The author develops a simple geometric analysis of Courno-Nash equilibrium in the price-quantity space by exploiting the economic content of the first order condition. The approach makes it clear that strategic interdependency in oligopoly originates from externalities among producers. This explains why cartels are unstable and casts oligopoly with the more general commons-anticommons framework.
Geometry of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium with Application to Commons and Anticommons
D'AGATA, Antonio
2010-01-01
Abstract
The author develops a simple geometric analysis of Courno-Nash equilibrium in the price-quantity space by exploiting the economic content of the first order condition. The approach makes it clear that strategic interdependency in oligopoly originates from externalities among producers. This explains why cartels are unstable and casts oligopoly with the more general commons-anticommons framework.File in questo prodotto:
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