The motivations of the Italian Constitutional Court sentence no. 162 4, which declared unconstitutional the prohibition of the heterologous fertilization, cast doubts on the legitimacy of the ban of surrogate maternity, if interpreted as an absolute prohibition that forbids any form of surrogate motherhood, including the altruistic surrogacy. Doubts arise, on the one hand, from the broad interpretation of the right to psychophysical health, that has been referred to by the constitutional judges as a whole to the couple and, on the other hand, from the statement of the right to reproductive freedom as part of the right to self-determination; as fundamental rights their exercise may be limited only if there is a need to protect rights of the same level, such as the safeguard of the dignity and the health of the pregnant woman and the well being of the child.
Le motivazioni della sentenza n. 162 4 della Corte costituzionale, che ha dichiarato l’incostituzionalità del divieto di fecondazione eterologa, sollevano dubbi sulla legittimità del divieto di maternità surrogata, ove esteso anche alla surrogazione solidale e gratuita. I dubbi emergono, per un verso, dalla concezione del diritto alla salute psicofisica, dai giudici costituzionali riferita alla coppia, per altro verso, dall’affermazione del diritto alla procreazione quale profilo del diritto all’autodeterminazione; diritti fondamentali il cui esercizio può essere limitato solo dalla necessità di tutelare altri beni di pari rango, quali la tutela della dignità e della salute della donna e del benessere del nato.
Per un’interpretazione costituzionalmente orientata del divieto di maternità surrogata
alfio guido grasso
2018-01-01
Abstract
The motivations of the Italian Constitutional Court sentence no. 162 4, which declared unconstitutional the prohibition of the heterologous fertilization, cast doubts on the legitimacy of the ban of surrogate maternity, if interpreted as an absolute prohibition that forbids any form of surrogate motherhood, including the altruistic surrogacy. Doubts arise, on the one hand, from the broad interpretation of the right to psychophysical health, that has been referred to by the constitutional judges as a whole to the couple and, on the other hand, from the statement of the right to reproductive freedom as part of the right to self-determination; as fundamental rights their exercise may be limited only if there is a need to protect rights of the same level, such as the safeguard of the dignity and the health of the pregnant woman and the well being of the child.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.