In this paper we develop the time-dependent pollution control problem in which different countries aim to determine the optimal investment allocation in environmental projects and the tolerable pollutant emissions, so as to maximize their welfare. We provide the equilibrium conditions governing the model and derive the evolutionary variational inequality formulation. The existence of solutions is investigated and a numerical example is also presented.

A variational inequality formulation of the environmental pollution control problem

SCRIMALI, Laura Rosa Maria
2010-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we develop the time-dependent pollution control problem in which different countries aim to determine the optimal investment allocation in environmental projects and the tolerable pollutant emissions, so as to maximize their welfare. We provide the equilibrium conditions governing the model and derive the evolutionary variational inequality formulation. The existence of solutions is investigated and a numerical example is also presented.
2010
Nash equilibrium; Evolutionary variational inequality ; Kyoto Protocol
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11769/5225
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