Born within the fight against disinformation and foreign interference, election integrity (EI) has gradually emerged, through the action of the EU institutions over the last decade, as an autonomous policy that no longer concerns only the mechanics of voting, but the conditions that make participation meaningful: access to non-manipulated information, pluralism, and the inclusion of traditionally marginalised groups such as minorities, persons with disabilities and mobile citizens. The article reconstructs and periodises these measures by distinguishing three dimensions of electoral integrity: the rules and institutions of voting, the information environment in which electoral choices are formed, and citizens’ trust in the electoral process. The EU’s action proves deeply asymmetrical. The Union has invested little in the first dimension, left to national sovereignty and blocked by the unanimity requirement (Art. 223 TFEU); heavily in the second, where the Digital Services Act, the Regulation on political advertising and the European Democracy Shield build on established competences in the digital single market; and only weakly in the third. This asymmetry reflects the distribution of competences rather than a coherent design. Within the limits of the evidence currently available, the article concludes that a policy field that did not previously exist has taken shape, but highlights structural limits: the largely non-binding nature of the instruments, the lack of benchmarks to assess their effectiveness, the absence of any direct effect on recommender algorithms, and the unstable boundary between protecting information integrity and interfering with political pluralism.
Nata nel quadro del contrasto alla disinformazione e alle interferenze straniere, l’election integrity (EI) si è progressivamente affermata, nell’azione delle istituzioni europee dell’ultimo decennio, come policy autonoma, che non riguarda più soltanto la meccanica del voto ma le condizioni che rendono la partecipazione significativa: l’accesso a informazioni non manipolate, il pluralismo, l’inclusione di categorie tradizionalmente marginalizzate come minoranze, persone con disabilità e cittadini mobili. Il saggio ricostruisce e periodizza queste misure distinguendo tre dimensioni dell’integrità elettorale: le regole e le istituzioni del voto, il contesto informativo in cui si forma la scelta elettorale, la fiducia dei cittadini nel processo. Ne emerge un’azione profondamente asimmetrica. L’Unione ha investito poco sulla prima dimensione, lasciata alla sovranità nazionale e bloccata dal requisito dell’unanimità (art. 223 TFUE); moltissimo sulla seconda, dove il Digital Services Act, il Regolamento sulla pubblicità politica e lo Scudo europeo per la democrazia fanno leva su competenze consolidate in materia di mercato interno digitale; solo debolmente sulla terza. Questa asimmetria riflette la struttura delle competenze più che un disegno coerente. Nei limiti delle evidenze oggi disponibili, il saggio conclude che si è sedimentato un policy field prima inesistente, ma segnala limiti strutturali: la natura in larga parte non vincolante degli strumenti, l’assenza di benchmark per valutarne l’efficacia, la mancata incidenza sugli algoritmi di raccomandazione e l’instabile confine tra tutela dell’integrità informativa e ingerenza nel pluralismo politico.
La lezione europea sulla Election Integrity (EI): contrasto alla disinformazione e inclusività
sampugnaro
2027-01-01
Abstract
Born within the fight against disinformation and foreign interference, election integrity (EI) has gradually emerged, through the action of the EU institutions over the last decade, as an autonomous policy that no longer concerns only the mechanics of voting, but the conditions that make participation meaningful: access to non-manipulated information, pluralism, and the inclusion of traditionally marginalised groups such as minorities, persons with disabilities and mobile citizens. The article reconstructs and periodises these measures by distinguishing three dimensions of electoral integrity: the rules and institutions of voting, the information environment in which electoral choices are formed, and citizens’ trust in the electoral process. The EU’s action proves deeply asymmetrical. The Union has invested little in the first dimension, left to national sovereignty and blocked by the unanimity requirement (Art. 223 TFEU); heavily in the second, where the Digital Services Act, the Regulation on political advertising and the European Democracy Shield build on established competences in the digital single market; and only weakly in the third. This asymmetry reflects the distribution of competences rather than a coherent design. Within the limits of the evidence currently available, the article concludes that a policy field that did not previously exist has taken shape, but highlights structural limits: the largely non-binding nature of the instruments, the lack of benchmarks to assess their effectiveness, the absence of any direct effect on recommender algorithms, and the unstable boundary between protecting information integrity and interfering with political pluralism.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


