OBJECTIVES: This paper investigates empirically whether the institutional features of the contracting authority as well as the level of 'environmental' corruption in the area where the work is localised affect the efficient execution of public contracts for healthcare infrastructures. METHODS: A two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is carried out based on a sample of Italian public contracts for healthcare infrastructures during the period 2000-2005. First, a smoothed bootstrapped DEA estimator is used to assess the relative efficiency in the implementation of each single infrastructure contract. Second, the determinants of the efficiency scores variability are considered, paying special attention to the effect exerted by 'environmental' corruption on different types of contracting authorities. RESULTS: Our results show that the performance of the contracts for healthcare infrastructures is significantly affected by 'environmental' corruption. Furthermore, healthcare contracting authorities are, on average, less efficient and the negative effect of corruption on efficiency is greater for this type of public procurers. CONCLUSIONS: The policy recommendation coming out of the study is to rely on 'qualified' contracting authorities since not all the public bodies have the necessary expertise to carry on public contracts for healthcare infrastructures efficiently.
On the role of environmental corruption in healthcare infrastructures: An empirical assessment for Italy using DEA with truncated regression approach
	
	
	
		
		
		
		
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		
		
		
		
		
			
			
			
		
		
		
		
			
			
				
				
					
					
					
					
						
							
						
						
					
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
			
			
		
			
			
				
				
					
					
					
					
						
							
						
						
					
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
			
			
		
			
			
				
				
					
					
					
					
						
							
						
						
					
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
				
			
			
		
		
		
		
	
CAVALIERI M.;GUCCIO C.
;RIZZO I.
			2017-01-01
Abstract
OBJECTIVES: This paper investigates empirically whether the institutional features of the contracting authority as well as the level of 'environmental' corruption in the area where the work is localised affect the efficient execution of public contracts for healthcare infrastructures. METHODS: A two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is carried out based on a sample of Italian public contracts for healthcare infrastructures during the period 2000-2005. First, a smoothed bootstrapped DEA estimator is used to assess the relative efficiency in the implementation of each single infrastructure contract. Second, the determinants of the efficiency scores variability are considered, paying special attention to the effect exerted by 'environmental' corruption on different types of contracting authorities. RESULTS: Our results show that the performance of the contracts for healthcare infrastructures is significantly affected by 'environmental' corruption. Furthermore, healthcare contracting authorities are, on average, less efficient and the negative effect of corruption on efficiency is greater for this type of public procurers. CONCLUSIONS: The policy recommendation coming out of the study is to rely on 'qualified' contracting authorities since not all the public bodies have the necessary expertise to carry on public contracts for healthcare infrastructures efficiently.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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