This introduction to the issue revisits the philosophical concept of happiness, contrasting a “predatory” understanding of happiness as the satisfaction of personal lack with the notion of pax philosophica as a foundational condition for moral action. Drawing on Aristotle, Descartes, Pascal, and especially Kant, it argues that happiness should not be conceived as an external goal to be achieved but as an a priori state that grounds ethical responsibility and coexistence. The study proposes a renewed interpretation of happiness as a form of philosophical peace capable of addressing the tensions of contemporary subjectivity and moral life.
Dalla soddisfazione alla felicità pax
Francesco Pio Leonardi
2026-01-01
Abstract
This introduction to the issue revisits the philosophical concept of happiness, contrasting a “predatory” understanding of happiness as the satisfaction of personal lack with the notion of pax philosophica as a foundational condition for moral action. Drawing on Aristotle, Descartes, Pascal, and especially Kant, it argues that happiness should not be conceived as an external goal to be achieved but as an a priori state that grounds ethical responsibility and coexistence. The study proposes a renewed interpretation of happiness as a form of philosophical peace capable of addressing the tensions of contemporary subjectivity and moral life.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


