Other-regarding preferences or decision errors are the main explanations put forward to justify contributions exceeding the non-cooperative optimum in VCM games. An alternative rationale relies on ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion increases the perceived marginal benefit of own contributions, which in equilibrium will exceed the Nash level. We present a series of experiments testing this hypothesis. To control for other-regarding preferences, we run a two-player game in which a human player plays with a virtual agent. Players are assigned either to a risky setting (known probabilities of opponent’s choices) or to an ambiguity setting (probabilities of opponent’s contribution are vague). Results show that ambiguity affects contributions. However, attitude to ambiguity appears to be affected by the location of the aggregate Nash optimum inside the decision space.
|Titolo:||Kindness, confusion, or....Ambiguity?|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2011|
|Citazione:||Kindness, confusion, or....Ambiguity? / DI MAURO C; Finocchiaro Castro M. - In: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1386-4157. - 14:4(2011), pp. 611-633.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|