Negotiation Lens: The Case of Prud’homies

While the European Union’s fishing policy is mainly based on maximum sustainable yield, at the local fishing community level, fishers’ main incentive to sustain fish stocks appears to be maintenance of social relationships. Divergence of the stakeholders’ objectives on the management of marine resources creates conflicts of interest that can be overcome through a process of negotiation. The formulation of the solution is embedded in the perspective of the stakeholders. In this paper we analyze the negotiation mechanisms between the French Mediterranean local fishing communities and the European Union common fishery policy. Inspired by interactive governance theory, the performance of Prud’homies, a local governance entity in the French Mediterranean, has been analyzed through their capacity to cooperate and represent the fishers’ voice in formal institutes. We are witnessing a declining representation of this local institute among the official decision-makers of the marine resource governance.