In EU law, crises are often portrayed not as anomalies but as constitutive elements of the EU legal order, understood as an evolving legal system. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has generally approached emergencies as integral to that order, allowing no formal departure from legal orthodoxy. Accordingly, the Court has not developed a distinct emergency doctrine or crisis-specific legal principles, continuing instead to rely on traditional interpretative tools. This continuity, however, does not preclude adaptation in judicial practice, as emergency contexts significantly affect the standard and intensity of judicial review. This tension invites closer examination of whether, and how, the CJEU’s interpretative practice adapts in emergency contexts. Against this background, the paper argues that judicial deference in emergencies serves two primary objectives: first, to constrain Member States’ discretion where emergency measures risk circumventing obligations under EU law; and second, to support EU-level institutional action and reinforce confidence in supranational crisis management. Overall, the paper highlights an underlying normative claim in the Court’s crisis case law—namely, that EU law constitutes the most appropriate locus for the governance of emergencies.
The Court of Justice of the European Union in Times of Crisis: A Study of Emergency Interpretation
claudia cinnirella
In corso di stampa
Abstract
In EU law, crises are often portrayed not as anomalies but as constitutive elements of the EU legal order, understood as an evolving legal system. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has generally approached emergencies as integral to that order, allowing no formal departure from legal orthodoxy. Accordingly, the Court has not developed a distinct emergency doctrine or crisis-specific legal principles, continuing instead to rely on traditional interpretative tools. This continuity, however, does not preclude adaptation in judicial practice, as emergency contexts significantly affect the standard and intensity of judicial review. This tension invites closer examination of whether, and how, the CJEU’s interpretative practice adapts in emergency contexts. Against this background, the paper argues that judicial deference in emergencies serves two primary objectives: first, to constrain Member States’ discretion where emergency measures risk circumventing obligations under EU law; and second, to support EU-level institutional action and reinforce confidence in supranational crisis management. Overall, the paper highlights an underlying normative claim in the Court’s crisis case law—namely, that EU law constitutes the most appropriate locus for the governance of emergencies.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


